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
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
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S. C.



BENGAL

UNDER THE LIEUTENANT-GOVERNORS.



BENGAL UNDER THE

LIEUTENANT-GOVERNORS ;

BEING

*A NARRATIVE OF THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS AND  
PUBLIC MEASURES DURING THEIR PERIODS  
OF OFFICE, FROM 1851 TO 1868.*

BY

C. E. BUCKLAND, C. I. E.

OF THE INDIAN CIVIL SERVICE.



"The position of the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal has become by much the most important of any under the Supreme Government."

SIR G. CHESLEY, "Indian Polity," p. 92.

"The fact is that the Bengal Government is in every way a great charge—far the greatest Local Government in India."

SIR G. CAMPBELL, "Memoirs," Vol. II : p. 199.

IN TWO VOLUMES ;


( With 14 Illustrations )

Vol. I.

CALCUTTA :

S. K. LAHIRI & Co.,

1901.





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Vol. No.....9349.....

Page.....128-57.....

Sl. No.....954.14.....

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CALCUTTA

PRINTED BY NOSHIBHUSAN CHAKRAPARTI

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## PREFACE.

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It must be the common experience of all who have passed middle life to find that important events in which they took part, and great men with whom they were well-acquainted, are absolutely unknown to the rising generation. I certainly have been much struck with the general want of information of the comparatively recent history of Bengal during the last thirty years. Traditions linger here and there : certain names are associated with particular occurrences : but such recollections are often inaccurate and always incomplete. The reason is not far to seek. There is no connected "history of our own times" in Bengal. There are excellent gazetteers, reports, statistical accounts, and books of reference ; but such works may not be readily available : they are sometimes dry reading, and at any rate they require search and study.

The object of these volumes is to supply the want of a continuous narrative of the official history, the principal events, and the personalities of a definite period. It is chiefly a compilation, as it is based on verbatim extracts from Administration Reports, Gazettes, official papers, books (some of standard merit, and others less known to fame), newspapers, and other public sources. An effort has been made to include every matter of importance in Bengal, and to give such an account in each instance as should satisfy either the ordinary or the official reader. Figures have necessarily been reproduced where essential, but statistics have been generally avoided. Documents have sometimes been quoted *in extenso* : in other cases the narrative is much condensed. To those who read for amusement only, such a compilation will present but few attractions : those who seek information will, it is hoped, find it in a handy form. In the abundance of materials the difficulty of selection has been considerable. "The art, like all art," as has been said, "consists in seeing and seizing the right facts and giving them prominence." As the work does not aim at being an encyclopædia, it is impossible to satisfy everybody, but a future edition, if called for, can supply any obvious omissions which may be brought to light.

The name of the work—"BENGAL UNDER THE LIEUTENANT-GOVERNORS"—has been deliberately chosen, to indicate not only the scene, but the principal personages of the period which forms its subject. The rulers of a province more extensive than many European kingdoms exercise (although subordinate to the Government of India) large powers and a wider influence. For five years they may be held responsible for the welfare of over seventy millions. The charge is one of the heaviest under the Crown, the position one of the most honourable, and those who have held the charge and the position deserve to be remembered in the province (at least) where they have ruled. They are responsible not only for any policy they may initiate, but for their manner of dealing with events as they occur. Famines, cyclones, floods, earthquakes, wars and rumours of wars, a falling exchange, grave alternations of agricultural depression and prosperity, serious changes of policy affecting the revenues of the State,—all these things form a series of events beyond the control of the Provincial Government, which are liable to recur at any moment, and which constantly threaten the security of the Provincial finances—at the least they upset all calculations, and derange the finances on which all administrative policy and projects depend. The following Chapters will show how some Lieutenant-Governors have been fortunate in escaping such catastrophes, whereas others have experienced and combated them: some have been able to carry out a preconceived policy, others have been compelled, or have chosen, to be opportunists: all—as may safely be said of any high English officer—have been actuated by a high sense of public duty. Possibly this record of events and measures of importance may be of some use to their successors. Some observations have been offered on the main policy and events of each period, as well as the personal characteristics of each Lieutenant-Governor. "In the main posterity must accept the findings of contemporaries on questions of character." For obvious reasons, the work ends with the close of the administration of the last-retired Lieutenant-Governor.

In transliterating from Indian languages the names of persons and places, and technical terms, the latest orders of the Government of Bengal (of February 1892) have been followed: the spelling of vernacular words has varied so greatly and so often between 1854 and 1898 that the reproduction of the words as spelt by the original

writer in each case would have presented a very unscholarly appearance in the work as a whole: in the orders above-mentioned some concession was made to historical and literary usage in respect of certain words: the general principle followed was the system adopted by the late Sir W. W. Hunter, K.C.S.I. Although some Lieutenant-Governors have not been knighted until the middle or end of their tenure of office, I have, to avoid pedantry, called them "Sir—" throughout—except in quotations. Some additional matter has been included in Appendices, which will, it is hoped, prove of interest. Belvedere is the subject of a special notice: it is a house surrounded with historical and official associations. Brief lives have been prepared of a number of Native gentlemen who have been prominent and influential during the years 1854-1898; they have been collected together in an Appendix, so as to avoid interrupting the main account of each Administration. Lists are given of the Chief Justices, Judges, Members of the Board of Revenue and their Secretaries, of the Secretaries and Under-Secretaries to Government, and of the Members of the Bengal Legislative Council, for the period under treatment. A brief Glossary of most of the vernacular words occurring in the volumes has been added. A catalogue of the books and works consulted is included.

I had hoped to finish these volumes (which have been prepared simultaneously with the discharge of official duties) in the rare hours of leisure that can sometimes be found, but unforeseen circumstances have rendered it necessary to produce them under the greatest pressure of work, without extending my researches or completing my inquiries as I should have liked. I must enter this plea in palliation of the many deficiencies which will doubtless be noticed. But if the volumes serve for a time to record the names and achievements of distinguished men, to convey some knowledge of the modern history of Bengal, and to be of some practical use for reference, they will not have been composed in vain.

My grateful acknowledgements are due to many brother officers and others who have helped me with their advice, support and encouragement, and equally to my Indian friends and fellow-workers who have laboured loyally and cheerfully to carry out my design.



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### ERRATA.

Page 63, <i>third</i> line from bottom,	for 1838, read 1834.
„ 64, <i>first</i> line,	for 1886, read 1856.
„ 176, <i>last</i> line,	dele complete.
„ 484, <i>twentieth</i> line.	for (the first) has, read had.
„ 486, <i>twenty-second</i> line	for Sontha read Sonthal.
„ 537, <i>twenty-fifth</i> line	for comprising read comprising.
„ 541, <i>seventh</i> line	dele most.
„ 550, <i>last</i> line	for fo read of.
„ 554, <i>twenty-fourth</i> line	for Sis read Sir.
555, <i>sixteenth</i> line	after which read it
„ 561, <i>last</i> line	read indulgent.
„ 566, <i>twenty sixth</i> line	for thin read thing.
„ 569, lines 20 and 21	read additional.

## INTRODUCTION.

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THE earlier history of the British power in Bengal does not fall within the scope of this work. But some account may be briefly given of the system of Government which obtained in Bengal previous to the creation of the Lieutenant-Governorship in 1853. The Governor-General of Bengal had, by the Statute 3 and 4 W. c. 85 (the Government of India Act. 1833), become Governor-General of *India, and* Governor of Bengal. By section 56 of that Statute the executive Government of Bengal was vested in a Governor-in-Council of the Presidency of Fort William in Bengal and three Councillors, (but under section 57 no Councillors were appointed in Bengal), and by section 69 the Governor-General-in-Council was authorised, as often as the exigencies of the public service might appear to him to require, to appoint one of the ordinary Members of the Council of India, as he might think fit, to be Deputy Governor, but with no additional salary. Since the passing of this Statute the following had been appointed Deputy Governors as occasion required:—

Alexander Ross, Esq., Senior. October 20, 1837

Colonel William Morrison, c. B., Madras Artillery.

October 15, 1838.

Thomas Campbell Robertson, Esq.,

June 17, 1839

Sir Thomas Herbert Maddock, Kt. c. B.

{ September 20, 1845  
{ October 11, 1848.

Major-General Sir J. H. Littler, G. C. B.

March 12, 1849.

Hon'ble J. A. Dorin

December 9, 1853.

In the Warrant\* of Precedence, the Deputy Governor of Bengal came next after the Governor-General, and before the Governors of Madras and Bombay.

An Act of 1835 authorised the appointment of a Lieutenant-Governor of the North-Western Provinces, and one was appointed in 1836. This necessarily reduced the area under the Government of Bengal, *i. e.* of Lower Bengal, to which this work refers.

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\* *Lord Dalhousie's Minute of 28th September 1854.*

In a Minute written in March 1867, Sir W. Grey mentioned that "the complete separation (below the head of the Government) of the 'administration of Bengal from the general administration of India dates from 1843, in which year Lord Ellenborough assigned a separate Secretariat Establishment to the Bengal Administration, by which the whole civil business, including public works, was to be transacted. The establishment which it was at that time thought right to assign to the work of the Bengal Government was one Secretary and two Under-Secretaries."

An outline of the system which practically obtained in 1845, and presumably still obtained in 1853 (as no material changes had been introduced meanwhile), is to be found in an article of January 1845, by the historian Mr. J. C. Marshman, c. s. i. on *"Bengal as it is."* "The Executive Government of Bengal," he wrote, "is administered by the Governor or Deputy Governor, aided by one Secretary and two Under-Secretaries. The duties annexed to it embrace the entire control of the Civil, Magisterial, and Police branches of the administration; of the Land Revenues; of the Salt and Opium monopolies; of the *Abkari*, or Excise on spirits; of the Ecclesiastical, Marine, and Steam Departments, as well as that of Public Institution and the Post Office. It is also charged with the management of the Ultra-Gangetic settlements of Penang, Malacca, and Singapore. With the Legislative, the Military, and Political Departments it has no connection; they belong exclusively to the province of the general Government. The duties which are thus thrown on the Government of Bengal have been supposed to exceed those which devolve on the united Governments of Madras and Bombay, in which the responsibility of deliberation is shared by two distinct Councils, and the labour of action is distributed among several bureaux. In reference to the finances, however, the functions of the Bengal Government are strictly administrative. The funds collected through its instrumentality are at the entire disposal of the Government of India, and are expended according to the arrangements laid down by it; and which can be modified only by its authority. The Governor of Bengal can make no alteration in the allowances of the public servants; he cannot establish a new school, or augment the pay of a *daroga* to the extent of a rupee, without a vote of the Council of India. But

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\* *Calcutta Review*, Vol. III. page 169.

in the internal management of the whole of the administration the Governor of Bengal is unfettered by the necessity of any reference to the Government of India. The vast patronage of the Covenanted and Uncovenanted Service is at his absolute disposal: and, in the exercise of discipline, any appeal from his decision lies to the Court of Directors and not to the Governor-General in Council. He is constrained, however, by the most stringent injunctions to forward every petition of appeal against his own proceedings to the home authorities."

Another account of the Government of Bengal previous to 1853 is to be found in Sir George Campbell's *Modern India* (1852), written 19 years before he himself became Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal. It is not too long to quote. "Of late years, the Governor-General having been so much absent, there has generally been a Deputy-Governor of Bengal: and latterly the duties of Governor-General and Governor of Bengal have been found to be too much for one man, and the Governor-General has even when present nominated a Deputy-Governor. He has most of the powers of Government (delegated to him by the Governor) except that, as the Governor-General is better acquainted with, and more frequently present in, Bengal than in the other Presidencies, he exercises a more minute supervision, and I believe that he retains in his own hands the patronage of appointments exceeding 1,000 rupees *per mensem*. Although the Governor-General may select the Deputy-Governor from the Members of Council, in practice it has become the custom to consider the appointment the right of the senior Member, and he has invariably been appointed. The consequence is a constant change in the holder of the office. In 12 years up to 1850 the reins had been held by 9 successive Governors or Deputy Governors. The present Deputy-Governor has served in the army with credit for 52 years, but has never had any experience of any kind in civil affairs: and at this stage of his life, being suddenly promoted into the office of Deputy-Governor, he is called on to perform duties to the nature of which I have alluded, and to superintend the details which I shall afterwards describe.".....

"The Government of Bengal Proper must be the heaviest of all. The Governor has the administration of the great provinces of Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa, with subsequent additions—Assam,

and the country known as the North-Eastern frontier Agency—another very large, thinly peopled, tract of hilly country, known as the South-Western Agency—Arracan and the Tenasserim Provinces on the east of the Bay of Bengal; and he has the charge of a number of petty independent States. He has under him the opium manufacture, whether carried on in his own territory or in the North-west Provinces; the Bengal salt manufacture; the whole of the very heavy local business in and about Calcutta, rendered very harassing from the presence of a large population of European adventurers, bound by no laws—and of the Supreme Court, ever ready to thwart him in every particular; the marine and pilot establishments, and river flotilla, maintained by Government; a number of educational establishments; and many other miscellaneous charges.

“One circumstance has hitherto lightened his labour in the Revenue department, compared to the same department in other Presidencies, viz., the non-interference of Government in the permanently-settled estates, except to receive the land revenue and sell those in default; but the system has worked so ill that there may be more trouble in store for the Governor of Bengal on the score of land revenue than where surveys and boundary marks and detailed settlements have been established from the beginning.

“All the duties above detailed have hitherto been left to a Governor-General, with the whole management of the empire on his shoulders, who takes them up for a few months at a time when he happens to be in Calcutta, or to an accidental senior Member of Council, civil or military, fit or unfit, continually changed, who receives nothing for his trouble, but is put to large expense. It is no wonder that such a Government is inefficient, that nothing has generally been done beyond mere routine, and that Bengal has suffered in consequence. The best man who could be selected, permanently appointed, and with no other duties, would have a hard task of it. As it is, the whole administration depends on a good Secretary and compliant Governor; and even in this case there are many disadvantages in the exercise of power without responsibility and the establishment of a bureaucracy.”

Sir John Strachey\* writes thus: ‘It had long been obvious that it was impossible for a single person to discharge the

\* (*India*, Edition 1894.)

double duty of Governor-General of India and Governor of Bengal, and the administration of Bengal had notoriously become less efficient than that of any other Province in India": and again—"While the empire was being constantly extended, he could spend comparatively little time in Calcutta. When he was there, he was by law Governor, but it was impossible for him to attend personally to the details of Bengal administration. When he was absent from Calcutta, the senior Member of Council for the time being became Deputy-Governor. Thus there was a frequent change of rulers, and no man was long responsible for the good Government of the Province." At last, the contrast between the condition of Bengal and that of other parts of India became too obvious to be neglected." The idea of relieving the Governor-General of all details connected with the internal administration of Bengal had indeed been mooted so long ago as 1826 by Sir John Malcolm,\* who saw that "there would be a further advantage in separating the duties of a Governor-General from those of the Local Government of Bengal, in its withdrawing his high name from those minor acts which must always agitate a community composed like that of Calcutta."

The creation of a Lieutenant-Governorship of Bengal had its legal origin in the renewal of the Charter of the East India Company in 1853, and was the consequence of a special recommendation by the Governor-General, then the Earl of Dalhousie. A writer† of the day, referring to the Statute of 1853, describes the new arrangement as a boon, and adds: "This, one of the real wants of India, or at least of that part of it where agitators can shout the loudest, instead of being prominently put forward in the memorials of Associations and Committees, was inserted at the tail of a whole string of fancied wants, or nearly buried under a mountain of imaginary grievances. It might have passed unnoticed, or have been honored with the merited contempt assigned to so many other representations. It is known, however, that the Governor-General brought to the notice of leading men at home the paramount necessity that existed for making Bengal Proper a separate executive charge. A recom-

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\* *The Political History of India from 1784 to 1823.* Chapter X.

† *The Administration of Lord Dalhousie; Calcutta Review*, Vol. XXII. January 1854, by W. S. Seton-Karr (of the Bengal Civil Service, 1842-70).

mendation, coming from his clear and practised judgment, and expressed in his lucid convincing language, derived additional force from the fact that, if ever we had a Governor-General competent to the double task of presiding in the Supreme Council and wielding the executive power of the Government in the Lower Provinces, Lord Dalhousie was the man. But the best horse may be overtasked, and every one is now fully persuaded that the best security for reform and progress in Bengal is to entrust it to the ablest civilian that can be found."

In his speech, on moving for leave to introduce a Bill to provide for the Government of India (as the existing Statute was to expire on the 30th of April 1854) the Right Honorable Sir Charles Wood, President of the Board of Control, said in the House of Commons on June 3rd 1853:—"The only alteration in the position of the Governor-General which we propose to make is this. It appears from the whole of the evidence, that, entrusted as he is both with the Government of India and the Government of Bengal, he has more duties to attend to than he can fairly discharge. We propose, therefore, to relieve him of the administration of the province of Bengal. But we do not propose that any change should be made in the general control which he exercises over the whole of the Indian Government. ...The evidence is uniformly in favour of the establishment of a permanent Lieutenant-Governor in Bengal. The interests of the Presidency are stated in many cases to have suffered from the want of a permanent officer superintending the various matters connected with its administration and, as it is desirable to relieve the Governor-General of the labour of this duty and will clearly be to the advantage of the district, we propose that power should be taken to appoint a Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal."

When the Statute of 1853, i. e., 16 and 17 Vic., c. 95, s. 16 was passed by Parliament, to renew the East India Company's Charter, the Court of Directors was empowered (1) to declare that the Governor-General shall not be Governor of the Presidency of Fort William in Bengal but that a separate Governor shall be appointed for such Presidency, and (2) until a separate Governor of such Presidency should be constituted, "to authorise and direct the Governor-General of India in Council to appoint from time to time any servant of the said Company, who shall have been 10 years in their service in

India, to the office of Lieutenant-Governor of such part of the Territories under the Presidency of Fort William in Bengal as for the time being may not be under the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-Western Provinces, and to declare and limit the extent of the authority of the Lieutenant-Governor to be so appointed." The Governor-General's power of appointing a Deputy-Governor of Bengal ceased. The same Statute, s. 35, named the salary of the Lieutenant-Governor as 1,00,000 Company's Rupees. In communicating this Statute to the Governor-General, the Court of Directors in their despatch No. 61 of 12th October 1853 wrote:—"We have no intention at present of appointing a separate Governor for the Presidency of Bengal, but, under the latter provision of the clause which has been quoted, we authorize and direct you to appoint a servant of the Company, who shall have been 10 years in our service in India, to the office of Lieutenant-Governor, and to declare and limit the extent of his authority. The Lieutenant-Governor so appointed will be removable at any time, but it will probably be advisable that it should be understood that, in ordinary circumstances, he will hold the appointment for 5 years. The term of his Government, however, may be prolonged as has been done in the case of the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-West Provinces, if it should be for the advantage of the Public Service."

In a Minute dated the 6th December 1853 Lord Dalhousie hailed with the utmost satisfaction the authority conveyed by this despatch. But he felt himself not in a condition to avail himself of the authority. He had not been aware of the intention to give immediate operation to s. 16 of the Statute, and he did not wish to leave several important Bengal subjects incomplete to his successor in the local administration: he therefore proposed to postpone making any appointment of a Lieutenant-Governor for some little time to come; though he would sincerely rejoice to "shift from the shoulders of the Governor-General some portion of a burden which, in present mass, is more than mortal man can fitly bear." He noticed that the Statute of 1853 had not extinguished the *Governor of Bengal*: and a legal question arose as to the powers of the Governor-General in Council, the Governor of Bengal, and the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal. After another Minute, of the 16th of February 1854, from Lord Dalhousie, the



Government of India on the 24th idem asked the Court of Directors "whether the proper superior authority of the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal will be the Governor-General in Council?"

In accordance with the despatch of the 12th October 1853 and on a Minute of Lord Dalhousie's of the 20th April 1854, the Government of India issued a Resolution on the 28th of April 1854, on the subject of the Lieutenant-Governorship of Bengal. It stated that an official residence had been provided for the Lieutenant-Governor and that he would be allowed Rs. 600/- p.m. for establishment. The territorial jurisdiction of the Lieutenant-Governor was to be co-extensive with that previously exercised by the Governor of Bengal, with the exception of the Tenasserim Provinces, which (like Pegu), the Governor-General took under himself, Fort William remaining exclusively in the hands of the Governor-General. The extent of the Lieutenant-Governor's authority was to correspond in all respects with that which had been exercised by the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-West Provinces, subject to such changes as the Governor-General or the Governor of Bengal, acting within his jurisdiction, might think fit to make. It was laid down that the Lieutenant-Governor should correspond with the Government of India, and send reports of his proceedings to the Court of Directors direct, (as the Government of Bengal had done previously), until otherwise ordered. The salaries of the Secretary and 2 Under-Secretaries to the Government of Bengal were to continue to be Rs. 36,000 and Rs. 15,000 each *per annum* respectively. These arrangements were confirmed by the Court of Directors.

In due course another Statute 17 and 18 V. c. 77. was passed on the 7th August 1854, to empower the Governor-General by section 3 to except the Tenasserim Provinces from the authority of the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal; by section 4, with the sanction and approbation of the Court of Directors, to declare and limit the extent of the authority of the Lieutenant-Governor, and, by section 5, to exercise all the powers which had not been transferred to the Lieutenant-Governor: and the Governor-General of India was no longer to be the Governor of the Presidency of Fort William in Bengal. Accordingly by a Resolution dated the 26th January 1855 the Government of India declared that the authority of the Lieutenant-Governor extended to all matters relating to civil adminis-

tration previously under the authority of the Governor of Bengal, and that the territorial jurisdiction of the Lieutenant-Governor was co-extensive with the jurisdiction exercised by the Governor of Bengal on the previous 28th April, with the exception of the Tenasserim Provinces and Fort William. The Lieutenant-Governor was directed to record his proceedings in the form of narratives to be submitted to the Government of India, for the latter to transmit to the Court of Directors. A Proclamation was issued, taking the Tenasserim Provinces under the immediate authority of the Governor-General. On the 28th September 1854 Lord Dalhousie raised the question of the rank and precedence of the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, as the latter then had strictly speaking no special rank at all. He wrote :—"The Deputy Governor of Bengal, under Her Majesty's warrant, took place next to the Governor-General and before the Governors of Madras and Bombay. But the office of the *Deputy* Governor of Bengal was of much greater extent and dignity than the newly created office of *Lieutenant-Governor* of Bengal. The Deputy Governor was a *locum tenens* for the Governor of Bengal; and while he existed his jurisdiction was in theory co-extensive with the Presidency of Bengal. The Lieutenant-Governor, on the other hand, has jurisdiction only over that part of the Presidency of Bengal which includes the Provinces of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa. It may seem therefore right to the Hon'ble Court that the Lieutenant-Governor should not rank as the Deputy Governor formerly did, but should take precedence next after the Governor of Bombay. Regarding the question from a different point of view, the Hon'ble Court may think that, having regard to the great importance of the Local Government which he administers, the Lieutenant-Governor should enjoy the precedence which formerly belonged to the Deputy Governor. It will be for the Hon'ble Court to suggest, and Her Majesty's gracious pleasure will decide this point." The Lieutenant-Governor has precedence after the Governors of Madras and Bombay and the President of the Governor-General's Council, and, when in his own territories, before the Commander-in-Chief in India.

In the last despatch, (dated the 28th April 1854) which he issued as Governor of Bengal, Lord Dalhousie wrote to the Government of India as follows :—

“ During 3 of the 6 years, (i. e. since the 12th of January 1848) that His Lordship has held the Government of India the local administration of the Government of Bengal has also been in his hands. In these years some of the imperfections which time had exposed in the frame of the local administration have been amended. Parliament has lately supplied a remedy for that great deficiency the effects of which pervaded the entire system and were felt in every department of the administration—namely the want of a Lieutenant-Governor, who should be able to devote the whole of his time and capacity to these Lower Provinces alone. There still remain a few conspicuous wants and errors, which His Lordship’s experience in this Government has convinced him ought to be supplied and amended; and on which he wishes to submit recommendations to the Government of India before he lays his local authority down.” These errors he stated to be (1) the separation of the offices of Collector and Magistrate, contrary to the system which formerly prevailed throughout the Presidency, and to that which still prevailed in the North-Western Provinces, (2) the perpetual change of Civil Officers from one district to another and from one branch of administration to another, and (3) the great deficiency of gradual training, more especially for judicial functions. Some of these matters came under consideration soon afterwards. In his final Minute, dated the 28th of February 1856, Lord Dalhousie wrote of this change, after it had been in force nearly 2 years, as follows: “ When the Statute of 1833 expired, material and important changes were made by the House of Parliament upon the frame of the administration itself .....Until that time the Local Government of Bengal had been placed in the hands of the Governor General of India. But in the year 1853 the system, by which the officer charged with the responsibility of controlling the Government of all India was further burdened with local duties of vast extent and importance, was happily abandoned. The Governor-General was finally liberated from the obligation of performing an impossible task, and a Lieutenant-Governor was appointed to the charge of Bengal alone. The importance of this measure cannot be over-rated.”

The contemporaneous writer, who has been previously quoted, has given an account of the main administrative events in Bengal during the period immediately preceding the creation of the

Lieutenant-Governorship. The years 1850 and 1851 were spent by the Governor-General partly in the hills and partly in the plains, and during his absence the Government of Bengal was administered by the President of the Council for the time being, all matters of importance, and all nominations to the high prizes of the Civil Service, being referred to Simla or Mahasoo for orders. Though each Presidency stood theoretically in the same relation to the Government of India, Bengal was one of the divisions of the Empire in which Lord Dalhousie's influence was most felt. Mr. Seton-Karr wrote thus of Bengal in 1854: "It is the focus of civilization: the commercial capital of the country: it has been the residence of the Governor-General for the last two years: it represents one-half of India in the eyes of the untravelled at home: it is here that we have the most influential bar, and the largest mercantile community: here the spread of education is the most acknowledged, and the effects of missionary operations are most visibly seen. Moreover, Calcutta, or rather Bengal, conceives itself to have a right to the presence of the Governor-General, at least for such time as he is also the Governor of this large and fertile kingdom. When, then, the administration of the Lower Provinces was left for the whole interval, between October 1848 and February 1852, in the hands, first, of Sir H. Maddock, and next, of Sir J. H. Littler, considerable dissatisfaction was expressed by the fourth estate and by the community generally, and it was even asserted, that matters, instead of progressing, were actually going backward. For the time that Sir H. Maddock held the reins, from 1848 to March 1849, these murmurs did not make themselves very loudly heard. Sir H. Maddock had had very considerable experience in civil business, and had been Deputy-Governor under Lord Hardinge. But when the administration was presided over by a soldier, who was not unjustly supposed to know more about platoon firing and advancing in echelon than about the Excise Code and the Decennial Settlement, the Government of Bengal was assailed by considerable obloquy, though the old soldier commanded respect by his kind manner and straight-forward dealing, and though his responsible adviser was, in talent, integrity and uprightness, amongst the very foremost of the whole Civil Service. There is no doubt, however, that it is anomalous and unjust to hand over the Govern-

ment of such a Presidency as Bengal to a man who has many other duties to employ him—to a man who may be somewhat worn out, who may be inexperienced, who, though a good councillor, may not be the fittest man for such a post. There is more work to be done under the Bengal Government than under any other Government in India. The land-revenue, though assessed in perpetuity, is constantly giving rise to new, intricate and perplexing questions. The manufacture and sale of opium create a responsibility, of which the Lieutenant-Governor at Agra knows nothing. The salt, the excise, and the sea customs, themselves, form no contemptible addition to the work. The police is a heavy burden, where the population expect to be protected, and will not stir a finger to help themselves. The Marine Department, as at Bombay, requires a great deal of attention and would be a hard task for any Civil Governor, were it not for the admirable manner in which ships and men are disciplined and kept in order by the Superintendent of Marine. The whole of the judicial branch demands constant attention, in a country where there is valuable property to be contended for, and acute intellects that make litigation a trade. Education is making grander and more rapid strides in Bengal than in any other part of India, without a single exception, and the schools and colleges under the Council of Education are more than double those of any other Presidency. The non-regulation provinces of Assam, Arracan, Tenasserim, and the South-west Frontier Agency, together with the Tributary *Mahals*, would, if geographically compact, form an area equal to that of a separate kingdom. Finally, Calcutta alone must occupy a large portion of any Governor's time and attention. It is unjust to blame those entrusted with the administration of Bengal for not having advanced its moral and material prosperity in the same ratio as that of Agra had been advanced. Great questions require undivided energies and uninterrupted leisure. A Governor of Bengal should be a person of "large discourse, looking before and after." He must be wholly unfettered by other duties, be a man of large experience and unquestionable ability, if he is to grapple with the question of improving the village watch, if he is to reform the police, to lay down roads, to simplify procedure, to establish Courts of Small Causes, to visit the different districts at intervals in the year. We think ourselves fortunate to have secured in Mr. Halliday a person equal to this task.

If the routine and current work has been carefully and well got through under the old system, if cases have not been slurred over, nor practical difficulties eluded, no blunders committed, we ought perhaps not to expect much more. But we shall hope to show that, while all this has been done, the forward movement, as it is termed, the great cause of reform, has not been wholly forgotten. We proceed then to state what was done for the Lower Division of the Presidency, during the absence of Lord Dalhousie. In 1849, we had the Commission on the police of Calcutta, which terminated in a very satisfactory reform of that department. The merit of this is due entirely to the Governor-General. In the same year, the Bengal Government took possession of the small state of Sambalpur, lying on the Bombay road, in the South-West Frontier Agency. This little chiefship lapsed from failure of heirs, its last Raja having, in his lifetime, expressed a desire of seeing the administration made over to the British Government. The amount paid by this State as tribute, previous to 1849, was only 8,800 rupees. The amount now taken in the shape of direct revenue is 74,000 rupees, of which only 25,000 rupees are expended in the cost of collection and in the payment of establishments, including an European officer. The country, naturally rich and productive, but unhealthy at certain seasons of the year, was admirably ruled by the late Dr. Cadenhead. Not the slightest symptom of discontent has appeared, and one of the Members of the Board of Revenue was to visit it this last cold season. But greater changes, with regard to some of the non-regulation provinces, have been carried out. It was found that Arracan and the Tenasserim Provinces, as to revenue matters, were under the Revenue Board, and that Assam and the South West Frontier Agency were not. Arracan, under the management of Capt. Phayre, was giving in nearly 7 *lakhs* of net revenue, while its grain was exported to all parts of the world. Sixteen *lakhs* worth of rice are exported yearly from the port of Akyab. The province is remarkably free from crime, the population are contented; a great stream of emigration is flowing yearly from Chittagong southward, the Bengali is pushing the native Arracanese aside. The Tenasserim Provinces under the successive administrations of Major Broadfoot, Captain Durand, and Mr. Colvin had been generally recovering from the distress and confusion into which they had been thrown by ill-

advised measures, some 10 years previous to the time of which we are writing. But of Assam little was known, and the same might be said of the district of Hazaribagh and Chota Nagpur, though much nearer in position to the seat of Government. Both these provinces were put under the Board of Revenue, and the good effects of this measure have been already made apparent in a better and more effective system of management. The mention of the Board of Revenue naturally leads us to record a change in the composition of the Board itself. For the first year after Lord Dalhousie's departure for the Upper Provinces, the 2 Members of this body were very much opposed to each other in opinion. They differed not as men often differ in India, from mere captiousness or unwillingness to yield points—but from honest conviction and after protracted inquiry. The result however of their antagonism, which never prejudiced the interests of either the Government or the landholders, was that an immense deal of additional work was thrown on the office of the Bengal Secretary. Several very knotty points of revenue law were referred to that office, and there set at rest. But it is obvious that an Executive Government should have something to do besides giving rules as to the party with whom lands in the Sundarbans should be settled, or as to the precise meaning of some clause in Mr. Holt Mackenzie's famous Revenue Regulation of 1822. Accordingly when one Member of the old Board of Customs had retired, and another had been removed from office, it was found convenient to send the third and remaining Member to the Board of Revenue. The advantages of this measure were, first, the saving of expense by the abolition of 2 appointments worth 52,000 rupees a year; secondly, the addition to the Board of Land Revenue of a third Member, who had long been its Secretary and was well versed in revenue law; and, finally, the union of all the great sources of revenue under one well-selected body, the Members of which were enabled to divide all current work amongst themselves, and to discuss all questions of importance in a full conclave. Indeed, it cannot be denied that the working of the revenue system in the Lower Provinces has, within the last 4 years, been greatly ameliorated. All the operations in the Chittagong Division, which rendered the presence there of an officer with extraordinary powers indispensable, having been wound up by Mr.

Ricketts, this gentleman was succeeded by an officer with the ordinary pay and powers of a Commissioner. Collectors everywhere were instructed to move about their districts in the cold weather, to examine the condition of *khas mahals* or Government estates, and to follow the example of Magistrates in exchanging stone walls for canvas ones. A great deal has been done towards the arrangement of the records in various Collectorates, and order and regularity have been introduced amongst a mass of confused or moth-eaten papers. The survey has engaged much attention; it has been manned by officers of ability, and has been pushed forward with the laudable desire of demarcating the boundaries of villages and estates, and of saving a very considerable expense in establishments. It is hardly possible, and it would certainly not be desirable, that the survey in the Lower Provinces should mark off every field, or designate every holding. The advantages derivable thence would not be commensurate with the vast expense and the fearful delay of such a measure. All that the survey professes to do is to record the boundaries of estates and villages, the natural features of the country, the area, and the extent of cultivation, the products of particular districts, the extent of the pressure of the Government revenue on each acre—and other statistical information which the surveyors may pick up in the course of their work. All this will be available in a few years' time for every district in the Lower Provinces. With regard to the vigorous enforcement of law and abatement of crime, much has not been done.\* We have, however, a Commissioner of Dacoity, who is doing his best; and we have seen a vigorous and effective police established on the Grand Trunk Road from Calcutta to the Karamnassa. The lower division of the line, it should be remembered, is the very opposite in features to the upper part under the Government of Agra. From Benares upwards, the road passes through some of the richest and most populous districts of the Doab. After leaving Burdwan, the Grand Trunk Road merely skirts the edge of the districts of Birbhum, Bhagalpur and Gaya, and does not go within 50 miles of a single station. The line selected lies, in fact,

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\* The office of Superintendent of Police was abolished on the 25th January 1854 and the powers exercised by him were vested in the Commissioners of Revenue and Circuit.



through a hilly, wooded, and thinly populated country, which, though fertile in materials for the construction of roads, is equally so, in places where unsuspecting travellers might be robbed and murdered by scores. An effectual protection to life and property has been afforded throughout the line. At every 2 or 4 miles there are stations, the police of which regularly protect the road from sunset till dawn. At certain parts there are *sauwars* and at every 50 or 80 miles there is a Deputy Magistrate. The whole force on the line is numerically about equal to a regiment of infantry, and it is as safe to travel along this line as it is to go from Calcutta to Barasat, or Krishnagar. Besides the above reforms, the Bengal Government has commenced the very proper practice of publishing selections from its records, and the numbers, which already amount to more than a dozen, contain abundant information on the opium manufacture, on teak forests, on several wild districts and their occupants, on the Electric Telegraph, on embankments, on the sanitary condition of Calcutta, and on other subjects. No doubt, when we have a regular Lieutenant Governor, things will move at a quicker rate, and we may think little of reforms such as those just enumerated. But when we consider that current business alone is greater in Bengal than elsewhere, that the Executive during the period of which we are writing, was burdened with some personal cases, relative to the conduct of civilians and other officers, of a very serious and complicated character, it will be allowed that the Bengal Government has done, and done well, all that in common justice could be expected of it. Neither must we forget that its care has been to put, into the highest court of criminal and civil justice, the very best officers that could be selected, and the Calcutta Sudder for 4 years was presided over by judges, who, for energy and acuteness, long acquaintance with native character, with the procedure of the courts, and with the Company's law, were not approached by those of any of the Courts at the other Presidencies. The contrast presented by the decisions of the Calcutta Court, with Mr. J. R. Colvin at its head, and by those of the Sudder at Agra, since it has been bereft of the judicial acumen of Messrs. H. Lushington and Deane, is something almost painful to contemplate. The files of the Calcutta Court have been reduced to the lowest possible amount; the confidence of suitors and pleaders in its decisions has been increased by the new

rules under which civil cases are argued before a full Bench : the results of criminal trials appealed, or referred to the Court are widely made known, with the Minutes of the several judges ; and the good effects of a strict supervision by officers, whose talents and character command respect, are visible in the additional care with which Magistrates prepare, and Judges in the districts dispose of the calendars." It was about this time also that the half yearly examinations, by 2 standards of qualification, of young civilians after they had passed the College of Fort William, were introduced. (The College itself was abolished and the Board of Examiners established on the 24th January 1854). It was recorded that these examinations were found to have been really needed and that they answered remarkably well. " Something of this kind was wanted to take up the college course where it terminated, and to add to book-learning the power of talking fluently with *bunneas* and *raiya's*." Subsequent to February 1852, the Government of Bengal was again administered by Lord Dalhousie himself, aided by Mr. (Sir) Cecil Beadon, (whose merits had deservedly gained him a high and important position at a comparatively early period of service). Mr. Seton-Karr briefly summarised the administrative events of this period. " The measures by which these 2 years have been distinguished are, an important alteration in the law relating to the sale of estates for arrears of revenue, the promulgation of a new set of rules for the grant of waste lands in the Sundarbans, which may, it is hoped, have the effect of inducing capitalists to lay out money in clearance and cultivation, the giving effect to the Mitford bequest to the city of Dacca, in accordance with the decree of the Court of Chancery : and the extension of English education by the establishment of a new College at Murshidabad, and an English school at the principal station of every district where the inhabitants may be ready for such a course of instruction. Lord Dalhousie himself has also visited Arracan and Chittagong, and has sent grave Sudder Judges and Members of the Board of Revenue to report on unknown and unexplored districts and to suggest measures for their improvement. The only drawback to the benefit derivable from these tours appears to be that the deputation of 2 Judges of the highest Court of appeal tends to disorganize the machinery of justice. It is not always easy to supply the vacant places on the Bench : nor, if Judges

are to have roving commissions over huge provinces, do we exactly see of what use is the office of commissioner of Division. But when we have a regular Lieutenant-Governor, we shall expect that for him the steamer will be ready, the tent spread, or the dawk laid, and that a beneficial personal intercourse will be maintained between the chief, his subordinates, and the influential landholders, many of whom have never seen a live Governor."

# THE LIEUTENANT-GOVERNORS OF BENGAL.

1854—98.

1. SIR FREDERICK JAMES HALLIDAY, K. C. B. ... May 1, 1854.
2. SIR JOHN PETER GRANT, K. C. B., G. C. M. G. ... May 1, 1859.
3. SIR CECIL BEADON, K. C. S. I. ... April 23, 1862.
4. SIR WILLIAM GREY, K. C. S. I. ... April 23, 1867.
5. SIR GEORGE CAMPBELL, M. P., K. C. S. I., D. C. L. March 1, 1871.
6. THE RIGHT HON'BLE SIR RICHARD TEMPLE,  
*Bart.*, M. P., G. C. S. I., C. I. E., D. C. L.,  
L. L. D., F. R. S. ... April 9, 1874.
7. THE HON'BLE SIR ASHLEY EDEN, K. C. S. I. { *officiating*  
January 8, 1877  
*confirmed*  
May 1, 1877.
- Sir Steuart Colvin Bayley*, K. C. S. I., C. I. E.  
*officiating* ... July 15, 1879  
to December 1, 1879
8. SIR AUGUSTUS RIVERS THOMPSON K. C. S. I.,  
C. I. E. ... April 24, 1882.  
*Mr. Horace Abel Cockerell*, C. S. I., *officiating* August 11, 1885,  
to September 17, 1885.
9. SIR STEUART COLVIN BAYLEY, K. C. S. I., C. I. E. April 2, 1887.
10. SIR CHARLES ALFRED ELLIOTT, K. C. S. I. ... December 17, 1890.  
*Sir Antony Patrick MacDonnell*, G. C. S. I.  
*officiating* ... May 30, 1893  
to November 30, 1893.
11. SIR ALEXANDER MACKENZIE, K. C. S. I. ... December 18, 1895  
to April 7, 1898  
*Sir Charles Cecil Stevens*, K. C. S. I., *officiating* June 22, 1897  
to December 21, 1897.







Photo-gravure

Survey of India Offices, Calcutta, November 1900

SIR FREDERICK JAMES HALLIDAY, K C B.

From a photograph by Mess<sup>rs</sup>. Johnston & Hoffmann

# BENGAL

## UNDER THE LIEUTENANT-GOVERNORS.

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### CHAPTER I.

SIR FREDERICK JAMES HALLIDAY, K. C. B.

1854—59.

At the commencement of each Chapter I propose to state briefly some of the principal facts concerning each Lieutenant-Governor—such as, his family, education, appointments—antecedent to his tenure of office : such details are of some interest and show, at any rate, the preparation he had received for the arduous duties of the Lieutenant-Governorship.

Frederick James Halliday, son of Thomas Halliday, Esquire, of Ewell, Surrey, was born on Christmas Day 1806, and educated at St. Paul's School, Rugby, and the East India College, Haileybury. He was appointed to the Bengal Civil Service in 1824; arrived in India 8th June 1825; served in Bengal as Assistant to the Registrar of the *Sadar* Court, 1826; Registrar and Assistant Magistrate of Birbhum, 1829: Judge and Magistrate of Hooghly, 1829: Magistrate-Collector of Rajshahi, 1830: Magistrate-Collector of Northern Bundelcund, 1832: Joint-Magistrate and Deputy Collector of Noakhali and Bullooa, 1833. During these early years of his service, he was gazetted "on paper" to various other appointments of which he did not take charge. He became Secretary to the *Sadar* Board of Revenue in April 1836; Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Judicial and Revenue Departments, May 1838; Junior Secretary to the Government of India, Revenue, Judicial and Legislative Departments in addition to his



other duties, March 1840, and Officiating Secretary in March 1842; Secretary to the Government of India, in the Home Department 1849; Member of the Governor-General's Council, December 1853.

He was absent on furlough to England from July 1852 to November 1853, and in May and June of 1853 was, on sixteen occasions, examined before the Committees of the Lords and Commons on Indian subjects in connection with the renewal of the Company's Charter. While on furlough he was nominated by the Court of Directors to be a Member of Council and held that office at the time of the creation of the Lieutenant-Governorship of Bengal. But, even if he had not been Member of Council, it had always been the intention of the Governor-General, the Earl of Dalhousie, to nomi-

Lieutenant-  
Governor.

nate him for the new office of Lieutenant-Governor—a resolution formed before the office was created. On the 21st March 1854, Lord Dalhousie wrote:—"The fittest man in the service of the Hon'ble Company to hold this great and most important office is, in my opinion, our colleague, the Hon'ble F. J. Halliday. I have the highest satisfaction, both personally and officially, in proposing that on the 30th April, or immediately before that day, Mr. Halliday should be appointed to the office of Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal;" and he was so appointed accordingly by Notification of the 28th April 1854. The Government of Bengal had, since February 1852, been administered by Lord Dalhousie himself, aided by Sir Cecil Beadon as Secretary. In the Introduction reference has been made to the part taken by the Governor-General in inducing Parliament to give power by law for the appointment of a separate Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal. It was one of the many large reforms which emanated from that vigorous mind and strong will. The time had come for a new departure and Lord Dalhousie was the man to take it. The selection of Sir F. Halliday for the new appointment was thus shadowed forth in Mr. W. S. Seton-Karr's article\* on *The Administration of Lord Dalhousie*:—"We believe that no Governor-General has ever worked harder than Lord Dalhousie, and that no man is more sensible of the paramount necessity of entrusting the Government of Bengal to the undivided

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\* *Calcutta Review*, January 1854.

time and the entire energies of the ablest civilian that can be found for the post. All considerations of reduced patronage and diminished weight and influence, even if correctly stated, ought to give way to the public interests. A Governor-General comes out here to superintend and direct the affairs of each Presidency, to master all the political and external relations of India, to set the financial system on a secure basis, and to see that the legislative, social and commercial policy of the Empire be directed by adequate means, and on approved principles, towards one and the same end. It is not his business, overwhelmed as he is with references on every point, from the building of a barrack at Peshawar to the repairs of a gun-boat at Rangoon, to grapple with the intricacies of land tenures, to promote vernacular education, to infuse spirit into the police of Bengal, to enquire by whom village-watchmen shall be nominated and paid. Let the Governor-General but choose a man in whom he can place implicit reliance, whose talents and character will command the respect of the services, and of the native and European population—and we will answer for it that no measure will be undertaken and carried out, in which the head of the Empire shall not be furnished with ample previous information. We have good reason to believe that the creation of a Lieutenant-Governor for Bengal is due much more to the candour and foresight of the present Governor-General than to the lugubrious declamation of Anglo-Saxon and Hindu reformers, who made a great stir about evils which no Act of Parliament could remedy, and said very little about the one measure which it was in the power of the Houses to pass. If report is to be believed Lord Dalhousie will make over the kingdom of Bengal to Mr. Halliday: an act which the services and the community will think fully justified by that gentleman's long experience, intimate knowledge of the country, renewed energies, acknowledged service and honourable name." Sir F. Halliday's appointment was thus regarded in 1854 by another Calcutta Reviewer: "The creation of this new and important office, and the appointment to it of such an able and experienced civilian as Mr. Halliday, will necessarily excite in the public mind no ordinary expectation, as to the prosecution of continued improvements in the internal administration of Bengal:" and again a writer in the same Review in 1858 may be appropriately

quoted here :—" If there ever was a person who succeeded to office with signal advantages, it is the present holder of the high appointment of Lieutenant-Governor. Mr. Halliday had served in the judicial and in the revenue line. He had been Secretary to the Board of Revenue and a *Registrar*, as the office is absurdly termed, of the *Sadar* Court. He was for eleven long years Secretary to the Government of Bengal. As Secretary to the Government of India, he had enjoyed the confidence of one of the wisest and most vigorous statesmen that ever swayed, by his personal character, the destinies of a great kingdom. He had given evidence in the year 1853, which had left a vivid remembrance on the minds of able statesmen of both Houses of Parliament, and had at home, no doubt, imbibed all those influences which freshen and invigorate the dried-up currents of thought, and the seared sympathies of men who have long worked in the East. He came to his task, therefore, with an amazing amount of knowledge as to the evils, and their proposed remedies, prevalent in every branch of the administration, from Patna down to Sandoway, from Debroghar in Assam to Chota Nagpur and 'Cuttack.'

Sir F. Halliday assumed the office of Lieutenant-Governor on the 1st. May 1854, and appointed Captain H. R. James, 32nd N. I., who was succeeded by Captain H. Raban, 36th N. I., as his Private Secretary. There was at that time no sign on the horizon of the terrible trials through which India was to pass, and of which Bengal had its share. But the Mutinies did not take place until Sir F. Halliday had been three years in office, and meanwhile there was abundance of work to employ him in the development of the Newly-constituted Province. The record of those earlier days are more meagre and formal than would suffice for modern requirements: but even from them it is possible, without reproducing wearisome statistical information, to extract accounts of important schemes and events which retain their interest to the present day. It will be seen indeed, that in some departments foundations were then laid which have not been disturbed since: on the other hand it will appear that ideas which then obtained have not always continued to hold the field.

The extent of the provinces included within the Lieutenant-Governorship of Bengal was stated in the first\* Administration Report of the year 1855-56. The Provinces were divided into seven portions, namely :—

Bihar, having an area of about	...	42,000	Sq. miles
Bengal ... do ...	...	85,000	,,
Orissa ... do ...	...	7,000	,,
Orissa Tributary <i>Mahals</i> ...	...	15,500	,,
Chota Nagpur and the tributary } States on the S. W. Frontier }	...	62,000	,,
Assam ...	...	27,500	,,
Arracan ...	...	14,000	,,

Total area ... 2,53,000 Sq. miles

and the population was moderately estimated at forty millions. Arracan was soon transferred to the Chief Commissionership of Burma, of which it geographically formed a part. Assam continued to be attached to Bengal until the year 1874. So large an area of country, held by a foreign power, necessarily requires the presence of an adequate military force, even when the population in general is so peaceably disposed as that of Bengal. It is well-known that the

military force in the Bengal Presidency was much stronger in 1854 than it is at the present day. The "Disposition of the Bengal Army," as shown in the *Bengal Directory* for 1854, was in Lower Bengal, excluding Orissa and Assam, as follows. The Garrison of Fort William consisted of H. M. 98th. Foot (in progress), 65th. N. I. (in progress to Rangoon) : a Detail of Fort Artillery : Detachments of Native Infantry : The Calcutta Native Militia at Alipore : the Governor-General's Body Guard at Ballygunge. The Brigadier General commanding the Presidency

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\* In his final minute of 28th. February 1856, Lord Dalhousie recorded that one of the last, and not the least important, of the recent measures of the Government of India had been a Resolution to require henceforth from the Government of every Presidency, from each Lieutenant-Governor, and from the Chief officer of every province, an Annual Report ; narrating the incidents that may have occurred during the year within their several jurisdictions, and stating the progress that may have been made, and all of moment that may have been done, in each principal department of the Civil and Military Administration.

Division, at *Barrackpore*, had at that station the 33rd., 37th., 48th., 53rd., and 72nd., N. I. and the Regiment of Ferozpur: at *Dum Dum*, there were—the first and fourth Co's 5th. Battalion—Depot 5th. Battalion En. Foot Artillery and Head Quarters and 1st, 2nd, and 4th. Companies of the 9th. Battalion Native Foot Artillery: at *Chinsura*, the 3rd. En. Regiment—Depot for H. M.'s Troops: at *Berhampore*, a Detail of Native Foot Artillery, Depot 2nd. En. Bengal Fusiliers and 7th. N. I.: at *Midnapore*, the Regiment of Loodiana: at *Chittagong*, a Detachment of 33rd. Native Infantry: at *Jamalpur* the 6th Native Infantry: at *Dacca*, a Detail of Native Foot Artillery. The Brigadier General commanding the *Dinapore* Division had under him, at that station, the 2nd. Co. 3rd. Battalion Foot Artillery—H. M. 29th. Foot—the 13th. and 44th. N. I.: at *Segowlie*, the 12th. Irregular Cavalry: at *Bhagalpur*, the Hill Rangers: at *Monghyr*, *Titalya &c.*, Detachments of the Hill Rangers: at *Darjeeling*, the convalescent Depot of Detachments of H. M. and H. C's Troops, and the *Sebundi* Sappers and Miners: at *Doranda*, the Ramghar Light Infantry Battalion, with two *Risalas* of Irregular Cavalry: (the R. I. Cavalry were serving in Burma): at *Bankura*, *Chaibassa*, *Hazaribagh*, *Purulia* and *Sambalpur*, Detachments of the Ramghar Light Infantry Battalion. It is impossible not to be struck with the strength of the force, its wide distribution, and the preponderance of the native element. At the outbreak of the Mutiny, it has been stated\*, "the great Province of Bengal was destitute of European troops. There were in the Province 2,400 European soldiers, as against a native force of more than 29,000. A single English Regiment was distributed between the fort in Calcutta and the neighbouring Cantonments. A traveller would have found no other European troops till he reached Dinapore, 380 miles away; and the English regiment there stationed had enough to do in watching four native regiments and the neighbouring city of Patna."

Nearly contemporaneous with the creation of the Lieutenant-Governorship was the fresh impetus given to Education in Bengal, with the rest of India. On the 19th. July 1854 issued the great Education Despatch No. 49, of the Court of Directors which was prepared under the direction

Education  
Despatch.

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\* *Earl Canning*, by Sir H. S. Cunningham, K. C. I. E.

of The Right Hon'ble Sir Charles Wood, *Bart.*,—then President of the Board of Control,—and has been called the Charter of Education in India. Lord Dalhousie wrote of it that it contained a scheme of Education for all India, far wider and more comprehensive than the Local or the Supreme Government could ever have ventured to suggest, and that “it left nothing to be desired, if indeed it did not authorise and direct that more should be done than is within our present grasp.” Under this despatch the office of the Director of Public Instruction was constituted, and in January 1855 a commencement towards carrying out its provisions was made by the appointment of Mr. Gordon Young, of the Civil Service, as the first Director. The purport of this Despatch, which has been so momentous in its consequences to Bengal, was summarised in the report of the Education Commission of 1882 (Sir W.W. Hunter's) as follows :—

The Despatch of 1855 commends to the special attention of the Government of India the improvement and far wider extension of education, both English and vernacular, and prescribes as the means for the attainment of these objects: (1) the constitution of a separate Department of the administration for education; (2) the institution of Universities at the presidency towns; (3) the establishment of institutions for training teachers for all classes of schools; (4) the maintenance of the existing Government colleges and high schools, and the increase of their number, when necessary; (5) the establishment of new middle schools; (6) increased attention to vernacular schools, indigenous or other, for elementary education; and (7) the introduction of a system of grants-in-aid. The attention of Government is specially directed to the importance of placing the means of acquiring useful and practical knowledge within reach of the great mass of the people. The English language is to be the medium of instruction in the higher branches, and the vernacular in the lower. English is to be taught wherever there is a demand for it, but it is not to be substituted for the vernacular languages of the country. The system of grants-in-aid is to be based on the principle of perfect religious neutrality. Aid is to be given (so far as the requirements of each particular district as compared with other districts and the funds at the disposal of Government may render it possible) to all schools

imparting a good secular education, provided they are under adequate local management, and are subject to Government inspection, and provided that fees, however small, are charged in them. Grants are to be for specific objects, and their amount and continuance are to depend on the periodical reports of Government Inspectors. No Government colleges or schools are to be founded where a sufficient number of institutions exist capable, with the aid of Government, of meeting the local demand for education; but new schools and colleges are to be established and temporarily maintained where there is little or no prospect of adequate local effort being made to meet local requirements. The discontinuance of any general system of education entirely provided by Government is anticipated with the gradual advance of the system of grants-in-aid; but the progress of education is not to be checked in the slightest degree by the abandonment of a single school to probable decay. A comprehensive system of scholarships is to be instituted so as to connect lower schools with higher, and higher schools with colleges. Female education is to receive the frank and cordial support of Government. The principal officials in every district are required to aid in the extension of education; and, in making appointments to posts in the service of Government, a person who has received a good education is to be preferred to one who has not. Even in the lower situations, a man who can read and write is, if equally eligible in other respects, to be preferred to one who cannot." In July 1855, provisional rules were issued by Government for grants-in-aid of any school giving a good secular education, either through English or the vernacular, to males or females or both, under adequate local management. A University Committee and a certain number of Inspectors were soon appointed, though several months elapsed before the necessary rules were laid down, establishments sanctioned and other preliminaries arranged to enable the Department to set properly to work. This Committee was charged with the duty of framing a scheme for the establishment of Universities at the Presidency towns: it

The Calcutta  
University.

provided for the examination of candidates and the granting of Degrees in the Faculties of Arts, Law, Medicine and Civil Engineering. The Calcutta University was incorporated under Act II of 1857, on the model of the London

University. The Presidency College was placed upon an improved footing, as sanctioned by the Court of Directors in September 1854, and made a model for imitation as far as possible by the *mufassal* colleges. The *zilla* English schools were then forty in number. Great difficulty was at once met in Bihar in inducing the inhabitants to comply with the conditions of the grants-in-aid rules as regards private contributions. Not only were indifference and unwillingness to make the smallest effort for self-improvement exhibited, but bigotry and suspicion, amounting sometimes to hostility, were encountered.

In connection with the subject of education in Bengal it will be relevant to mention here a minute of 1858 by Sir F. Halliday on a letter dated the 28th April 1858 written by Lord Ellenborough, as President of the Board of Control, to the Court of Directors, and on a memorandum by Sir G. Clerk on the state of education in India. Sir F. Halliday showed that their statements and inferences as to Bengal required considerable correction. "On the question of the connection between education and the rebellion our wisdom, no less than our duty, is to persevere in what we have begun and not to turn our backs upon Bihar, or any other parts of our territory, because there is difficulty or danger in the path of improvement. It is certain, however, that both the difficulty and the danger are exaggerated and look imposing only to those who keep at a distance from them and view them through the delusive mist of prejudice and misinformation. As to difficulty—the progress of Bengal, even within the memory of living witnesses, is a proof of the aptitude of the people, and of their plastic docility. And though it is not uncommon in these days to attribute the recent mutinies to our educational operations, and even to propose to draw back from them for fear of similar consequences in future, the error of this opinion is like that of a man who, after unwisely and incautiously exposing a barrel of gunpowder to all kinds of dangerous influences, and having by good luck, and in spite of bad management, long escaped without an accident, should at last, when the fatal and inevitable explosion takes place, blame neither the gunpowder, nor his own rashness and indiscretion, but rather lay the whole mischief to account of some one of many little sparks flying about, and talk of limiting the use of fire and candle in future to prevent similar occurrences.

Minute on  
Education.



“The people of Bihar doubted and disliked our plans of education, as all ignorant people doubt and dislike schemes for their improvement. But, if the army had not mutinied, the people would never have thought of rebelling in consequence of our schools, nor have they now thought of it. For the few of the people of Bihar who have joined the rebellious troops have done so, some because they were bound with those troops in the closest ties of relationship, and others because they were thieves and plunderers by taste and profession, and ready to take advantage of any moment of confusion. And, except in rare cases, no especial hostility has been shown towards educational buildings or persons, so that the work of the schoolmaster has gone on little if at all affected by the surrounding disturbances. The army mutinied because it was a mercenary army, ill-organized, mis-governed, spoilt, encouraged into the grossest exaggeration of its own supposed power and importance, unwatched, unguarded, unsuspected, and, in its material, ignorant, uneducated and superstitious beyond all other classes of our subjects. Of all men in India the Sepoys had known the least and felt the least of our zeal for education; which, whatever it had incited us to do elsewhere, had never led us to think of educating the soldier, or of raising him from his debased and semi-savage intellectual condition. It was an army more or less mutinous, always on the verge of revolt, and certain to have mutinied at one time or another as soon as provocation might combine with opportunity. It was vain to talk of this great, but always impending, always inevitable mutiny as if it had been caused by a few schools in Hindustan. The mutiny had many causes, of which schools were the most trifling and most inconsiderable; and it would have taken place sooner or later, though there had never been a child taught to cypher from one end of India to the other.”

The connection between education and the mutiny was altogether of another kind. If it was not education that caused the mutiny, it was the mutiny that retarded education in India. An extract from a despatch of the Court of Directors of the 22nd. June 1858 is conclusive on this point: “We desire that you will bear in mind the great financial difficulties to which we are now exposed, and that you will not on any account sanction any increase of expenditure in any part of India in

connection with education without our authority previously obtained."

The Sonthal *Parganas*, which now form the Southern district of the Bhagalpur Division, were not always inhabited by the Sonthals. In the Census report of 1872, the total number of Sonthals was returned at 923,532, of whom 455,513 or nearly one-half were in that district. They were (according to Sir W. W. Hunter) an aboriginal Kolarian tribe, inhabiting a tract of country about 350 miles in length, extending from the Ganges at Bhagalpur to the Baitarni river in Orissa. They colonised parts of the Hazaribagh district and parts of Birbhum at a very remote period, and it was chiefly by migrations from these colonies that the modern Sonthalia was formed. They are said to have immigrated in considerable numbers about the middle of last century and cultivated all the valleys and lower slopes of the hills, so that the *paharias* (or hill-men) with no settled cultivation became confined to the hillsides. Their origin, characteristics, habits etc. have been fully described by Colonel Dalton† and other writers, and I need not dilate upon them here. The insurrection of the Sonthals in 1855 broke out suddenly. It was described by Lord Dalhousie in his final minute of February 1856 as a local outbreak. "little looked for." But there had been signs of coming trouble. In the cold weather of 1854, they were in a restless excited state: their grievances were being agitated among themselves. Their tract of the country called the Damin-ikoh, or skirt of the hills, comprised in 1832 within a defined boundary, was divided between the districts of Bhagalpur, Murshidabad and Birbhum. It was under the fiscal and general management of a superintendent, Mr. Pontet, subordinate to the Commissioner of Bhagalpur, and in criminal matters under the Magistrate of Bhagalpur. There was only one resident Magistrate at Deoghur. To the wild Sonthal, justice was far off and very difficult of access at the Bhagalpur Courts. Bengali grain-dealers had flocked to the Sonthal country for business purposes. It was no wonder that the ignorant and helpless Sonthals should fall easy victims to the unscrupulous *mahajan*. Once in the clutches of

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\* See the *Calcutta Review* Vols. XXVI and XXXV.

† Descriptive Ethnology of Bengal.

the usurers, they became with their families their bondslaves. And this was occurring at the time when a railway line skirting the Sonthal country for 200 miles was under construction, and creating an immense demand for labour. The bondslaves, working to pay off debts which were never satisfied, felt the contrast between themselves and the free workers. Thus it was the grinding oppression of the Bengali *mahajans* on the semi-savage Sonthals that was the main cause of the outbreak. The latter had no sufficient protection against the crafty Bengali, and the machinery of the Civil Courts was employed only as an instrument to rivet the chains of servitude. Thus, it has been said, the Sonthals, starting with the desire to revenge themselves on the Hindu money-lenders who had taken advantage of their simplicity and improvidence, found themselves arrayed in arms against the British Government. The noted leaders of the rebellion, two brothers, Seedoo and Kanoo lived with their less forward brothers, Chand and Bhairab, at a village Bhagnadihi, half a mile from Burhait, the capital of all the Sonthal towns and villages. There is reason to suppose that this village had been particularly oppressed. The two brothers were men of strong personal character, and brooded over the wrongs of their race. They claimed to have seen apparitions of their *Thakur*, and to have been favoured with scraps of paper, which were distributed through the country. They also sent forth a *sal*-tree branch to their brothers and others, as a sign to rouse the clans. On the 30th of June accordingly 10,000 Sonthals are supposed to have met at Bhagnadihi, and it was said, though it was not proved, that the assemblage, at Seedoo's direction, addressed Government and all subordinate authorities. The intentions of the movement were announced to be against the *mahajans*, *zamindars* and all rich Bengalis: not against Government. On the 7th. July the *Daroga* of Thana Dighi, or Burio Bazar, went out with his escort to inquire about the assemblage: he was promptly despatched by Seedoo, nine persons were killed by the Sonthals and the rest of the Police party fled. The rebellion, thus commenced with bloodshed, spread rapidly with many frightful atrocities. The whole country rose. The insurgents were armed with bows and poisoned arrows, axes, swords and a few guns only. But with these weapons they carried all before them for a time

through the western districts. Villages were sacked and burnt, three European gentlemen and two English ladies were killed, factories were attacked: the course of the insurgents was marked throughout by scenes of inhuman and atrocious cruelties, ruthless murders, burnings, pillage and devastation: even railway works were destroyed. There were not at the time, it was said, 1200 troops within 80 miles of the rebels. The troops available were however rapidly mobilized from Dinapore and Calcutta to Raniganj and about the 25th July placed under Brigadier-General Lloyd. When information of the assemblage was received at Bhagalpur, the Hill Rangers were called out and advanced to Colgong. In an encounter on the 16th. July with the insurgents they lost their Sergeant-major, 25 men of the corps, and an indigo-planter. For a time the Sonthals held possession of the country from Colgong to Palsa on the Ganges, and nearly to Birbhum and Raniganj on the west. With reinforcements of European troops and Native Infantry, the Hill Rangers cleared the country round Bhagalpur about the end of August, drove the insurgents southwards and recovered large quantities of plunder and stores. The Birbhum side of the country was more disturbed and for a longer time. A force was sent to prevent the Sonthals from crossing the Damodar and the Grand Trunk Road, and to protect Birbhum. Several engagements with the insurgents took place: the troops met with partial reverses, but by the 17th of August quiet was restored to this part of the country, though the rebels under arms were still estimated to exceed 30,000.

The insurgents were also active on the Murshidabad border, on the north of the Damin-i-koh, and along the south bank of the Ganges from Colgong to Rajmahal. The latter place was saved by the resolution and energy of Mr. Vigors, a Railway Engineer, who fortified his residence. To the west of Rajmahal, the Sonthals ravaged the country in the face of troops, who remained inactive. On the Murshidabad border the first move was made by the Berhampore troops with Mr. Toogood, the Magistrate of Murshidabad, through Aurungabad and Doolian. They were too late to catch the rebels at Kadamsa (where the latter had been checked by the indigo planters) but came up with them at Moheshpur and inflicted a signal defeat: three of the brother leaders were wounded, but not mortally.

The troops reached Burhait on the 24th. July, and again beat the rebels at Rogunathpur. Soon afterwards, Seedoo was given up to the Bhagalpur troops through treachery. Garrison posts were planted on the Murshidabad border, and no further violence was experienced in that quarter. The rainy season of the year was unsuited for active operations in pursuit of the rebels, who found refuge in the jungles. Sir F. Halliday had been desirous of proclaiming martial law in August, but the Government of India, under the influence of Sir Barnes Peacock and Sir J. P. Grant, had refused permission. A proclamation issued by the local Government, inviting the rebels to surrender on terms, was rejected by them and in some places treated with contempt. Though the conduct of the military operations against the Sonthals had been placed entirely in the hands of the military authorities, still the Civil Law was the law of the disturbed country and the tactics of the military were to some extent subjected to Civil control: it has been said that the military remained individually amenable to the Civil Officers for their acts. Misunderstandings constantly occurred. In September, the rebels resumed activity in parts of Birbhum and Bhagalpur: and it became apparent that Martial Law was necessary. This was accordingly proclaimed on the 10th. November; and its effect was soon apparent. The Proclamation ran as follows:—

“Whereas certain persons of the tribe of Sonthals and others, inhabitants of the Rajmahal Hills, of the Damin-i-koh, and of certain *parganas* in the districts of Bhagalpur, Murshidabad and Birbhum, and owing allegiance to the British Government, are, and for some time past have been, in open rebellion against the authority of the Government; and whereas, soon after the first out-break of the said rebellion, a proclamation was issued offering a free pardon to all who should come in and submit within a period of 10 days, except ringleaders and persons convicted of murder, notwithstanding which act of clemency the great body of the rebels have not availed themselves of the offer of mercy thus held out, but continue in rebellion;—wherefore, it has become necessary for the speedy and effectual suppression of this rebellion that advantage should be taken of the season to commence systematic military operations against the rebels, for which purpose it is expedient that Martial Law should be declared, and that the functions of the ordinary

Criminal Courts of Judicature should be partially suspended in the said districts ;

It is hereby proclaimed and notified, that the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, in the exercise of the authority given to him by Regulation X. of 1804, and with the assent and concurrence of the President in Council, does hereby establish Martial Law in the following Districts, that is to say :—so much of the district of Bhagalpur as lies on the right bank of the river Ganges : so much of the district of Murshidabad as lies on the right bank of the river Bhagirathi : the district of Birbhum ;—And that the said Lieutenant-Governor does also suspend the functions of the ordinary Criminal Courts of Judicature within the districts above described with respect to all persons, Sonthals and others, owing allegiance to the British Government, in consequence of their either having been born or being residents within its territories and under its protection, who after the date of this Proclamation and within the districts above described, shall be taken in arms in open hostility to the said Government, or shall be taken in the act of opposing by force of arms the authority of the same, or shall be taken in the actual commission of any overt act of rebellion against the State ;

And that the same Lieutenant-Governor does also hereby direct that all persons, Sonthals and others, owing allegiance to the British Government who, after the date of this Proclamation, shall be taken as afore-said, shall be tried by Court Martial ; and it is hereby notified that any person convicted of any of the said crimes by the sentence of such Court will be liable, under Section 3, Regulation X of 1804, to the immediate punishment of death.”

The weather becoming more suitable for operations, a military force, organised in sufficient strength, swept through the country and speedily subjugated all those who had not been broken by the ravages of hunger and disease, from which the Sonthals had suffered grievously since the line of troops had been drawn round them. Many of them tried to quit the country by escape to the south but were not suffered to cross the Grand Trunk Road. On the 31st December the insurrection was officially declared to have been entirely suppressed. The thanks of Government were awarded to Major-General Lloyd, c. b. and Brigadier General Bird and the Field Force was broken up. General Lloyd had exercised great discretion, forbearance and humane consideration in his action towards the misguided people with whom he had to deal : a few ringleaders

were executed and, on the capture of Kanoo, quiet was restored to the country. A large number of Sonthal prisoners were tried and condemned: and the further operation of Martial Law was suspended on the 3rd January 1856. A few fresh outrages thereupon occurred, but the Sonthals had lost heart and were badly in want of food: so the renewal of the insurrection soon died away. By the end of the cold weather, the rebels had formally submitted and resumed work. On the pacification of the country, inquiry was made into the grievances of the Sonthals, with a view to their redress. The investigation was well conducted by the Hon'ble Mr. (Sir A.) Eden, c.s., specially deputed for the purpose. The results were that a separate non-regulation district was formed of the Sonthal *Parganas*: a Deputy Commissioner was placed in charge, with four assistants, all vested with Civil as well as Criminal jurisdiction, under the Commissioner of Bhagalpur as Commissioner of the Sonthal *Parganas*. Laws were passed, Acts XXXVII of 1855 and X of 1857, making the Sonthal country independent of the jurisdiction of the Regular Courts, by removing the district called Damin-i-koh and the other districts principally inhabited by that tribe from the operation of the general laws and regulations which were found to be unsuited to so uncivilised a race. Another Act XXXVIII was passed in December 1855, to be in force for three years and provide for the speedy trial and punishment of rebellion and other heinous crimes committed within the districts in which Martial Law was proclaimed.

On the 5th November 1855 the Governor-General, Lord Dal-  
Public Thanks-  
giving, Lord Dal-  
housie's Procla-  
mation.
houseie, issued from Bangalore a Proclamation ordering a day of Public Thanksgiving for the fall of Sebastopol. It may well find a place here, as a brief State paper of great interest, applying to Bengal.

“The Governor-General has the highest satisfaction in announcing to the army, and the people of India, the capture of the town of Sebastopol, with its forts, and arsenals, and munitions of war.

When during the past year the Russian forces invaded the dominions of His Highness the Sultan, the Sovereigns of England and France, in close alliance, despatched their fleets and armies to save him from the danger by which he was threatened.

From the day when war was declared, the Russian fleets sought

safety within their fortified ports ; and have never dared to meet the allied force upon the sea.

The defences of Bomarsund have been captured and destroyed. The great naval arsenal of Sweaborg has been bombarded—its magazines exploded—its stores of material and its buildings burned.

The coasts of Russia have everywhere been blockaded. Her commerce has been extinguished ; and her merchant navy no longer exists.

The Russian Army was speedily compelled to retire from the Turkish Provinces which it had invaded ; and the Russian Territories were invaded in their turn.

Since that time the allies have defeated the Russians in three great battles within the Crimea ;—have forced them to abandon their forts along the whole Circassian shore ;—and have swept and ravaged all their coasts ; while at the same time they have been laying constant siege to the mighty fortress of Sebastopol.

This great siege, without a parallel in the annals of war, has now been crowned with triumphant success.

Garrisoned by a numerous army—stored with unbounded resources—and defended by our enemies with the utmost gallantry, determination and skill, Sebastopol has nevertheless been compelled to yield. The town, the dockyard, the arsenals, and forts have fallen into the hands of the allies. Four thousand pieces of artillery, and enormous quantities of warlike stores, have been captured in the place. Lastly, the Russian navy in the Black Sea, which consisted of more than one hundred ships-of-war, carrying upwards of two thousand guns, has been utterly demolished ; and all its vessels have been burnt, sunk, or destroyed.

For the great and glorious victory which has thus been vouchsafed to their arms, the allied Sovereigns have already offered up their sacrifice of gratitude to Almighty God.

The Governor-General, desirous that their example should be followed throughout the British Dominions in the East, proposes that on the second day of December Public Thanksgiving should be offered to Almighty God for the signal and repeated successes which have been gained during the present war by Her Majesty's forces, and by those of Her allies, and especially for the capture of the town of Sebastopol.

The Governor-General directs that this proclamation shall be read to all the troops, and promulgated throughout the country ; and that the glorious tidings which it conveys shall be welcomed by a royal salute in every station of the Indian army.



Attempts at Municipal legislation had been made in India by Act X of 1842 and Act XXVI of 1850. The former Act never really came into operation and was repealed in 1850 as having proved ineffectual, and the latter Act, which was of a permissive character, had, though largely applied in the N. W. Provinces and Bombay, remained almost a dead letter in the rest of India. But the *Chaukidari*, or local Police Act of 1856 was brought into operation chiefly in Bengal and the N. W. Provinces. Its main object was to provide for the watch and ward of the places to which it was extended. No previous application from the inhabitants was necessary, and all authority was really vested in the Magistrate. A *panchayat*, or Committee, was nominated by him of at least five members, whose duty it was to assess upon the inhabitants the rates to be paid to meet the demand on the place, but their proceedings were subject to revision by the Magistrate. He also appointed the *chaukidars*, fixed their rates of pay and determined what additional sums were required for the collecting and other establishments, &c. Any further sum available after defraying the expenses of the *chaukidars* might be devoted to cleansing, lighting or otherwise improving the town. The tax to be levied under the Act might be either an assessment according to the circumstances and property to be protected of the persons liable to pay it, or a rate on houses and ground according to the annual value thereof. Government was to determine which form the tax should take: and maximum payments were fixed at low rates. Before its repeal this Act was in force only in small towns, or large villages, or groups of villages.

Municipal Government in Calcutta dates from 1840. In that year the town was divided into four divisions, and the Government was empowered, on the application of two-thirds of the rate-payers in any division, to entrust to them the assessment, collection and management of the rates on a scheme to be approved by Government. But this self-working system never worked, for not a single application was made to Government under the Act. Then followed experiments with seven Commissioners, with four and three. In 1856, Municipal legislation was undertaken by the Government of India for the Presidency towns. By Act XIV of that year provision was made for the conservancy and improvement

of the town of Calcutta (and other Presidency towns), the responsibility being vested in "the Municipal Commissioners," meaning the persons, however designated, constituted to administer the funds for the purpose. Act XXV provided for the assessment and collection of municipal rates and taxes in those towns, and, by Act XXVIII, three Municipal Commissioners were to be appointed by the Lieutenant-Governor for the conservancy and improvement of Calcutta, and power was given them to raise additional funds for drainage and lighting. These powers were utilized : in March 1859, the Municipal Commissioners submitted Messrs. Rendels' report on their Engineer's, Mr. Clark's, scheme for the drainage and sewerage of the town.

In 1856 the Excise Law (*i. e.*, the law to regulate the liquor-traffic) of Bengal was amended and consolidated.

Excise,

In no subject has the policy of Government more constantly oscillated than it has in Excise, between *sadar* distilleries and outstills, and perhaps the last word has not yet been said. The following extracts from an important despatch of 1890 will show how the pendulum swung to and fro for exactly hundred years in Bengal. The variations subsequent to 1856, will be described more fully as they occurred.

"In Bengal, in the period immediately preceding British rule, the tax on spirits and drugs was for the most part levied, like other taxes, through the agency of the *samindars* or tax farmers ; and the Bengal Excise Commission (of 1883) recorded their opinion that under that system "it is probable that there was a practically unrestricted system of outstills paying very low rates in many places." In other words, the system which the British Government found universally in force in Bengal was the worst form of the most inefficient system that has ever prevailed in the country. This system was necessarily continued for some time under British rule : under it the price of spirit was less than it has ever been anywhere in Bengal since the modern excise system was introduced in 1790, and complaints were then rife about the spread of drunkenness among the lower classes of the people.

"In 1790 the Bengal Government determined, on moral grounds, to resume from the *samindars* the right of collecting duties on spirits and drugs, the immoderate use of spirituous liquors and drugs, "which had become prevalent among many of the lower orders of people owing to the very inconsiderable price at which they were manufactured and sold

previous to 1790", being stated in the preamble of one of the Regulations as a reason for the new rules. This was the first step taken in the direction of reform, and the ground then gained has never been lost, as the number of shops has since that date been always limited by Government and not left to be settled as caprice or the cupidity of individual land-owners dictated. The Regulations issued between 1790 and 1800 prohibited the levying of a tax on the manufacture or sale of liquors except on the part of Government, and manufacture or sale without a license from the Collector; a daily tax was levied on each still, and the officials were instructed to reduce as much as possible the number of licenses, and to fix on stills the highest rates which could be levied without operating as a prohibition. The system thus introduced was an outstill system: each license was for one still only.

"In 1813 an attempt was made to introduce central distilleries in large towns, outstill licenses being prohibited within eight miles of any such distillery. Twenty-one central distilleries were opened; but after a few years' experience the opinion was formed that the measure had not in general been productive of the advantage expected to be derived from it, and the distilleries were closed in all districts except five.

"After 1824 the farming system, with certain restrictions more or less strictly enforced, was tried, and the system was extended to nearly the whole province.

"This in its turn was found to be open to objection, to lead to an encouragement of consumption, and to involve a sacrifice of revenue, by which the farmer alone benefited; and from 1840 changes were introduced which resulted in the general re-introduction of the outstill system except in a few places where central distilleries were continued.

"In 1856, by Act XXI of that year, the Excise Law of Lower Bengal and the North-Western Provinces was consolidated and amended. The manufacture of spirit after the English method was confined to duly licensed distilleries, and the rate of duty on such spirit was fixed at one rupee a gallon: the customs duty on imported spirit was then Re. 1-8-0 a gallon. Collectors were to issue licenses to any person for the manufacture of country spirit: they were also authorized to establish distilleries for the manufacture of country spirit and to fix limits within which no liquor, except that manufactured at such distillery, should be sold, and no stills established or worked. There is no mention in the Act of the levy of a fixed rate of duty per gallon on the produce of such distilleries; the Boards of Revenue were merely given a general power to prescribe the conditions on which spirits might be manufactured at them. The levy of a tax or duty on licenses for retail sale was pre-

scribed, and generally wide powers were given for the restriction and taxation of the trade in spirits and drugs.

"In 1859 the Government of India suggested to all Local Governments the expediency on moral and fiscal grounds, of extending the central distillery system, with a fixed rate of duty per gallon, to many populous localities, if not universally. The Bengal Government adopted this view, thinking that the measure would render it possible to increase the rate of tax and discourage consumption. The system was accordingly introduced almost universally throughout the province in the next few years, the objections of local officials that in many places the system could not be worked successfully being over-ruled.

"Before the end of the decade numerous objections to this wholesale measure were forced on the attention of the Government, and in 1874 several memorials were received praying that steps might be taken to counteract the growing increase of drinking and drunkenness. The objections to the universal adoption of central distilleries were so strong that it was decided to re-introduce outstills in certain places ; from 1871 steps in this direction were taken, and after 1877 the reaction was carried to very great lengths, and outstills again became the general rule, central distilleries being the exception.

"A few years' experience of this system proved that, while it was not open to the objection of forcing the people to illicit practices, it was open to that of insufficiently discouraging drinking, as, in some cases, it admitted of liquor being sold at very low rates. This consideration led to the appointment of the Bengal Excise Commission in 1883 and since the Report of that Commission was received the Government has been engaged in correcting the evils arising from the excessive reaction in favour of the outstill system ; the central distillery system is being re-introduced wherever there is a prospect of its being worked with satisfactory results : and the measures for regulating outstills recommended by the Commission are being adopted.

"This brief notice of Bengal is sufficient to show that since 1790, when the worst conceivable system existed, taken over from the previous Native Government, attempts have been continually made to introduce the sounder and more scientific practice of levying a fixed duty on each gallon of spirit, and that the errors committed have generally been the introduction of reforms in too great haste, and the consequent reaction and reversion to stricter systems which invariably followed. The question of the comparative merits of the central distillery and the outstill in particular localities is one on which there may be, and is, great difference of opinion, because their relative advantages cannot

be tested by figures. The danger of the immediate future is that the reaction against the outstill system may now be carried too far. But one branch of the excise question refers to the number of shops, and the rates of duty. If the number of shops has not been increased, and the rates of duty not lowered, still more if the number of shops has been reduced and the rate of duty raised wherever a fixed duty levied, it will be clear that in these respects at least there has been no relaxation in the restrictions on drinking."

In 1856 a Bill was brought in by Sir J. P. Grant, as Member of Council, and passed as Act XV, to remove all legal obstacles to the marriage of Hindu widows. This had long been a subject of controversy, which was thus settled once for all. The preamble of the Act itself contains sufficient reasons for its enactment :—

The Hindu Widows Remarriage Act.

"Whereas it is known that, by the law as administered in the Civil Courts established in the territories in the possession and under the Government of the East India Company, Hindu widows with certain exceptions are held to be, by reason of their having been once married, incapable of contracting a second valid marriage, and the offspring of such widows by any second marriage are held to be illegitimate and incapable of inheriting property :

and whereas many Hindus believe that this imputed legal incapacity, although it is in accordance with established custom, is not in accordance with a true interpretation of the precepts of their religion, and desire that the Civil law administered by the Courts of Justice shall no longer prevent those Hindus who may be so minded from adopting a different custom, in accordance with the dictates of their own consciences :

and whereas it is just to relieve all such Hindus from this legal incapacity of which they complain : and the removal of all legal obstacles to the marriage of Hindu widows will tend to the promotion of good morals and to the public welfare" ; it was enacted &c. &c.

The first clause of the Act was—"No marriage contracted between Hindus shall be invalid and the issue of no such marriage shall be illegitimate by reason of the woman having been previously married or betrothed to another person who was dead at the time of such marriage, any custom and any interpretation of Hindu law to the contrary notwithstanding." Much has been written and might be written on the policy of passing this law and on its effect on Hindu Society.

The Police of a Province is one of the first matters requiring attention: and in no Province of India was the Police force more in need of improvement than in Bengal. Sir George Campbell wrote thus in his *Modern India*, in 1852 :—

“In Bengal Proper, on the contrary, both the police and people are effeminate, and the former has attained an unfortunate notoriety as being more active for evil than good. The misdeeds of the Bengal police may be a good deal exaggerated, but they are doubtless inefficient and apt to be corrupt. The chance of efficiency seems to be much lessened by the precautions which it is necessary to take against extortion and malversation on their part. A Bengal Inspector, instead of being an active, soldier-like man, mounted on a pony, is generally an obese individual, clad in fine linen, who can hardly walk, and would think it death to get on horseback, who is carried about in a palanquin on men's shoulders, and affects rather a judicial than a thief-catching character. When a serious crime occurs, he *first* writes an elaborate report, and perhaps intimates his intention of proceeding *next day* to investigate the case; and, when he does go, he takes up his quarters in the village, and, summoning all and sundry to appear before him, holds his court. This is just the man to suit a prosecutor who gets up his own case at his own discretion and produces his own witnesses, but little is gained by an unfortunate, stripped by *dacoits*, who finds the Inspector quartered upon him, taking useless depositions. But, after all the great cause of crime in Bengal is the effeminacy of the people, who do not defend themselves against either *dacoits* or Police. It is certain that, at this moment, in many districts of Bengal, the inhabitants are not only in danger of secret thieves but of open robbers; that gang-robberies are frequent, and any man's house may be invaded in the night by armed force.”

Sir George Campbell referred to the same subject in his Administration Report for 1871-2. “It has been said that in Bengal the rich and powerful have been less restrained and the poor less protected than in other provinces and up to that time (the mutiny) this was so in the most literal sense of the word. There was in the interior of Bengal a lawlessness and high-handed defiance of authority by people who took the law into their own hands by open violence, which would not have been tolerated for a moment in any other part of India. It required all the energies of the first Lieutenant-Governor to deal with these and other patent evils.”

Sir John Strachey has described\* Bengal as having been, in 1853, the most backward of the provinces of the Empire. "There were almost no roads or bridges or schools, and there was no proper protection to life and property. The police was worthless and robberies and violent crimes by gangs of armed men, which were unheard of in other provinces were common not far from Calcutta. From the date of the appointment of a Lieutenant-Governor, a great change began and constant improvement has been going on ever since. The Courts have been purified, the police has been organised, crimes of violence have almost ceased."

Subsequent to the abolition of the office of Superintendent of Police for the Lower Provinces in 1853, the Commissioners of Circuit had the general control of the Police in their Divisions, submitting their periodical returns and annual reports regarding each district, direct to Government. The Magistrate of each district was held responsible for the actual management of his own police and was bound to keep the Commissioner constantly informed of all his proceedings, being entitled to the assistance and support of the Commissioner in all cases of difficulty. There was then also a Commissioner for the suppression of *Dacoity*, working through a system of approvers. In the years 1854-57, the question of the best form of police administration in Bengal was much discussed. Lord Dalhousie, in his last despatch as Governor of Bengal to the Government of India on the 28th of April 1854, held that the separation of the offices of Magistrate and Collector had been an error and that the true theory of Government in India was the entire subjection of every Civil Officer in a Division to the Commissioner at the head of it. Sir J. P. Grant, as Member of Council, in more than one minute strongly opposed the reunion of the offices of Magistrate and Collector; Sir F. Halliday, as Lieutenant-Governor, as strongly advocated it. The Governor-General (Lord Canning) in the minute of the 18th February 1857 expressed his opinion that reason, no less than experience, pointed to the necessity of concentrating the whole executive power of the Government in each district of Bengal in the hands of one experienced man. He thought the division of authority was to be avoided rather than sought. As regards the people, he fully believed that the

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\* (India, Edition 1894)

patriarchal form of Government was in their present condition most congenial to them and best understood by them: and, as regards the governing power, "the concentration of all responsibility upon one officer cannot fail to keep his attention alive, and to stimulate his energy in every department to the utmost whilst it will preclude the growth of those obstructions to good Government which are apt to spring up where two co-ordinate officers divide the authority."

While this question of the separation of the offices of Magistrate and Collector in Bengal was under discussion, many allusions were made to the old cry of the inadequacy of the Police. For instance Sir J. P. Grant wrote "It is very true that we are pressed with the sense of police affairs in Bengal being amiss now. But what is the root of the evil? No one denies that police affairs in Bengal will continue amiss, till an adequate constabulary force and trusty native officials in the *thanas* are provided for it, till Bengal shall be put on an equal footing in this respect with the rest of India:" and Sir F. Halliday, in March 1855, "It is stated with perfect justice, that one great cause, perhaps the greatest, of the present inefficiency of the police is the want of an adequate constabulary force," and, "I suppose that every body will agree in desiring that the constabulary force should be as large and the pay of the police as high as the nature of the service requires, and the Government finances can afford." Sir F. Halliday's suggestions for the improvement of the *mufassal* police assumed definite shape in April 1855. It was proposed not to touch the pay of the police *darogas* which had been raised in 1843: but to raise the *muharrirs* to three grades of Rs. 40, Rs. 35, and Rs. 30 a month, the *jamdars* to three ranks of Rs. 20, Rs. 15, and Rs. 10 a month, and the *barkandazes* to Rs. 6, Rs. 5 and Rs. 4 a month: the total increase per annum amounting to Rs. 3,38,609. It was admitted that the outlay though considerable could not be regarded as final, as the police establishment was numerically weaker than it should be for the protection of property and the preservation of good order. The official application concluded thus: "The immediate object of the outlay now proposed is to remove what has hitherto been a standing reproach of Indian Administration in Bengal, and the Lieutenant-Governor would urge the matter upon the attention of



the Supreme Government with an expression of earnest hope that a public measure which is in his opinion surpassed by *no other* in importance, may be recommended to the Hon'ble Court. The inadequate payment of the subordinate officers of police was one of the matters, it may be remarked, which formed the subject of investigation before the late Parliamentary Committee appointed to enquire into the operation of the Charter Act of 1834." The Government of India passed no immediate orders on this application of the Bengal Government. On the 4th. June 1856 the local Government again pressed the question, by submitting an elaborate minute (of ninety-three paragraphs, with annexures) dated the 30th. April 1856 by Sir F. Halliday on the improvement of the police and the administration of criminal justice in Bengal. He admitted the badness of the *mufassal* police, and the insufficiency of the measures previously taken to improve them: he regarded the thirty-three subdivisional Magistracies then existing as too few to exercise adequate control: and he dwelt on the corrupt state of the village *chaukidars*. At the same time he considered that it would be vain to improve the agency for the detection and apprehension of criminals unless the agency for trying them was also improved: "no doubt the badness of the police and the inefficiency of the tribunals act and react on each other, and both are concerned in bringing about the deplorable existing circumstances."... "Whether right or wrong the general native opinion is that the administration of criminal justice is little better than a lottery, in which however the best chances are with the criminals; and I think this also is very much the opinion of the European *mufassal* community . . . —the corruption and extortion of the police, which causes it to be popularly said that *dacoity* is bad enough, but the subsequent police inquiry very much worse." The inexperience of the Magistrates did not escape notice. Sir F. Halliday considered five measures indispensably necessary—(1) the improvement of the character and position of the village *chaukidars* or watchmen, (2) adequate salaries and fair prospects of advancement to the stipendiary police, (3) the appointment of more experienced officers as covenanted *zilla* Magistrates, (4) a considerable increase in the number of uncovenanted or Deputy Magistrates, (5) improvement in the Criminal Courts of justice. He asked for one

hundred more Deputy Magistrates, and for the junction of judicial and executive power in all Magistrates. As to (5) above many suggestions were offered. The assistance afforded by good roads to the police was mentioned; and he advocated the encouragement of good service among the *amla* and the institution of a Civil Order of Merit for natives. Sir F. Halliday also recapitulated the arguments for and against the extended employment of rich and powerful *zamindars* and planters in the *mufassal* as Honorary Magistrates, but did not recommend the measure for immediate adoption. Finally he dwelt upon the importance of a popular system of vernacular education, as sure to prove cheaper and more enduringly profitable than the best system of administration by the most efficient and costly establishments.

Lord Canning, in the minute of 18th February 1857, already quoted, proposed to reorganize the police of Bengal, without waiting for a plan applicable to the whole of India, and to sanction the additional charges asked for by Sir F. Halliday. In writing to the Court of Directors in May 1857, the Government of India unanimously reported that the appointment of one Police Commissioner for the whole of the Lower Provinces was not expedient and that the Commissioners should exercise authority over the police as well as other branches of the executive. They also recommended a moveable corps of military police for each Division, to be ready to assist the civil police in case of need, being employed ordinarily in station and escort duties. In consequence of the Sonthal insurrection, the Government of India determined on permanently locating a second regiment or irregular cavalry in Bengal, and, with reference to the apparent necessity for more troops also, asked Sir F. Halliday what additional troops would suffice and where they should be placed. The opportunity was taken of recommending a scheme for raising a body of military police for the internal defence of Bengal, by which, if well organized and officered, the peace of the country might be preserved, even on such occasions as the Sonthal insurrection, with very small or no assistance from regular troops and at a much smaller expense. A force was sanctioned, to consist of a battalion of foot of 100 sepoys, and of a *risala* of 100 *sawars*. The corps was raised near Lahore and sufficiently organized for ordinary military purposes by October 1856.

was marched down under its commandant, Captain Rattray, and was completing its drill at Suri when the Mutinies broke out. The whole Corps volunteered to go out against the insurgents and was most actively and usefully employed. In 1858, a military police corps was sanctioned, with a strength of 900 for each of the 10 battalions, all under Major Rattray as Inspector; but for reasons of economy not more than 700 per battalion were enrolled. These battalions were largely recruited from the rude but hardy tribes of the Non-Regulation Provinces, each consisting of men of the same race. The military police at Chittagong were of great use soon after their formation, in repelling an incursion of the Kukis upon the eastern frontier, and in quieting excitement among the *rajpats* of the indigo districts: by a display of force in suitable places all tendency to riot and violent disturbance was suppressed. In 1856-57 it was brought to the notice of Government that several daring cases of robbery upon travellers and attacks upon the Government bullock train had lately been committed on the Grand Trunk road and that the density of the jungles skirting the road in many parts afforded thieves and plunderers convenient shelter to ambuscade while watching the approach of their victims. Government resolved to extend the clearance of jungle on each side of the road from 50 to 200 yards, to increase and reorganize the road police force, to build additional station-houses, about  $1\frac{1}{2}$  to  $3\frac{1}{2}$  miles apart, and to ensure more vigilant and active supervision over the police.

Some idea of the want of means of communication in Bengal may be formed from the following facts. In Communications, 1855-6 an Engineer Officer was still engaged in preparing detailed plans and estimates and investigating the question of the best starting point for the Calcutta-Darjeeling road from the Ganges in 1856-7 preference was provisionally given to a road from Caragola Ghat, opposite the intended Railway Station at Pirpainti, to run through Purnea and Kissenganj to Titalya and there join the existing road to Darjeeling. The cost was assumed at 21 lakhs of rupees. The whole road, from Caragola Ghat to Siliguri, 126 miles, was not complete in 1861-2: by that date it was not metalled, and the bridging of five large rivers still remained to be carried out: in 1864-65 one river was still unbridged. The cart Road from Siliguri to Darjeeling, (then supposed to be 62 miles

in length), was only commenced in 1861-62 at the two ends, Kurseong and the Saddle: nothing had then been done towards the formation of the road from Kurseong to the plains. In the year 1855-56, a Committee was appointed to consider the project of bridging the Hooghly at or near Calcutta, and submitted its report. This project was dropped in 1859-60. In 1855-56 the Calcutta-Jessore Road had been sanctioned. The project of the Cuttack Road was submitted to the Court of Directors, as it was to cost nearly 9 *lakhs*. Four streams on the Grand Trunk Road remained to be bridged. And (to anticipate a little) there were in 1861-62 in Bengal 11 Imperial Trunk Roads existing or under construction, extending over 199½ miles, with Imperial branch roads aggregating 1145 miles: the Grand Trunk Road from Calcutta to the Karamnassa was nearly completed. It was expected that these roads would take 167 *lakhs*, to complete them, whereas the funds available were only 7 to 8 *lakhs* a year. Schemes were plentiful enough but the means and time were wanting.

No better account of the early beginnings of railways in Bengal is likely to be forthcoming than that recorded by <sup>Railways :</sup> The E. I. Railway Lord Dalhousie in his final minute of 28th February 1856, from which the following paragraphs are taken :—

“The subject of railway communication in India was first laid before the Supreme Government by Mr. Macdonald Stephenson, in 1843. In 1849 the Hon'ble Company engaged in a contract with the East Indian Railway Company, for the construction of an experimental line at a cost not exceeding one million sterling. The line was to be selected with a view to its forming a portion of a future trunk line to the North-Western Provinces. On that ground the section from Howrah towards Rajmahal was chosen, with a branch to the Coal field at Raniganj. In the cold weather of 1851, a line was surveyed between Burdwan and Rajmahal. In the following season that survey was continued to Allahabad.

In the Spring of 1853 the Government of India submitted to the Court of Directors its views upon the general question of railways for the Indian Empire. The Hon'ble Court was respectfully advised to encourage the formation of railways in India to the utmost. It was urged not to hesitate to engage in the enterprise upon a scale commensurate to the vast extent of the territories which had been placed under its Government, and to the great political and commercial interests which

were involved. It was specifically recommended that, in the first instance, a system of trunk lines should be formed, connecting the interior of each Presidency with its principal port, and connecting the several Presidencies with each other.

The trunk lines which were proposed, and of which the general direction could alone be given, were,—1st.—A line from Calcutta to Lahore : 2nd.—A line from Agra, or some point in Hindustan, to Bombay, or alternatively a line from Bombay by the Narbada valley to meet at some point the line from Calcutta to Lahore : 3rd.—A line uniting Bombay and Madras : 4th.—A line from Madras to the Malabar coast. The Hon'ble Court was pleased to give its approval to the general plan which the Supreme Government had sketched.

Some progress has already been made in the construction of most of these lines ; and measures have been taken for the construction of them all in due course of time. In the Bengal Presidency, the line from Calcutta to Raniganj, a distance of 120 miles, was opened on the 3rd. February 1855. The Court of Directors has sanctioned the construction of a line from Burdwan to Delhi, on a capital of £10,000,000 sterling. The direction of the line from Burdwan to Allahabad having been previously approved, that from Allahabad to Cawnpore was sanctioned in June 1854, from Cawnpore to near Agra in December 1854, and thence *via* Agra and Muttra to Delhi in November 1855. Surveys of two alternative lines from Delhi or Agra to Lahore were executed in 1854-55 : additional surveys have been authorized from Mirzapur to Jabalpur, and from Cawnpore to Bhilsa.

It has been stated above that the trunk line from Calcutta to Burdwan, with a branch to Raniganj, has already been opened. It is expected that the section of this trunk line which lies between Mirzapur and Agra (except the bridge over the Jamna at Allahabad) will be completed by the end of 1857 and arrangements are in progress for opening this portion of the line separately. It is further expected that the section between Burdwan and Rajmahal will be completed in 1858, and the remainder probably not till 1859."

In fact the East India Railway was opened to the Ajai river in October 1858 : to Rajmahal in October 1859 : to Bhagalpur in 1861 : to Monghyr in February 1862 : and to Benares (541 miles) in December 1862.

Sir Charles Wood, President of the Board of Control, having in January 1855 drawn the attention of the Court of Directors to the numerous discrepancies to be found in the salaries of corresponding officers under the different

Presidencies, the Government of India on the 15th March 1855 appointed Mr. (afterwards Sir) H. Ricketts, B. C. S., Member of the Board of Revenue, to be Commissioner for the revision of civil salaries and establishments throughout India. His duty was to equalise salaries and duties all over India, and reduce as far as possible the aggregate expenditure. Thus every appointment came under scrutiny in Bengal as in the rest of India. Sir H. Ricketts presented an exhaustive report to the Government of India on the 1st September 1858; and on the 3rd June 1859 the Government of India reviewed his report in a despatch addressed to Lord Stanley, then Secretary of State. The principles on which Sir H. Ricketts conducted the revision were considered generally to be unobjectionable; but Government excepted the measure by which he proposed to open certain appointments to all classes of servants, and award the same salary to the incumbents without reference to class, whether they were Civilians, or Military Officers, East Indians or Natives. Whereas Sir H. Ricketts had recommended reductions in salaries amounting to Rs. 11,20,435 a year, as compared with existing salaries, the Government recommended a reduction of Rs. 10,33,423. Sir H. Ricketts proposed a reduction of 12.15 per cent in the aggregate pay of the officers of the Judicial and Land Revenue Departments in Bengal. Including proposed improvements in many departments, his recommendations would have resulted, on the whole, in an annual increase of Rs. 9,81,457 *per annum*. I can trace no comprehensive orders on this Report, and have always understood that no orders were passed on it as a whole.

In the year 1856-57, some remarkable correspondence took place on the subject of the Hindu Festival called *Charak Puja*.

The Court of Directors having remarked that, if  
 Charak Puja.  
 the practice of swinging on *Charak* was found to be attended with cruelty, and liable to be enforced without the free consent of parties submitting to it, Government would doubtless consider what measures should be adopted, an inquiry was made whether the existing law was sufficient for preventing the crime, or whether special measures were required. Before reports were received, however, the Court of Directors wrote again saying that they preferred that endeavours for the suppression of this practice should be based on the exertion of influence rather than upon any

act of authority. At the same time the Calcutta Missionary Conference memorialised Government, not asking for interference with the religious ceremony of the *Charak Puja*, but for the suppression of the cruelties, the acts of barbarism and suffering, which accompanied its celebration during the three principal days of the festival. "These devotees," it was said, "cast themselves on thorns and upraised knives; they pierce their arms or tongues by iron arrows, draw strings through the flesh of their sides, or fix thereto spikes that are heated by continually burning fire, while others swing on the *Charak* tree by hooks fastened through the muscles of their backs." After careful consideration Sir F. Halliday came to the conclusion that, as the case was one of pain voluntarily undergone, the remedy must be left to the Missionary and the school-master, and that, as stated by the Court of Directors, all such cruel ceremonies must be discouraged by influence rather than by authority.

During his term of office Sir F. Halliday made extensive  
 Tours,                    tours, visiting every considerable station under  
                              his control except Assam and including the  
 opium agency at Ghazipur in the N. W. Provinces. His  
 tours were for the first time recorded in 1856-57. The  
 tour commenced on the 30th. June and terminated on the 7th.  
 September 1856. It was mainly a water expedition and comprised  
 a visit to the river stations of Berhampore, Murshidabad, Rajmahal,  
 Bhagalpur, Monghyr, Barh, Patna, Chapra, Ghazipur, Purnea and  
 Malda were also visited. The steamer and yacht were nearly wrecked  
 in a severe gale a little above Rampur Boalia. Sir F. Halliday  
 subsequently proceeded to Calcutta by the unusual route of the  
 Mathablianga, to observe the state of the Nadia district. It  
 was evidently a year of high floods, as the whole country was one  
 sheet of water, so that it was difficult to distinguish even the course  
 of the river, and the villages, except those on the higher lands, were  
 nearly submerged. "The Lieutenant-Governor made a practice at  
 each station of inspecting the several public offices, the school, the  
 library, the jail, the dispensary, and any other public institution  
 belonging to the place; and all matters demanding his consideration  
 were brought forward, discussed and investigated on the spot, with  
 all the advantage which personal communication usually ensures,

The Lieutenant-Governor also gave his immediate attention to all representations, petitions and complaints that were submitted to him by the people, to whom, both high and low, every facility of access was given. Public darbars were held at Berhampore and Dacca." I have thus quoted the original record of the work done on these tours, as it contains a description applicable to all of them, and need not be repeated. In December Sir F. Halliday visited Burdwan, Raniganj, and Bankura: travelling chiefly by the East Indian Railway. On the 15th. January 1857, he proceeded, *via* the Sundarbans, to Rampur Boalia where his camp had been formed, and marched through Dinajpur and Rangpur, to determine on the best site for a new Cantonment for a regiment of Native Infantry and two troops of Irregular Cavalry in that direction. The Government of India were at that time contemplating measures against the Government of Bhutan, to punish them for past outrages and restrain them for the future. In a minute of the 5th. March 1857, Sir F. Halliday proposed, as a punitive measure, to take possession not of all the Bengal (*sic*) Duars, but of the territory acquired by Bhutan by our cessions of 1780-84 and 1787. For the execution of this threat the advance of troops beyond Rangpur was required, and, after full consideration on the spot, he recommended that the Cantonment should be located at Jalpaiguri, and this was the site finally chosen. He then proceeded to Darjeeling for a few weeks and was there when the Mutinies began. He immediately returned to Calcutta.

Sir John Kaye has recorded the influence which Sir F. Halliday had over Lord Canning. During the early months of the Mutinies, when proposals were being made for the disarming of the whole native population and every native soldier was under suspicion of being disaffected, Lord Canning had persistently refused to disarm his own bodyguard or to substitute a European guard for the Sepoy sentries at Government House. Sir John Kaye writes: 'At last, Mr. Halliday, Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, who had come down to the Presidency from Darjeeling (early in June 1857), so wrought upon the Governor-General by telling him that his duty to his country demanded that he should take every precaution to protect a life, which at such a time was of incalculable value, that he began reluctantly to yield, and to bethink himself of consenting to the change which had been so often vainly pressed upon him,



"It was no easy task that Halliday had set himself and it was not easily accomplished. Time did something to mitigate the difficulty, for the general disaffection of the Bengal Army was every week becoming more apparent. But the personal influence of the Lieutenant-Governor did more. Lord Canning said of him afterwards, that for many months he had been the "right hand of the Government." A man of commanding stature and altogether of a goodly presence, he looked like one born to command. He had all his life been a steady robust workman, and he had brought to his work no small amount of natural ability and administrative sagacity of the most serviceable kind. His lot had been cast in the hitherto tranquil regions of Bengal. No opportunity of proving his powers in action had been afforded to him; but his sufficiency in council had won the confidence of successive Governments, and in all that related to the Lower Provinces there was no man whose experiences were of greater value. To Lord Canning, who, wisely or unwisely, had been chary of his confidences to those immediately about him, the arrival of Mr. Halliday had been extremely welcome, and from that time there was no member of the Government whom he so frequently consulted or whose opinions he so much respected. But still only by repeatedly urging upon the Governor-General that his life belonged to his country, and that he had no right to expose it to any unnecessary risks, could his Lieutenant induce him to allow the order to be issued for European guards to be posted at Government House. It was not, indeed until the month of August had expired that the European guard marched into the compound of Government House, under the immediate orders of the Lieutenant-Governor\*."

*Per contra*, Sir H. S. Cunningham records another incident, with reference to Lord Canning's nobility of character—"Sir F. Halliday narrates how, on one occasion, when the outcry against him was loudest, Lord Canning showed him papers, illustrating the scandalous brutality of certain of the special tribunals. The Lieutenant-Governor urged their publication, by way of reply to his calumniators. "No," said Lord Canning, taking the papers and locking them up in his drawer, "I had rather submit to any obloquy than publish to the world what would so terribly disgrace

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\* This was either on the 31st. of August or the 1st. of September.

my countrymen. It is sufficient that I have prevented them for the future”.

It is not my purpose to give a general history of the Mutinies, which would involve an incursion into regions far beyond the purview of this work. But it cannot be overlooked that the Mutinies absorbed all thoughts, and so dislocated the machinery of Government—both the Supreme and the Local—that little else could be attended to during 1857 and part of 1858. Sir F. Halliday himself was obliged to be in such frequent and close personal communication with Lord Canning that he had to take rooms overlooking Government House and repair to them daily for the transaction, at much inconvenience, of the business which he, as Lieutenant-Governor, usually conducted at Belvedere, 3 miles out of Calcutta. It will be remembered that the first indications of the troubles to come were manifested in Lower Bengal. Early in 1857 the rumour of the greased cartridges was spread at Dum-Dum: the 19th. N. I. mutinied at Berhampore on the 26th of February and were disbanded on the 31st. March at Barrackpore; the affair of Mungul Panday of the 34th. N. I. and the misconduct of that regiment occurred also at Barrackpore on the 29th. March, leading after full inquiry, to their disbandment on the 6th. May. The air was full of rumours: and accordingly the Government of India issued the following Proclamation of the 16th. May 1857, under the signature of Sir C. Beadon, Secretary in the Home Department: it may be here quoted, as it applied to Bengal and was published in Calcutta:—

“The Governor-General of India in Council has warned the Army of Bengal, that the tales by which the men of certain Regiments have been led to suspect that offence to their Religion or injury to their caste is meditated by the Government of India are malicious falsehoods. The Governor-General in Council has learnt that this suspicion continues to be propagated by designing and evil-minded men, not only within the Army but amongst other classes of the people. He knows that endeavours are made to persuade Hindus and Muhammadans, Soldiers and Civil Subjects, that their religion is threatened secretly, as well as openly, by the acts of the Government, and that the Government is seeking in various ways to entrap them into a loss of Caste for purposes of its own. Some have been already deceived and led astray

by these tales. Once more then the Governor-General in Council warns all classes against the deceptions that are practised on them.

“The Government of India has invariably treated the religious feelings of all its subjects with careful respect. The Governor-General in Council has declared that it will never cease to do so. He now repeats that declaration, and he emphatically proclaims that the Government of India entertains no desire to interfere with their Religion or Caste, and that nothing has been, or will be done by the Government to affect the free exercise of the observances of Religion or Caste by every class of the people. The Government of India has never deceived its subjects ; therefore the Governor-General in Council now calls upon them to refuse their belief to seditious lies. This notice is addressed to those who hitherto, by habitual loyalty and orderly conduct, have shown their attachment to the Government and a well-founded faith in its protection and justice.

The Governor-General-in-Council enjoins all such persons to pause before they listen to false Guides and Traitors who would lead them into danger and disgrace.”

The feeling of insecurity was so great in Calcutta in the month of June that, with some hesitation, the Governor-General yielded to the demand for the enrolment of Volunteers : and on the 13th. the following Notification was issued—

The Calcutta  
Volunteer Guards:  
the Bengal Yeomanry Cavalry.

“The Right Hon'ble the Governor-General-in-Council has received from the inhabitants of Calcutta many offers to serve as Volunteers in aid of the Authority of Government, and for the preservation of the Security and Order of the City, should any attempt at disturbance take place therein. The Governor-General-in-Council accepts these offers, and, in doing so, he desires to express the warm acknowledgments of the Government to those who have so zealously tendered to it their support. Accordingly all persons willing to serve in the Corps of Volunteer Guards of Calcutta, either as Horsemen or on Foot, and to place themselves as members of that Force at the disposal of the Government, are hereby invited to enrol their names and places of residence at the office of the Town Major in Fort William. The Governor-General-in-Council has been pleased to appoint Lieutenant Colonel Orfeur Cavanagh to the Command of the Volunteer Guards. Arms, accoutrements, and a plain uniform will be provided for each person enrolled”.

The Corps consisted of a battery of 4 guns, 5 troops of cavalry, and 7 companies of infantry. It answered every expectation, and

most satisfactorily performed all the duties required of it. It was broken up from the 1st. June 1859, when the crisis had passed away and confidence had been restored, so that the necessity for a special corps to aid in the protection of Calcutta no longer existed and there was no further occasion to demand the time and services of the inhabitants for the purpose. The Viceroy in the name of the Government of India, publicly acknowledged the services of the Volunteer Guards, and thanked them for the cheerful and hearty manner in which they had performed their duties at a great sacrifice of their time and convenience. By another notification of the 23rd. July 1857 the Bengal Yeomanry Cavalry Corps was formed as follows :—

“The Governor-General in Council has reason to know that there are in Calcutta, Bengal, and the North-Western provinces, many Englishmen and others whose peaceable avocations have been interrupted by the disturbed state of the country ; and who, although in no way connected with the Government, are willing and eager to give an active support to its authority at the present time by sharing service in the field with the Troops of the Queen and of the East India Company.

The Governor-General in Council has thorough confidence in the loyalty, courage, and enterprising zeal of the community to which he refers ; and he is satisfied that service, rendered in the spirit in which they are ready to give it, will be most valuable to the state.

With the view of availing himself of such service in the most effectual manner, His Lordship in Council directs that a Corps of Cavalry be formed, to be called the “Bengal Yeomanry Cavalry,” and to be equipped and prepared for duty in the disturbed districts.

The Regiment will be constituted as follows :—1 Major (Commandant) : 1 Captain (Second in Command) : 1 Adjutant : 4 Lieutenants : 8 Cornets : 1 Medical Officer : 200 Men. The Regiment will be divided into 4 Troops : 1 Lieutenant and 2 Cornets to be attached to each Troop.

Those who enlist will be provided by the Government with a horse, arms, uniform, accoutrements, and tents.

The Corps, although in spirit a Volunteer Corps, will receive pay at the following rates :—Each Trooper Rs. 100 a month, as provision for man and horse. Cornets, Rs. 160 each a month. Lieutenants, Rs. 250 each a month. Second in Command, Rs. 500 a month. The Major, the Adjutant, and the Medical Officer will be taken from the Army of Bengal.

The post of Captain (Second in command) is conferred by the

Governor-General in Council upon Mr. F. C. Chapman, whose gallant and energetic service as a Volunteer in the North-Western Provinces marks him as eminently qualified to hold it. The Lieutenants and Cornets will be chosen by the members of the Corps from amongst themselves, subject to the approval of the Governor-General in Council. The enlistment will be for one year, with the understanding that, should the Governor-General in Council require it, service is to be continued for a second year. The retirement of any member of the Corps, before the expiry of one year, will take place only with the permission of the Governor-General in Council.

The widows of those who may fall in action will receive life pensions : the widows of troopers and cornets at the rate assigned to the widows of Ensigns in the Army : the widows of the Lieutenants and Captain, at the rates assigned to those ranks in the Army”.

The feeling of alarm in Calcutta culminated on “Panic Sunday” the 14th June, which has been described by Kaye and Malleeson. The panic has been declared to have been groundless and unreasonable, but of its existence there can be no doubt, as I have heard from men who were in Calcutta at the time. Numbers of people, in higher and lower positions, sought refuge in Fort William and on board the ships in the port, and it devolved chiefly on the Town Major to reassure them and induce them to return to their own houses.

Among the measures required to deal with the crisis caused by the mutinies, it became at an early date necessary to pass a Press Act. On the 13th. of June 1857, a Bill was introduced by Lord Canning himself into the Legislative Council and on the same day became Act XV of 1857, an Act to regulate the establishment of Printing Presses and to restrain in certain cases the circulation of printed books and papers. It passed without a dissentient voice and temporarily placed the Indian Press very much in the position in which it was permanently before Sir Charles Metcalfe’s Government in 1835 passed Act XI of that year, whereby complete liberty was given to it. It may be mentioned, in passing, that on the 1st. of February 1836, the Court of Directors reprimanded the Governor-General in Council for passing an Act releasing the Press from restrictions and recorded their opinion that the passing of such an Act without a reference at home was wholly indefensible, but they abstained

from disallowing it. The framers of Act XI of 1835, when arguing in favour of the liberty of the Press in India in the ordinary state of things, recognized not only the right but the bounden duty of the Government to suspend that liberty on the possible occurrence of certain emergencies, when such a measure might become necessary for the safety of the State. An emergency of the nature contemplated having arisen, and one, it was confidently assumed, very much graver than was thought in 1835 to be within the range of probability, Act XV of 1857 was passed in the belief (confirmed by the opinions of officers of the highest character engaged at the moment in distant Provinces in supporting the British cause) that the unregulated freedom of the Press at the then pending crisis was tending strongly to the extension of revolt, and the weakening of the British power.

The Act prohibited the keeping or using of Printing Presses without license from the Government. The Government took discretionary power to grant licenses, subject to such conditions (if any) as were thought fit; it was also empowered to revoke at any time the licenses granted. The publication or circulation in India of newspapers, books, or other printed papers, of any particular description, might also be prohibited by order of the Government. The Act made no distinction between the English and native Press. There were, when it passed, more than one newspaper in the English language written, owned, and published by natives, almost exclusively for circulation among native readers, and although no fear was entertained that treasonable matter would be designedly published in any English newspaper, yet it was deemed desirable to guard in those times against errors in discretion and temper, as well as intentional sedition. The Act was applicable not only to Bengal but to all India. Its duration was limited to one year, which expired on the 13th. June 1858. The licenses above mentioned were given on certain conditions, the violation of any of which enabled Government to seize the types and presses of the offender. The conditions were as follows :—application for licenses to keep or use any printing press or types or other materials and articles for printing within the town of Calcutta were to be made to the Commissioner of Police, and the Commissioner was to forward a copy of every such application to the Government of India, in the Home

Department, from whence licenses were to be issued. The Lieutenant-Governor was authorised to grant licenses outside Calcutta, and to appoint any person to receive applications for such licenses in any part of Bengal. The conditions upon which licenses to keep or use any printing press or types or other materials or articles for printing were ordinarily to be granted, were :—

“ That no book, pamphlet, newspaper, or other work printed at such press, or with such materials or articles, shall contain any observations or statements impugning the motives or designs of the British Government either in England or in India, or in any way tending to bring the said Government into hatred or contempt, to excite disaffection or unlawful resistance to its orders, or to weaken its lawful authority, or the lawful authority of its civil or military servants :

“ That no such book, pamphlet, newspaper or other work shall contain observations or statements having a tendency to create alarm or suspicion among the native population of any intended interference by Government with their religious opinions and observances :

“ That no such book, pamphlet, newspaper or other work shall contain observations having a tendency to weaken the friendship towards the British Government of native princes, chiefs, or states in dependence upon or alliance with it.”

The above conditions were to apply equally to original matter and to matter copied from other publications.

On 29th. June it was resolved to warn the publisher of the newspaper called *The Friend of India* against a “repetition of remarks of the dangerous nature” of those in an article of the 25th. June on the “Centenary of Plassey.” Subsequently, the Law Officers of the Government were directed to take the necessary steps for bringing the Printers and publishers of the *Durbin*, the *Sultan-ul-Akhbar*, and the *Samachar Sudhabarshan* to trial before the Supreme Court on a charge of publishing seditious libels. True bills were found by the grand Jury at the Sessions against the defendants ; but the Advocate-General was authorised not to press for punishment if the defendants connected with the two former papers would plead guilty, and express contrition for their offence. This course was accordingly adopted ; the defendants pleaded guilty, and were discharged after entering into recognisances to appear and receive judgment when called upon. The third defendant was prosecuted on the charge brought against him, but the trial resulted in a verdict

of not guilty. On 3rd. July, the press called *Gulshan-i-nau-bahar* was seized, the paper of that name having published malignant articles. On 10th. September the *Hurkaru* was warned and on the 18th. suppressed, but, on an apology from the proprietor, the license was restored. Prominence has been given to this temporary Press Act, as it was required more for Bengal and Calcutta than for Upper India, owing to the comparatively advanced development of journalism in the Lower Provinces. It was called "the Gagging Act" and aroused a storm of indignation in the European community, on the ground that the European Press had been brought under the same restrictions as the native Press. This was the deliberate intention of the Governor-General who was himself in charge of the Bill. In introducing the measure in the Legislative Council on the 13th. June, he said that he saw no reason, and did not consider it possible in justice, to draw any line of demarcation between European and native publications.

It is not necessary to make more than the briefest enumeration of the other Mutiny Acts, all passed in June 1857, originally for one year, but subsequently extended until the end of 1859. They were :— No. XIV—to make further provision for the trial and punishment of certain offences relating to the army, and of offences against the State : No. XVI—to make temporary provision for the trial and punishment of heinous offences in certain districts : No. XVII—to provide temporarily for the apprehension and trial of native officers and soldiers for Mutiny and desertion. It was under Act XVI of 1857 (and under the old Regulation X of 1824) that Martial Law was proclaimed in the whole Patna Division on the 30th. July and in the whole Chota Nagpur Division on the 10th. August 1857, the functions of the ordinary Criminal Courts being thereupon suspended in those Divisions in respect of heinous offences. Early in September Government ordered the Civil and Military authorities in all districts in which martial law had been proclaimed, and in the Bhagalpur Division, to send away all European women and children of every class to Calcutta, if possible, or at any rate to some station below Rajmahal : and none were allowed to go there. On Sunday the 4th. October a Day of Special Prayer was observed in each Presidency under a Proclamation of the Governor-General. It has been remarked that, at the time of their greatest need, the



Government of India bound themselves to proceed by legal measures in the punishment of offenders against the State and disturbers of the public peace.

Though the general history of the Mutinies, including those in Upper India, does not come within the range of this work, it is necessary that some account should be given of the most important series of events in Lower Bengal of the last half of the XIXth century: and this cannot be presented in better form than in the Minute, dated the 30th. September 1858, recorded by Sir F. Halliday as Lieutenant-Governor, on "the mutinies as they affected the Lower Provinces under the Government of Bengal, 1858". No apology is required, I think, for reproducing at length so interesting a State-paper. It forms an Appendix to this Chapter.

In the section headed "Bihar Division" in his Minute on the Mutinies in Lower Bengal, Sir F. Halliday alluded briefly to the occurrences at Patna which led to the removal of Mr. W. Tayler, c. s. from his post of Commissioner of Patna and the appointment of Mr. E. A. Samuells, c. s. in his place. For some time Mr. Tayler's actions and reticence had impaired his credit with the Government: the climax was reached when his order of the 31st July 1857 was issued, withdrawing the officers from the out-stations. The decision of Sir F. Halliday to remove him from his Commissionership was conveyed to Mr. Tayler on the 4th August 1857 and concurred in by the Governor-General in Council on the 18th idem. A discussion then commenced, composed of minutes, memorials and despatches &c, which, in volume and vigour, has probably never been equalled in the annals of official literature. I have come across over 500 pages of printed matter. Mr. Tayler never ceased to plead his case up to the highest tribunals and never acknowledged defeat. The whole affair has been the subject of much controversy. Mr. Tayler's side was strongly taken by Sir J. W. Kaye,\* and by Colonel G. B. Malleon.† It is not my intention to weigh all that has been written, or to offer an opinion on the question whether Mr. Tayler was hardly treated or only received his deserts. Any attempt to do

\* Vol III, Book VII, Chapters II and IV of his *History of the Sepoy War*.

† Vol I, Book VII, Chapter II, of his *History of the Indian Mutiny*.

Removal of Mr. W. Tayler, c. s. from the Commissionership of Patna.

so would require a separate treatise to itself. The whole matter was, in reality, of no very great moment, but it was vested with a fictitious importance at the time in Calcutta by the agitation which was sedulously raised and kept alive, and by the hostility of the local daily papers to the Government: it was very differently regarded when the case reached England. Leaving those who are concerned with Mr. Tayler's defence to study the pages of Kaye and Malleson, I must be content with indicating the course of the correspondence, and referring to one or two of Sir F. Halliday's Minutes on the case. That of the 5th August 1857 was laid before the Governor-General in Council, who entirely concurred in Sir F. Halliday's condemnation of Mr. Tayler's conduct in ordering the Civil officers of the several districts of the Division to abandon their posts and fall back upon Dinapore, and in the propriety of his removal.

In reply to the orders for his removal Mr. Tayler submitted a long explanation of 119 paragraphs dated the 22nd. August to the Lieutenant-Governor, and sent a copy with an appeal to the Government of India, besides addressing the Private Secretary to the Governor-General. On the 10th. September the Lieutenant-Governor declined to reinstate him. About this time Mr. Tayler caused to be printed in Calcutta, for private circulation, his "Brief narrative of events" connected with his removal from the Commissionership of Patna. When they passed orders on the 23rd. December on the appeal, the Government of India retained their opinion that the state of affairs did not justify Mr. Tayler in ordering the Civil Officers to abandon their stations, and that Sir F. Halliday was thoroughly justified in removing him on the 4th. August, on the ground that at so critical a period the Division could not safely be left in his charge. They could not, they wrote, too strongly condemn Mr. Tayler's order to Major Eyre, desiring him not to advance to the relief of Arrah. They also severely censured Mr. Tayler for printing and circulating his "Brief narrative &c." and other official correspondence, as being an elaborate attack upon the Lieutenant-Governor, and disrespectful in its tone: they also entirely declined to order the Government of Bengal to employ him temporarily or otherwise. On the 29th. January 1858 Mr. E. A. Samuells (who had succeeded Mr. W. Tayler as Commissioner), addressed Government (81 paragraphs), defending himself against the severe reflections

made in Mr. Tayler's pamphlet on his administration of the affairs of the Patna Division. On the following 17th. March Sir F. Halliday recorded a minute (123 paragraphs) on Mr. Tayler's "Brief narrative &c." On the 3rd. and 8th. April 1858 Mr. Tayler wrote to the Government of Bengal two letters of 303 and 53 paragraphs, remonstrating against Mr. Samuells' letter of the 29th. January, and against the publication of the latter by the Lieutenant-Governor in a Blue book, and at his request they were laid before the Government of India, who forwarded them to the Court of Directors. Mr. Tayler, having appealed to the Government in England against the Government of India's decision, the Court of Directors gave their judgment (against him) on the 11th. August 1858. Mr. Tayler was subsequently appointed Judge of Mymensingh, but at the instance of the Government of India (21st. January 1859) was suspended, for the second time, by the Lieutenant-Governor, for his "insufferably offensive conduct," and resigned the service on the 29th March 1859. Mr. Tayler applied to every Secretary of State in succession from 1857 to 1888 for a reconsideration of his case, for a public and suitable recognition of his services as Commissioner of Patna in 1857, for a cancellation of the condemnation passed on him, for honorary distinction, for pecuniary compensation, and for redress of his alleged wrongs. In every instance the appeal was rejected, after consideration. He induced the House of Commons to hear his case in 1888. and after debate it was rejected by an overwhelming majority, only 22 members voting for it, and there it ended.

The length of his episcopacy, his great age, and his general <sup>Death of Bishop</sup> personality combined to give the Right Reverend <sup>Wilson.</sup> Daniel Wilson, Lord Bishop of Calcutta and Metropolitan of India, a position of great eminence : and when he died on the 2nd January 1858 it was felt that a leader of men had passed away. Some space must be devoted to one who was so long a conspicuous character in Bengal. He was born on 2nd July 1778, his father being a silk-manufacturer in Spitalfields. He was apprenticed to his uncle in business ; in his eighteenth year he felt a call to religion, which resulted in his being entered at St. Edmund's Hall, Oxford. After taking his degree he became successively Curate of Chobham, Surrey, Tutor of St. Edmund's Hall, 1804-12, Assistant and Incumbent of St. John's Church, Bedford Row,

London, 1809-1823. Vicar of Islington, 1823-32. The Bishopric of Calcutta was offered to him in March 1832, and early in November he arrived in Calcutta, in the 55th year of his age. He found many matters that required immediate settlement in connection with the religious and charitable institutions of the Presidency, and entered on his work with a zeal and energy which he never relaxed. His tours throughout India and Ceylon were long and repeated : and extended moreover to the Straits, Singapur and Malacca. On one of these tours he left Bombay at the commencement of 1836 and marched up to Simla, arriving there on the 3rd June. On the 8th October 1839 he laid the foundation stone of St. Paul's Cathedral at Calcutta and consecrated it on the same day of the year 1847. He himself gave nearly one-third of the total amount of seven and a half *lakhs* subscribed towards it. His liberality was princely throughout his episcopate. It was apparently in 1849 that the Bishop's residence was transferred by him from Russell Street to Chowringhi. The caste question among native Christians in Madras, which was causing much trouble, he treated with a firm hand, insisting on its absolute abandonment. Besides dealing energetically with all Church matters, he found time to advocate Steam communication with India. At one time he was described as the champion of Evangelicalism. In his charges he made some bold and uncompromising denouncements of Tractarianism. He dreaded theory, it was said, and felt that he must act, doing the work of the Church. His punctuality and business habits remained to the last. Lord Dalhousie spoke of him to Lord Canning as "the best man of business he had to do with in India." Numerous anecdotes testified to the originality of his character : he had a peculiar mannerism which amounted almost to eccentricity : and he allowed himself a directness of personal remark which in another speaker might have been termed rudeness. He had resolved to end his days in India. On the 4th January 1858 he was buried in the vault at the east end of the Cathedral.

While the Mutiny was still unsubdued, the House of Lords on

the 16th March 1858 passed a unanimous Resolution, adding the name of Sir F. Halliday to a previous Resolution of the 8th. February, in which they had

Thanks of Parliament and the Court of Directors.

accorded the thanks of that House to the Governor-General and

others "for the energy and ability with which they have employed the resources at their command to suppress the widely-spread mutiny in Her Majesty's Indian Dominion." The House of Commons passed a similar vote of thanks to the Lieutenant-Governor on the same day. The Court of Directors and a General Court of the East India Company had on the 10th and 17th February respectively recorded Resolutions in the same terms. These were all officially communicated through the Lord Chancellor, the Speaker, the Court, and the Governor-General to Sir F. Halliday. Again on the 4th. August 1858, the Court of Directors, in a despatch reviewing the narratives of the Lieutenant-Governor from the revolt of the troops at Segowlie and Dinapore in July to the close of 1857, expressed their opinions on some of the principal occurrences of the mutiny in Bengal, which have been mentioned in Sir F. Halliday's Minute: "We are glad to observe that the admirable conduct of Mr. A. Money and Mr. Hollings in remaining at Gaya, notwithstanding the order of the Commissioner, thereby saving the Government Treasury, and for the time preserving the peace of the district, has been rewarded by promotion to a higher office in the case of Mr. Money, and by an increase of salary in that of Mr. Hollings, who had already reached the highest grade in that branch of the Uncovenanted Service to which he is attached.

"We have perused with the greatest interest Mr. Wake's account of the gallant defence at Arrah by the European residents and 50 Sikhs of Captain Rattray's Corps against three revolted Regiments of Native Infantry. We have already, in our Despatch in this Department, No. 155, dated 16th. December 1857, adverted to the conduct of Mr. Boyle, the Engineer in the service of the East Indian Railway Company, and it is only because we have called for a list of those Civilians who have particularly distinguished themselves during the recent disturbances, that we abstain from more prominently noticing him on the present occasion, together with the gallant conduct of Mr. Wake, and those who shared with him in the remarkable defence which forms the subject of his report. We entirely approve of the rewards conferred upon the small band of Sikhs, whose courage, endurance, and fidelity so greatly contributed to the safety of the Garrison; and it is with the highest gratification that we have noticed the loyalty and discipline of the

recently formed Corps to which these men belonged, and the important services it has rendered under its Commandant Captain Rattray, in protecting no inconsiderable portion of the Province of Bihar.

"On the appointment of Mr. Samuells to succeed Mr. Tayler, Munshi Amir Ali was appointed to be Special Assistant to the Commissioner of Patna, and Deputy Magistrate under Act XV. of 1843, in all the districts of the Patna Division.

"This last appointment, as observed by the Lieutenant-Governor,

"I may perhaps be allowed here to state that Amir Ali's appointment was, in the opinion of those best able to judge and appreciate the tone of Patna native society, a highly politic, popular and useful measure. The better classes of natives in this city have throughout these evil times displayed nothing but loyalty and good will to the British Government. The appointment of Amir Ali, a native of the province, and known to each and all, either as personal legal adviser, or a successful pleader in the highest Court of Judicature, to assist the Commissioner in his early communications with those classes, was precisely what was required to allay fears which were daily gaining ground and strength; fears that the Government was bent on general and indiscriminate vengeance for the atrocities committed in other parts of India. There is no calculating what might have been the danger or mischief of a spread of the belief among a credulous and timid population. The fear was at once allayed by Amir Ali's advent, and not only has the real justice of the Government been made apparent to the native mind, but its vast power and resources, not half understood or believed by the people, were made real and credible to all.

"has been a good deal cavilled at;" we are of opinion however that the Lieutenant-Governor has shewn good and sufficient reason for it, and the excellent service rendered by Munshi Amir Ali is the best justification of the Government in selecting him for the important office which he held at Patna. The marginal extract from the letter of the late Acting Commissioner Mr. Farquharson to the Commissioner dated 23rd. October 1857, contains very strong evidence as to the sound policy of the measure.

"The arduous task of preserving order in the district of Saran was committed to Kazi Ramzan Ali, who was authorised by the Commissioner to exercise magisterial powers until the return of the constituted authorities. The Kazi was left in charge of the district for a fortnight, and the Commissioner reports that during that period, he "faithfully performed the duties allotted to him, and under very trying circumstances continued to preserve order and tranquillity." We trust you at once conferred on the Kazi some substantial mark of your approbation of services of so devoted a character at a very critical juncture. Eminent services have also been rendered by many others of our native subjects possessing authority and influence among their countrymen. Of these we may specially notice the

Maharaja of Bettia and Shah Kabiruddin Ahmad of Sasseram in the Shahabad district, for their zealous exertions from the commencement of the disturbances; the Nawab Nazim of Bengal, for the assistance rendered by him on the occasion of the disarming of the city of Murshidabad; and Parganait Jagat Pal Sing, of whom the Lieutenant-Governor remarks that, in "arresting the progress of the mutineers of the 8th Native Infantry at Pitoria, he in all human probability saved the lives of the whole of the European Officers on their retreat from Ranchi to Hazaribagh". You have directed the thanks of the Government to be communicated to the above named persons, and of this we approve. We are glad to observe however, that the Lieutenant Governor has directed the proper local authorities within his jurisdiction to furnish a list of all such persons as may have been known to have distinguished themselves in the service or for the benefit of the British Government from the commencement of the present troubles, and we suggest for your consideration, whether, on the close of the disturbances and when the list shall be complete, it would not be a measure as well of policy as of justice, to recognize in a more public, and where circumstances render it appropriate, a more substantial manner than has yet been done, such services as those to which we have referred.

"About the middle of September, Mr. J. R. Ward, Commissioner for the suppression of *Dacoity*, a very active and intelligent officer, was appointed Superintendent of carriage and supplies for troops marching in the Lower Provinces of Bengal, and was furnished by the Local Government with very full instructions as to the nature and extent of his duties. In the discharge of those duties the Superintendent was warmly supported by the Government, and the success which attended the arrangements made by Mr. Ward and his assistants, for procuring supplies for the troops, is sufficiently manifest from the fact that a force of 20,000 men (almost wholly Europeans) "passed along the Grand Trunk Road from Raniganj to Benares, a distance of nearly 300 miles, and had been so well satisfied with the arrangements made for their supplies, that not a dozen complaints of any sort had been preferred, and some of these of the most trivial character," notwithstanding that every facility for preferring complaints was afforded. We appreciate most highly the excellent services performed by Mr. Ward, and we lament deeply

that an illness, which compelled that Officer to relinquish his post, has since terminated fatally.

“ At para 8 of our despatch No. 155, dated 16th. December last, we have expressed our approval of your application to the Legislature for an Act to regulate the importation, manufacture, and sale of arms, and the right to keep and use them. We have since received a copy of the Act which was passed on the 11th September 1857, and is to continue in force for a period of two years from the date of its enactment. Exception has been taken to this Act as being too general in its provisions, embracing all classes of persons, and confounding “ the loyal with murderers, mutineers, and rebels.” We cannot admit the force of this objection. We concur with you that no one class could have been excepted in express terms from all liability to the provisions of the Act, without doing injustice to others equally well affected towards the Government, and we approve of your having framed the Act in general terms, so as to render it applicable to all classes of the community, leaving it to the executive to discriminate as to the exceptions to be made when carrying its provisions into execution. A full power of exemption, in respect to such persons as it may think fit, is given to the Government, and, as observed by the Vice-President when introducing the Bill into the Legislative Council, the operation of the exemption clause will be extended “ to all Europeans, East Indians, many educated native gentlemen, the Parsi gentry and community, and other sections of the general community, of whose loyalty no doubt can exist.”

“ We cannot conclude our review of the proceedings which have now come under our consideration without expressing the high sense we entertain of the manner in which the Lieutenant-Governor of the Lower Provinces has discharged the duties of his office, during an eventful period. We may instance in particular his prompt and energetic measures in providing and superintending an effective agency for the transport of troops, in repressing alarm in the Presidency and adjacent districts, in meeting pressing emergencies in scenes of actual or threatened disturbance, and in maintaining order in many parts of the extensive territories subject to his authority. The thanks of Parliament and of the Court of Proprietors will ere this have been conveyed to Mr. Halliday, and to these we would add our



own acknowledgments for the important services which he has rendered."

A brief notice is required of the "Act for the better Government of India," 21 and 22 Vic. c. 106 (1858), which, after the Mutinies, enacted that the territories previously in the possession and under the Government of the East India Company, should henceforth be governed by and in the name of Her Majesty, and vested in Her Majesty all the territories and powers of the Company. It was passed on the 2nd of August 1858, and took effect thirty days after. It specially affected the Lieutenant-Governorship of Bengal, in this respect, that Section 29 provided that "the appointments of the Lieutenant-Governors of provinces or territories shall be made by the Governor-General of India, subject to the approbation of Her Majesty; and all such appointments shall be subject to the qualifications now by law affecting such offices respectively." A Proclamation was accordingly, under Her Majesty's command, issued from Allahabad on the 1st. November 1858 by the Governor-General, to the Princes, Chiefs and People of India, to notify the assumption of the Government of India by the Crown. This Proclamation, as an important event in the annals of Bengal, is reproduced here, as follows :—

#### VICTORIA,

By The Grace of God, of The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and of the Colonies and Dependencies Thereof in Europe, Asia, Africa, America, and Australasia, Queen, Defender of the faith.

Whereas, for diverse weighty reasons, We have resolved, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords, Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in Parliament assembled, to take upon ourselves the Government of the Territories in India heretofore administered in trust for Us by the Honourable East India Company :

Now, theretofore, We do by these Presents notify and declare that, by the advice and consent aforesaid, We have taken upon Ourselves the said Government ; and We hereby call upon all Our Subjects within the said Territories to be faithful, and to bear true allegiance to Us, Our Heirs, and Successors, and to submit themselves to the authority of those whom We may hereafter, from time to time, see fit to appoint to administer the Government of our said Territories in Our name and on Our behalf :

And We, reposing especial trust and confidence in the loyalty, ability and judgment of Our right trusty and well-beloved Cousin and Councillor, Charles John Viscount Canning, do hereby constitute and appoint him, the said Viscount Canning, to be Our first Viceroy and Governor-General in and over Our said Territories, and to administer the Government thereof in Our name, and generally to act in Our name and on Our behalf, subject to such Orders and Regulations as he shall, from time to time, receive from Us through one of Our Principal Secretaries of State :

And we do hereby confirm in their several Offices, Civil and Military, all Persons now employed in the Service of the Honourable East India Company, subject to Our future pleasure, and to such Laws and Regulations as may hereafter be enacted.

We hereby announce to the Native Princes of India that all Treaties and Engagements made with them by or under the authority of the Honourable East India Company are by Us accepted, and will be scrupulously maintained ; and We look for the like observance on their part.

We desire no extension of Our present territorial Possessions, and while We will permit no aggression upon Our Dominions or Our Rights to be attempted with impunity, We shall sanction no encroachment on those of others. We shall respect the Rights, Dignity, and Honor of Native Princes as Our own ; and We desire that they, as well as Our own Subjects, should enjoy that Prosperity and that social Advancement which can only be secured by internal Peace and good Government.

We hold Ourselves bound to the Natives of Our Indian Territories by the same Obligations of Duty which bind Us to all our other subjects ; and those Obligations, by the Blessing of Almighty God, we shall faithfully and conscientiously fulfil.

Firmly relying ourselves on the truth of Christianity, and acknowledging with gratitude the solace of Religion, we disclaim alike the Right and the desire to impose our convictions on any of our Subjects. We declare it to be our Royal will and pleasure that none be in any-wise favored, none molested or disquieted, by reason of their Religious Faith or Observances ; but that all shall alike enjoy the equal and impartial protection of the Law ; and we do strictly charge and enjoin all those who may be in authority under us that they abstain from all interference with the Religious Belief or Worship of any of Our Subjects, on pain of Our highest Displeasure

And it is Our further will that, so far as may be, Our Subjects, of whatever Race or Creed, be freely and impartially admitted to Offices in

our Service, the Duties of which they may be qualified, by their education, ability, and integrity, duly to discharge.

We know, and respect, the feelings of attachment with which the Natives of India regard the Lands inherited by them from their Ancestors ; and We desire to protect them in all rights connected therewith, subject to the equitable demands of the State : and We will that generally, in framing and administering the Law, due regard be paid to the ancient Rights, Usages, and Customs of India.

We deeply lament the evils and misery which have been brought upon India by the acts of ambitious Men, who have deceived their Countrymen by false reports, and led them into open Rebellion. Our Power has been shown by the suppression of that Rebellion in the field ; We desire to show Our Mercy, by pardoning the Offences of those who have been thus misled, but who desire to return to the path of Duty.

Already in one Province, with a view to stop the further effusion of blood, and to hasten the Pacification of Our Indian Dominions, Our Viceroy and Governor-General has held out the expectation of Pardon, on certain terms, to the great majority of those who, in the late unhappy Disturbances have been guilty of Offences against our Government, and has declared the Punishment which will be inflicted on those whose Crimes place them beyond the reach of Forgiveness. We approve and confirm the said act of Our Viceroy and Governor-General, and do further announce and proclaim as follows :—

Our Clemency will be extended to all Offenders, save and except those who have been, or shall be, convicted of having directly taken part in the Murder of British Subjects. With regard to such, the demands of Justice forbid the exercise of Mercy.

To those who have willingly given asylum to murderers knowing them to be such, or who may have acted as Leaders or Instigators in Revolt, their Lives alone can be guaranteed ; but, in apportioning the Penalty due to such Persons, full consideration will be given to the circumstances under which they have been induced to throw off their Allegiance, and large indulgence will be shown to those whose Crimes may appear to have originated in too credulous acceptance of the false reports circulated by designing Men.

To all others in arms against the Government, We hereby promise unconditional Pardon, Amnesty, and Oblivion of all offence against Ourselves, Our Crown and Dignity, on their return to their homes and peaceful pursuits.

It is Our Royal Pleasure that these terms of Grace and Amnesty

should be extended to all those who comply with their Conditions before the first day of January next.

When, by the blessing of Providence, internal Tranquillity shall be restored, it is Our earnest Desire to stimulate the peaceful Industry of INDIA, to promote Works of Public Utility and Improvement, and to administer its Government for the benefit of all Our Subjects resident therein. In their Prosperity will be Our Strength ; in their Contentment, Our Security ; and, in their Gratitude, Our best reward. And may the God of all Power grant to Us, and to those in authority under Us, Strength to carry out these Our Wishes for the good of Our People.

This Proclamation was read by the Home Secretary from the platform at the top of the staircase on the North side of Government House, in the presence of Sir J. P. Grant, (then President of the Council), the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, &c., &c. with appropriate ceremonial. In the evening there was a general illumination of the town of Calcutta and of the ships in the port. The Governor-General issued his own Proclamation at the same date from Allahabad, as follows :—

Her Majesty the Queen having declared that it is Her gracious Pleasure to take upon Herself the Government of the British Territories in India, the Viceroy and Governor-General hereby notifies that from this Day all Acts of the Government of India will be done in the name of the Queen alone.

From this Day all Men of every Race and Class who under the administration of the Honourable East India Company have joined to uphold the Honour and Power of England will be the Servants of the Queen alone.

The Governor-General summons them, one and all, each in his degree, and according to opportunity, and with his whole heart and strength, to aid in fulfilling the gracious Will and Pleasure of the Queen, as set forth in Her Royal Proclamation.

From the many Millions of Her Majesty's Native Subjects in India, the Governor-General will now and at all times exact a loyal Obedience to the Call which, in words full of Benevolence and Mercy, their Sovereign has made upon their Allegiance and Faithfulness.

Her Majesty's Proclamation was received throughout British India and by the Native Princes with the greatest loyalty : and in these demonstrations Her Majesty's Government saw "abundant promise of a peaceful and a prosperous future."

The last days of Sir F. Halliday's term of office were occupied in the passing of laws with which he had been long and closely concerned as Lieutenant-Governor, though the law (the Statute 16 and 17 Vic. c. 95) of 1853 did not name him as a Member of the Governor-General's Legislative Council. So important a subject as the Recovery of Rent requires more than a passing reference. Act X of 1859 (*to amend the law relating to the recovery of rent in the Presidency of Fort William in Bengal*)—an Act which has been called the Magna Charta of the *raiya*t—received the Governor-General's assent on the 29th of April 1859. Mr. E. Currie, c. s. was the 'author of the measure', and had charge of it in the Legislative Council, as the representative Member for Bengal. Its object was to reform the whole of the existing system for the recovery of rents and the adjudication of questions connected therewith in Bengal. The Act defined and settled several important questions connected with the relative rights of landlord and tenant, of which a definition and settlement had long been considered desirable and necessary. Prior to the passing of the Act, the law on this subject was so confused and imperfect, and was scattered through such a vast number of Regulations and Acts, that a revision and consolidation of it was admitted to be a matter of urgent necessity. Landholders were empowered to enforce payment of their rents by distraint of the property of defaulters and by preferring summary suits before the Collector. The Collector was also authorized to try summarily suits brought by under-tenants, to contest the demand of distrainers, and suits for damages for illegal distraint. *Raiyats* were entitled to receive *pattas* for the lands cultivated by them, and to have their rates of rent adjusted on certain defined principles, penalties being prescribed for the exaction of any excess above the legal rate of rent or of any unauthorized cess. The law further recognized the right of all resident *raiya*ts to the occupancy of the lands cultivated by them, so long as they paid the established rent.

But the remedy in all these cases, in the Lower Provinces at least, was either by regular suit in the Civil Courts, which to poor suitors, it was thought, was a very inadequate remedy; or by summary suits before Collectors in some of the several descriptions of cases between landlord and tenant. Section XX, Regulation VII of

1822, indeed, empowered the Executive Government to invest Collectors with jurisdiction in all those cases. But such jurisdiction had only been given to Collectors in the North-Western Provinces. The law relating to the right of *raiya*ts to receive, from those to whom they paid rent, *pattas* or writings containing a statement of the quantity of land held, the annual rent of the land, and the conditions of the holding; also, the law relating to the adjustment of rates of rent, and the occupancy of land, and to the prevention of illegal exaction and extortion in connection with demands for rent, were re-enacted in a concise and distinct form in this Act. In the spirit, though not within the letter, of the previous law, the new Act also declared landholders to be entitled to receive from their *raiya*ts *kabulyats* or counterparts of the written engagements. It was deemed just that, when a *raiya*t had a right to demand a *patta*, the landlord should have a right to demand a *kabulyat*. It was for the interest of the *raiya*t himself that written engagements should be exchanged in all cases; and as, in a later part of the Act, distraint was allowed only when the distrainer held a *kabulyat*, it became necessary to provide landlords with the means of enforcing the delivery of such documents. The Act provided a Code of Procedure for the trial of suits between landlord and tenants. It was much discussed whether the adjudication of such suits should be by the ordinary Civil Courts or by the Collector's Courts. Messrs. Mills and Harington, in their Code of Civil Procedure, recommended that the Revenue Officers should have jurisdiction in all such cases; and they proposed that, in preference to the existing practice of a summary decision by the Collector, subject to a re-trial of the same matter by regular suit in the Civil Court, "the trial before the Revenue Court should constitute the original suit, in like manner as if the case had been brought as a regular Civil action, and that the summary decision passed in such cases shall be open to a regular appeal on the merits to the *zilla* Appeal Court."

This principle was adopted in Act X of 1859. The jurisdiction in all such cases was given to Collectors and certain of their Deputies and Assistants. It was specially provided that no Deputy Collector should exercise judicial powers under the Act if entrusted with any police functions. The Collector's judgment was to be final, if the amount sued for did not exceed Rs. 100. In all other

suits an appeal to the *zilla* Judge was provided, unless the amount or value in dispute exceeded Rs. 5,000, in which case the appeal was to lie to the *Sadar* Court. Lastly, the Act greatly restricted, and at the same time imposed more effective checks on, the power of distraint vested in landholders—a power which appeared to have been grievously abused.

At the same time, Act XI of 1859 (*to improve the law relating to sales of land for arrears of Revenue in the Lower Provinces under the Bengal Presidency*), which had been introduced as a Bill so long before as December 1855, was passed on the 30th. April by Sir J. P. Grant who, as Member of Council, was in charge of it; and it remains in force until the present time. The first important amendment which it effected in the former law was, by discontinuing the practice of obtaining the previous sanction of the Board of Revenue to sales of estates for arrears of Revenue or other demands of Government in the Provinces of Cuttack, so as to assimilate the system of collection in Cuttack to the system of collection in Bengal, where the districts are permanently settled, and where the process of sale is the only process; whereas, in the provinces not permanently settled, the process of sale was the last of several coercive measures resorted to for the collection of the revenue.

The Act gave a mortgagee who might deposit money, in order to save the estate mortgaged to him from sale (to the extinction of his lien), a further mortgage or lien upon the estate to the extent of the money so deposited by him.

Another important alteration in the law was to enable sharers of joint estates held in common tenancy, and holders of specific portions of the land of an entire estate, to acquire the privilege of protecting their shares by paying up their own portion of the Government revenue, whether the other sharers paid up their portion or not. The Act provided that, when a recorded sharer desired to pay his portion of the Government revenue separately, he might submit to the Collector a written application, specifying the nature and extent of his interest in the estate. The Collector was then to cause the application to be published, and if, within six weeks from the date of publication, no objection was made by any other recorded sharer, the Collector would open a separate account with the applicant, and credit separately to his share all payments made by him on account

thereof. If any recorded proprietor objected to the application, the Collector was to refer the parties to the Civil Court, and suspend proceedings until the question at issue was judicially determined. The Act at the same time provided that, where the highest offer for a share exposed to sale for arrears of revenue was not equal to the amount due upon it, the Collector must stop the sale, and declared that the entire estate would be put up to sale for arrears of revenue, unless the other sharers, within 10 days, purchased the defaulter's share by paying to Government the whole amount due upon it.

The Act enabled a proprietor of an estate, by the deposit of money or Government securities, to preserve his estate, from all risk of sale by reason of any accident or neglect on the part of an agent. It remedied a defect in that part of the old law which provided that, in case of repeated default, the difference between the sum bid by each defaulting bidder and the actual sale price should be levied and credited to the former proprietor, whereas all that he was entitled to was the difference between the highest bid and the actual sale price.

The Act made provision for giving the purchaser at an auction-sale possession of his purchase; it restricted the annulment of a sale for irregularity to those cases only in which the irregularity had occasioned injury to the proprietor; and rendered compulsory, under penalty of forfeiture of all benefit therefrom, the execution of a final decree of a Civil Court annulling a sale, as well as the repayment, with interest, by the party obtaining execution, of any surplus purchase-money paid away by order of a Civil Court, within 6 months from the date of such final decree.

But the most important alteration in the law which the Act effected was by enforcing the registration of under-tenures created subsequently to the Permanent Settlement. The Bill, as introduced, proposed to render compulsory the registration of all under-tenures, those created before as well as those created after the Permanent Settlement. It was very strongly urged, however, that in the case of ante-settlement tenures, which were already protected by the existing law, registration ought not to be made a condition of protection in case of any future sale of the estate, and in accordance with this view the Act provided that the registration of such tenures should be entirely at the option of the holder. With regard to post-settle-



ment tenures, several plans were proposed for protecting them. According to the plan adopted by the Act, there were to be two registers, one for common registry and the other for special registry. In the common register, tenures to the registration of which no objection was preferred after due notice were to be registered without inquiry, the effect of such registry being to protect the tenure in all cases, except the remote contingency of a purchase by Government. In the special register, tenures were to be registered after inquiry as to the sufficiency of the rent to secure the Government revenue. The effect of special registry would be to give absolute security in all circumstances. The registry might be common or special, according to the application of the holder of the tenure, and in cases of special registry all the expenses of the inquiry ordered to be made were to be paid by the applicant.

Lord Canning's final Minute, dated July 2nd. 1859 "regarding the services of Civil Officers and others during the Mutiny and rebellion" dealt with all India, and, though it was not published until Sir F. Halliday had left India, extracts from it may well be given here with reference to him and other Bengal officers.

Lord Canning's  
minute on the  
Mutiny services of  
officers.

"The bloodshed, strife, and general disorganisation consequent upon the Mutiny of the Bengal army, which declared itself two years ago, are drawn to a close.

Here and there a few bands of turbulent and disaffected marauders still remain in arms; but there is no unity among the enemies of the State, and, although the complete and universal security which prevailed before the out-break has not in all places returned, there is no part of the Queen's Indian possessions to which Civil Government has not been restored.

A day of solemn thanksgiving for this happy result has been appointed.

This being so, it becomes my grateful duty to bring to the notice of Her Majesty's Secretary of State the names of those earnest, devoted men, by whose abilities, sound judgment, and unexampled labours, the Civil authority of the British Government has been upheld or re-established.

Although Civilians by profession, or holding for the time Civil offices, the duties which they have performed have been, for the most part, full of peril and toil.

Only some few of them have been called on occasionally to take part in the operations of the army, and have thereby had the satisfaction of seeing honor done to their names in the Gazettes of the day ; but there are others who have been distinguished by conduct in front of an enemy which would make any army proud of them.

They have organised levies and led them ; defended stations ; kept in check large disaffected communities ; re-assured the wavering, and given confidence to the loyal.

Many of them have, in the service of the State, carried their lives in their hands for months together.

The position has been such as to try not only their physical courage, but the judgment, intelligence and self-reliance of each individual, and to keep these qualities unceasingly on the strain.

The most anxious part of their long task is now at an end, and I confidently claim for them from Her Majesty's Government the same respect, admiration and gratitude as have been so deservedly bestowed upon their fellow-labourers of the army.

The return which accompanies this minute shews some of the services of those who have been most actively engaged, but very briefly and imperfectly.

I will speak first of Bengal.

The value of the services rendered by the late Lieutenant-Governor, Mr. Halliday, is as well known to the Home Government as to myself. With a charge of enormous extent and responsibility, and called upon to take a large share of the work by which troops and munitions of war were forwarded from Calcutta to other local Governments, Mr. Halliday was the right hand of the Government of India for many months. The efficient aid given by Mr. Halliday to the Government, the watchfulness and sound judgment which marked his advice in regard to affairs within his own jurisdiction, and the promptitude and completeness with which he carried out all the precautionary and defensive measures sanctioned by the Government of India, effectually checked the spread of rebellion in Bengal.

And although in this province the people are, far the most part, less warlike and turbulent than those of Upper India, there are in it many dangerous centres of fanaticism and many wide, and not easily accessible tracts where an outburst of rebellion would have sorely crippled the small means at the disposal of Government, and where peace was to be maintained more by good management than by show of force.

As the head of the Government, I feel myself deeply indebted to Mr. Halliday for his most useful aid, and I confidently trust that the Secretary of State will not be forgetful of his service.

Of the officers of the Bengal Government who have been brought to notice by Mr. Halliday, I wish to recommend to the favorable consideration of Her Majesty's Government, Mr. G. Yule, the Commissioner of Bhagalpur ; Mr. A. Money, Magistrate of Shahabad and Gaya, whose good service has already attracted the notice of the Home Government ; Mr. S. Wauchope, Commissioner of Police in Calcutta, who had a most irksome and difficult post, and has discharged the duties fearlessly and excellently ; Mr. E. A. Samuells, the late Commissioner of Patna ; and Mr. H. C. Wake, Magistrate of Shahabad.

The following officers have also well deserved the notice of Her Majesty's Government :—Mr. W. J. Allen, Member of the Board of Revenue, on deputation at Cherra-Punji ; Mr. G. F. Cockburn, Commissioner of Cuttack ; Mr. R. L. Mangles, Assistant in Shahabad ; Mr. E. Jackson, the Superintendent of supplies on the Trunk road ; Mr. C. Hollings, Sub-Deputy Opium Agent at Gaya ; Mr. F. B. Drummond, Magistrate of Purnea ; Mr. E. McDonnell, Sub Deputy Opium Agent in Saran ; Mr. E. Baker, Deputy Magistrate of Sasseram ; Mr. C. Carnac, Magistrate of Dacca ; Mr. W. F. McDonell, Magistrate of Saran, attached to Sir E. Lugard's column ; Mr. J. D. Gordon, Assistant Magistrate of Jalpaiguri ; Mr. W. Brodhurst, Magistrate of Shahabad ; Mr. Garstin, Deputy Magistrate of Sasseram ; Mr. Boyle, Mr. R. de Courcy, Mr. J. Cockburn, and Mr. J. Wemyss, gentlemen not connected with the Government but who have given to it valuable aid ; and Mr. J. Todhunter and Mr. W. McIntyre, both of the Telegraph Department.

In respect of military officers in Civil employ, I have to call to notice the excellent services of Captain Dalton, Commissioner at Chota-Nagpur ; of Lieutenant J. Graham, Assistant Commissioner in Palamau ; of Lieutenant Birch, Assistant Commissioner of Chota Nagpur ; Lieutenant R. Stuart, Superintendent of Cachar ; and Lieutenant R. Stanton, Executive Engineer of the Grand Trunk Road at Shergati.

Of the value of the assistance received from Mr. A. R. Young, Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Mr. Halliday has spoken forcibly. I can add nothing to what he said on this head, but I have pleasure in confirming it."

On the eve of his departure an address was presented to the retiring Lieutenant-Governor at Belvedere by a number of representative native gentlemen of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa : it was couched in general terms commendatory of his administration. Sir F. Halliday replied as follows :—

Reply to Fare-  
well Address.

"I thank you for the address which you have presented to me ; I

thank you that, now at the close of my public career, when power and patronage are falling from my hands and no one has any thing to gain or lose from my good or ill will, you have come forward to bear weighty and valuable testimony, that, during my long service in India, you believe me to have had constantly in view the comfort and happiness of the people of this country, and to have striven to the best of my knowledge and ability, earnestly, zealously, and faithfully to promote their moral and material welfare. Such testimony coming at one and the same time from numerous persons of great knowledge and experience and of different creeds and ranks and walks of life in many and various parts of the wide territory over which I have exercised authority, cannot but be gratifying to me, and I accept it with as much pride as pleasure.

"However, anxiously I may have labored, I am far from imagining that I have succeeded in every effort for the benefit of this country ; but I am encouraged by the favorable sentiments expressed in this address, to look back with satisfaction, more than I have hitherto ventured to allow myself, on some things in which I have succeeded, and to some great and beneficial measures in which I have been privileged to bear a not insignificant part.

"You know that it is rarely given to Governments, least of all perhaps to the Governments of this country, to accomplish improvements without great discussions, great differences, great deliberation, and consequently great delay. The measure which is completed to-day and gratifies you by its fair promise of wide-spreading benefit, arose not, you may be sure, from a proposition of yesterday, but it is the fruit of seeds sown by some now probably unknown hand many long years ago. The five years allowed in the country as the ordinary limit of an administration may suffice indeed to sow such seeds and to labor anxiously in their cultivation, but the harvest is rarely reaped by the hands which sowed them ; and he is fortunate in such a position as mine who shall see his own measures in mature operation before his very name shall have passed away from remembrance for ever. But though this lot has largely fallen on me, I may yet hope to hear my name coupled hereafter with some important improvements.

"If your rural and stipendiary police, from being a curse to the country, shall hereafter become a blessing, the day may come when you will remember that for 20 years I laboured incessantly towards that end ; that I was not among the least prominent or the least vigorous denouncers of the abuses of the system, that I framed plans for its improvement and that I actually carried into first operation some momentous changes towards that purpose which cannot fail to produce large benefit at no distant day.

"If your Civil Courts should come to be cleared of the complicated difficulties, expenses and delays which now beset them, and a simpler, cheaper and more effective form of administering justice be at length promised to your wearied expectation, you may perhaps call to mind that I have never failed here or in England to contend for this great amelioration, that I have borne no inconsiderable share in the discussions regarding it, and that I have myself commenced the introduction of such reforms in places where I had the power to act on my own authority and was free to follow my own convictions.

"If again, among many other such instances to which I will not weary you by alluding, the law of landlord and tenant is at last about to assume a juster and healthier aspect than it has ever done since the days of the Permanent Settlement, it will be known at some future time, that I first gave the impulse, which has led, under Mr. Currie's admirable management, to the recent valuable enactment, and that, if the *raiyat*, after long years of hopeless oppression, has now a prospect of coming freedom and independence, he owes that prospect in some degree to my exertions.

"I cannot look at the names appended to this address without observing that they are those of men, who, at a season of difficulty and disaster when many fell away from their allegiance, remained eminently, constantly and honorably faithful to the British Crown and Dominion, and, by that constancy, exhibited in positions of influence and authority, largely helped to maintain a whole territory loyal and faithful in the midst of doubt, panic and danger. Thus have you shown far more forcibly than could be expressed by any words your contentment with the Government under which you live, and thus have you taught me to value your approbation, as of men who, when they applaud the acts of those in authority over them, have proved in practice that their appreciation is real and effective.

"You may be assured that the deep interest I have ever felt for this country will not depart from my mind when I quit its shores; and that, whatever may be my future lot in life, I shall never cease to think with affectionate remembrance of those who, for so many years, were to me as fellow-countrymen; and shall omit no opportunity that may be offered me of promoting by speech or action their true welfare and prosperity."

Sir F. Halliday was a musician of unusual capacity as an amateur, and used to perform on the Contra Basso. He gave several concerts at Belvedere, and performed at them himself. He kept up the practice of his favourite instrument

Sir F. Halliday  
as musician.

after he had retired to England, and his great stature made him a conspicuous figure in many an orchestra at the Crystal Palace and elsewhere. An old Calcutta newspaper in a review of "*Court Life in India*" contained the following passage, which may be quoted, notwithstanding its style :—"These were the days (1854-59) when Frederick Halliday was King of Bengal, and ruled and kept a court that reminded people of what they had read of that good old King René of Provence. Sir Frederick was a devoted lover of music, and himself an accomplished instrumentalist. "*Big-fiddle*" was the polite term by which the *Englishman* used to designate him, and on that instrument he assuredly had few amateur equals. The concert nights at Belvedere were a great treat. Sir Frederick had got together a powerful orchestra, composed of Secretaries, Under-Secretaries, Members of the Board, clerks, brokers, organists &c., who rendered the music of the masters in a style that would not have disgraced the best genius a *conservatoire* has ever turned out." It so happened that there was at that time a remarkable wealth of musical talent in Calcutta, which met with encouragement at Belvedere.

Before relinquishing charge of the Lieutenant-Governorship to his successor on the 1st May 1859, Sir F. Halliday had received the thanks of both Houses of Parliament for the energy, resolution, and administrative ability which he displayed as Lieutenant-Governor during the mutiny. He was created a (Civil) Knight Commander of the Order of the Bath in May 1860 for his services to the State. He was appointed a Member of the Council of the Secretary of State for India on the 30th September 1868, and held the position until the 31st December 1886. As he was appointed Member of Council under the Statute (21 and 22 Vic. c. 106) of 1858 'during good behaviour,' his appointment did not come under the operation of the Statute (32 and 33 Vic. c. 97) of 1869, which limited the tenure of that office ordinarily to 10 years, with a possibility of reappointment 'for special reasons of public advantage' for a further term of 5 years.

Sir F. Halliday married in 1838 Eliza, daughter of General Paul Macgregor, E. I. C. S., (she died 1886), and had a numerous family. Their eldest son was Frederick Mytton Halliday, of the

Bengal Civil Service from 1886 to 1891. Commissioner of Patna, Member of the Board of Revenue and of the Governor-General's Legislative Council.

While these volumes were in preparation in 1900, I had the privilege of meeting Sir F. Halliday, then in his 94th year, and to no one have I been more indebted for sound advice and kindly encouragement. With his faculties and memory unimpaired by age, and with his unique experience, no one person could have a greater knowledge of the history of Bengal, as a whole, than the first Lieutenant-Governor.

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## APPENDIX.\*

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### THE MUTINIES AS THEY AFFECTED THE LOWER PROVINCES UNDER THE GOVERNMENT OF BENGAL, 1858.

DURING the progress of the late mutinies, and the all-engrossing events which have characterised their progress in Upper and Central India, it is not unnatural that the provinces of Bengal and Bihar, which have been comparatively less disturbed, should have attracted less notice.

It cannot, however, be supposed that these great provinces, connected in so many ways with the more disturbed districts, inhabited partly by a people cognate in manners, language, sympathies, and race with those of the North-Western Provinces—partly by tribes of ignorant and unenlightened savages, and everywhere, to some extent, occupied by portions of that army whose mutiny is at least the proximate cause of these disturbances,—can have altogether escaped the wide-spread contagion.

Accordingly, it will be found that they have been the theatre of events similar in character, if not in importance and degree, to those which have convulsed the Upper and Central Provinces.

The Province of Bihar has been most seriously and universally affected—the district of Shahabad was in some parts overrun by Koer Singh and the mutineers from Dinapore immediately after the outbreak at that station, and even then became the arena of more than one sanguinary combat, and of a most serious and disastrous repulse ;—whilst the station of Arrah, with its jail broken open, its convicts released, and its treasury plundered, was the scene of a defence and a relief which will bear comparison with any of the achievements called forth by the rebellion. Nor was this unhappy district to escape further troubles. After a period of comparative tranquillity, Koer Singh, defeated at Azimghar, himself wounded and dying, again crossed into Shahabad with what then seemed a broken and dispirited band of followers, without guns and with little ammunition ; but again, under the influence of an almost unaccountable panic, was a British detachment to suffer a disastrous repulse with the loss of guns and ammunition. And though these guns have since been recovered, though the rebel's force has been beaten with severe loss wherever it has been

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\* See page 42.



encountered, yet reinforced not only from across the Ganges, but from the discontented sepoy population of the district itself—hopeless of ultimate success, and thereby rendered more desperate—aided by its position in a dense jungle and by the more than usual heat of the sun, and under the leadership of the bold and determined rebel Ummer Singh—it has hitherto held its ground and resisted all attempts at dislodgement. The three districts—Champaran, Saran and Tirhut—have all been more or less affected by the prevailing disturbances. In the first-named district took place the mutiny of Holmes' Cavalry, attended with more than ordinary circumstances of barbarous treachery. The whole of the three stations were temporarily abandoned, whilst they were long seriously threatened by the occupation of Gorakpur under the usurping *chakli-dar*, Muhammad Hussain.

Tirhut also was at one time further menaced by the mutinous *sawars* from Jalpaiguri.

In these districts too, as in Shahabad, great uneasiness has been caused by the late successes of the rebels, and in Saran much mischief has been done by roving bands of plunderers, of which, however, the district is now free. In the district of Patna, the city itself in close proximity to the mutineers of Dinapore, was long a ground of apprehension, and subsequently the scene of a serious riot attended with loss of life.

Gaya, in the district of Bihar, was, during the first outbreak, twice abandoned and once temporarily occupied by the rebels—the jail twice broken open, and the prisoners set at liberty, the treasure (a large amount) having been previously removed by the prompt energy of the Collector

Again, during the second outbreak, was the jail for a third time broken open, and great part of the district ravaged and plundered, till the rebel bands were completely broken and dispersed by Captain Rattray and a part of his Battalion.

In the Division of Bhagalpur and the Sonthal *Parganas*, two separate mutinies occurred, the latter accompanied by savage murders.

The district of Purnea and the station itself were threatened by the Jalpaiguri and Dacca mutineers, but saved by the boldness, promptitude and energy of the Commissioner, aided by the gallantry of a band of Volunteers, together with 50 of Her Majesty's 5th. Fusiliers, and 100 seamen sent to their assistance, when it became apparent that no military aid could be expected from the Supreme Government.

In Chota Nagpur the Ramghar Battalion mutinied, various stations were abandoned, the prisoners were released, the treasuries plundered, and, as might naturally be expected, the savage and ignorant inhabitants

deceived into supposing, from the partial anarchy prevailing, that all Government was at end, rallied round the feudal Chiefs, in many instances probably seeking an opportunity of avenging old grudges, and renewing old tribe feuds, rather than with any hope or serious intention of resisting the Government. A contagious feeling of discontent nevertheless spread into Palamau, Sambalpur, and the borders of Cuttack .

In the Rajshahi Division, there was a constant sense of apprehension, first on account of the suspected native troops at Jalpaiguri ( the Cavalry portion of which eventually mutinied ), and afterwards because of the threatened approach of the mutineers from Dacca. The stations of Dinajpur and Rangpur were saved from probable attack only by the despatch of bodies of sailors from Calcutta.

In the Nadia Division, Berhampore, garrisoned by native troops, both cavalry and infantry, was rescued from threatened danger, first by the rapid despatch of European troops by land and by steamer, and secondly, by the prompt and well-conceived measures for disarming the native garrison. An uneasy feeling meanwhile extended itself through Krishnagar, Jessore and the whole Division.

In the Burdwan Division, bordering on Chota Nagpur, the Pachete *zamindar* was in a state of semi-rebellion.

To the eastward, in the Dacca division, the city of Dacca became the scene of a mutiny of a large native detachment, not put down without considerable loss of life, and was saved by the presence of a party of European sailors previously stationed there.

Chittagong was the theatre of a serious mutiny, resulting in the release of the convicts, the plunder of the treasury, and the escape of the mutineers through Tippera and its jungles into the Sylhet and Cachar districts, where, however, owing partly to the despatch of a body of European troops, and partly to the gallantry and loyalty of the Sylhet Light Infantry and the activity and prudence of the officers, civil and military, they are supposed to have perished to a man ; but this was not effected without a loss on our side of an European officer and several men of the Battalion.

In Assam the seeds of rebellion were sown which, but for the timely discovery of the plot, the arrest and subsequent execution of the chief conspirators, and the secret and timely despatch of European sailors, must have resulted in most serious consequences.

The districts immediately in the neighbourhood of Calcutta, and even the Presidency itself, have been subject to periodical panics during the

whole progress of the rebellion—panics which, if in almost every instance groundless, cannot perhaps under the circumstances be considered altogether unnatural, and which were only allayed by a great show of precaution in the posting of troops.

It will thus be seen that hardly a single district under the Government of Bengal has escaped either actual danger or the serious apprehension of danger.

All the events above alluded to have already been recorded in the weekly narratives furnished by the Bengal Government; but I have thought it advisable to recapitulate continuously, but very briefly, the course which events have taken in each separate Division,—partly for the sake of placing them in a more collected shape, so that the circumstances which occurred in each separate Division may form a separate and continuous narrative, but more especially with a view to bring to prominent notice the very many excellent services which have been performed from time to time by the civil and military officers subordinate to the Bengal Government.

It is perhaps unnecessary for me to remark that I have had no military resources at my own disposal, and that the urgent requirements of the North West have prevented my receiving, except in a limited number of instances, and for limited periods, that assistance which, under a less pressing emergency, would have been no doubt readily accorded to me. I have, therefore, in the great majority of cases, been obliged to depend upon such resources as were locally available, or such as could (with the sanction of the Supreme Government, which has always been promptly accorded) be entertained for the occasion and sent from the Presidency.

Having premised thus much, I proceed with the separate narratives, commencing with the Bihar Division, which, from its position and importance, as well as from the fact that the earliest disturbances occurred there, naturally claims the first place.

#### BIHAR DIVISION.

It will readily be understood that on the outbreak of disaffection in the North West, I became more than ordinarily anxious for the province of Bihar, bordering as it does on the actively disturbed parts of the country, more than one of its districts supplying soldiers for the army, the town of Patna itself rightly or wrongly supposed to be the hotbed of Muhammadan conspiracies, and of course at this time an object of more than usual suspicion, (which, however, I am bound to say that

events have not justified,\*) an uneasy feeling on the subject of religion being reported to prevail : nor looking to what had occurred at Meerut, Delhi and other up-country stations, was the presence of three native regiments at Dinapore calculated to allay any anxiety that might be felt. Added to all this was the importance of the province, politically and financially, almost every district touching the Ganges, and the Great Trunk road running through a large portion of the Division, so that anything happening to endanger the safety of the province would, at the same time, have cut off the two great highways to the Upper Provinces ; and again, in a financial point of view, its immense opium cultivation, the quantity of manufactured and partially manufactured opium in the godowns at Patna, the large and scattered treasures almost unprotected; and, to crown all, except at Dinapore, where their presence was absolutely necessary as a check on the native regiments, not a European soldier throughout the whole Division.

Ordinarily precautionary measures were adopted, such as adding to the police force in Bihar, watching the ferries, guarding the frontiers of the disaffected districts, so far as means admitted, and removing the treasure from the stations of Chapra and Arrah to Patna.

Captain Rattray's police Battalion, stationed at Suri in the Burdwan Division, had volunteered for active service, and entreated to be led against the murderers of women and children. Six companies were now sent to Patna, and the whole Battalion has since done admirable service through the whole course of the rebellion.

For some time, though considerable apprehension prevailed in various parts of the Division, nothing noteworthy occurred. Attempts were made to tamper with the fidelity of the Sikhs and Najibs, arrests took place both in the city of Patna and in the Division, a few deserters were from time to time taken and executed, and a police *jamadar* named Waris Ali was seized on the 23rd. of June, and, treasonable correspond-

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\* I cannot but notice here, with reference to what must now be considered the exaggerated opinions of danger to be apprehended from disaffection in the city of Patna itself, which were at that time entertained, that these opinions have been by no means justified by recent events. Whatever may have been the inducements and encouragements to rebellion in June and July 1857, have certainly not been lessened in June and July 1858. when the people of Patna have had before them the spectacle of the neighbouring district of Shahabad for weeks in occupation of the rebels, the Gaya district overrun by marauding parties, and Government *thanas* and private property destroyed within a few miles of Patna itself, yet, with a small merely nominal garrison, the city has been as quiet as in a time of profound peace.

ence being found on him, he was executed on the 6th. of July ; he was said to be related to the royal family of Delhi. It was not till the night of 3rd of July that any overt act was committed, when the riot in Patna took place, which resulted in the death of Dr. Lyell. It seems certain that only a very inconsiderable portion of the inhabitants of Patna were cognizant of and concerned in this outbreak ; many arrests were, however, made, and many executions followed on what the Commissioner considered sufficient evidence. That Pir Ali, the Patna book-seller, was a party to, and a prime-mover in the conspiracy, there can be no doubt. Letters were found in his house, indicating the existence of a conspiracy, but nothing that particularly pointed to Patna as the seat of disaffection. A Muhammadan *daroga*, Shaik Syad-ud-din, who particularly distinguished himself by his bravery against the rioters and was very severely wounded, was rewarded by Government.

This *daroga* subsequently died of his wounds, but his widow has been rewarded by Government. A *sawar*, named Pir Beg, who showed great courage on this occasion, has received a reward of Rs. 200.

The leader of the Wahabi sect of Muhammadans (who are a large and influential body in Patna and its neighbourhood) had been arrested on the 21st. June and long remained under surveillance, the Commissioner (Mr. Tayler) holding that there were grounds of suspicion against them. Nothing, however, was at any time proved or even alleged against them, and indeed information, unhappily disregarded, of the intended outbreak, was given by one of the Wahabis, who from his age was exempted, when the other Chiefs were placed in confinement. Lutf Ali Khan, a rich and respectable banker of Patna, was arrested by the Commissioner and brought to trial on capital charges, of which he was fully acquitted.

So far all the other districts in the Division and Patna itself, after the outbreak, remained tranquil ; the Rajas of Bettia and Hatwa came forward with offers of assistance, placed men and elephants at the disposal of Government, and have given praiseworthy aid and support to Government during the whole progress of the rebellion, for which they have received suitable thanks.

About this time the Commissioner applied for and obtained permission to raise a body of military police, horse and foot, which he deemed it expedient to recruit from the lower castes, whilst Christians, European and Eurasian, were, if procurable, to be added to it.

Thus matters continued up to the 125th. of July, on which day the mutiny of the three regiments at Dinapore was reported to the Commissioner of Patna.

The circumstances of this mutiny, the march of the mutineers out

of the station, the subsequent pursuit, and our disastrous defeat near Arrah, I shall pass over without remark, for these events, though matter of public notoriety, have not come under my official cognizance, nor is it within my province to allude to them except in as far they bear on the general affairs of the Division.\* I pass on to the time when I find a large part of the district of Shahabad overrun by the rebels, and the station of Arrah actually in the occupation of Koer Singh and his mutinous followers. Here a small band of Europeans and Eurasians, with one native Deputy Collector (all of whose names are mentioned below†) together with a party of fifty of Rattray's Sikhs, were besieged by the enemy in a small bungalow which had been fortified by Mr. Boyle, the railway engineer.

The story of the gallant little band and their relief by Major Eyre has been already told in the narrative furnished by the Bengal Government.

After the relief of Arrah, Major Eyre, with 150 Europeans and three guns, attacked and dispersed some thousands of the enemy, amongst whom were the three mutinous regiments from Dinapore, and subsequently reinforced by 200 men of H. M.'s 10th. Foot, 100 fresh Sikhs from Rattray's battalion, and the 45 from Arrah, under Wake, he attacked the enemy's entrenchments, defeated and followed them up to the walls, of Jagdishpur, which was precipitately abandoned by the rebels, and afterwards destroyed by Major Eyre.

Thus was Shahabad cleared for a time of Koer Singh and his adherents.

Whilst these events were passing, the remainder of the Division had not been undisturbed. At Segowlie, in Champaran, almost contemporaneously with the outbreak at Dinapore, Major Holmes' regiment, the 12th. Irregular Cavalry, mutinied, savagely murdered their officers, and then attacked the houses of Messrs. Lynch and McDonell, the

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\* I ought, however, to mention that Mr. R. L. Mangles, of the Civil service and Mr. J. W. Garstin accompanied the pursuing force as volunteers. Both these gentlemen were wounded, the latter very severely. He has since received an appointment as Deputy Magistrate.

† Mr. A. Littledale, Judge; Mr. Combe, officiating Collector; Mr. H. C. Wake, Magistrate; Mr. Colvin, Assistant Magistrate; Dr. Halls, Civil Assistant Surgeon; Mr. Field, Sub-Deputy Opium Agent; Mr. Auderson, Assistant in the Opium Agency; Mr. Boyle, District Engineer to the East Indian Railway Company; Saiyad Azim-ud-din Hussain, Deputy Collector; Mr. Dacosta, Munsif; Mr. Godfrey, Head Master Arrah School; Mr. Cock, officiating head clerk, Collectorate; Mr. Tait, Secretary to Mr. Boyle; Mr. Delpiero, Mr. Hoyle, and Mr. D'Souza, Railway Inspectors.

Deputy Magistrate and Sub-Deputy Opium Agent at Siwan, (who made their escape with difficulty), eventually marching towards Azimghar. On the 30th. July martial law was proclaimed in the districts constituting the Patna Division, viz., Shahabad, Patna, Bihar, Saran, Champaran, Tirhut ; and on the 31st. of the same month, the Governor-General of India in Council extended, to the whole of the Lower Provinces of the Presidency of Bengal, the operation of Act XVI. of 1857, which made temporary provision for the trial and punishment of heinous offences in certain districts.

It was on this date, July 31st, that Mr. Tayler issued his ill-advised order, directing the abandonment of all the out-stations in this Division. The question of this order has already been so fully discussed that it is necessary to do no more than allude to it here. That it was uncalled for, in almost all, if not in every instance, cannot be doubted, and so mischievous did I consider it, that I at once, with the concurrence of the Supreme Government, removed Mr. Tayler from his post of Commissioner and appointed Mr. Samuells in his room.

At Gaya, Messrs. Money and Hollings by the exercise of their own judgment and courage, saved the greater part of the treasure (7 *lakh*s) and conveyed it safely to Calcutta. On the 1st of August this station had been actually abandoned by all the officials ; but these two gentlemen, after proceeding about 3 miles, determined on returning. On the 2nd. Mr. Money called in a detachment of 80 men of H. M.'s 64th. Foot, which was proceeding eastward, in order that, if necessary, he might send away the treasure under their escort. On the 3rd, having received intelligence that Koer Singh intended to despatch one of the mutinous regiments to Gaya, it was determined to abandon the station. The treasure was taken, and the party fell back on the Grand Trunk road. The *najibs*, emboldened probably by the first abandonment of the station, were by this time in a state of mutiny, and before Mr. Money had left the station the jail was broken open and the prisoners released, and he himself narrowly escaped capture, having only time to mount his horse and gallop off, leaving everything behind him. Subsequently a night attack was made on the party, resulting in the repulse of the assailants, of whom several were killed. Eventually, as I have said, the treasure was brought safe to Calcutta. I had previously expressed my high approval of the conduct of Messrs. Money and Hollings in returning to the station, and had directed them, in case of their being compelled to retire, to fall back on the Trunk road in preference to retreating to Patna. It is as well to add here that Gaya was re-occupied on the 16th of August without opposition. Much damage had been done in the station, but all by the bad characters of the place and

the released convicts, who left as soon as the relieving force appeared. No other enemy approached the place, and but for Mr. Tayler's order its tranquillity need not have been disturbed. A special acknowledgment of the services of Messrs. Money and Hollings was made by Government, and Mr. Hollings, who was previously Sub-Deputy Opium Agent in the district, was made a Deputy Magistrate with an increase of allowances. Lieutenant Thomson, H. M.'s 64th. regiment, with his detachment, received the thanks of Government for the special service rendered by them in escorting the treasure to a place of safety. After the re-occupation of Gaya a party of 50 *najibs*, under Mr. Colin Lindsay, was sent from thence to relieve the Tehta Sub-Deputy Opium Agency, reported to be besieged. In a village near Jahanabad, midway between Patna and Gaya, Mr. Lindsay attacked and defeated a body of 200 armed men, killing 7, wounding 5, and taking 9 prisoners. Mr. Lindsay burnt the village. The *najibs* behaved admirably. The *daroga* of Jahanabad, Ramphal Singh, lost a leg in the fight. He afterwards died of his wound, but his son has been pensioned by Government. Mr. Whitecombe, of the Railway Department, accompanied the expedition, and the acknowledgments of Government were returned to him for his conduct. Mr. Lindsay was also thanked for the spirited behaviour which he had displayed on this and other occasions; but he was recommended to be cautious in so serious a matter as burning villages, which may be occupied by armed men, without the consent or participation of the principal inhabitants. The *najibs*, who behaved so well here, were afterwards rewarded.

The out-stations of Shergati and Nawada had also been abandoned. Orders were given to the officers to return at once to their posts. Mr. Vincent, in charge of the out-station of Barh, happened to be at Patna when Mr. Tayler issued his order; he however, returned to his station without orders, and maintained peace and tranquillity in his district during the whole time of the disturbances.

Muzaffarpur was similarly abandoned in obedience to Mr. Tayler's order; but Mr. E. Lautour, Collector and officiating Magistrate, who had in vain attempted to persuade the residents to remain, after proceeding to Dinapore, returned immediately of his own accord to Muzaffarpur, where he found everything quiet. A small detachment of the 12th Irregulars had mutinied on the abandonment of the station, but had been repulsed by the *najibs* and some *barkandazes* in an attack on the treasury, the jail and the Government offices, and, after plundering the residences of the Judge and the Collector, had gone off accompanied by a *thana jamadar* and four or five of the new police *sawars*. At Motihari the Magistrate, Mr. Raikes, had left his station on the mutiny



of the 12th Irregulars at Segowlie (in his immediate proximity), but had immediately returned to it, and refused again to leave his post.

Chapra had been abandoned on the news of the Segowlie outbreak. It was re-occupied on the 12th, when everything was found in a tranquil orderly state, with the jail and treasury untouched, and the detachment of *najibs* loyal. Order had been preserved by a native gentleman, *Kazi* Ramzan Ali, who received the thanks of Government, and has since been more substantially rewarded. His conduct on this occasion is deserving of the highest praise.

On the 8th. August, Sasseram was attacked and plundered by 2,000 of the rebels from Arrah. Shah Kabiruddin, whose influence over the Muhammadans in the neighbourhood was very great, kept the inhabitants of the town and neighbourhood in good heart, and did his utmost to assist the Government. The Shah's conduct on this occasion was very praiseworthy, and he has since been thanked and rewarded.

Koer Singh, with a few followers and his relative Ummer Singh, hung, for some time, about Rhotas and its neighbourhood, and were not ejected without difficulty.

Disturbance had been caused in the Nawada district by a rebel named Hyder Ali Khan. He and one or two of his followers were captured by the police, and capitally punished, and the rest dispersed.

In consequence of the exposed state of the districts of Shahabad and Chapra on the abandonment of Gorakpur, the Arrah establishments were removed to Buxar.

Two 6-pounders were at this time placed at the disposal of Lieutenant Stanton, of the Engineers, for the protection of the passage of the Sone at Barun.

About this time Honorary Magistrates were appointed from among the indigo planters in the Chapra, Champaran and Tirhut districts. They were authorized to raise small and efficient bodies of police for the protection of their immediate neighbourhood. The arrival of two Gurkha regiments in the Champaran district had restored confidence in that quarter.

I must not omit to mention in this place the loyal spirit displayed by a *zamindar* in Tirhut, who, as the only means in his power of doing service to the State, and showing his loyalty and devotion, tendered a donation of Rs. 25,000 to Government. The name of this gentleman is Bishur Parkas Singh.

The 5th. Irregular Cavalry, which had mutinied at Bhagalpur on the 14th. of August, as will be detailed hereafter, after remaining for some time in the Sonthal *Parganas*, was now moving on Gaya, *via* Nawada, plundering as they went. No troops could be spared to

attack them, and Captain Rattray, who was stationed here with the Head Quarters of his Battalion, did not feel himself sufficiently strong to move out to any distance against them. At length, having destroyed the public buildings at Nawada, they approached Gaya, and Captain Rattray proceeded to encounter them at a few miles distance from the station ; but after a severe skirmish, in which, though suffering severely themselves, they inflicted considerable loss on the police Battalion, they evaded him and got to Gaya before he could reach it. Here they made an unsuccessful attack on a house which had been fortified for the protection of the residents, but succeeded in breaking open the jail and liberating the prisoners. They failed in an attempt to plunder the town, and, after murdering the Munsif of Bihar, rode off for Tikari and the Sone. These events took place on the 8th. and 9th. of September. After having committed every species of lawless act in their progress through the Bhagalpur and Bihar Divisions, they ultimately left the Division, no further attempt to stop them having been practicable.

A Naval Brigade, under Captain Sotheby, of H. M. S. *Pearl*, was, during this month, despatched for service in the Patna Division.

Whilst Ummer Singh, with the 5th Irregulars and other followers, was hanging about the neighbourhood of Sasseram, Lieutenant Stanton, of the Engineers, moved out from Dehri with a party of Sikhs in search of escaped prisoners, plunder, &c. In the village of Etwa some property belonging to Mr. Solano was discovered. The house in which the property was found was set on fire by order of Lieutenant Stanton. The inhabitants of a neighbouring village took the opportunity of firing other houses, and, the work of destruction once commenced, the whole village was destroyed. I did not, in this instance, disapprove of this wholesale destruction. It was not undeserved, for every inhabitant of the village was believed to have taken part in the late disturbances, and an example such as this was likely to have a salutary effect.

A portion of Colonel Fischer's Column, which had been moving along the Grand Trunk road, was permitted by the Supreme Government to halt at Dehri on the Sone ; whilst I had directed Captain Rattray to send to the same position as many of his Sikhs as he could spare from the defence of Gaya. Colonel Fischer reached the Sone on the 23rd of September.

Sasseram and its neighbourhood was now the part of the Division most liable to disturbance. Some uneasiness was still felt in the neighbourhood of Nawada, but it was gradually settling down since the return of the Deputy Magistrate ; and the whole of Bihar was gradually returning to a sense of security. The late *nazir* of Patna exerted his influence to restore order, and sent in many prisoners.

Shah Kabiruddin, of Sasseram, had continued to make himself useful and prove his loyalty, and was rewarded with a *khilat* of 10,000 Rupees and a *sanaad* under the seal and signature of the Governor-General. But a complete feeling of security could hardly be expected to exist. In the beginning of October Ummer Singh and the 5th. Irregulars were still in the neighbourhood of Rhotas. Bihar was constantly disturbed by reports that the mutineers of the Ramghar Battalion, who had broken out in Chota Nagpur, were intending to move in that direction. Rumours were current that Koer Singh meditated a return to Shahabad ; whilst uneasiness was kept up along the frontier on the banks of the Gogra by the abandonment of Gorakpur by the authorities, and its occupation by the *nazir*, who had been joined by a portion at least of the mutinous 12th Irregulars, and was said to be daily strengthening himself. At the suggestion of the Commissioner, Captain Sotheby's Naval Brigade was now sent to Buxar, with two mountain howitzers added to its equipment. This relieved the detachment of Sikhs at that station, who were thence moved for service in the interior of the district.

On the 28th September, Lieutenant Baker, 2nd in command of Rattray's Sikhs, surprised Ummer Singh's village of Sarohi. Here a quantity of grain and some ammunition were seized. Ummer Singh was not in the village. A *jamadar*, a *havildar*, and two sepoys were captured in the place, and hanged two days afterwards. Previously to this—from apprehension of possible contingencies—the *sawars* of the Sikh Battalion had been disarmed ; but they took part in this affair and behaved so well that at Captain Rattray's request I consented to their having a further trial.

In answer to a communication from the Raja of Bettia, received early in October, I announced to him the capture of Delhi and relief of Lucknow under Generals Havelock and Outram, and at the same time I directed the Commissioner of Patna to spread this intelligence throughout his Division. Outrages continued to take place in the villages of the neighbourhood of Arrah, and Bihar was still in an unsettled state. A marauder named Jodhur Singh, with a band of Bhojpur men, was doing much mischief, making grants to his followers and alleging that the British rule was at an end, yet, notwithstanding all this, as the time for the collection of revenue approached, large sums came into the treasury. *Zamindars* who were unable to collect their rents sent in gold coins and old rupees, which were afterwards redeemed, and in some parts of the district the usual advances for Opium cultivation had been made and received. These things show the confidence that was felt in the strength and permanence of our rule.

On the 29th September an action was fought at Chatra, in Chota

Nagpur, between a force under Major English and the mutineers of the Ramghar battalion. The fugitives from thence, joined by some of Koer Singh's men, took up a position in the village of Akbarpur. Here Captain Rattray attacked them on the 3rd of October with his Sikhs and *sawars*, and drove them with some loss into the jungles towards Rhotas. On this occasion too, the cavalry of the Battalion, though without their carbines and armed only with *talwars*, behaved loyally and well, and showed great courage, and I in consequence intimated to Captain Rattray that their carbines might be restored to them.

The approval of Government was conveyed to Maharaja Chattardhari Singh, of Hatwa, for the services he had rendered to the British troops, and the measures he had taken against the rebels.

Meantime fresh alarm was caused in the district of Bihar by the movements of two companies of the 32nd N. I., which had mutinied in the Bhagalpur Division. Owing to some misapprehension of orders, the detachment of H. M.'s 53rd Regiment, under Major English, which had been directed to proceed to Gaya for the protection of that place, halted at Shergati, and it was apprehended that these mutineers, following the route taken by the 5th Irregulars, might, in consequence of the delay, anticipate the arrival of this detachment. Precautions were, therefore, taken both at Nawada and Gaya : 150 prisoners were removed from the former to the latter place, whilst preparations were made for forwarding these and others from Gaya to Patna, should it prove necessary ; the money in the treasury was expended in opium advances ; the records were removed to a place of safety, which the residents intended to defend with a garrison of 50 men.

The mutineers, however, continued their march through the districts of Bihar and Patna without visiting Gaya, and on the 22nd of October Major English reached that place.

Notice of the movements of the mutineers was sent to Captain Rattray in order that he might, if possible, intercept them. I directed Major Simpson at Hazaribagh to send as many as he could spare of the detachment of Sikhs at that place to reinforce Captain Rattray, whilst, on my representations to the Supreme Government, a wing of H. M.'s 13th Regiment with two guns, was sent up to Raniganj to be ready to move in any direction ; this being a precautionary measure in case the Head Quarters of the 32nd should follow the example of the two mutinous companies.

A party of 42 *najibs*, sent out to effect the capture of Jodhur Singh, failed in their object. He had taken up his position in a strongly fortified house surrounded by lofty mud walls loop-holed. An attempt to force an entrance was repulsed, and the attack was, for the present,

abandoned. Shahabad was becoming more settled, notwithstanding the presence of Ummer Singh in the district. Both his and Koer Singh's estates were declared forfeited to Government.

In Saran fears continued to be entertained of an advance from the Gorakpur direction, and the Commissioner had advanced one of the Gurkha regiments for the protection of the frontier. This regiment left Segowlie on the 17th October. The Naval Brigade was also ordered to Chapra, and, pending the arrival of the *Jamna* armed Steamer, the Patna steam ferryboat was detained for service in the Gogra.

In a minute addressed to the Government of India, I suggested the re-organization of the Patna station-guards (*najibs*) upon the footing of Captain Rattray's Police Corps. This has been since sanctioned, and the approval of the Supreme Government has also been given for raising a regiment of irregular cavalry in the Bihar Division.

The two companies of the 32nd mutineers had, unopposed, continued their march through the Division, and crossed the Sone at Arwal *ghat* on the 24th of October; and in the meantime a 2nd detachment of two companies of the same regiment, who were proceeding from Barhait, in the Sonthal *Parganas*, to the Head Quarters of the regiment at Suri, mutinied *en route*, and followed the general direction taken by the previous detachment and the 5th Irregulars. Had it been found practicable to pursue them immediately, it is impossible that they could have escaped.

It was on the 17th of October that they broke out into mutiny at Rampur Hat, and it was not till the 24th of that month that two companies of H. M.'s 13th and a portion of the Yeomanry were sent in pursuit. They had thus a start of six days, still it was hoped that, though the pursuing column might not come up with them, yet that they would be kept in a state of hurry and alarm, and that the calamitous consequences of their march might thus be in some degree mitigated. Lieutenant Boddam, of the Artillery, an officer well acquainted with the country through which they would have to pass, and who throughout the whole period of the disturbances had done admirable service, was sent with the pursuing column. It is as well briefly to add here that this second body of mutineers, following nearly in the track of the first, on reaching Nawada, were attacked by the force under Major English on the 2nd November. After losing several killed and wounded, the main body escaped and forded the Sone at Arwal. On the 6th Captain Rattray met them at a place called Danchua, and a severe fight took place, lasting for many hours. The sepoys on this occasion fought with great obstinacy. The advantage of position was all on their side. Dislodged with considerable difficulty from plots of sugar-cane, in which

they had established themselves, they retreated on the village of Danchua, where, protected first by a mud wall in front of the village on which our guns could make no impression, and then fighting persistently from house to house, they were able, in some measure, to maintain their position, till, night closing in, they made good their retreat, and by a march of 40 miles, escaped from the district, and evaded all further pursuit. Their loss was heavy, nor was the victory gained without a considerable loss on our side, including Lieutenant Boyd, a very gallant and promising young officer, who was doing duty with the battalion. Mr. E. B. Baker, Deputy Magistrate of Sasseram, was present, and took part in the engagement.

The first detachment had previously crossed the Grand Trunk road about 36 miles in advance of Dehri, actually under the eye of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, who was at that time travelling up country by *dak*.

The Saran district during this time did not remain unscathed—500 men from Gorakpur having entered the district and plundered two factories, one belonging to a native, Baburam, the other to Mr. Macleod, the European assistants of the latter having barely time to escape.

I directed the Commissioner to do the best he could for the defence of the district, making use of the two Gurkha regiments and of the Naval Brigade, but for the present to act strictly on the defensive ; and I now made an application to the Supreme Government, requesting that European officers should be attached to the Gurkhas. This was immediately accorded ; but pending permission, the Brigadier in command at Dinapore had, at the instance of the Commissioner, sent some officers to do duty with the force. One of the regiments, together with Captain Sotheby's Naval Brigade, was stationed at Siwan, the other at Motihari and subsequently at Bettia, and no further attack was made from the Gorakpur direction. The *Jamna*, as has been previously stated, was ordered to enter the Gogra ; but her Commander reported that there was not sufficient water for her ; much later, however, in the dry weather, the *Jamna* was able to proceed up the Gogra. For the present she was employed in guarding the Sonepur *ghat* during the annual fair. Every thing went off quietly at this fair, and Mr. Macleod purchased a large quantity of draught bullocks and some horses on the part of Government.

A body of European mounted police was about this time (beginning of November) sanctioned for the Bihar district, and a Commandant and 26 men were entertained and sent up. This has been found a very useful body. Trials under Act XVI of 1857 had been going on in all the districts of the Division. Some few men had been executed, and many

more sentenced to various terms of imprisonment. The statistics of these trials have been so fully detailed in the weekly narratives that I shall not make any further allusion to them.

Ummer Singh and his followers continued to infest Rhotas and its neighbourhood, and on one occasion a relative of his, with a party of marauders, crossed the Sone for the purpose of plunder.

Shah Kabiruddin more than once proposed to raise a body of men at Sasseram to act against them, and I called for a report on this subject from the local authorities, who, however, did not give their support to the scheme. The Commissioner also strongly represented the necessity of clearing out Rhotas, and I communicated his views to the Supreme Government; but, about the middle of November, Ummer Singh was said to be deserted by the rabble who had hitherto followed him, and to have taken refuge in Chainpur with the fugitive mutineers of the 32nd Native Infantry. Shahabad was becoming tranquillized.

In the districts to the North of the Ganges everything remained quiet. A meditated attack on the Mohowla Raja by Rit Bhanwar Singh, a relative of Koer Singh, was checked by the advance of the Siwan Brigade. At this time, had it been in the power of the authorities in the Central Provinces to afford efficient co-operation, I had intended making a movement towards Gorakpur with the Naval Brigade and Gurkhas; but on being informed of their inability to act in concert with this movement, I directed the Commissioner to be cautious in making any advance, and on no account to allow the troops to move beyond Selinpur. A Brahmin, taken in the camp of the Naval Brigade with seditious letters in his possession, was tried by Court Martial and shot.

The detachment of Gurkhas at *Bagha ghat*, on the Gogra, captured 19 of a party of rebels armed with fire-locks, swords &c., who had crossed into Champaran; but these districts generally were tranquil and quiet.

Some uneasiness was felt in the Bihar district on account of preparations made by the Rani of Tikari, who was reported to be collecting men and to be mounting guns on her fort.

In Shahabad Ummer Singh was now said to be a fugitive lurking in jungles and caves, with only seven or eight followers; but the neighbourhood of Rhotas was still infested by banditti who did some mischief. The inhabitants of a village near Akbarpur successfully repulsed an attack made by a *subadar* and 50 sepoy, wounding the *subadar* and three of his men.

Another party of sepoy crossed the Sone and set fire to the bungalow belonging to the Bengal Coal Company at Budwa, destroying much property. In the districts North of the Ganges a new element of danger

was at this time added by the mutinies of the detachments at Dacca and Chittagong. It was feared that the 73rd regiment at Jalpaiguri, as well as the *risalas* of Irregular Cavalry, would follow the example set by these detachments, and joining them would attempt to make their way through these districts into Oudh. Great panic in consequence prevailed, and this extended even to Patna, where the natives were reported to be sending away their wives and children. I urgently represented the matter to the Supreme Government ; but it was at that time found impossible to spare any of the troops that were moving upcountry. The Yeomanry Cavalry, then at Gaya, were, however, placed at my disposal, and I directed them to proceed into Tirhut with all practicable despatch for the protection of Muzuffarpur and the Government Stud at Pusa. The danger, however, which at the time seemed so imminent, passed over, and Tirhut and the other northern districts remained undisturbed.

I was at this time informed by the Supreme Government that Maharaja Jang Bahadur was about to march an Army into our territories to co-operate with us, and that His Excellency might be expected at Segowlie about the 19th December. I at once directed the Commissioner to issue orders for the collection of all necessary supplies and for the affording all assistance that might be required for the Nepalese Army.

Considerable alarm was caused in the Shahabad district early in December by a report, seeming to rest on reliable grounds, that a body of 2,000 sepoy were about to cross the Gogra near Barha *ghat*. Preparations were made for opposing them ; but the report proved subsequently to be altogether groundless.

A reward of 1,000 Rupees was offered for the apprehension of Ummer Singh, and a smaller reward for the capture of Sarnam Singh, a rebel ringleader, who had lately attacked the Telkap indigo factory, murdering three factory servants and a police *barkandaz*.

On the Gorakpur frontier a party of Gurkhas, under Lieutenant Burlton, made a successful expedition to Bhanuli in Gorakpur, recovering a large number of hackeries and cattle.

A small body of rebels crossed from the Gorakpur into the Saran district, and attacked the post of Gathni, which was held by a detachment of 55 Sikhs, who, thinking a large force was on them, fled. Reinforcements were promptly sent by Colonel Rowcroft from the Gurkhas and Naval Brigade ; but the enemy had made his escape across the river before the party came up. Captain Rattray had frequently represented the partial disorganisation of his corps caused by his having to detach so many different parties from Head Quarters. I now directed him to hold himself in readiness to proceed to Arrah, informing him that



arrangements would be made for calling in as many as possible of these detachments. This, too, was an arrangement that would tend much to the pacification of the country in the neighbourhood of Arrah. I also desired that Mr. Wake, the Magistrate of Arrah, should send in a scheme for strengthening the local Police.

On the 15th December two regiments of the force, under Maharaja Jang Bahadur, arrived at Champaran, and another on the 19th. Mr. Richardson, Collector of Saran, was sent to superintend the collection of supplies, carriages, &c., for the force, a duty which he most satisfactorily performed. Messrs. Raikes and O'Reilly also exerted themselves in a very praiseworthy manner, as did Mr. Dampier of Tirhut.

The services of Mewa Lal, the *faujdarî nazîr*, and Munshi Zinat Hossain, the Government *rakîl* at Gaya, were brought to notice by the Magistrate, and suitably rewarded.

On the 23rd December Captain Rattray arrived at Arrah with the Head Quarters of the Battalion. Some uneasiness continued to be felt in the Shahabad district, and more particularly in the neighbourhood of Sasseram. In Bihar all was quiet. An extra police force of 250 men was at this time sanctioned for the sub-division of Nawada.

In the districts north of the Ganges a feeling of insecurity still prevailed in consequence of the near neighbourhood of the Gorakpur rebels, some of whom, indeed, were occupying posts on this side of the Gogra; nor had anxiety yet ceased as to the movements of the mutinous *sawars* from Jalpaiguri and the sepoys from Dacca, who were moving along the *Tarai* to the north of Tirhut. The Yeomanry Cavalry were still in a position to protect Muzaffarpur and Arrah.

On the 23rd of December Jang Bahadur, with the main body of his army, arrived at Bettia, and on the same day General MacGregor, who had been appointed Military Commissioner with His Excellency, also reached that place. All arrangements for carriage and supplies had been satisfactorily completed.

On the 26th of December, at Sohanpur, on the Gorakpur frontier, Colonel Rowcroft, commanding the force consisting of the Naval Brigade and detachments of two Gurkha regiments, 50 of Rattray's Sikhs, in all less than a thousand men, defeated a force under the *naib nazîr* Mashraf Khan, consisting of not less than 6,000 or 7,000 men, amongst whom were 1,100 or 1,200 sepoys. Of the rebels 120 are said to have been killed, whilst Colonel Rowcroft lost only one dooly-bearer killed, and one man, a Gurkha *subadar*, wounded.

On the same day a fight took place at Sahibganj, 5 miles from Pipra, between 2 regiments sent out by Maharaja Jang Bahadur and a party

of rebels, 4 of whom were killed and several wounded, the Gurkhas losing only one man killed and 3 wounded.

These successes had the effect of clearing the districts of the Patna Division north of the Ganges. The Maharaja of Bettia received my acknowledgments for the service he had rendered in assisting to prevent the rebels from crossing the Gandak.

Early in January 1858 Colonel Rowcroft and his force moved into the Gorakpur district, so that his future proceedings do not come within the scope of this narrative.

On the 13th January, the Deputy Magistrate at Sasseram reported that Ummer Singh, being pressed by a force despatched from Mirzapur, had reoccupied Rhotas; but that no troops, European or native, were available at Sasseram to co-operate with the Mirzapur party. Colonel Michell was now commanding at that post, and I directed Captain Rattray to return to Sasseram, and give the assistance of his Battalion in clearing out and occupying Rhotas.

Bihar was meanwhile perfectly quiet. One hundred sailors, with officers of the Indian Navy, had been sent up to Gaya, and arrived early in January. Mr. Money reported that two brothers, Rajput *samindars*, had offered to bring 500 men to act against Rhotas. Their offer was accepted, and they were directed to join Captain Rattray's force.

Early in February Captain Rattray arrived at Sasseram, and Colonel Michell immediately proceeded to organise an advance on Rhotas with a detachment of H. M. s 54th, a few men of the Royal Artillery, a portion of the Bengal Police Battalion, and some levies furnished by *samindars*. Colonel Michell occupied the fort without any opposition, Ummer Singh's rabble having retired on his approach; but it was evident, from the preparations that had been made in Rhotas and its neighbourhood, that the enemy had contemplated holding the place in force at some future time; and it was probably intended to be a rallying point, when the rebels should be driven out of Oudh and Gorakpur.

An attack made by 200 rebels in the beginning of February on Akbarpur was repulsed by the *samindars*.

The mutineers of the 11th Irregulars and 73rd N. I., who had been moving through the *Tarai*, were about this time reported to have crossed the Gandak, and all fear of their entering the Patna Division was at an end.

In anticipation of the permission of the Supreme Government, I authorized the authorities in Tirhut and Champaran to entertain extra police to prevent the escape of fugitive mutineers, under the guise of pilgrims, into Nepal, during the Shivaratri festival, which took place

on the 12th of February, and the Nepal darbar, with the same object, directed the closing of the passes into Nepal.

At the suggestion of Colonel Michell and Mr. Wake, I sanctioned, subject to the confirmation of the Supreme Government, the entertainment of a levy of 250 men for the occupation of Rhotas.

This has been organized by Mr. Baker, Deputy Magistrate at Sasseram, and placed under a very intelligent Non-Commissioned officer, Sergeant Nolan, whose services were placed at my disposal for this purpose; and, while this body was being raised and disciplined, Rhotas was occupied by Lieutenant Baker, 2nd in Command of Captain Rattray's Police Battalion, with a large detachment from that corps, which still continues to hold it.

The Deputy Magistrate at Sasseram was also empowered to increase his local police.

The march of H. M.'s 85th regiment through Bihar seemed to offer a fitting opportunity for dismantling the fort of Tikari. The regiment was, at my request, directed to halt at Gaya, and two companies, with the sailors who have been previously mentioned, proceeded to Tikari, accompanied by the Magistrate Mr. Money, and his assistant Mr. Bayley.

It is unnecessary to repeat what has been so recently reported of the proceedings here, resulting in the discovery of some guns, ammunition, &c., the existence of which was persistently denied; but the concealment took place, in all probability, more from fear of the consequence supposed to be attendant on their discovery, than from any intention of reserving them with a view to future treasonable designs against Government.

Considering the case in this light, I hesitated to adopt the severe measures recommended by the Commissioner, who proposed the partial, if not the entire, destruction of the fortifications, and the removal of the Rani to Patna. I held that the guns and ammunition having been seized under the operation of section 26, Act XXVIII. of 1857, the penalty therein laid down was all that in strict justice could be enforced, and that great allowances were to be made for the circumstances which, in the state of partial lawlessness prevailing in the Bihar district, had almost compelled the Rani to take up arms for her own protection, as she had been actually laid under heavy contribution by the 5th Irregulars during their march through Bihar.

Early in March a large body of rebels was said to be advancing from Faizabad in Oudh *via* Gorakpur towards the district of Saran. They were, however, defeated by Colonel Rowcroft with heavy loss, and the danger was thus for the time averted; but on the 26th March I received positive intelligence that Azimghar was occupied and a detachment of H. M.'s

37th regiment besieged in their entrenchments at that place, by a considerable force under Koer Singh. It is not for me to describe the operations at Azimghar on the advance of various detachments to its relief from Allahabad, Benares and Ghazipur, or the subsequent defeat of the rebels by Sir E. Lugard with the Division which had been despatched under his command from Lucknow. All this has doubtless been detailed by the Government of the North West Provinces. I return to the relation of the measures taken for the defence of the several districts of Bihar, and more particularly of Shahabad, which was now again to be partially occupied by the rebel forces, and of Chapra, which seemed also to be threatened. At the end of March the force in the Division was thus disposed.

At Dinapore, under the Command of Brigadier Christie, were portions of each of H. M.'s regiments, the 35th and 37th, in all about 600 ; of these 53 were at Patna.

At Dehri, watching the *ghats* of the Sone, was the headquarters of the Bengal Police Battalion under Captain Rattray, from which he had furnished detachments, to Rhotas 250, to Jahanabad, on the Grand Trunk road, 100 infantry, with nearly all the cavalry attached to his Battalion, besides other parties at Patna, Chapra and elsewhere.

At Sasseram, under the independent Command of Colonel Michell, and afterwards of Colonel Corfield, were from 200 to 300 European recruits, with 70 artillerymen and 4 9-pounder guns. Here also was the levy before spoken of under Sergeant Nolan, 250 strong.

At Gaya were 100 sailors under Lieutenant Duval, I. N., and 25 European police under Mr. Hely.

I despatched from Calcutta on the 1st of April 100 European seamen, accompanied, as usual, by two guns, and I directed the Commissioner of Patna to make a requisition on Mr. Yule, the Commissioner of Bhagalpur, for the 100 European sailors with their guns, who were then at Purnea.

Both at Arrah and Chapra an entrenched position was established, and at the former place, in consideration of its proximity to Jagdishpur, were stationed two companies of H. M.'s 35th, which, at the urgent representation of Mr. Samuells, the Commissioner, Brigadier Christie had sent thither, together with two light howitzers and a handful of artillery, the 100 sailors from Calcutta and 100 Sikhs, whom Captain Rattray had been directed to send from Dehri. At Chapra were posted the 100 seamen from Purnea and about 50 of Rattray's Sikhs, whilst at Siwan was a levy, similar to that at Sasseram, 200 strong, which had been raised and organized under the superintendence of Mr. McDonell, the Sub-Deputy Opium Agent.

I do not mention the Bihar station-guards, which were scattered over the Division generally, at different stations, for these were universally mistrusted, and, as will be seen, it has since been thought advisable to disarm them.

The armed steamers *Jamna* and *Megna* were directed to cruise—the latter in the Ganges off Ballia, the former in the Gogra, so as to interfere with any crossing either into Shahabad or Chapra.

The fort at Buxar was put into a state of defence, and manned by a few seamen from the *Jamna*.

Koer Singh, meanwhile, had been driven out of Azimghar by Sir E. Lugard about the 13th of April, and had been again defeated on the 20th at Bansdia by a column under Brigadier Douglas, who closely pursued him to the very banks of the Ganges, where so precipitate was the flight of the rebels that their guns, treasure and even Koer Singh's palanquin fell into the hands of the pursuing force. A large party nevertheless effected the passage of the river at Sheopur, where they were said to have been assisted with boats by the *samindars* of that place, and made their way to the jungles of Jagdishpur. This was on the 21st of April. On the 22nd the officer commanding the troops at Arrah, Captain LeGrand, having consulted with the civil authorities, determined on an attack on Jagdishpur, before the enemy, broken and dispirited, should have time to recover its energies or make any efficient preparations for defence.

Accordingly, with the 2 companies of H. M.'s 35th, 140 strong, 50 European sailors and 100 Sikhs, 5 artillerymen and 2 guns, he made a night march arriving in the neighbourhood of Jagdishpur before daylight in the morning. When day dawned he entered the jungles, into which he had not penetrated far, when, meeting with some slight opposition, he ordered a retreat perhaps in the hope of drawing the enemy into the open plain. But, whatever may have been his motive for thus retiring, the retreat on the part of the Europeans degenerated into a panic flight. No entreaties of their officers could induce the men again to form and face their pursuers, whilst heat and fatigue did their work and proved most fatal enemies. Man after man dropped from exhaustion; and out of nearly 200 European soldiers and seamen who left Arrah, not more than 59 returned alive. Three officers also fell, amongst whom was Captain LeGrand, the others being Lieutenant Impey and Dr. Clarke, of H. M.'s 35th. Guns, ammunition, tent equipage, &c., fell into the enemy's hands; but it is due to the artillerymen to say that they fought their guns to the last, and out of the 5 one only escaped. The Sikhs behaved with the greatest bravery, forming a rear-guard and covering the retreat; perhaps it is not too much to say,

that but for them not a European would have returned to Arrah. Their loss was 10 killed and 5 wounded. Lieutenant Waller, of the late 40th N. I., who commanded them, and showed very great gallantry, was also severely wounded, nor would he have escaped but for the devotion of one of the native officers with the Sikhs, who gave up his horse to him. The name of this officer is Nihal Singh. For this act of devotion, and for his conduct and bearing generally on this occasion, he has received the first class of the Order of Merit at the recommendation of Captain Rattray. *Jamadar* Sewdial Singh also behaved with conspicuous bravery, and was presented with the 3rd class of the Order of Merit.

The enemy followed up the pursuit to within 2 miles of Arrah.

In Chapra precautions were taken against any possible advance of the enemy in that direction, and, when an incursion into the district seemed imminent, the ladies and the treasure, amounting to 6 *laks*, were taken into Dinapore.

Great fears were naturally entertained for this district, as it was pretty generally known that in the treasury of the Raja of Hatwa was property to the amount of a crore of rupees (one million sterling), nor, in the event of any attempt on the place, should we have been able to render the slightest assistance to this loyal family, who have stood firmly by us during the whole disturbances.

Saran, however, was not made the point of attack, and, with the exception of a few small and scattered parties, no attempt on the part of the rebels was made to enter the district. The presence of the Steamer *Jamna* may have had its effect, and I ought to mention that the *Megna* fired into and dispersed more than one body that would otherwise have crossed the Ganges into Shahabad.

It was not till the 30th of April that any reinforcements reached Arrah. On that and the following day, a portion of Brigadier Douglas' column, which had commenced the passage of the Ganges on the 28th of April, moved into the station, and by this time Sir E. Lugard had also arrived on the opposite bank and was preparing to cross. Measures were also taken for reinforcing Sasseram, and H. M.'s 6th regiment, then in Calcutta, was with all haste despatched to that place. During all this time the rebels, emboldened by their success of the 23rd, which had added 2 guns and other arms, with a considerable quantity of ammunition, to their equipment, were strengthening themselves at Jagdishpur. Discharged sepoys and bad characters from the districts round were flocking in, and Ummer Singh had joined them with a considerable band of followers.

It was afterwards found that Koer Singh, who had been wounded during the retreat, died very soon after his arrival at Jagdishpur ; but his death was, for some time, carefully concealed by those about him, as his name has always been a tower of strength to the rebels in this part of the country.

During the first week in May, Sir E. Lugard was engaged in crossing his force into Shahabad, and in making his preparations for an attack on Jagdishpur. On the 7th, after an interview on the previous day with the Commissioner and Brigadier Christie, he marched to Bihia with a force of artillery, 13 guns, cavalry about 600, and infantry about 1,400, with the intention of advancing on the west, as the rebels had devoted all their energies to the defence of the east approach, on which side they confidently expected an attack. Having made all arrangements on the 8th, as fully detailed in his own despatch, he on the 9th moved on Jagdishpur, from which the enemy were dislodged after making a determined stand, the casualties on our side being only 2 men slightly wounded. But, though driven from their position at Jagdishpur, the rebels still held together in the extensive jungle which on all sides surrounds it, and on the 11th the General, having opened communications with Colonel Corfield, who by his direction had moved from Sasseram to Piru with between 800 and 900 men, again attacked them, Colonel Corfield making a simultaneous attack from the south whilst Colonel Robertson on the west, with cavalry and horse artillery, repulsed a party, said to be under the leadership of Ummer Singh, which attempted to break away in that direction.

In all these operations the enemy suffered very severely. Our loss was trifling, and as usual the sun proved more destructive than the sword, many, and especially in Colonel Corfield's force, being struck down by heat and exhaustion.

The main body of the rebels had now established themselves in the southern part of this extensive jungle. On the 15th they made a faint attack on Sir E. Lugard's position, but retreated as soon as the troops moved out. Their strength could not actually be estimated ; but the Commissioner was of opinion that there was still a collection of some 3,000 men, of whom only a portion were sepoys, the remainder being composed of fluctuating bodies from the different villages round.

Parties from time to time detached themselves in different directions ; as, for instance, one body of from 300 to 400 men crossed the Grand Trunk road at Jahanabad, carrying off the *dhik* horses and burning an indigo factory in the neighbourhood. This party afterwards returned to the jungle. The attention of the authorities was now directed to the destruction of this jungle, and, as its immediate and entire demolition

was impossible, it was determined to cut a broad path\* through the jungle from east to west with Jagdishpur as its centre, so that the rebels should not be able to pass from south to north, or *vice versa*, without detection.

Sir E. Lugard took up a position at Jagdishpur ; but Colonel Corfield returned to Sasseram, a movement which he considered necessary for the protection of the Grand Trunk road.

This was the state of affairs till the 26th. On that day Sir E. Lugard having first despatched a party of cavalry and artillery to Dalipur to divert the enemy's attention, whilst H. M.'s 10th Foot, under the command of Brigadier Douglas, marched through the jungle to attack the enemy's rear, moved with the main body of his forces on their position at the village of Mitha, on the south western skirt of the jungle.

Almost as soon as our forces came in sight, the rebels, having fired a few rounds from the two howitzers captured in the disastrous affair with the detachment of the 35th, abandoned them and fled precipitately. They were pursued for some miles by the 10th Foot, who at length were obliged to desist from fatigue, and subsequently 500 of the rebels were believed to have succeeded in returning to the jungle. Besides the guns, two elephants and some baggage and supplies fell into our hands.

So far the remainder of the district had continued comparatively quiet. A rebel named Futteh Singh, who gave some trouble last year, collected some followers in the Bihar district ; but the Deo Raja volunteered to put him down, and the Sonepura Raja had actually attacked and driven him from a position he had taken up, for which service he has received the commendation of Government. A few scattered bodies in twos and threes made their way into the Chapra district, more with the idea and hope of eluding pursuit and returning to their villages than with any hostile intention.

The rebels, during the whole time of their occupation of a portion of the Shahabad district, had levied contributions on all the neighbouring villages, and taken severe vengeance on all whom they considered to be their enemies. As an instance of their barbarity I may mention that a *barkandaz*, who was conveying a letter from Arrah, having fallen into their hands, they cut off the unfortunate man's nose and right hand, and in this state dismissed him, nor was this a solitary instance of their cruelty.

Sir E. Lugard now moved from his standing camp at Jagdishpur which was becoming unhealthy, and occupied a post on the east side of the jungle. On the 2nd of June, having received trustworthy intelligence of the rebel position, he advanced on it from the eastward, (Brigadier

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\* An estimate made showed that it would have employed 320,000 men 6 weeks to cut it all down.



Douglás having been sent to occupy Dalipur on the west,) and attacking the rebels at a place called Akarwa, took them completely by surprise, and drove them into the north east corner of the jungle, killing between 30 and 40 of them. He then extended a line of sentries through the jungle completely from east to west, so as to prevent their recrossing this line. On the 3rd the General again attacked them at Bhitaura, and obtained a complete success, their loss being very severe, not less probably than 200. Four elephants were captured.

On that night the rebels under Ummer Singh, who was seen by the villagers mounted on a white horse and clothed in armour, evacuated the jungle in a body, and moved on Surajpura, and from thence to the village of Dhansuki, where they plundered the house of the Dumraon Raja's Dewan. From thence they turned westward, and, crossing the Karamnassa, took up a position in the village of Gomhur, which overlooks the Ganges. Lieutenant Baker, 2nd in Command of the Bengal Police Battalion, started with 60 of his *sawars* in pursuit of Ummer Singh; but, though he marched upwards of 70 miles in two days, he failed in overtaking the party of the rebel chief before they had secured their position in the village of Gomhur.

Meanwhile an unfortunate occurrence had taken place in the Chapra district, where the *daroga* of Tajpur, who had made himself particularly active in the apprehension of fugitive mutineers, was murdered by some of the scattered bands, whom I have before mentioned as having entered that district. The family of this officer will be pensioned.

At the representation of the Commissioner I applied for an officer to command the Siwan Levy, and Captain Miles of the late 23rd N. I., was appointed.

About this time the capture took place of the rebel chief Nishan Singh. This man had, from the time of the first outbreak, taken a prominent part, and was one of the principal leaders. A reward of 1,000 Rs. had long been offered for his apprehension.

He had some days previously left the rebel camp, and proceeded in the direction of his own village of Bardeshi. From information furnished by Mr. Baker, Deputy Magistrate of Sasseram, this capture was admirably effected by Sergeant Nolan with a party of the Sasseram *sebundis* (which are under his charge). In the absence of any Special Commissioner, he was handed over to the military authorities for trial, and sentenced to be blown from a gun, and the sentence was carried out. He confirmed the intelligence, of which there had previously been some sort of doubt, of the death of Koer Singh.

My commendations were conveyed to Mr. Baker, Sergeant Nolan,

and all concerned in this business. The reward was paid and distributed amongst the captors.

The rebel force, which under the conduct of Ummer Singh had, as I have stated, taken up their position in the village of Gomhur, were burning and destroying in various directions. Brigadier Douglas was, however, in pursuit, and reached Buxar on the morning of the 9th of June. It was hoped that Colonel Cumberledge, who had moved from Ghazipur to Zamania, with a small force of cavalry, infantry and 2 guns, would have been able to co-operate from the west ; but, thinking that Ghazipur was threatened, he returned to that place before Brigadier Douglas was able to make his attack. On the evening of the 9th, about 500 men opened a musketry fire on the *Megna* gun boat, which was lying near Gomhur. No damage was done to the crew who, under the direction of their commander, Mr. Sanderson, kept up an incessant fire on the enemy, resulting in their killing one *sardar* and 6 men. Mr. Sanderson's spirited conduct received my warm approbation.

Brigadier Douglas moved across the Karamnassa on the 11th June with the intention of attacking the rebel position at Gomhur, but Ummer Singh, without waiting the attack, evacuated this post, and once more returned to the Jagdishpur jungle with several men. Captain Rattray, with 300 or 400 men of his Battalion, was encamped at Rupsagar, and the rebels fired a few shots into his camp as they past on their way into the jungle, which they reached on the 12th. General Lugard, with H. M's 10th Foot and other troops, was at Dalipur, west of the jungle. Other parties of the rebels had meanwhile crossed into the Ghazipur district, where they did considerable damage.

On the 15th a portion of those in the Jagdishpur jungle marched for the Sone and crossed into the Bihar district, with the supposed intention of attacking the fort of Tikari, where a large sum of money, 15 to 20 *lakhs*, was known to be deposited. They plundered villages on both sides of the Sone, destroyed two factories belonging to Mr. Solano, and surprised and burned the *thana* of Bikram in Bihar. General Lugard had meanwhile moved into Arrah, and his force was so much knocked up as to be unable to take up arms in pursuit of these marauding parties. Captain Rattray was left with his Sikhs to watch the jungle and protect the men employed in cutting it down ; but he also retired into Arrah on the 17th June, being pressed for supplies and much outnumbered by the enemy in his neighbourhood. This move he had been directed to take in case of Ummer Singh showing himself with any force at Jagdishpur.

Colonel Longden, however, with a portion of General Lugard's force, pushed across the Sone towards Dinapore with a view of preventing any attack on the city of Patna. Nor was this uncalled for. It was

notorious that the rebels had entered the Patna district, and, as has been shown, had destroyed the Bikram *thana* at a distance of not more than 16 miles from the city itself, which was incapable of resisting any attack, whilst the opium godown (and this too at the manufacturing season) was entirely destitute of means of defence, the small party of Sikhs, which had hitherto guarded it, having been sent off to join the head quarters of their Battalion at Jagdishpur, where their services seemed urgently required, and a similar party from Chapra, upon which the Commissioner had depended, having meanwhile been despatched to Siwan for the protection of the Saran frontier, which was then threatened.

Patna, however, was not attacked, owing, probably, to the movement of our troops under Colonel Longden. Of the rebels who had crossed the Sone the main body were led by Jodhur Singh, a man whose name has been before mentioned in the course of the narrative, originally possessing little or no influence, but whom a certain amount of audacity, combined with accurate local knowledge and bitter hostility to the authorities, have raised to a certain degree of importance. He was, at this time, believed to have with him a force of not less than 700 men; but the numbers appear to have been somewhat exaggerated, and at any rate of regular sepoys he could at no time have had more than 150, with perhaps double that number of half-armed rabble,—a quite sufficient number, however, to do very serious damage, where no resistance could be immediately organised.

It was apprehended from the first that Gaya and its jail would again be attacked, and Mr. Money, the Magistrate, applied for assistance to Captain Young, who was at that time at Shergati with a detachment of Madras Rifles. He brought 300 men into Gaya, and two companies of of the same regiment, which afterwards arrived at Shergati, were also directed by the military authorities to proceed to Gaya.

In a consultation with Mr. Money, Captain Young gave it as his opinion that the position of the jail was untenable, and Mr. Money consequently determined on despatching 156 of the worst prisoners under a portion of the *najib* guard (Bihar station-guards) to Shergati. This detachment broke into mutiny on the road within six miles of Shergati, shot their native officer, and released the prisoners. Nine of them went off to join the rebels, whilst the remainder, with 8 of the prisoners whom they professed to have recaptured, went on to Shergati, and alleged that they had been attacked by the enemy, and that the release of the prisoners had been forcibly made. This was proved to be false, and after trial 18 of the *najibs* were sentenced to be hanged, and the rest —23—to be transported, and the sentences were carried out. The jail at Gaya had meanwhile been left in charge of the remainder

of the *najib* guard, and on the night of the 21st. June they reported that 200 rebels came quietly to the jail and released the prisoners. The whole transaction is mysterious ; but the Magistrate who investigated the matter acquitted the guard of any thing more than cowardice. It was, however, considered desirable to disarm the whole of the Patna station-guards, who had long been distrusted, and the measure was carried out without difficulty. In the same letter in which the Commissioner conveyed the news of this third release of the Gaya prisoners he brought to notice the systematic plan which the rebels were pursuing throughout the districts in which they had established a footing. Revenue was being regularly collected by them, all the Government buildings and all friendly villages were destroyed, the police and those who had in any way evinced a favourable feeling to Government were ruthlessly murdered, and the unfortunate contractor who had supplied our troops at Jagdishpur was hanged. On the 24th of June the Jahanabad *thana*, on the road between Gaya and Patna, was surprised, the Government buildings burnt, the *daroga* cut to pieces, and his mangled body afterwards hung up by the heels on a tree opposite the site of the *thana*. On the following day a police post was attacked, and one *barkandas* killed, the rest being able to effect their escape. The Nimanadawa *dik* bungalow was also destroyed on the same day, and Jodhur Singh is said to have boasted that he would destroy every public building between the Sone and Monghyr. Nimanadawa is not more than 10 miles from Patna, and the Commissioner made judicious arrangements for the defence of the city in case of an attack, moving a portion of the Marine Brigade, with two guns, to the opium godown, and posting his police so as to prevent any rising in the city. A reinforcement of two companies of H. M. 's 10th Foot had been sent from Dinapore. The treasure, amounting to 11 *lakhs*, was moved into the fort, as was also the Collector's office with the records, so as to save guards as much as possible.

But the enemy kept clear of any stations where troops might be supposed to be posted, and contented themselves with doing all the damage in their power to the scattered *thanas* and police stations.

The Tikari Ranis represented their defenceless condition, and I directed Mr. Money to send two companies of the Madras Rifles, accompanied by a civil officer, for their protection. This has since been done, but, though bands of the rebels were constantly in the neighbourhood of that fort, no attack was attempted by them.

The Chapra district, which at first was comparatively free from invasion, had lately, as I have shown, been infested by small and scattered parties of mutineers, and on the night of the 21st June an

attack on a somewhat larger scale, by a party variously estimated at from 100 to 500 men was made on Captain Miles' post at Etwa. With the newly raised Siwan Levy and a few Sikhs he repulsed this attack, killing twelve of the enemy, and, a few days later, he in his turn attacked them at a place called Lahazi, and, on their taking flight, pursued them for some distance. Great credit is due to Captain Miles for the service he has rendered with this before untried force.

For the defence of Muzuffarpur and Motihari, which had hitherto depended on the *najib* guards, now disarmed, the Marine Brigade was sent from Patna, whilst provision was made for the protection of the opium godown by an increase to the detachment from Dinapore.

On the 29th June Mr. Money, with a company of the Madras Rifles under Captain Young, and 5 European police surprised a party of rebels under Hetum Singh, a brother of Jodhur Singh in the village of Nimawan. They fled precipitately, till they reached the banks of the river Pun Pun, where they seemed inclined to make a slight resistance ; but they eventually made off, having lost three of their number.

Captain Rattray, with a portion of his battalion, 300 Infantry and 50 Cavalry, had been despatched across the Sone in order to the clearance of the Gaya district. After dispersing one party of the enemy near Arwal *ghat*, his attention was given to the main body under Jodhur Singh, of whose movements he had trustworthy intelligence, and on the morning of the 4th July he succeeded in coming up with and engaging them at a place called Kasma. The particulars of this action have been fully detailed in Captain Rattray's and Mr. Money's letters, published in the *Government Gazette* ; and it is unnecessary to say more than that the Sikhs fought with their accustomed gallantry, that Jodhur Singh's force was completely defeated, with a loss of about 100 men, and that this victory had the effect of clearing the whole of the Gaya district.

Soon after this Captain Rattray returned to Dehri, and since then he has succeeded in capturing the notorious freebooter Sarnam Singh, and destroying the whole of the male members of his family, who formed his gang. This man, having established himself on one of the spurs of the Rhotas hills, had long been the terror of the neighbourhood. His capture was effected by a clever stratagem. The few Hindustanis in Captain Rattray's Battalion, numbering not more than 7, and a sepoy of the late 56th N. I. having, under the disguise of mutineers, obtained access to the robber chief, killed his retainers, and brought in himself as a prisoner. He was afterwards tried, and sentenced to be blown from a gun, and the sentence was immediately carried out.

From the Bihar districts north of the Ganges, the rebels, not meeting with the sympathy they expected, seem completely to have retired.

In Shahabad alone do they now maintain any footing, but here they are still strong, and more particularly in the neighbourhood of Arrah and the country south of it. Lately they for a short time occupied, and cut off the communication in, the Grand Trunk road between Benares and Sasseram; but they were speedily dislodged from the position they had taken up here. They have carried their marauding expeditions to within 5 or 6 miles of the station of Arrah, and on one occasion had the hardihood to enter that station and burn down a bungalow. They were pursued by a small party of Cavalry under Lieutenant Beadon, and eventually by a body of upwards of 200 men consisting of detachments of H. M.'s 10th and 35th regiments, the Bengal Police Battalion and 3rd Sikh Cavalry under the personal command of Lieutenant Colonel Walter, commanding at Arrah. They came up with the enemy, estimated at about 500, in the village of Sarthua, from which they were dislodged with some loss, the only casualties in our side being two privates of H. M.'s 10th Foot, slightly wounded, and two deaths from sun-stroke. The village, which belonged to the rebel chief Ummer Singh, was destroyed. This occurred on the 7th of July.

I ought before this to have mentioned that General Lugard, having been obliged to leave on sick certificate, the whole of the military arrangements for the expulsion of the rebels has been placed in the hands of Brigadier Douglas, and special measures have been taken for the protection of the Grand Trunk road.

Mr Samuells has issued highly judicious orders for the reorganisation of the police, and, as far as possible, for co-operation with the military, and I trust the time is not far distant when the whole province of Bihar will be restored to its ordinary tranquillity, though it will probably be some time before we can expect a return of that confidence in our prestige which has been thus rudely shaken.

I shall no longer delay the conclusion of this paper, which has been held back in the hope that circumstances would enable me to report the final withdrawal of the rebels and the return of peace to the province; but I must not omit to record the names of those under my jurisdiction who have been prominently brought forward in the course of the later events.

Of the ability, zeal and judgment of Mr. Samuells it is not easy to say too much. Accepting the appointment of Commissioner at a most critical time, and under circumstances which increased the difficulties of that arduous position, he has throughout conducted matters with a tact and discretion, and at the same time an untiring activity and energy



which have merited my warmest approbation. A reference to the narrative will show the extreme difficulties which this Division has presented, —a Division which internally as well as externally from its position in the map, as well as from the character of its semi-military population, has been subjected far more to disturbing causes than any other Division in Bengal, and, if a part of this province is still unhappily convulsed, it is, I am bound to say, from no failure on the part of Mr. Samuells to make use of such resources as were at his disposal. He may point with just pride to the tranquillity that was maintained through almost the whole of his Division from October in last year to April in this, and even now to the pacific state of the city of Patna itself, which was held to be a hot-bed of intrigue and conspiracy, but which, with little but the ordinary means at his disposal, he has maintained undisturbed, even though marauding parties of rebels approached to within 10 miles of its walls.

Mr. Samuells has, from time to time, brought prominently forward the names of the civil officers in the various districts who have particularly distinguished themselves, as well as of the indigo planters and others who have come forward to the assistance of Government. Those who did good service in the earlier part of the rebellion have been already conspicuously noticed in the part of the narrative which refers to that time.

Mr. McDonell, Magistrate of Saran, was specially appointed to accompany the force which, under Brigadier Douglas and General Lugard, crossed into the Shahabad district from Azimghar. Of his services the Commissioner speaks most highly, and I am sure that he deserves all that can be said of him. His assistance in crossing the troops into the district was most valuable. He was with General Sir E. Lugard during the whole of the operations, and always took the field with the force. I have reason to know that the General entertained a very high opinion of him.

Mr. Richardson, Collector of Saran, who also conducted the duties of Magistrate during Mr. McDonell's absence, has, on this as on other occasions, proved himself a most efficient public officer. He was very active and successful in the pursuit and apprehension of mutineers, and in every way justifies the high encomium passed upon him by the Commissioner.

Mr. Atherton, the Judge of Saran, has also been very useful and energetic since his return to the district.

Mr. E. McDonell, Sub-Deputy Opium Agent in Saran, has most conspicuously distinguished himself from first to last during the whole course of the disturbances. Not only has he been most active and

energetic in his own particular department, but, in addition to other services which have been already noticed in this narrative, he has raised and superintended the drill of the Siwan Levy which, under Captain Miles, has done good service in Saran. He has more than confirmed the good opinion that was always entertained of him.

Mr. Pughe, Sub-Deputy Opium Agent, has also merited and received high commendation for the manner in which his duties have been performed under circumstances of great difficulty.

Mr. Brodhurst, Magistrate of Arrah, has exerted himself very strenuously during the occupation of his district by the enemy, and both he and Mr. Colvin, his Assistant, (who, it will be remembered, took part in the defence of Arrah) have been more than once in the field in the course of the late events.

Mr. E. Baker, Deputy Magistrate of Sasseram, has been obliged to take temporary leave on sick certificate. In another narrative (that of the Chota Nagpur Division) he has been mentioned as accompanying an expedition into Palamau. He has several times taken an active part in operations in the field, and has conducted his civil duties, which have been very onerous, to the entire satisfaction of the Commissioner and myself.

Mr. Dampier, the Magistrate of Tirhut, has received frequent and honorable mention from the Commissioner. He is a most energetic officer.

The services of Mr. Money, Magistrate of Gaya, have been prominently brought forward in the early part of the narrative, and, during the late partial occupation of his district by the rebels, he has again distinguished himself. It has been noticed that he took a personal and active part in the pursuit of Jodhur Singh, both with Captain Young and Captain Rattray, and was present in the action at Kasma.

The names of the following gentlemen have been specially mentioned by the officers in whose districts they reside :—

In Tirhut, Mr. Hudson, of Serya factory, Mr. Charles Gale, of Deorea, with Messrs. J. Gale and W. Howell, his assistants.

In Motihari, Mr. J. Slade, of Rajpur factory, and Mr. Alexander Urquhart. All these gentlemen have been most active in procuring information, watching the ferries, and exerting themselves in every way. Mr. Urquhart also furnished a body of peons to assist the police, and gave quarters for two days to a detachment of the marine brigade. They have all received my warm acknowledgments.

Mr. Dampier also mentioned the names of three of his subordinate native officials as deserving of great credit, *viz.*, Keola Put, *daroga* of Pusa, Keola Parshad *jamadar*, Dani Lal, *naib nazir* of the *faujdari* Court.



The services rendered by the Rajas of Deo and Hatwa have been so frequently mentioned that it is unnecessary further to allude to them. The Bettia Raja has also afforded considerable assistance, and suitable acknowledgments have been made to all these noblemen.

In conclusion I feel that I cannot too often repeat my very high opinion of the services rendered by Captain Rattray, his officers and his Battalion. To dilate on these services is unnecessary. The facts speak for themselves. I can only trust that they will receive the rewards which their bravery, endurance and successes have so richly merited.

### CHOTA NAGPUR AND CUTTACK.

During the whole period of the outbreaks, the Division of Chota Nagpur has been a source of anxiety and uneasiness, and from time to time of embarrassment and difficulty, and even of actual danger. In fact no Division in the whole of Bengal has been subject to such continued disturbance as this province. It extends along the whole length of the Grand Trunk road from Raniganj almost to Shergati, a distance of not less than 100 miles, and its scattered and not easily accessible stations were garrisoned by native troops who, in almost every instance, broke out into open mutiny, the stations being abandoned, the jails broken open, and bands of convicts scattered over the face of the country, the treasuries plundered, and the lives of the European officers only saved by timely flight. Its population is composed chiefly of half savages, ignorant and highly excitable, with a number of petty chiefs able at any time to collect a rabble round them, and now formidable from the disaffection of the very troops intended to keep them in check.

In Palamau, in Chaibassa, and in Sambalpur there have been rebellions, the dying embers of which are still feebly smouldering, and which have given occasion for the display, in many instances, of native loyalty and attachment, and of European courage and conduct.

In the following narrative I shall, for the sake of convenience, associate the Division of Cuttack with that of Chota Nagpur. Cuttack itself may be said to have been altogether unaffected by the recent outbreak, except perhaps on its very borders, where, though the boundaries of the two Divisions (Cuttack and Chota Nagpur) may be geographically defined, the tribes and their interests are so mixed up that it is difficult to distinguish between them. Besides which for some few months the district of Sambalpur, which belonged to the Chota Nagpur Commissionership, has, owing to the difficulty of access from the north, and the great amount of work which pressed on the Commissioner, been attached to the Cuttack Division. Very lately, and probably as a temporary arrangement, a Special Commissioner has been appointed to

Sambalpur, who, with reference to the still disturbed state of the district, exercises the chief authority both civil and military.

So much being premised, I proceed to give a sketch of the events in Chota Nagpur and Cuttack as if they formed a single Division.

At the commencement of the outbreak, the various stations of Hazaribagh, Ranchi, (or Doranda), Purulia, Chaibassa and Sambalpur were occupied by detachments of the Ramghar Battalion, which consisted of a full corps of infantry with cavalry and artillery attached. This, though a local corps, was composed, to a great extent, of Hindustanis, in fact of the same material as the regiments of the line. There were, moreover, two detachments of the 7th and 8th N. I. at Ranchi and Hazaribagh respectively. From the former place the detachment of the 7th was sent away before any outbreak occurred, and the uneasiness which their presence had caused was temporarily allayed. Little confidence was placed in the Ramghar Battalion's loyalty, which was supposed to depend on the fidelity or otherwise of the troops at Dinapore, whilst the artillery at Ranchi was openly distrusted even by the commanding officer. At Hazaribagh in particular great fears were entertained. There was a treasury, with upwards of a *lakh* of rupees in it, and two jails containing 900 prisoners. No European troops could be spared either to replace or disarm these troops, and, beyond temporary additions to the Police force at the various stations, nothing could be done. No overt act was, however, committed till the 30th of July, when the troops at Hazaribagh, consisting chiefly of two companies of the 8th N. I., heard of the events at Dinapore, mutinied, plundered the treasury and released the prisoners, and, after destroying a great deal of private property, left the station. The residents saved their lives by timely flight.

Meanwhile a detachment of the Ramghar Battalion, with two guns, under Lieutenant Graham, had been sent from Doranda to attack the two companies of the 8th; but, having received on the road the news of their mutiny, they also broke into open revolt, and seizing the guns, ammunition and elephants which accompanied them marched back to Ranchi with avowed hostile intentions towards the British residents there. No doubt existing that the head quarters of the corps stationed at Doranda\* would join them the Commissioner, Captain Dalton, with the other Europeans reluctantly quitted the station, which they had not left an hour before the mutineers arriving, having burnt down some of the bungalows, took possession of the treasury, containing about a *lakh* of rupees, released the prisoners, and fired cannon at the Church. The mutineers were joined by the troops at the military station of Doranda.

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\* Ranchi is the civil station, Doranda the military cantonment, separated the one from the other by a distance of 3 or 4 miles.

The cavalry portion of the force refused to join the mutineers. Those with Lieutenant Graham, under *jamadar* Amiadin Khan, stood by that officer, and accompanied him to Hazaribagh, where also a few men of the infantry, with 2 native officers, had joined him; whilst a detachment at Barhi on the Grand Trunk road, under *naib risaldar* Shaikh Mulla Baksh were preserving order and doing good service.

Captain Dalton retreated on Hazaribagh, and, with the small force at his command, proceeded to restore order at that place, recovering plundered property, recapturing prisoners, arresting suspected persons, and reopening the courts and bazars.

The Ramghar Raja both now and afterwards rendered efficient aid to Government, for which he has received my thanks. Captain Dalton's conduct merited my high approval.

At Purulia events of a similar character took place on the 5th of August. Here too was a treasury, containing upwards of a *lakh* of rupees, and a jail with between 200 and 300 prisoners, and, when it appeared that the outbreak was imminent, the European officers retired to Raniganj.

Immediate measures were taken for the protection of the Grand Trunk road; a part of the wing of Rattray's Police Battalion was moved up from Suri, and a company of H.M.'s 35th was sent to Raniganj.

Whilst such was the state of affairs in the districts lying along and near the Grand Trunk road, great uneasiness was felt at Chaibassa and Sambalpur. The principal Assistant Commissioner in charge of the former station, on hearing of the mutiny at Ranchi, unnecessarily abandoned his station, and placed himself under the protection of the Raja of Seraikhela, who furnished him with an escort to proceed to Raniganj, and the Raja himself took prompt, and, for the time, successful measures for the protection of Chaibassa.

In consequence of this abandonment of his post, this officer was subsequently removed, and Lieutenant Birch was appointed in his room. It appears that, previously to his departure, the principal Assistant Commissioner had committed the care of the district to Chakardhari Sing, the Raja of Seraikhela, and had issued summonses to the various petty chiefs, to send in their separate contingents. There was no backwardness shown except on the part of the Porahat Raja who, from jealousy of the Seraikhela chief, refused to send in his quota, or even to acknowledge the genuineness of the summons. Had there been any European officer present, there can be little doubt that the irregular force thus collected would have been sufficient to prevent any attempt at mutiny; but, with no one to control them, petty jealousies broke out amongst the retainers of the various chiefs, and, thus disunited, they did not

venture to act against the disciplined sepoys. But it was not till upwards of a month after the Doranda mutiny, and when emissaries from that place had been sent, returned, and again been sent to Chaibassa, that the sepoys, persuaded that the British rule was at an end, at last in the beginning of September plundered the treasury, broke open the jail, and marching out of the station, after failing to cross the Sangai, which was swollen by recent rain, and being subjected to constant harassing attacks from bands of Kols, who followed them and cut up all stragglers, they finally accepted the invitation of the Porahat Raja, and placed themselves and the treasure they had with them under his protection. It may very reasonably be supposed that, had not the station been abandoned by the chief authority, this detachment, like that at Sambalpur, would have remained staunch to the present hour.

The subsequent proceedings of the Porahat Raja, with the effects they have produced, will form a prominent feature of my narrative ; but I must now return to the relation of contemporary events in other parts of the Division.

It was for a long time believed that the companies of the 8th N. I., which mutinied at Hazaribagh, had gone off in the direction of Sambalpur, and the Commissioner of Cuttack was directed to send a portion of the Madras troops, stationed at Cuttack, towards that station. The report, however, turned out incorrect, and up to the end of August Captain Leigh, the principal Assistant Commissioner, was able to report all quiet.

The *subadar* in command at this post, Shaik Panch Kowri Khan, received a letter from the native officer who had assumed command at Ranchi, directing him to move to the latter station with the treasure, releasing the convicts in the jail to act as coolies. The *subadar*, however, communicated the letter to Captain Leigh, and was using every exertion to keep his detachment faithful.

On the 13th August Captain Dalton found it necessary to fall back from Hazaribagh to Bagoda. He was informed that reinforcements would immediately be sent up.

On the 18th of August I caused martial law to be proclaimed in all the districts forming the Chota Nagpur Division.

On the 28th of August the Commissioner re-occupied Hazaribagh with 150 Sikhs of Rattray's Battalion. Immediate measures were also taken for the re-occupation of Purulia.

The officers of the Ramghar Battalion were directed to employ themselves in raising a police corps in the Chota Nagpur agency, and I may add here that the experiment seems to have been very successful. The men entertained are Kols and Sonthals, and in a recent letter received

from the Commissioner, he speaks most highly of this new levy, and of the great credit due to Lieutenants Reeves and Middleton for the manner in which they have brought into a high state of discipline these men who, but a few months since, were untaught savages.

The Ranchi mutineers were still at that station. Some disputes had arisen, and the men who had been enlisted in the province were not disposed to agree with the Hindustanis. Hitherto no division of the treasure had taken place, and these native officers, who had their houses in the province, seemed to wish to compromise themselves as little as possible ; and in this state matters remained till the 11th September, when, after having plundered the town and destroyed some of the public buildings, they marched with 4 guns and a considerable quantity of ammunition and plunder towards Tikhu *ghat*, apparently with the intention of making their way through Palamau and joining Koer Sing, who was at this time supposed to be at or near Rhotas.

The troopers took this opportunity of making their escape, and joined their officers at Hazaribagh ; only 4 accompanied the rebels.

Meanwhile a Column under Colonel Fischer, of the Madras Army, had been sent up the Grand Trunk road, with the view of clearing the road and of acting against the mutineers wherever they might be found.

A portion of this Column, consisting of 180 of H. M.'s 53rd, and a wing of the 27th Madras N. I., with two guns, was now detached under Major English and marched towards Ranchi through Hazaribagh, whilst Colonel Fischer proceeded up the Grand Trunk road so as to be in a position to act in the Palamau direction should it prove necessary.

Major English, accompanied by Captain Dalton, the Commissioner, reached Ranchi on the 23rd, where less destruction than was expected was found to have taken place ; the records had been almost entirely destroyed, but the public buildings had sustained little damage, and order and confidence were soon restored ; but Major English, not considering himself warranted by his instructions in any pursuit of the mutineers, returned towards Hazaribagh *en route* to the Grand Trunk road.

On the 11th September Captain G. N. Oakes, accompanied by a party of volunteer Sikhs, who had been taken from various corps of the line and embodied, re-occupied Purulia without opposition. The Raja of Jalda, a prisoner in the Hazaribagh jail, had been released by the mutineers, and had made use of his liberty to close the passes between Ranchi and Purulia so as to prevent the mutineers from moving in that direction. He now presented himself to Captain Oakes, to whom he had furnished a small Contingent. He was allowed to be at large for the present (having executed an agreement to appear whenever called for) ; a small sum was advanced him to enable him to entertain men to keep

the *ghats* closed against mutineers and marauders, and a promise was made that his case should be favourably represented to Government. He has since received a remission of his original sentence.

Lieutenant Birch, who had accompanied Captain Oakes thus far, proceeded from hence accompanied by the faithful Raja of Seraikhela, the *samindar* of Karsawa, and 3,000 Kols, to Chaibassa, which he reached on the 16th September; and thus by the end of September all the stations which had been abandoned were re-occupied.

Slight disturbances had taken place in various parts of the district in which the actors were either escaped convicts or bands of marauding Sonthals, nor was much difficulty found in coercing them. The Sonthal raids were chiefly confined to the country near Hazaribagh and the eastern districts. A column, under Brigadier Berkely, surprised a large body of them near Dumri on the Grand Trunk road. Lieutenant Graham, with a small detachment; twice attacked them successfully in the neighbourhood of Narainpur, and Major Simpson, with a body of Sikhs, inflicted some chastisement on a noted Sonthal chief.

Some rather serious disturbances were said to have taken place in the part of the district bordering on Pachete, and, as will be seen hereafter, the Pachete *samindar* rendered himself liable to suspicion, and was placed under arrest previous to being brought to trial on serious charges.

To return to the Ranchi mutineers. Having in vain attempted to make their way through the Thibu pass, they suddenly turned northward towards the Grand Trunk road, and reached Chattra about the 30th September. Here they halted for a couple of days, and Major English, (whose instructions were positive to lose no time in returning to the Grand Trunk road, but who had agreed, at the urgent representation of the Commissioner, to take the route from Hazaribagh *via* Chattra to Shergati) with 150 of H. M.'s 53rd and 150 of Rattray's Sikhs under Lieutenant Earle, was able to overtake and attack them here. He found them posted with 600 men and 4 guns, and after a severe struggle he succeeded in capturing the guns one after another, and completely defeated and dispersed the enemy, who broke and fled, leaving their ammunition, treasure and camp equipage and the whole of their plunder. Their loss in killed and wounded was said to be upwards of 150. Our loss amounted to 56 killed and wounded, of whom not less than 46 were Europeans. Two of the principal mutineers, *subadar* Jaimangal Pandey and *subadar* Nadir Ali, were taken in the jungles, tried and hanged. The conspicuous gallantry displayed by sepoy Uthum Sing, of the Bengal police battalion, was rewarded by his promotion to a *havildarship* in the field by Major English. The appointment was afterwards confirmed by the Government.

Chota Nagpur was thus cleared of the main body of the mutineers early in October. The stations which had been abandoned, viz., Hazaribagh, Ranchi (and Doranda), Purulia and Chaibassa were all re-occupied, whilst Sambalpur remained in the occupation of the principal Assistant Commissioner, Captain Leigh.

With the exception of some petty disturbances likely to arise from the state of anarchy caused by the mutinies, and the consequent necessary abandonment of the stations, the northern part of the Division might now be considered manageable with the means at the disposal of the Commissioner and his subordinates ; but in the southern portion considerable uncertainty still prevailed. Captain Oakes reported from Purulia that the Sonthals in Manbhum were in a state of high excitement, whilst Nilmani Sing Deo, the *samindar* of Pachete, who has been before alluded to, was said to be arming his retainers, and in other ways assuming a warlike attitude. In Singbhum also the Porahat Raja seemed likely to give trouble as I shall shortly have occasion to detail, and it was thought advisable, with reference to the difficulty of communication between the northern and southern parts of the Division, to place the districts of Manbhum and Singbhum under the temporary charge of the Commissioner of Burdwan, whilst, at a later date, Sambalpur was also, as a temporary arrangement, made over to the Commissioner of Cuttack.

I may dismiss the district of Manbhum by saying that a wing of the Shekawati Battalion, having been placed under my orders, was sent into that district, and, backed by these troops, the officiating Commissioner found little difficulty in arresting the Pachete *samindar* who, unprepared to resist the force sent to coerce him, surrendered to Colonel Foster in the early part of November. His fort was searched, and 4 pieces of artillery, with other munitions of war, were found in it. Since his capture Manbhum has been undisturbed except by occasional *dacoities*.

Singbhum and Sambalpur will require much more extended notice, and indeed in neither of these districts can it be said that tranquillity is completely restored even up to the time at which I am writing. It will be remembered that, on the eventual outbreak of the detachment at Chaibassa, the Porahat Raja had invited the sepoys to join him, which they had done, making over to him the greater part of the money taken from the Government treasury. On the arrival of Lieutenant Birch at Chaibassa, he peremptorily called on the Raja to deliver himself up, restore the Government treasure, and make over to him the rebellious sepoys. After numerous professions of his intention to do as he was ordered, and after wavering for some time, he at length, instead of surrendering himself, as he had been ordered, to the principal Assistant

Commissioner at Chaibassa, marched off to Ranchi, and there made over to the Commissioner, Captain Dalton, the whole of the plundered treasure, with 100 sepoy as prisoners. He himself was reprov'd for his disobedience of orders, and directed at once to return to Chaibassa and give himself up to Lieutenant Birch for trial. It is as well to mention here that the 100 sepoys made over to the Commissioner, having been tried and found more or less guilty, were sentenced—43 to be hung, and the remainder to transportation or imprisonment for various terms. The sentences were carried out.

In the meantime the Porahat Raja excused himself on various pretences from presenting himself to Lieutenant Birch. He was said to be completely in the hands of his *dewan*, a man named Juggoo, for whose apprehension, on account of previous delinquencies, a reward had been before offered by the Government. This man was reported to be doing his best to excite the Kols to rise, and using all his influence with the Raja to prevent his submitting himself to Lieutenant Birch.

The Raja, however, still continued to profess loyalty and his intention of keeping his pledges, and, as all seemed quiet in the district, the principal men having renewed their submission, and the people being, to all appearances, peaceably inclined and engaged in gathering in their harvest, Lieutenant Birch, (who had, in the meantime, been reinforced by 100 Sikhs under Captain Montgomery), for some time took no active steps against the Raja, who, though now disobedient to orders, seemed entitled to some consideration as having proved his sincerity by giving up the mutineers and treasure; but at length, towards the end of November, perceiving that there was little chance of the Raja voluntarily surrendering himself, and being apprehensive of the machinations of Juggoo *dewan*, Lieutenant Birch determined on an expedition against the rebel force, which had, by this time, collected about the Raja. On his way to the position they had taken up, he surprised and captured Juggoo *dewan*, (who was summarily tried, sentenced and hanged), and was completely successful in a well-managed attack on the Raja's stronghold, though the Raja himself had just time to effect his escape into the neighbouring jungle. Here again the Chief of Seraikhela afforded great assistance to Lieutenant Birch, as did the *samindars* and petty chiefs, all of whom have since been rewarded.

Again for some little time tranquillity appeared to be established; but an uneasy feeling was abroad—the Raja Arjun Sing was still at large, his influence amongst the Kols was great, and by the end of December Mr. Lushington, the late officiating Commissioner of Burdwan, who had been temporarily appointed Special Commissioner for the districts



of Manbhum and Singbhum, had to report the existence of a widespread insurrection amongst the various tribes in Singbhum.

The only force at the disposal of the Commissioner at this time was a body of volunteer Sikhs under Captain Hale.

On the 25th of December Captain Hale's party, supported by the followers of the Seraikhela Raja, attacked and dispersed a large assemblage of Kols and others led on by a brother of the Porahat Raja ; but, though our measures were so far successful, it now appeared evident that without reinforcements the insurrection could not be effectually quelled, and I was again permitted to avail myself of the services of the Shekawati Battalion under Colonel Foster, who was at this time at Raniganj. He was directed to move on Chaibassa as soon as arrangements for his march could be made.

Meanwhile Arjun Sing and his brother were exerting themselves to the utmost to raise the whole Kolhan in insurrection, and, though a large proportion of the Kols were still well affected towards Government, a formidable opposition was organised.

On the 14th January the Commissioner, accompanied by the Senior Assistant Commissioner, together with 50 or 60 Sikhs under Captain Hale, went out with the intention of punishing the murderers of a *jamadar* and 2 *barkandazes* at a place called Bar Pir. Having succeeded in capturing 2 of the petty *sardars* who had been concerned in this outrage, they were preparing to return to the station, when they were informed of the presence of a body of hostile Kols in their immediate neighbourhood.

An attack was at once decided on. Advancing to the bank of the Mogra river they were opposed by a small body of insurgents, whom they easily dispersed, and, having destroyed a village which they had reached, they were on their way back by a different route, when, on crossing the deep bed of a dry *nala* they found it swarming with the enemy, who, thus ambushed, attacked them suddenly with a shower of arrows, and, to the number of not less than 3000 or 4000, regardless of their own losses, followed the little band for some distance, not relinquishing the pursuit till they emerged from the jungle into the open plain. Not an officer escaped unhurt. Captain Hale, commanding the Sikhs, was wounded in 4 places, Lieutenant Birch's arm was pinned to his side by an arrow, whilst Mr. Lushington and Dr. Hayes, the only others present, were also, though less severely, wounded. Of the 50 Sikhs, who all behaved most gallantly, 25 were more or less severely wounded, one mortally, and one man was killed. The enemy are said to have left 150 dead on the field.

On return to the camp it was determined at once to return to Chai-

bassa, lest the enemy should cut off the retreat, in which case, hampered as they were with wounded and straitened for provisions, they would have found it almost impossible to force their way to the station.

In the absence of all other carriage for the wounded it was necessary to take the elephants, which carried their tent equipage, which was, therefore, unavoidably abandoned ; but which, it is as well to mention here, was subsequently recovered.

The insurgent Kols pursued the party for a distance of 7 miles, but were kept in check by the steady behaviour of the unwounded men, who protected the rear, and the station was reached without further casualty.

About the same time an attack was made on Chakradarpur, the residence of the Porahat Raja, but at this time occupied by the friendly chief of Seraikhela who, though protected by a force of 300 matchlockmen and two guns, yielded to a very inferior force and pusillanimously fled.

Both these affairs tended naturally to encourage the rebels and temporarily to weaken our prestige with the more loyal part of the population, yet, notwithstanding this, the insurrection seemed almost entirely confined to those Kols who had in former times been retainers of the Rajas of Porahat, and even of these the inhabitants of the southern portion of the district were disheartened by the loss they had sustained in the action near the Mogra, which, though we had suffered severely, had been still more disastrous to them ; but, on the other hand, the more westerly population were animated by the easy victory they had gained over the Seraikhela chief.

By the 17th January, Colonel Foster having made rapid marches, had reached Chaibassa with the Shekawati Battalion, and in concert with the Commissioner was taking means for the pacification of the district ; and, with reference to the more actively disturbed parts, it was determined to make the first move in that direction.

At Chakradarpur a thousand men were said to be collected. These fled on the approach of Colonel Foster, and the village was destroyed. From hence the force proceeded to Porahat, burning many villages and seizing a large quantity of grain and cattle

But in the southern part of the district the Kols were again collecting in considerable numbers, and a large force had assembled at the Siringsella Pass. Colonel Foster, who had in the meantime been reinforced by a body of 50 European sailors, which I had sent up from Midnapore, by a judicious disposition of his forces succeeded in driving the enemy from the positions they had taken up in the jungles and hills, killing a considerable number of his opponents, whilst his own casualties consisted of 7 wounded.

It is unnecessary to give the details of the different expeditions. With

the exception mentioned, little or no resistance was offered ; but a severe example, especially in such times as these, was called for. The Raja and his people had provoked their own punishment. Numerous proclamations had been published, and many efforts had been made, through the Raja's own private friends and connections, to induce him to submit himself to the Government ; in particular a notice was issued and conveyed to the Raja in his jungly hiding place, that if he failed to deliver himself up within one month his estates would be confiscated ; but a conciliatory policy had proved ineffectual, and, to ensure present safety and future tranquillity, stern retributive measures were demanded, and the desired effect was produced. The petty chiefs, seeing that we had the power to coerce them, soon commenced to make their submission, and the more readily when it was found that submission was followed by forgiveness.

The Raja, however, though towards the expiration of the time allowed him for consideration he seemed inclined to enter into some negotiation with Mr. Lushington, allowed the month to pass without surrendering himself, and, after a still further term given him in the hope of his yielding had also gone by, the Commissioner declared his estates forfeit. I may add that up to the present time he is still a fugitive in the jungles, though Captain Dalton, who has resumed the Commissionership of Manbhum and Singbhum, has lately expressed a hope that he will at length be persuaded to surrender himself. His obstinacy has been most pertinacious ; but, if he should ultimately come in, there are obvious circumstances in his case which will cause him to be mercifully treated.

I need add little more to this portion of my narrative, except to say that, when Mr. Lushington made over charge to Captain Dalton, tranquillity seemed to be in a great measure restored. The services of the Shekawati Battalion were dispensed with, as far as this district was concerned, at the end of February, and the Battalion was sent to Sambalpur.

Some uneasiness, however, continued to exist in the district. A strong feeling of hostility seemed to be entertained by the Kols against our ally the Raja of Seraikhela, whilst the Porahat Raja, urged, it is said, by the evil counsels of the *derwan*, Rughoo Deo, still refused to deliver himself up to the authorities, though petitions have been received from him professing his willingness to surrender. Certain of the insurgent Kols still cling to his fortunes. In March an attack was made on the camp of the Assistant Commissioner by a body of Kols estimated at 2,000, and, though they were repulsed without difficulty, they succeeded in driving off a quantity of cattle then grazing in the jungle.

In April another attack resulted in the defeat of the insurgents by a part of the Naval Brigade at Chakradarpur and a few Seraikhela men. On this occasion thirty of the enemy were taken prisoners.

Again, towards the end of May a gallant affair took place under Mr. Welden, 1st officer of the Naval Brigade, who, with Mr. Scott, the 2nd Officer, and 26 men of the Brigade, a small body of the Seraikhela men and two *sawars*, was sent to punish the insurgent Kols for an attack on some friendly villages. After having destroyed 3 of the enemy's camps with little opposition, the party was gradually drawn on to a rocky basin covered with dense jungle. Here they found themselves surrounded by the enemy, who from the heights poured down a shower of arrows and matchlock balls. Mr. Welden made good his retreat till, reaching the open country, he faced about and drove his opponents back, killing some 30 of them and wounding many more, himself having only one man severely wounded.

On the 9th of June some thousands of Kols surrounded the camp of the Naval Brigade at Chakradarpur, and Captain Moncrieff, the Assistant Commissioner, who was returning from Chaibassa, whither he had been to see the Commissioner, had to fight his way into the camp, 3 out of his 4 *sawars* being wounded.

On the 10th and 11th they were successfully attacked by Mr. Welden, and on the 12th, on the arrival of reinforcements under Lieutenant Reeves, they made off. A pursuit was attempted, but was soon abandoned on account of the extreme heat.

Since this, an addition of 30 men, with 2 more howitzers, has been made to the Naval Brigade at Chaibassa. Captain Moncrieff has lately succeeded in destroying one of their camps, and he has, moreover, made seizure of immense stores of grain in the jungles.

The services of Mr. Lushington being no longer required in Singbhum he returned to Calcutta in February. I have great gratification in recording that both in Manbhum and Singbhum he has conducted the charge entrusted to him with great tact and judgment, and has accomplished all that was possible with the means at his disposal.

Lieutenant Birch is an officer of great energy, and has displayed great courage, ability and firmness during the whole time he has been employed in Singbhum.

The services of the Seraikhela chief have already been noticed, and Mr. Lushington has brought prominently forward the conduct of the Karsawa *samindar*, who had been very forward in rendering assistance to Government.

Earlier in the narrative I have said that all remained quiet in Sambalpur up to the end of August; but even in that month rumours

of insurrectionary movements had begun to spread, and, though no actual outbreak occurred for some considerable time, yet the storm which afterwards disturbed the peace of this district had already begun to gather.

Early in September two companies of Madras troops had been ordered up from Cuttack to Sambalpur by Mr. Cockburn, the Commissioner, partly with reference to any outbreak that might be contemplated by the detachment of the Ramghar Battalion at that station, and partly with a view to the prevention of disturbance in the district from other causes, and this judicious movement was probably the means of saving Sambalpur.

The ordinary police was also increased, and sanction was given to the raising of semi-military police, consisting of 80 men, with an adequate proportion of officers. The detachment of the Ramghar Battalion, 150 foot and 12 horsemen, remained perfectly staunch, and did good service through the whole of the troubled times.

It is now necessary to mention what were the chief disturbing causes.

Amongst the prisoners released from Hazaribagh jail were two brothers—Sarundar Sahai and Udant Sahai. They were related to one of the late Rajas of Sambalpur, and were under sentence of imprisonment for life, having been concerned in a serious affray in which some lives had been lost. These men, soon after their release, entered the Sambalpur district, where a number of followers soon collected round them, and for a long time rumours were rife that they pretended to the Sambalpur Raj, and were assembling their retainers with the purpose of making an attack on Sambalpur.

By the beginning of October they came into the immediate neighbourhood of the station, and the Senior Assistant Commissioner, Captain Leigh, offered a reward for their apprehension. In the middle of that month they entered the town of Sambalpur, and Sarundar Sahai, who had with him a rabble of some 1,400 or 1,600 men, sent to ask Captain Leigh to grant him an interview, stipulating for a safe conduct. Captain Leigh received him on these terms, and he then assured that officer that he had no intention of aspiring to the Raj, that his only object was to induce Government to cancel the remaining portion of his and his brother's imprisonment. Captain Leigh promised to represent the matter to Government, and in the meantime Sarundar Sahai promised to disperse his followers and remain at Sambalpur, whilst Udant Sahai was permitted to reside in the village of Khinda, a little distance off. There was no great gathering in the district; the Ghanoteas of the different villages had, it is true, given the brothers assistance, but this might have

been as much from fear as from any other cause, and till towards the end of the month no general feeling of disaffection appeared to be excited. Then, however, suspicions began to be felt, in particular the Ghanotea of Kolabera was distrusted, and spies were sent to watch his movements.

On the 31st of October Sārundar Sahai made his escape from Sambalpur and joined his brother at Khinda, where 1400 men are now said to be assembled.

A further reinforcement of two companies of the 40th Madras Native Infantry had been despatched under Captain Knocker from Cuttack for Sambalpur on the 10th October, and with these were sent 50 men of the Orissa *paik* companies, who were to undertake the station duties and so release the regular troops for more active service, and very shortly after, on the arrival of Lieutenant Hadow, of the Madras Artillery, with some light mountain guns, the Commissioner induced Major Bates to send another company under Lieutenant Hadow in charge of these guns. This officer joined by forced marches, and took part in the proceedings hereafter-recorded.

On the escape of Sarundar Sahai, Captain Knocker, of the 40th Madras Native Infantry, was ordered to proceed against Khinda and Kolabera. In the latter place, which he reached on the 5th November, he destroyed the house of the Ghanotea, but he failed to capture Sarundar Sahai and his brother at Khinda, though he found their houses loopholed and prepared for defence. In only one place (Jhinghati) did he find any assemblage of armed men; their numbers were concealed by the jungle, but he killed 5 or 6 of them. Matters, however, had now assumed a serious aspect, and many of the principal *zamindars* were said to be collecting their *paiks* for the purpose of resisting the Government. Indeed, the whole country in the neighbourhood of Sambalpur was now temporarily in the hands of the insurgents, who were posted in strength at a distance of not more than 3 or 4 miles from the station, and nightly fired on our pickets. Had it not been for the timely arrival of these various reinforcements and more especially of the guns, whose power and effect were on more than one occasion successfully exhibited by Lieutenant Hadow, the authority of Government over a wide extent of country would have been utterly lost, and its recovery would have been a matter of no small difficulty.

About this time Dr. Moore and Mr. Apothecary Hanson, of the Madras Army, were ordered up from Ganjam to Sambalpur to afford medical aid to the troops at that station. They had reached Rampur, the residence of the Rehracole Raja, a distance of 4 marches from Sambalpur, and from hence wrote to Captain Leigh for an escort; but unfortunately, having started without waiting for this escort, and un-

mindful of the warnings of the Raja, they were both attacked separately on the road. Dr. Moore was murdered ; Mr. Hanson escaped, and, after wandering about in the jungles for some time without food, he on the second day met with the party of *sebundis* which had been sent out to escort them, and returned to the Raja of Rehracole, by whom he was kindly received. The *sebundis* of the escort, who had behaved very well, were rewarded by Captain Leigh.

So bold had the rebels now become that they even ventured to attack Captain Leigh, (who, hearing of their assembling, had moved out with a considerable body of the Madras Corps to support the *sebundis*), and under cover of the jungle succeeded in killing and wounding several men of his detachment, whilst, from the dense nature of the jungle, retaliation was for the present impossible.

By the beginning of December the *dāk* road to Bombay was obstructed ; two of the *dāk* stations had been burnt down, whilst large bodies were collecting in various directions and committing excesses of all sorts. Mr. Cockburn, the Commissioner of Cuttack, now despatched to Sambalpur the remainder of the 40th Madras N. I., under the command of Major Bates, and with him the guns and artillerymen stationed at Cuttack, whilst he sent off an urgent requisition to Ganjam for a portion of the *sebundis* stationed there.

Meanwhile, I made a strong representation to the Supreme Government, in consequence of which orders were sent to the Government of Madras to take immediate measures for strengthening Sambalpur. I also, in anticipation of the sanction of Government, authorised the formation of two companies of *sebundis* for service in that district. The Governor-General, in Council approved of this and Captain Bird, of the 40th Madras N. I., was appointed to command the Levy

Captain Leigh, the Senior Assistant Commissioner, about this time applied to be relieved from his appointment. His resignation was accepted ; but I must add that he remained at Sambalpur, doing good service, till the arrival of Colonel Foster in the district.

It was at this time too that the arrangement took place for the temporary transfer of Sambalpur to the Commissionership of Cuttack, and Mr. Cockburn assumed official charge on the 19th December, though, as will have appeared from the narrative, he had been practically in charge of the district for some time before.

He now determined on at once proceeding to Sambalpur in person, and accordingly started for that place, accompanied by a wing of the Madras Native Infantry and a detachment of artillery, whilst he called on the Rajas of the Tributary *Mahals* to furnish their separate contingents of *paiks*.

On the 29th December Captain Wood arrived at Sambalpur from Nagpur, with a squadron of the Nagpur irregular horse, and next morning, having marched out with 73 of his own cavalry, 150 of the 40th M. N. I., and 50 of the Ramghar Battalion, by a carefully managed detour he surprised the enemy in a *tope* of trees, and charged down on them with his cavalry whilst the infantry came up in time to complete the rout. Fifty-three were killed, a great number wounded, and several prisoners taken, whilst on our side the only casualties were a slight arrow wound received by Captain Wood himself, who killed 3 of the enemy with his own hand, and 9 horses also wounded by arrows. Sarundar Sahai, who was present, again managed to effect his escape, but his brother Chail Sahai was killed, and his adherents were from that time completely disheartened.

But, though disheartened, the rebels were not yet convinced that submission was their best policy. A party of them attacked the *dāk* station at Chamrapusa, between Sambalpur and Midnapore, and large bodies of them were still collected with hostile intentions. The Raja of Rehracole had excited bitter animosity by delivering up to the authorities Mudoo Ghanotea, who was said to have organised the attack on Dr. Moore and Mr. Hanson. This man, and 3 of his *paiks*, who were captured with him, were afterwards tried, found guilty, and executed.

In the first half of January Major Bates, whose departure from Cuttack has been mentioned, arrived at Sambalpur. He had, by the advice of Captain Leigh, taken a circuitous route, but had met with some opposition on his march, and had found great difficulty in procuring supplies. Having arrived at Sambalpur and assumed command of all the troops in the district on the 7th January, he forced the Shergati pass, destroyed the breastwork which had been thrown up, killed 4 of the enemy, and seized a quantity of arms and ammunition. Udant Sahai was holding this position.

He next destroyed the village of Kolabera, which had been a nest of rebels. The estate was now confiscated to Government, and shortly after the destruction of the village the Ghanotea and 13 of the most influential men gave themselves up to Major Bates. The Ghanotea was afterwards convicted of treason and hanged.

On the 14th January Captain Leigh, taking with him 100 of the 40th Madras N. I. and 30 of the Ramghar Battalion, marched out for the purpose of attacking a body of rebels who were posted in a jungly hill and protected by stone barricades. Finding the force too small to attack this strong position in a dense jungle with any fair chance of success, Captain Leigh was about reluctantly to retire, when the enemy, em-



boldened by this movement, descended the hill and came out into the plain to the supposed number of about 1,500. A skirmish took place, and they again retreated into the jungle, leaving 4 dead. On our-side one man only was slightly wounded.

Mr. Cockburn, accompanied by a wing of the 5th M. N. I. under Major Wyndham, and guns under Captain Ellwyn, of the Madras artillery, arrived at Sambalpur on the 20th January meeting with no active opposition, though it was threatened on more than one occasion. An attack was made on one of the halting places previous to his reaching it, and the provisions prepared for his force were carried off. He describes the difficulties of the route to have been very great, and bears high testimony to the manner in which all fatigues were borne and obstacles overcome by the Madras troops.

The Singhor, a pass 60 miles west of Sambalpur, and on the road to Nagpur, was at this time forced by Captain Shakespear, who, with a detachment of Nagpur cavalry, attacked the insurgents, killing 11, wounding 15, and taking 3 prisoners ; but, as it was necessary that this officer should lose no time in returning to his post at Raipur, Captain Wood and Captain Woodbridge were sent out with detachments to occupy this position.

On the 12th February Captain Woodbridge having, without due caution, approached a post held by the rebels at Paharsinigurra, was unfortunately shot together with 2 sepoys of the 40th M. N. I., who were near him. On this the whole detachment were seized with panic and fled, with the exception of 2 sepoys, Mathura Panday and Murtaba Khan, of the Ramghar Battalion, both of whom were wounded in an attempt to recover Captain Woodbridge's body. These men were afterwards recommended for promotion to *havildarships*. Mr. Cockburn, immediately on the news reaching him, despatched a party under Captain Leigh, and prepared to take other means to retrieve the disaster ; but on the 14th Ensign Warlow attacked the position, and, driving the enemy off, recovered Captain Woodbridge's body. He found them very strongly posted in a defile between two hills covered with jungle. Across the entrance of the defile they had erected a wall 7 feet high and 30 feet long. Half way up the hill on the left, was another stonework which commanded the one in front, whilst on the crest of the pass was a third barricade. For some considerable distance in front they had cleared away the jungle, so that advance in that direction might at once be exposed to their full fire, and leave no cover to take advantage of. Ensign Warlow, however, on approaching the position, threw out 2 flanking parties to his right and left, whilst a third was to advance up the gorge and attack in front as soon as the other

2 parties should be engaged. This judicious arrangement had the desired effect. The enemy, seeing their position turned, fled without offering any resistance, leaving behind some arms and a considerable quantity of provisions.

Every means was being taken to put down the insurrection. Detachments were scattered in various parts of the district ; but the nature of the country, its dense jungles and almost inaccessible hills, threw great obstacles in our way, whilst, on the other hand, they afforded cover and a ready retreat for the insurgents. A successful attack was made by Captain Nicholls, of the 5th N. I., on a position in the Burrapahar hills, supposed to be inaccessible to regular troops. The rebels were driven from their fastness, and a store of provisions taken. In the territories of the Bamra Raja, Major Wyndham had destroyed several villages and re-opened the Calcutta *dák* road. Detachments under Captain Knocker and Lieutenant and Adjutant Robinson, of the 40th M. N. I., were also doing good service, and Mr. Cockburn speaks highly of the zeal, intelligence and ability displayed by these officers.

He mentions with great regret the death of Major Bates, which was a loss to the public service. After his demise Major Wyndham assumed the command, which he subsequently made over to Captain Taylor, of the 40th M. N. I., himself accompanying the Commissioner of Cuttack.

Mr. Dyer, with a small party of Orissa and Garjat *paiks*, also destroyed some villages, and captured a number of rebels. Another party at Dheogam opened the river route which had been for some months closed.

*Jamadar* Harnath Singh, of the Ramghar Battalion, who had distinguished himself throughout the whole disturbances by his loyalty and bravery, was recommended for the 3rd class Order of Merit by Mr. Cockburn, and the Supreme Government granted the well-merited distinction.

Towards the end of February some degree of tranquillity began to be restored. The rebels were being hunted down in all directions, and amongst those captured were some of the *samindars* who had been principally concerned in closing the roads to Cuttack and Calcutta. The *sebundi* Levy, which had been raised amongst the Goomsens, had arrived in Sambalpur, and seemed likley to be a most useful force. The ringleaders and inciters of this outbreak were, however, still at large, and might cause further disturbance. To relieve the troops, as much as possible, from harassing marches in the hot weather, Mr. Cockburn established 3 principal posts for the regular troops at the points most

likely to require their presence, and arranged for 11 subordinate outposts of 25 men each of the Ramghar Battalion and the recently raised *sebundis*, and, having made other dispositions for the security of the district, confiscated the estates of insurgent *zamindars*, and warned the friendly *zamindars* against harbouring rebels, he returned to Cuttack. His presence was no longer required at Sambalpur, for Colonel Foster, who had been invested with the chief civil and military authority in the district, was immediately expected.

I have frequently had occasion to intimate my high approbation of Mr. Cockburn's conduct and services during the progress of this outbreak; but I must take the opportunity of once more recording the high opinion I entertain of that officer, and my appreciation of the great energy, zeal, intelligence and personal devotion which he has so conspicuously shown throughout the crisis. He has expressed his high opinion of the conduct of all the officers who have been named in the narrative, and of the services rendered by both the 5th and 40th Madras N. I. with the artillery details.

Colonel Foster, on his first arrival at Sambalpur, wished to retain the services of a portion of the 40th Madras N. I., as well as the loyal detachment of the Ramghar Battalion, but he was shortly afterwards able to report that he could dispense with the services of all but his own regiment and the *sebundis*, and for further assistance he relied on the contingents of the various local Rajas who were now willing and anxious to support his authority and afford every aid in the restoration of peace and order. At the same time, when it was proposed that a detachment of the 40th should be retained, there appeared to be a slight feeling of discontent amongst the men who had suffered most severely from the unhealthiness of the place. I allude to the subject here simply to express my conviction that there was no mutinous feeling in the corps or even in his detachment, and, as I have already remarked, the regiment has done most excellent service under most trying circumstances.

Colonel Foster, with the Shekawati Battalion, arrived at Sambalpur on the 29th March, and, as had been previously arranged, assumed the chief civil and military authority. He has been vested with the powers of a Commissioner, and, being an officer of great experience, and one who has had favourable opportunities of becoming acquainted with the native character, he seems well adapted for the position he is now filling. Already has he held a very successful conference, at which all the principal Rajas and many of the petty chiefs attended, and he is strongly of opinion that the promise of future loyalty then made will be adhered to.

The Raja of Patana, who had been sentenced to a fine of Rs. 1,000 for permitting the escape of the notorious rebel Ujal Sahai (brother of

Sarundar and Udant Sahai) proved his loyalty by recapturing the offender, and making him over to Colonel Foster, who, therefore, recommended the remission of the fine. To this I gladly acceded, and desired that my thanks should be given to the Raja for the service rendered.

Colonel Foster has brought to notice the services of Babu Rup Sing, Rai Bahadur, Munsif of Sambalpur, who has highly distinguished himself by his energy and zeal, and by the general influence which he has been able to exercise. His merits will receive suitable acknowledgment.

Sarundar and Udant Sahai, up to the latest date, were still at large, wandering about in the jungles, and seeking an opportunity of doing further mischief; but I feel no apprehension of any fresh outbreak in that direction, and have the utmost confidence in Colonel Foster's arrangements.

In commencing this narrative I associated the Cuttack with the Chota Nagpur Division and more especially with the district of Sambalpur; but during the whole course of the recent outbreak Cuttack may be said to have remained undisturbed. Rumours have from time to time been rife of apprehended danger, but on inquiry they have always turned out to be without foundation, and the whole of Cuttack and the Tributary *Mahals* has been almost totally unaffected.

The Raja of Keonjhar, in the Tributary *Mahals*, has rendered most constant and useful assistance during the whole course of the disturbances, and I have recommended that he should receive an additional title and a substantial addition to his revenue. His *dewan*, Chandar Sikur Mahapati, has also proved himself a loyal friend to Government, and will not go unrewarded.

Mr. Cockburn has also most highly commended Dino Bandhu Mahanti, *tahsildar* of the Khond Malias. His *sebundis* saved Mr. Hanson's life, and throughout the whole disturbances he has given every assistance in his power. He has already received my thanks, has been made a Deputy Magistrate, and it is in contemplation to confer a rent-free village upon him.

But disturbances of a serious character were not confined to Singbhum and Sambalpur, but extended also to Palamau. The population of that district is composed chiefly of 2 tribes—the Cheroes and the Khairwars, with a sprinkling of Kols and other savages, who took little part in the outbreak, and a few Brahmins, Rajputs and others, who were opposed to the insurgents.

The Cheroes, a spurious family of Rajputs, said to have originally come from Kumaon, a few centuries since, dispossessed the original reigning family and established one of their chieftains in their room. His

descendants continued long to hold the chiefship, and the representative of the family, the last Raja, died within the last few years, leaving no direct heirs. The Cheroes, having thus established themselves, strengthened their position by conferring *jagirs* on their followers, and numbers of these *jagirdars*, with impoverished and deeply mortgaged estates, still exist.

The Khairwars, who are scattered not only over Palamau but over the whole of Chota Nagpur, are also settlers, said to have come originally from the hills west of Rhotas. They are divided into several clans, of which the principal are the Bhogtas, with whom alone we are now concerned. This tribe, inhabiting an elevated plateau between the high lands of Sirguja and the country of Palamau, from which they are further separated by a range of hills of which they hold the passes, and possessing almost inaccessible fastnesses, have been long known as a race of turbulent freebooters, and their late chief died an outlaw.

On his death it was considered a wise policy to confer this territory in *jagir* on his sons, Lilambar and Pitambar, with a nominal quit-rent, and this policy was long successful in suppressing the natural marauding tendencies of these chiefs. Unfortunately, however, Pitambar was at Ranchi when the outbreak took place, and thinking that here was the end of British rule, and still further confirmed in this opinion by the behaviour of the two companies of the 8th N. I., who passed through Palamau on their way to join Ummer Singh, the two brothers determined on declaring their independence, their first efforts being directed against the loyal Rajput *jagirdar*, Thakurai Raghubar Dial Singh, with whom they had long been at feud. Many of the Cheroe *jagirdars* were induced to join them, partly on the promise made of placing a Cheroe chief on the throne, partly, no doubt, in the hope of retrieving their now impoverished and decayed fortunes, and late in October a force of about 500 Bhogtas, with others of the Khairwar clans and a body of Cheroes, under the leadership of Lilambar and Pitambar, made an attack on Chainpur, Shapur and Leslieganj. The attack on Chainpur, directed as has been said against the loyal *zamindars*, Raghubar Dial and Kishan Dial Singh, on account of ancient enmities—was repulsed; but at Leslieganj they succeeded in doing some damage, destroying the public buildings, pillaging the place and committing some murders.

Lieutenant Graham, who was at this time officiating as Junior Assistant Commissioner in the district, having advanced with a small body of not more than 50 men, the Bhogtas retreated into the hills of Sirguja, whither, in consequence of the smallness of his force, he could not pursue them, and he was obliged to await reinforcements at Chainpur. By the end of November the whole country appeared to be up in arms,

and Lieutenant Graham, with his small party, was shut up and besieged in the house of Raghubar Dial, whilst the rebels were plundering in all directions. It had been proposed to send the Shekawati Battalion into Palamau; but at my urgent request two companies of H. M.'s 13th L. I., which were at this time quartered at Sasseram, were directed to proceed under command of Major Cotter to the relief of Lieutenant Graham. I at the same time called upon the Deo Raja to furnish a contingent for service in the disturbed district.

On the 27th November the station of Rajara had been attacked by a very large body of Bhogtas, and Messrs. Grundy and Malzar, who were employed there on the part of the Coal Company, after holding their house as long as possible, at last with some difficulty made their escape.

The two companies under Major Cotter, with two guns, were accompanied by Mr. Baker, the Deputy Magistrate of Sasseram, and crossed the Sone near Akbarpur on the 30th November. Instructions meanwhile had been sent to Lieutenant Graham, that on being relieved he was at once to fall back with the force, advancing again hereafter when he should have the means of doing so. The detachment reached Shapur on the 8th December, and were joined by Lieutenant Graham. One of the principal leaders of the insurgents, Debi Bux Roy, was at this time captured. On the advance of the force the rebels retreated; but burned the village of Monka, near Palamau fort, and destroyed the house of Bikari Singh, a *samindar* of some influence, who had lent great assistance to Lieutenant Graham. Major Cotter was ordered to return to Sasseram *via* Shergati to clear the *ghats* in that direction, and Lieutenant Graham accompanied him for some distance; but the rebel force seemed to be breaking up; the capture of Debi Bux Roy noted above had the effect of disheartening them, and the Deo Raja, having now joined with his Contingent of 60 matchlockmen and 100 *sawars*, I permitted that officer to return, and, advancing towards his former position, he reached Kishenpur on the 22nd December. Paltan *ghat*, which had been held by the Bhogtas, was abandoned on his approach.

The rebels also withdrew from Chainpur, having made an unsuccessful attack on Ranka fort, where they were repulsed by Kishan Dial.

By this time Lieutenant Graham had received a further reinforcement of 600 men, supplied by the *sarbarahkar* of Sirguja, and was able, not only to maintain his position, but to act on the offensive, and hearing that Premanand, *ilakadar* of Konda, was in the neighbourhood, he sent out a party which surprised this chief, the most influential leader of the Khairwar tribe, with 4 of his principal men and 75 followers.

Lilambar Sahai was still collecting men, and had lately plundered 2

villages ; he, however, kept most carefully to the jungles, and allowed no opportunity of attacking him. Sirguja was also invaded by the followers of the Singruli Raja, a contumacious dependant of the Rewah Raja, from whom he had no authority for thus acting.

On the 16th January Captain Dalton himself started for Palamau with 140 men M. N. I. under Major MacDonell, a small party of Ramghar cavalry and a body of matchlockmen under *parganait* Jagat Pal Sing, a chief who on this and other occasions displayed very remarkable loyalty and attachment to the Government, and has been rewarded with a title, a *khilaf* and pension. He reached Monka on the 21st January, and being joined during the night by Lieutenant Graham, next morning, after a reconnaissance of the Palamau fort, finding that it was held by the enemy, they determined on an immediate attack, and advancing in 3 columns, against which the enemy for some time kept up a brisk but ill-directed fire, succeeded in dislodging them, when they fled, leaving guns, ammunition, cattle, supplies and baggage behind them. Ten bodies of the enemy were found ; our loss amounted only to one killed and 2 wounded. Letters to Lilambar and Pitambar Sahai and Nucleut Manji were found with the baggage, and amongst them communications from Ummer Singh, promising immediate assistance from Koer Singh.

Some leading insurgents were captured about this time. Tikait Unarao Singh, and his *dewan* Shaik Bikari, were convicted of being concerned in the rebellion, and executed.

The Commissioner remained at Leslieganj till the 8th February, collecting supplies and making preparations, and he now determined on forcing the passes into the Bhogta country, having with him a force of upwards of 2,000 men, whilst that of Lilambar and Pitambar were said to be much reduced and not to number more than 1,000. Meanwhile he had issued *parwanas* for the attendance of the various *jagirdars*, most of whom readily responded to his call ; but the most powerful and influential of them all, Babu Bhawani Bux Rai, head of the Cheroe family, did not, for some time, make his appearance, and was said to be collecting a large force to oppose Captain Dalton, and to have entertained a number of the Ramghar mutineers. On the 3rd of February, however, he too came in, and thus removed a principal obstacle to our onward movement.

Having divided his force, Captain Dalton sent one body with Kishan Dial Sing and others to Shapur to advance against the Boglumara *ghat*, whilst he himself moved to the attack of the Tungari *ghat*. As he approached this place on the 10th February, he learned that the insurgents, who had held possession of the pass, were plundering the

village of Harnam in his immediate neighbourhood. Lieutenant Graham, with a party of *sawars*, dashed on, and succeeded in intercepting the enemy, and rescuing a band of captives and a herd of cattle which they were in the act of driving off. Three prisoners were also taken, one a leader of some consequence. Two out of the 3 were hanged, whilst the third was kept for the sake of information, which he seemed able and willing to communicate.

No opposition was attempted to their entering the Bhogta country, and on the 13th they reached Chemu, on the banks of the Koel, the principal residence of the insurgent brothers, where they had a fortified house. Captain Dalton crossing the Koel, the rebels did not await his attack in the village, but retreated and took up positions behind masked breastworks of stones on the sides and ridge of a hill overhanging the village. These were carried in succession, and the enemy put to flight. A *dafadar* of the Ramghar cavalry was killed at the beginning of the fight.

The village and the fortified house were afterwards destroyed, as was Sunya, another stronghold of the rebels, close to Chemu, which was also found deserted.

Large quantities of grain were seized, as well as herds of cattle; and several herdsmen, who had been captured by the rebels, were released.

The Commissioner remained in the Bhogta country till the 23rd of February, but was not successful in capturing the ringleaders, Lilambar and Pitambar. Parties were constantly sent out in all directions, who penetrated to their hill and jungle fastnesses, in some instances, as was evident, just as the fugitives had made their escape. A few influential men were taken; but neither threats nor promises had any effect in inducing them to reveal the hiding-places of their chiefs.

A full retaliation was, however, exacted for all the mischief done by them. Their villages were destroyed, their goods and cattle seized, and their estates confiscated to the State; but, whilst stern justice was thus meted out to the inciters of this rebellion, every endeavour was made to conciliate their less guilty followers and the inhabitants of the country, which now seemed to be gradually settling down.

In the Nawaghar hills a body of rebels was collected in the middle of March under Ganpat Rai and Bishonath Sahai. Captain Dalton proceeded to Lohardaga with the intention of attacking them, but falling ill was obliged to depute the duty to Captain Oakes, who, with a party consisting of Madras Rifles, Ramghar irregular cavalry, and 160 of the Kol and Sonthal Levy, under the command of Captain Nation, by a rapid march succeeded in surrounding the enemy, who were so



completely surprised that they made no resistance. Bishonath Sahai was captured on the spot, and Ganpat Rai, who succeeded for the time in making his escape, was soon taken and brought in by some *samindars* and matchlockmen, who had been sent in pursuit. These rebels were afterwards tried, found guilty and executed.

Nothing worthy of being recorded has since happened in the district of Palamau, and the restoration of complete tranquillity and confidence seems now only to be a question of time. Lilambar and Pitambar Sahai are still at large, miserable fugitives deserted by their followers, and the Commissioner is of opinion that no further danger need be apprehended from them.

The still disturbed state of the district of Shahabad cannot, however, but give cause for anxiety in the direction of Palamau, and indeed late accounts state that some bodies of mutinous sepoys have made their way into that district. It would appear, however, as if they had resorted thither in despair, and a recent letter from the Commissioner describes them as disheartened and utterly disorganised, and apparently capable of doing little mischief.

I must not quit the subject without recording my high admiration of the conduct of Lieutenant Graham, who, without another Englishman near him, surrounded by thousands of the enemy, never thought of a retreat, and, by maintaining his post, prevented the district from falling entirely into the hands of the insurgents. I have, in the course of the narrative, shown the nature of the services he has rendered, and he is still more usefully employed in the tranquillization of the district.

The essential services rendered by the Thakurais Raghubar Dial Singh and Kishan Dial Singh have appeared in the course of the narrative, and Captain Dalton and Lieutenant Graham urgently put forward their claims for special reward, which assuredly will not be disregarded. Lieutenant Graham also speaks in terms of praise of the conduct in the field of Rampratab Singh, *karpardaz* of Kishan Dial Singh.

Babu Sheo Charan Rai, *jagirdar* of Nawaghar, gave protection to the native officials who, with the Government treasure and records, fled from Leslieganj when it was attacked. He also preserved order in his own villages, and gave efficient assistance when called upon.

Kunwar Bikari Singh, of Manika, one of the Cheroe *jagirdars*, proved himself from first to last a loyal and faithful subject of Government. He was one of the first to join Lieutenant Graham, and his information was of great assistance. His house and property were destroyed by the insurgents, and his family only saved by some friendly Kols.

All these have been specially recommended to the Supreme Government for rewards adequate to their merits.

Captain Dalton also mentions approvingly the names of certain *iajirdars*.

My estimation of the services rendered by the Deo Raja has been recorded in a separate minute.

I have thus, necessarily at some length, entered into the history of events in the districts of Singbhum, Sambalpur and Palamau. In the rest of the Division nothing worthy of mention more than has been already noticed has happened since the re-occupation of Hazaribagh and Ranchi.

Captain Dalton, the Commissioner of Chota Nagpur has given me complete satisfaction, during the whole course of the disturbances. I have explained under what circumstances certain of the districts included in the Commissionership were temporarily placed under other jurisdictions, and that this arose from the nature of the country, and from the simultaneous outbreak of insurrection in parts of the Division widely separated and difficult of access, not from any incompetency on the part of Captain Dalton.

I have named in the course of the narrative those officers whom I consider to have specially distinguished themselves, and I have also recorded the names of native chiefs and others whose services have been prominently brought forward. I now add below a further list of those who have been considered highly deserving of the approbation of Government, some of whom have also received presents, not as an adequate recompense for, but rather as a recognition of, their loyalty.

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#### BHAGALPUR DIVISION.

The Division of Bhagalpur, though not containing within itself the same apparent elements of danger as the neighbouring Division of Patna, yet was by no means free from its own causes for distrust and apprehension. Its districts as in Patna command both sides of the Ganges ; its garrisons, at the commencement of the outbreak, were all native ; the 5th Irregulars, at the *sadar* station itself, long a subject of anxiety, at length broke out into open mutiny ; the head quarters of the 32nd N. I., at Bausi, remained loyal, but were a source of constant uneasiness, whilst two considerable detachments of the same regiment at different stations did actually mutiny, and caused great confusion in a part of the Division.

If there was no great centre of supposed disaffection like the city of Patna, - yet it must be borne in mind that this Division includes the but lately tranquillized Sonthal *Parganas*, where, though the result has

proved that no such apprehension need have been entertained, it was but natural to expect that in the presence of disturbing causes, such as the past few months have produced, some excitement would at least have been called forth. But in Bhagalpur, whenever an interruption has occurred to the general peace of the Division, it has been, not from any disaffection on the part of the inhabitants, but from what may be called foreign causes; and, whenever the immediate cause of disturbance has passed away, the disturbance has passed away with it. Very great praise is due to the Commissioner of this Division, Mr. Yule, to whose exertions and the universal support and sympathy which his character and conduct have evoked the general tranquillity and security of this Division are almost entirely to be attributed.

For some considerable time, after the first outbreak of the mutinies, nothing noteworthy occurred in this Division, except the treacherous murder of Sir Norman Leslie, at Rohini, in the Sonthal *Parganas*, nor did this seem to be any evidence of widespread disaffection amongst the troopers of the 5th Irregular Cavalry, but rather to have been the result of some personal ill-feeling on the part of the 3 troopers who made the savage assault on their officers, and who were discovered and brought to justice, through the instrumentality of Imam Khan, the *Urdu* Major, and some of the troopers of the corps, the former obstinately declining the reward which had been offered for the apprehension of the perpetrators of the deed. A handsome reward was subsequently presented to him.

The mutiny of the 3 regiments at Dinapore caused considerable alarm in the Division, but all remained quiet.

At the end of July, orders were sent up from the Supreme Government to disarm the 5th Irregulars at Bhagalpur; but the Commissioner's very strong remonstrances, made through me, prevented this step being taken, nor, though subsequent events proved that the major portion of the corps was disloyal, were the arguments of the Commissioner without a considerable show of reason, particularly those which urged the impossibility of simultaneously disarming the different small detachments scattered about the Division, and the consequent danger that would arise to the European officers at the various out-stations.

Previous to the Dinapore mutiny the Commissioner had considered the presence of European troops in his Division unnecessary; but now, looking to the importance of his position on the Ganges, and to the danger that might possibly arise from a mutiny of the 5th Irregulars and 32nd N. I., he thought it right to detain 100 men of H. M.'s 5th Fusiliers at Bhagalpur, as well as to send 50 to Moonghyr, thereby allaying a panic which had previously prevailed at the latter place.

On the 14th August, at midnight, the 5th Irregulars mutinied and left the station, without, however, doing any mischief. They moved off to Rohini, where they were joined by the detachment of their regiment, and thence, (having extorted Rs. 12,000 from the inhabitants,) to Bausi, which place they passed on the 16th. The 32nd N. I. refused to aid them, and by their fidelity saved the stations of Bausi and Deoghar. A messenger, at the risk of life, conveyed to Colonel Burney, at Bausi, the intelligence of the mutiny, arriving just half an hour before the troopers. He received a reward of Rs. 1000. The authorities at Deoghar were similarly warned by a messenger, who walked 80 miles in 30 hours, and who also was rewarded. The *sawars*, failing in their attempt to corrupt this regiment, proceeded westward by very rapid marches. The Division in other respects remained tranquil, except from a little plundering by the escaped convicts from Gaya, whilst on the Purnea side of the river uneasiness was felt from the proximity of the 73rd N. I. at Jalpaiguri.

The conduct of Babu Shamalanand Mukerji at Naya Dumka was deserving of much praise. Distrusting the *sawars* of the 5th Irregulars at that station, he managed to send the treasure (Rs. 4,000) and the prisoners to Suri. The acknowledgments of Government were communicated to him. Lieutenant Boddam, of the Artillery, whose name has been previously mentioned, received the special thanks of Government for the part taken by him in preserving order in the southern district.

At this time the Commissioner recommended the enlistment of a body of Sonthals for Police purposes. This, under the sanction of the Supreme Government, has been carried out, and there is reason to believe that they will be a useful force, and that the policy of employing men from these tribes will have a favorable result.

After the affair of the 5th Irregulars, nothing worthy of being recorded occurred till the 9th October, when a detachment of the 32nd N. I. suddenly broke out into mutiny, murdered their commanding officer, Lieutenant Cooper, and Mr. Ronald, the Assistant Commissioner, and, having plundered the bazar, marched off to Rohini and thence to the westward, following the same route as that taken by the 5th Irregulars.

Some of the circumstances attending this outbreak are worth recording as illustrating the unaccountable conduct which has on many occasions been displayed by the sepoys during the late outbreak. Lieutenants Cooper and Rannie and Mr. Ronald, the Assistant Commissioner, were all surprised in the same bungalow, which the sepoys completely surrounded. Lieutenant Cooper was an officer who implicitly trusted his men, was constantly with them in familiar intercourse, and appeared to be an object of sincere attachment. Mr. Ronald was an utter stranger to them; whilst Lieutenant Rannie, though of

course well known to the men, took no particular pains to please them, and, as I am informed, appeared in no way to be a favourite with them. Yet him they specially spared, calling out to him by name to come out of the bungalow, and allowing him to leave the place unmolested, whilst they ruthlessly murdered their friend Lieutenant Cooper, and the stranger Mr. Ronald, of whom they could know nothing bad or good. Lieutenant Cooper was an officer of great promise, and had received my thanks for his judicious conduct on the occasion of Deoghar being threatened by the 5th Irregulars, when, in the absence of the Civil authorities, he had maintained confidence by opening the *cutcherry* and carrying on the current duties.

The Head Quarters of the 32nd N. I. had meanwhile marched from Bausi to Raniganj, and, notwithstanding attempts made to tamper with them during the march, on arriving at the latter place they quietly, and of their own accord, surrendered their arms.

A second detachment of the corps mutinied at Rampur Hat, as has been elsewhere detailed. On reaching the Bhagalpur Division they followed in the footsteps of the 1st detachment, but without committing any marked outrages.

Some *dacoities* occurred in the neighbourhood of Deoghar in consequence of the unsettled state of affairs; but order was very soon restored in this direction.

About the end of October sanction was given by the Supreme Government to a scheme which originated with Mr. Kerry, an indigo planter in the Purnea district, who proposed to raise a corps of the Parbatias, inhabiting the Morung, which divides our territories from Nepal. Mr. Kerry was requested to commence enlisting these men, and subsequently an officer has been appointed to the charge of them, and an establishment sanctioned on the same scale as the Bengal police Battalion. The experiment seems to promise to be very successful. Great scarcity prevailed in the Monghyr district, and in consequence there was an increase in the number of felonies, and this cause continued to operate for a considerable time. The stoppage of railway and other works consequent on the disturbances created extensive distress, and later in the year, and at the commencement of the present year, several deaths from starvation are said to have taken place. An increase of crime was naturally to be expected; but this can only remotely be traced to the prevailing disturbances.

Early in November I despatched 100 sailors to Purnea for the protection of that place in anticipation of the not improbable contingency of an outbreak at Jalpaiguri.

These men, as will be seen in the sequel, under their gallant commander, Captain Burbank, did most excellent and useful service.

On the 24th November I telegraphed to Mr. Yule, the Commissioner, the intelligence of the mutiny at Chittagong, and on the following day I announced the outbreak at Dacca, thinking it very possible that these events, the latter in particular, might bring matters to a crisis at Jalpaiguri, and thus affect the peace of the Purnea district. It was, of course, to be expected that the detachment which had escaped from Dacca would endeavour to make its way to the headquarters of its regiment. At Jalpaiguri were not only the 73rd N. I., but two *risals* of the 11th Irregular cavalry. What was expected actually happened; the companies from Dacca marched straight for Jalpaiguri, but before they came near it the 11th Irregulars mutinied and went off in the direction of Purnea. This much is necessary to explain Mr. Yule's movements, which will here be very briefly detailed. Having summoned the detachment of H. M.'s 5th Fusiliers (50 men) from Monghyr (the services of the regiment at Bhagalpur itself had been previously dispensed with), he left Bhagalpur on the 29th November, and, taking the 100 sailors under Captain Burbank, he moved to Kissenganj as the point from which he could most readily and effectually act in any direction.

With him followed all the Europeans in the Division, planters, civil officers, &c., well mounted and armed, forming a by no means insignificant body of most willing and cheerful volunteers. With remarkable energy he had collected not less than 80 elephants, and with his little army he was now ready for any thing that might happen.

On the 4th and 5th December two different detachments of the 11th mutinied, and went off. On the 9th news reached Kissenganj that they had passed to the southward of that place. Mr. Yule, putting his men on elephants, marched all night, accomplished the distance to Purnea (40 miles) before daylight, and met the *sawars*, who were leisurely marching into the place. They refused to face his force, and retired a few miles. The Commissioner followed, and on the morning of the 11th came up with them just as they were preparing to march. On this occasion they charged with a resolution worthy of a better cause, some of them, and a *risaldar* in particular, charging up to the steady little squares which formed in admirable order to receive them, and falling dead on the bayonets, 18 or 20 bodies were afterwards found on the field and in the neighbouring jungle. Under cover of a heavy fog they now retired, carrying with them many wounded. One man was taken and hung. Not a casualty occurred on our side.

On the morning of the 12th the Commissioner, having received information that the *sawars* intended crossing the Kusi to Nathpur,

started to intercept them, and in 45 hours accomplished the 50 miles to that place, including the crossing of the Kusi with its numerous and extensive quicksands. Arrived here, and having halted a few days, he learned that the *sawars* had entered the Nepal Morung, and were at Chatra, 36 miles north of Nathpur, and, as he had received an express from Jalpaiguri, urgently requesting aid against the Dacca mutineers, he determined on moving in that direction *via* Kissenganj, which (a distance of 64 miles) he reached in 36 hours, and on the 22nd December proceeded to Titalia, and afterwards to a post recommended by the Jalpaiguri authorities between Siliguri and Pankabari. Having waited here till the 26th without further intelligence, he determined on moving to Chowah *ghat* on the Tista, where the Dacca party were expected to cross. On nearing the *ghat* he came in sight of the enemy's encampment in a position unfavorable for an attack, and, withdrawing into the jungle, established his force on the path by which, as he was told, the enemy must pass. They, however, evaded him at night, taking an unfrequented by-path, and on the morning of the 28th he learned that they had crossed the Mahanadi and were making for the Darjeeling road. Mr. Yule, leaving his camp standing, took up a position on the road, and, after waiting some hours and seeing nothing of them, had just ordered his men back to camp, when the rebels were seen crossing the road at a little distance off. So rapid was their rush across the small open space from jungle to jungle that Mr. Yule's advanced party had only time to fire a volley which killed one straggler before they again disappeared in the jungle, and the pursuit, which Captain Burbank continued for 2 or 3 miles, was hopeless and unsuccessful.

The fugitives having thus made good their escape into the forest, Mr. Yule moved parallel with them on the out-skirts to prevent their making any inroad into Purnea, and reached the Kusi opposite Nathpur on the very same day that they formed a junction with the *sawars* at Chatra.

An attack planned by Mr. Yule on the position at Chatra failed in consequence of the rebels making a sudden retreat across the Kusi at a most difficult ford, where many of their horses, unable to reach the opposite bank, were abandoned. Major Richardson, who was watching the opposite bank lower down, was too late to intercept them, and indeed they were in a country where it was impossible for cavalry to act with effect, and, as has been related in the Patna narrative, they now got off through the Nepal *Tarai*, and eventually made their way into Oudh.

The very greatest credit attaches to Mr. Yule for the manner in which his whole expedition was conducted. His own report of his proceedings, as furnished to Government, has been published, and the

present slight sketch is intended not to give any adequate representation of Mr. Yule's services, but by an unembellished detail to keep up the thread of the narrative. Circumstances over which he could have no control prevented him from giving the rebels the severe lesson they would have received had the attack on Chatra succeeded ; but, in thus keeping his Division free from all outrage, he did all and more than could have been expected with the means at his disposal. Very much of his success is attributable to the tact and judgment he evinced in collecting and maintaining the means of transport and supply for his little force, and much to the personal popularity which caused all assistance to be lent to him with so much alacrity and cheerfulness. I must not omit to mention the names of those to whom the Commissioner was greatly indebted for such assistance. These were Messrs. F. B. Drummond and Simson of the Civil Service, Messrs. Wood and Braddon, Assistant Commissioners, Mr. St. George, of the Railway, Mr. Alexander, Mr. G. Waller and his two sons, Messrs. F. and R. Waller, and Messrs. Burford and Cornish.

Telanand Singh, of Bunali, and his co-sharer (a minor) supplied the Europeans most munificently and refused all payment. Mr. A. Forbes of Sultanpur was most liberal in his supplies, as were Mir Mahomed Taki of Piraha, Pertab Singh through his manager, Mr. J. J. Cave, and Mr. De Courcy. Raja Ahmed Reza, of Suriapur, and Mahomed Faizbux, of Dhubaili, also gave great assistance with the utmost readiness, and the two petty Muhammadan *milikdars* of Aruria and Chatragachi each presented two fat cows for the use of the men.

Since these occurrences Bhagalpur has remained undisturbed, and nothing worthy of notice has been recorded.

#### RAJSHAHI DIVISION.

The Division of Rajshahi would in itself have given little cause for uneasiness during the recent disturbances. Its inhabitants are of a quiet peace-loving disposition, and for many years past it has not been necessary to quarter a soldier in the Division. It was only within a few months previous to the mutinies that a native regiment was stationed at Jalpaiguri, in the Rangpur district, not, however, from any necessity for the coercion of the inhabitants, but with a view to the repression of inroads which seemed to be threatened by the Bhutias along the frontier. It is owing to the presence of this regiment, and of the detachment of the 11th Irregular cavalry, that any anxiety for the tranquillity of the district has been caused ;—and though this corps, the 73rd, is one of the very few in the Bengal Army that still retains its arms, yet, as has been related in the preceding narrative, continual apprehensions were



entertained of its loyalty, nor has it been without the exercise of the greatest courage, patience, tact and judgment on the part of the officers, that an outbreak has been prevented; whilst its 3 companies at Dacca resisted an attempt to disarm them, and, breaking out into open mutiny, excited great alarm in the districts of Dinajpur and Rangpur, and—though failing to induce the main body of their own regiment to join them—were the ultimate and exciting cause of the defection and mutiny of the two *risalas* of the 11th Irregulars at Jalpaiguri.

Early in this outbreak a meeting of the *samindars* and other inhabitants of the Division forwarded to the Government of India resolutions expressing their loyalty and determination to aid the Government in the maintenance of order, for which the acknowledgments of the Governor-General in Council were returned.

In July a few arrests were made of sepoys and others, and in the latter part of the month a plot was said to have been discovered for murdering the officers of the 73rd regiment at mess. Some sepoys were in consequence arrested and sent to Calcutta for trial by court martial, and about the end of August 18 Muhammadan troopers of the 11th Irregulars were disarmed and sent to Berhampore.

Early in September an offer made by the manager of Messrs. Watson and Co.'s factories to raise a small force of European volunteer cavalry for service, in case of need, was accepted with thanks. A small but very effective body, consisting of indigo planters and civil officers, has since been raised and organised at Rampur Boalia, and an officer deputed to superintend their drill, &c.

Cases of individual disaffection occurred from time to time in the regiment at Jalpaiguri, as for instance, in the first week of November, a sepoy loaded his musket and threatened to shoot any European officer who should come near him. He was secured after jumping into the river, and on trial sentenced to transportation for life. Some few others whom he named as implicated in a plot were dismissed. About this time Colonel Sherer, commanding the regiment, commenced to entertain Gurkha recruits with a view of introducing a neutralizing element into his corps.

All remained quiet in the Division till the end of November, when news of an outbreak at Dacca reached Jalpaiguri, and great anxiety was naturally felt for the loyalty of the whole regiment, particularly as it was expected that the mutineers would march on the latter station. Immediately on the intelligence reaching Darjeeling, Captain Curzon, with 100 Europeans and 300 trained Gurkhas, proceeded towards Jalpaiguri, which they reached on the 6th December. In the meantime a force from the 73rd N. I., who seemed to show no sympathy with their mutinous

brethren, and one *risala* of the 11th Irregular cavalry, had been sent out to Madarganj to intercept the Dacca party, in case of their approaching the station. On the night of the 4th December the *risala*, which was left behind, took themselves off, sending intelligence of their movements to their comrades at Madarganj, who followed on the night of the 5th, and, having formed a junction with the first party, the whole body made a hasty retreat out of the Division and entered, as has been previously narrated, the Purnea district. On the 9th two *sawars* who had been captured were blown away from guns in the presence of the 73rd, who evinced no sympathy with them. The Dacca companies meanwhile having crossed the Brahmaputra, not very far from Bágwa ghat, murdered an unfortunate *barkandaz* who attempted to oppose them, and entered the Rangpur district on the 30th November, and, finding there was little hope of a successful advance on Jalpaiguri, they entered the Bhutan frontier about the 8th December. It was determined that an attack should be made on them here; and accordingly Captain Curzon moved out with a party of Europeans and Gurkhas, accompanied by the Joint Magistrate, Mr. Gordon, who had made a personal reconnaissance of the enemy's camp, and marching all night reached the neighbourhood of the enemy's position before daylight on the morning of the 12th December. A dense fog and a want of accurate knowledge of the ground prevented their advancing for some time after day had dawned, but, as soon as the fog lifted, having got close to the mutineers, they found them much more strongly posted than they expected. Advancing as rapidly as was possible across a belt of very heavy sand, and dashing through a rapid stream some 4 feet deep, they came on another belt of sand, where they were exposed without protection to the fire of the rebels, who were drawn up on the high perpendicular bank of a second stream, awaiting their approach.

A surprise had been calculated on, but this had failed; the party under Captain Curzon was very small, and, with the almost insurmountable obstacle in front, an advance would have been very rash and almost certain to end in disaster, and consequently, after the exchange of a few shots, it was determined that the attack should be abandoned, and the retirement was effected without any loss, except 2 men slightly wounded.

The mutineers soon afterwards left this position, and, as has been related in the narrative of the Bhagalpur Division, they crossed the Tista on the 26th of December, and effected their escape into the Nepal *Tarai*. Mr. Gordon used every effort to prevent their crossing; but, misled by false information, and deceived by the treachery of the Bhutia *suba* of Mainaguri, who, whilst making all sorts of professions

to that gentleman, was really lending all his aid to the sepoys, and with the difficulties to contend against which the country itself presented, covered as it was with dense jungle, he was unable to oppose any serious obstacle to their progress.

The Hon'ble Captain Curzon's proceedings have no doubt been applauded by the military authorities. His prompt descent from Darjeeling and subsequent vigilance and conduct probably saved Jalpaiguri from a mutiny of the 73rd N. I. Mr. Gordon has displayed a great deal of courage, zeal and energy, as well as discretion during a very critical period, and I have every reason to express satisfaction at his conduct.

As soon as the news of the Dacca mutiny reached Calcutta, I lost no time in despatching 100 European sailors with guns to each of the stations of Rangpur and Dinajpur. These proceeding *via* Bagwa *ghat* (on the Brahmaputra) reached these stations on the 15th and 20th December respectively, and I now felt no further anxiety for the Division.

Even had the 73rd been disposed to rise, the force at Jalpaiguri itself was capable of putting down any disturbance there, whilst the presence of these bodies of Europeans was sufficient to prevent any risk of attack on the 2 stations at which they were posted.

Anxiety was at first felt for the district of Pabna, as it was thought not improbable that the Dacca mutineers might cross to Sirajganj *en route* to the north west, and more particularly so with the prospect of plunder which that rich and important mart held out. Mr. Ravenshaw, the Magistrate, sent a hasty summons to all the planters and other Europeans in his district, which was most promptly responded to, and a well-mounted and equipped body of horsemen soon collected at the *sadar* station, and moved at once to Sirajganj, where Mr. Barry had fortified his house, and with a small gunboat on the river was prepared to resist all comers. He had previously been furnished by Government with a couple of 3-lb. howitzers, with other arms and a supply of ammunition. My thanks were given to all the gentlemen who took part in this expedition, and I highly approved of the energy displayed by Mr. Ravenshaw, who accompanied the party. The Commissioner of the Division also brought to my notice the name of Bijoy Gobind Chaudhri, *zamindar* of Tatapara, who offered to place guards at his own expense between Dacca and Pabna to prevent the mutineers from advancing on the latter place. This gentleman also received my warm acknowledgments for his loyalty.

In the Rangpur district the name of Rani Sarnamoyi, *zamindar* of Baharband, was conspicuously mentioned as having given assistance

and supplies for the parties of sailors on their arrival at Bagwa *ghat*. At a time when it was feared that Rangpur would be attacked by the mutineers, Messrs. Featherstonhaugh and Proby had been entrusted with the treasure, which they undertook to convey to a place of safety. They received subsequently a reward of Rs. 500 each.

Since the mutiny of the detachment of cavalry and the escape of the Dacca mutineers from the district, every thing has remained perfectly tranquil and nothing has occurred which seems deserving of notice.

#### NADIA DIVISION.

The Nadia Division, if it has escaped the active disturbances, either foreign or internal, which have more or less unsettled the majority of the provinces of Bengal, has not been exempted from its own peculiar share of anxiety, but has been affected both directly and indirectly by the general disturbing causes,—directly by the presence in the neighbourhood of Calcutta and of Murshidabad of portions of the native army which has probably in most instances been the starting point of the panics, groundless as I have before said, and as I truly believe, but hardly perhaps unreasonable, to which the European portion of the inhabitants of Calcutta and other parts of the Division have been frequently subject;—indirectly by the constant arrival in Calcutta of large bodies of European troops, which has been the occasional source of inconvenience of the inhabitants of Calcutta generally, and to the native inhabitants in their turn a more intelligible source of panic, rendering necessary a large increase to the police force.

Nor must it be forgotten that it was in this Division that the first symptoms were displayed of the coming mutiny which was so soon to destroy the hitherto trusted army of Bengal. It has been from two points in the Division—Berhampore and Barrackpore—the one the military cantonment of Murshidabad, the other the head quarters of the Division which supplies the native guards for the town of Calcutta,—where these symptoms first showed themselves, that any apprehension has arisen, and in both cases was to be added the danger, such as it was, of the neighbourhood of large native cities, and, in the case of Murshidabad in particular, a large Muhammadan population, together with whatever prestige attached to the residence there of the descendant of the old rulers of Bengal. I must do the Nawab the justice to say that he has throughout conducted himself with the utmost loyalty, giving all the assistance in his power, and always showing himself ready to anticipate any requisition on the part of Government.

In the portion of my narrative which refers to this Division, it will be necessary for me to record but very little; the districts generally

have been perfectly tranquil, and furnish little matter to remark upon. The events connected with the insubordination and punishment of the 2 regiments, the 19th and the 34th, do not come within my province, even had they not already been so fully discussed as to render all further notice unnecessary, and the same may be said of the disarming of the whole body of the native troops both at Barrackpore and Calcutta, and the raising of the body of European volunteer guards at the Presidency.

As soon as the events at Meerut and Delhi became fully known, loyal addresses were presented by the various communities of Calcutta and the neighbourhood, and all classes showed themselves well affected to Government. The disarming of the native troops took place without any difficulty on the 14th June; numbers of deserters from various sepoy regiments were said to be wandering about the different districts, but a strict inquiry showed that these reports were very much exaggerated. A complete list of such deserters was published, and served to allay the apprehension that had been felt. At Berhampore all was quiet up to the 23rd. of June, though some seditious placards had been posted up in the city of Murshidabad. On that day a panic occurred from an unfounded belief that the 63rd N. I. and the 11th Irregular cavalry, which were stationed there, had mutinied. The Nawab lent his assistance to the authorities, and the fears passed away. The feeling of confidence was secured by the despatch to Berhampore of detachments of H. M.'s 84th and 25th regiments, of whom part were sent by steam to Alatoli, on the right bank of the Ganges, and thence conveyed by elephants and carriages rapidly and secretly to their destination. Another part were sent up in break vans with 4 horses each, and, notwithstanding the season, arrived speedily and unexpectedly at Berhampore. In this too the Nawab lent his assistance by providing horses, elephants, &c.

A plot was discovered amongst the men of the *najib* guard at Jessore in which a *jamadar* and two sepoys were principally concerned. The *jamadar* was hung and the sepoys sentenced to transportation for life. Both these men committed suicide by hanging themselves in their cell the night before they were to have been sent away from the station.

The police was strengthened through the whole Division, and more particularly in the 24-*Parganas*.

Up to the end of July all was quiet. At Jingergachia, near Jessore, a police *jamadar* named Muhammad Ali had circulated a religious proclamation to the effect that the day of judgment was at hand. The Commissioner attached little importance to this foolish act, but further inquiries were directed to be set on foot.

Various public buildings in Calcutta were at this time assigned for the use of European troops now shortly expected to arrive. An uneasy

feeling was abroad in consequence of a belief that very large purchases of arms had been made by the natives, and that these arms were concealed in the city. On careful inquiry by the Commissioner of Police the reports were found to have been greatly exaggerated, though considerable sales had no doubt taken place; the native gunsmiths voluntarily rendered their stock to the Commissioner of Police, and all precautions were taken against any possible danger that might arise during the approaching Muharram.

Great alarm existed amongst the Muhammadan population regarding imaginary violent measures that were to be taken against them during their festival. The Magistrates, as well as the influential Muhammadan gentlemen, were requested to point out to them the groundlessness of these delusions.

The news of the mutiny at Dinapore reached Calcutta at the end of July, and it was of obvious moment to disarm the 63rd regiment N. I. and the 11th Irregular cavalry, who were assuredly not to be trusted. H. M.'s 90th regiment were at this time on their way to the Upper Provinces, and a portion was allowed to make a temporary divergence for the purpose.

The disarming was carried out without difficulty. The cavalry exhibited a spirit of insubordination, and were deprived of their horses as well as their arms. All this was done in a manner very creditable to both the Nawab and the Governor-General's Agent. Subsequently, as our disarmed soldiers were reported to be making inquiries about their arms in the city of Murshidabad, it was determined that the city too should be disarmed, and the Magistrate was able to effect this without the aid of European troops. He seized a considerable number of wall and field pieces and 2,000 small arms. All this was done in the first few days of August.

In Calcutta, the Bakr-Id passed off quietly, and there was no cause for apprehension; but it was found necessary to place a prohibition on the sale of copper caps to natives by European firms, and thus to prevent them from being sent upcountry and disposed of to the mutineers.

The Commissioner of Police was allowed, at his own suggestion, to have 2 field pieces placed in the police compound, with a supply of ammunition, for the purpose of training sailors. This has been found a most useful measure with reference to the parties of sailors that have been sent to various stations, and the Commissioner has been constantly able to furnish men with some training in the use of artillery for these marine brigades. During the month of August, and indeed at various times since that period, reports were in circulation that large bodies of

upcountry natives were coming down towards Calcutta, both in boats and by land. The reports, on inquiry, were always found to be grossly exaggerated. As a precautionary measure an establishment was allowed for the purpose of searching all boats, and the police at the entrance of the Bhagirathi river was strengthened. In Calcutta itself an addition of 60 men was made to the "European police." The Muharram, which took place at the end of August, passed off more quietly than usual. An address was subsequently presented by the leading Muhammadans thanking Government for the means which had been taken to preserve order; but no doubt a great part of the credit is due to the population themselves, who endeavoured to prove their loyalty by their moderation on the occasion.

In parts of the Jessore district some sort of panic seemed to exist. In September 100 stand of arms were sent for distribution amongst the planters in that district. Various arrests of followers of the King of Oudh at Barasat and elsewhere took place during this month, as well as at other times both previous and subsequent, but I need do no more than allude to this.

Early in October the Commissioner of the Division was authorised to raise 100 men for police purposes at the *sadar* station of each district. By the end of October and beginning of November considerable bodies of European troops had begun to arrive, and a temporary increase to the European police constables became necessary.

In this month, at the representation of the Superintendent of the Alipore jail, a European guard was sanctioned, and the disarmed native guard, hitherto furnished by the Calcutta Militia, was altogether withdrawn.

I have before alluded to the disturbances caused by the arrival of large bodies of European troops in Calcutta. I may pass over these without lengthened detail, mentioning that the Commissioner of the Division reported that the troops stationed at Barrackpore were creating a very uneasy feeling amongst the respectable natives by entering *sananas* and insulting the females, &c., whilst in Calcutta some serious affrays took place. On the night of the 29th of November in particular, a fight occurred in the Bow Bazar between several hundreds of soldiers and sailors, in which the recently organised police proved very useful. Again, on the night of December 2nd, an affray took place in which a police Inspector was severely injured. The Grand Jury of the Supreme Court afterwards made a presentment on the subject. It was no doubt difficult to exercise an efficient control over the troops, scattered as they were over the whole town, at intervals of miles; the facilities for procuring liquor were also very great. Under the orders of the Governor-

General in Council all possible means were taken to lessen the latter evil. The Commissioner of Police caused all liquor shops to be closed at 5. P. M., whilst the military authorities opened a temporary place of amusement in a central position, where books and papers were provided for the men, and good and wholesome liquor was obtainable. Whilst I am on this subject, I must mention that, as late as in the first week of May 1858, very serious disturbances have occurred in the town; these have been caused by the recruits for the Hon'ble Company's cavalry who have recently arrived in India, and it has even been necessary to have a large mounted patrol on duty every night. The recruits have now all left Calcutta, and order has been consequently restored.

Assaults by Europeans on the native (disarmed) sentries at the gates of Government House had about that time become almost nightly occurrences, and to prevent them a European Serjeant was obliged to be constantly patrolling. At the end of December some uneasiness was felt at Berhampore on account of the sepoys at the station, who were supposed to be plotting. I therefore despatched a party of 100 European sailors to that station.

At the beginning of February, an intense panic was said to have seized on the artisans and native servants in Calcutta, who expected to be forcibly seized and sent to the Upper Provinces. This may not improbably have arisen from the impressment bill passed about that time, which, however, it was never intended to enforce in Calcutta or its neighbourhood.

It having been reported that some sepoys, who after a short imprisonment had been released from the Alipore jail, were being entertained as *lathials*, means were taken to prevent a recurrence of this.

On the 2nd March occurred one of the almost inexplicable panics to which Calcutta has been from time to time exposed. It was, I believe, represented to the Hon'ble the President in Council that an attempt was to be made to arm the guard which in the course of the usual monthly relief would march down from Barrackpore to Calcutta. A house was indicated (that of the Nawab of Chitpur) where the arms were said to be concealed. Under Mr. Dorin's orders, the march of the guard was stopped, and a strict search was made in the house named; but I understand that no trace of the arms could be discovered, and that the whole story was subsequently discredited.

As the anniversaries of the outbreak of 1857 approached, rumours of various kinds were set afloat, and considerable uneasiness was felt in this and other Divisions, in consequence of the report which has been elsewhere noticed; of the "something white" which after a certain fixed time was not to be obtainable. Inquiries were made as to the



origin and object of this rumour ; but I have no reason to apprehend any interruption to the peace in this or any of the neighbouring districts and Divisions.

I must not omit this opportunity of recording my high estimation of the singular services rendered by Mr. Wauchope, Commissioner of Police for Calcutta. He and his staff have always been indefatigable in their exertions to preserve order. He has given constant and most valuable assistance in the entertainment and training of men for the marine brigades. His information as to suspicious characters has always been most full and accurate, and in all respects I consider him a peculiarly efficient and most valuable officer.

#### BURDWAN DIVISION.

What has been said of the Nadia Division will also, in a great measure, apply to the Burdwan Division. It has been quite free from any disturbance, though it has not altogether escaped the apprehension of danger. For a long time the Shekawati Battalion was a fruitful, and, considering its composition, a not unreasonable source of apprehension to the residents and inhabitants of Midnapore and Bankura, whilst the but lately tranquillised Sonthal *Parganas*, and the still unsettled Chota Nagpur districts, bordering as they do 2 sides of this Division, afforded also reasonable cause for anxiety and uneasiness.

The main stay of the Division, Rattray's police Battalion, which had been expressly raised for service in the Sonthal *Parganas*, was, owing to the exigencies of the crisis, early moved away to a distant station, and, for a considerable period, the only defence against any possible rise of the Sonthals was the Shekawati Battalion, itself, as I have said, suspected of a disloyal spirit. No outbreak has however, occurred, and, as respects the Shekawati Battalion, it has not only remained faithful to the State, but has done very good service in the Chota Nagpur Division, at a time when no other troops could be spared, and when any, even wavering, on its part, would have had a very prejudicial effect.

The Division has throughout been perfectly tranquil, and I have never had the slightest grounds for anticipating any disloyalty on the part of the inhabitants.

I need hardly add that almost all the troops intended for the Upper Provinces have passed through this Division : but the arrangements at Raniganj, which have so much facilitated the onward movement of these troops, will be more particularly alluded to hereafter. As was to be expected, as soon as the general nature of the mutiny became apparent, suspicions began to be entertained of the Shekawati Battalion which was then stationed at Midnapore. A police *barkandaz* was even found

tampering with the sepoys, and endeavouring to excite them to mutiny ; but neither then nor subsequently has the regiment itself, as far as I know, been proved to have displayed any symptoms of disaffection, nor does the case of the 2 sepoys who made a murderous attack on some of their comrades, and who were released at the intercession of the commanding officer, and of the regiment generally, form any exception to this statement.

In the Hooghly district the landholders and others presented a petition, complaining of the inefficiency and cowardice of the police *barkandazes*, and begging that the bolder class of *lathials* might be entertained. The experiment on a small scale was sanctioned at the *sadar* station of Hooghly, with an intention of extending it, should it turn out successful ; and whilst I am on the subject I may add, though the circumstance belongs to a later period, that Mr. Hodgson Pratt, who has been officiating for some months past as Magistrate of Hooghly, has succeeded in obtaining the services of a considerable body of native Christians, who appear likely to be good and useful men.

At Birbhum the Judge distrusted the *sawars* attached to the Bengal police Battalion who, whilst the infantry were all Sikhs, were chiefly up-country Hindustanis, recruited in the neighbourhood of Delhi and Fathighar. Captain Rattray, commanding the Battalion, and Mr. Baker, commandant of cavalry, were both consulted on the subject of disarming these men, and both replied that means were always at hand of coercing them, and that this measure did not then seem desirable. They were however subsequently disarmed without any trouble (but after they had left Suri), and again received back their arms, as has been related in a previous part of the narrative, on giving decisive proof of their loyalty.

On the occurrence of the outbreak of the Ramghar Battalion, fresh uneasiness was felt on the subject of the Shekawati Battalion, both at Midnapore and Bankura, where was a detachment of the corps,—an uneasiness which was increased by the close neighbourhood of the Chota Nagpur districts, and a fear of outbreak amongst the Chuars and Sonthals inhabiting the country about Bankura. The distrust, however, of the Battalion seems gradually to have passed away, and in October, when increased fear of an outbreak amongst the Sonthals seemed to be entertained, a wing of the Shekawatis was gladly welcomed at Bankura, and served to allay the anxiety that was felt. But it is not necessary to record the recurrence of mere apprehensions, it is sufficient to repeat that neither then, nor at any other time since, have the apprehensions either about the sepoys or the frontier tribes been realized.

At the end of August large numbers of upcountry men were said to

have come into the Hooghly district ; on inquiry these were found to be chiefly men seeking service in Calcutta.

The Magistrate was, however, directed to exercise all vigilance in watching any movements of the kind. Throughout the Division escaped convicts from Chota Nagpur were from time to time arrested.

At the time of the Bakr-Id, in August, the Munsif and law officer at Birbhum made loyal addresses to the Muhammadans at that place, for which they received the approbation of Government.

In September the Supreme Government gave notice of their intention of establishing a temporary cantonment at Raniganj.

Towards the end of October confidence was so far restored that the Magistrate at Bankura proposed to dismiss an extra establishment of *barkandazes* which he had been allowed to entertain.

Soon after this the Shekawati Battalion, whose services were urgently required in the Chota Nagpur Division, left Midnapore, and, in the end of November, the Commissioner having reported that some disturbance amongst the Sonthals was likely to arise, I determined on sending a marine brigade of 100 men to Midnapore. These men left Calcutta on the 3rd December. Subsequently, on their services being urgently required in Singbhum, a second body of 100 men was sent to take their place.

Nothing further worth recording seems to have occurred in this Division. Loyal addresses were from time to time presented, in particular, one from the principal inhabitants of Ukhra, transmitted by the Judge of Birbhum, who was directed to return my acknowledgments.

The Commissioner also brought to my notice the services rendered, and the offers of assistance made, by the Raja of Burdwan, and I desired that my approval might be conveyed to the Raja.

#### DACCA AND CHITTAGONG.

In reviewing the circumstances connected with the late outbreak in the more eastern provinces, I have thought it desirable that the 2 Divisions of Dacca and Chittagong should form the subject of one narrative both because the geographical position of the 2 Divisions favors such an arrangement, and also because the occurrences in one have had a great bearing on the course of events in the other ; forming indeed, in the case of Chittagong, Tippera and Sylhet, a continuous and complete narrative, the details of which cannot easily be separated.

At the time when the mutinies in the north-west first broke out, the stations of Dacca and Chittagong were garrisoned by detachments of the line,—the former by the 2 companies from the 73rd regiment which have already been so frequently mentioned in connection with the

Bhagalpur and Rajshahi Divisions, the latter by 3 companies from the 34th N. I., of which the remaining 7 companies had been disarmed at Barrackpore—whilst the districts of Sylhet and Cachar were occupied by detachments from the local corps, the Sylhet Light Infantry, whose head quarters were at Cherrapunji in the Khasia Hills.

In the Chittagong Division the presence of the body of native troops was the chief, if not the only, cause for anxiety ; the inhabitants were no doubt perfectly if only passively loyal.

In the town of Chittagong itself the population was a very mixed one, consisting largely of Maghs, Rajbansis, and other Arracanese tribes, with a considerable sprinkling of Christians, and all classes were at least free from any sympathy with the sepoys, and the same may be said of the 2 districts of Noakhali and Tippera. The jungle tracts which run along the whole eastern part of the Division are inhabited by tribes of savages, who, whilst some of them own nominal allegiance to the British Government, and others are the so-called subjects of the Tippera Raja, are in fact but little amenable to any rule, and acknowledge no authority but that of their own petty chiefs.

But neither from these was any danger to be apprehended, and they are for the most part more formidable to each other and to the half-reclaimed savages who have taken refuge within our frontier from the oppression of the more powerful tribes, than to the peace of the province in general.

In the Dacca Division, on the other hand, there appeared to be much more serious elements of disturbance. The district of Faridpur, the headquarters of the fanatic Ferazis—Backergunge with its notoriously turbulent and insolent population—Sylhet with what was by many believed to be the dangerous presence of the Sylhet Light Infantry, but which, when the time of trial came, proved to be the saving of our European frontier from the very serious peril which threatened it—and beyond all, the city of Dacca, with its large Muhammadan population, which by the local authorities was believed to be at least not well affected to Government, though at the same time their undoubted antipathy to the sepoys was sufficient to prevent their lending *them* any aid or assistance, and I am also bound to say that neither before, nor since the breaking loose of the Dacca detachment, have they by any overt act shown a want of loyalty. I could not, however, but feel considerable apprehension for the tranquillity of these districts and the more so from the extreme difficulty that presented itself in the way of sending any assistance to the authorities. Unlike most other Divisions of Bengal, where in case of any outbreak a temporary divergence of troops intended for the Upper Provinces was sufficient either altogether to prevent any

outbreak, or at least to avert the more serious consequences, this part of the country was, I need hardly say, far removed from any possible resource of this kind; all despatch of aid must, therefore, be quite independent of any other movement, whilst the only means of despatch was by a circuitous water route, and that too at a time when steamers could be ill spared. The Governor-General, however, convinced of the urgent necessity for maintaining tranquillity in our Eastern provinces, despatched a body of 100 sailors from the H. C. S. *Zenobia* with two armed pinnaces; and the presence of these men prevented any serious consequences that would have been otherwise certain to arise from the mutinous outbreak which afterwards occurred, and which, but for their presence, would probably have happened at an earlier and more embarrassing time, and, I need hardly say, been attended with much more serious consequences.

The districts of Sylhet and Cachar were calculated to give still graver cause for apprehension, not only on account of their greater distance from relief, but also from their geographical position in our extreme Eastern frontier, with no barrier between it and Burma, but the small independent territory of Manipur, which, powerless in itself to resist any invasion, was sure to be an indirect source of trouble and annoyance in the event of any weakening in our prestige, since for years past, whenever an opportunity has offered, Cachar has been the starting point for a revolutionary attack on Manipur; and indeed that portion of the mutinous 34th detachment which reached Cachar was immediately joined by some one or other of the pretenders to the Rajaship of Manipur with a small following, which on the slightest prospect of success would rapidly have increased.

In short, had not the Sylhet Light Infantry displayed an almost unhopèd-for loyalty, and, moreover, a very distinguished gallantry, the eastern districts would have been utterly disorganised for an indefinite time, and, even supposing troops to be available, there would have been most serious difficulty in restoring matters to their original state of tranquillity.

Mr. Allen, of the *Sadar* Board of Revenue, had been deputed to Cherrapunji some months before the commencement of any disturbances, and I found it advisable to place the Eastern frontier temporarily under his control, a measure which has been very successful.

The stations both of Dacca and Chittagong were early subjected to panics arising from the presence of the sepoys; but, in the first case, the arrival of the marine brigade with the 2 armed pinnaces before alluded to, had restored confidence, whilst the judicious measures of Mr. Chapman, the officiating Commissioner of Chittagong, seemed to

have restored confidence to that station as well as to Tippera, which had also been subject to the prevailing uneasiness. The detachment too of the 34th N. I. appeared to have given an earnest of loyalty by a voluntary offer to make use of the obnoxious Enfield cartridge, and for some months the whole Division remained perfectly tranquil.

In the Dacca district meanwhile some uneasiness was caused on the score of a sect of Muhammadans somewhat similar to the Ferazis, under the alleged leadership of one Karamat Ali, who was said to be indetical with a well-known *mulla* of that name in the Jaunpur district ; but the identity seems never to have been clearly established, and the excitement, whatever it was, subsided without any outbreak.

In July an increase to the police of the city was sanctioned, and in August confidence was still further restored by the enrolment of the European residents as volunteers, the Supreme Government having thankfully accepted their services.

Mr. Allen reported from the Khasia hills that exaggerated rumours of the fall of the British power had caused some excitement amongst the hill chiefs, and shortly afterwards the ex-Raja of Jaintia (which adjoins the Khasia hills) was found to be intriguing with the Cherra chiefs, with a view to the recovery of his lost possessions. The Commissioner was directed to seize him if possible and send him to Calcutta ; but, on Mr. Allen's representation that this would be making the Raja and the whole proceedings of more importance than they deserved, he was directed to act on his own judgment in the matter, and the Raja was ordered to reside in Sylhet under the eye of the authorities.

At Sylhet itself the detachment of the Sylhet Light Infantry was increased in anticipation of the approaching Muhammadan festival, which, however, here, as elsewhere, passed over without the slightest disturbance.

It was at this time, the latter end of August, that the districts of Sylhet and Cachar were placed under Mr. Allen.

At the end of August, in the regular course of things, a detachment should have been sent from Jalpaiguri to relieve the 2 companies at Dacca ; but, as this would temporarily have doubled the strength of the sepoys there, and as it was not advisable at this time to move bodies of native troops about the country, the relief was postponed for the present, and the supreme Government approved of this. Some uneasiness was shown by the sepoys on receipt of intelligence that a man of their regiment had been sentenced and shot at Jalpaiguri, but there appeared to be no disloyal feeling. Fears for the approaching Muharram were entertained at Backergunge, and at a meeting of the residents it was determined to raise private funds and engage a body of 300 men, com-

posed of Maghs, Native Christians, &c., for the defence of the district, and in the meantime Government was requested to undertake the expense. A reference on this was made to the Government of India, for permission to raise such a body, limited to 200 men, at each *sadar* station, as part of a comprehensive scheme which should embrace all the districts of Bengal, and this was subsequently sanctioned. In Backergunge at this time it appeared especially needful, in consequence of the turbulence and contempt of authority habitually evinced by the people.

The Dacca volunteers made an offer at this time to escort the treasure from the different out-stations to Dacca but arrangements for this had already been made by the local authorities, and the offer was declined with thanks.

A body of 100 sailors intended for service in Assam arrived about the 17th of September at Dacca, where they evinced a mutinous spirit, and wished to decline proceeding any further. The firmness of Mr. C. Carnac, the Magistrate, and of Lieutenant Lewis, commanding the detachment of the Indian Navy at that station, soon reduced them to obedience; 2 men deserted, the remainder proceeded without further remonstrance. I directed the Commissioner to convey my approbation to Khwaja Abdul Ghani and Abdul Ahimad Khan, two Muhammadan gentlemen, who had given ready aid to Government.

On the 24th October, Mr Carnac reported that there was an uneasy feeling amongst the sepoy's; this, however, seemed to arise from reports which had been industriously circulated amongst them that it was intended to disarm them, and, on his explanation that no intention of the kind was entertained, the excitement subsided.

In the Chittagong Division everything seemed perfectly tranquil.

In August, 30 percussion muskets with ammunition were sent to the Magistrate of Noakhali. At Chittagong itself the officiating Commissioner was, during the month of September, taking steps to raise the station guard, which had been sanctioned, and this tended to add to the growing confidence. He was also collecting elephants for the Government service. Mr. Courjon, a large landed proprietor in Tippera, proposed to make over to Government 4 or 5 trained elephants on the condition that an equal number of those to be hereafter caught should be given him in exchange. His liberality was suitably acknowledged.

Thus matters remained in these 2 Divisions, till the night of the 18th November, when, without any previous notice, the 3 Companies of the 34th N. I. broke into open mutiny, plundered the treasury, leaving, however, the stamps and records untouched; broke open the jail, and murdered a *barkandas* who attempted to resist them, released the

prisoners, whom they pressed as coolies to carry the treasure and ammunition, and, having burned down their own lines and the magazine, marched out of the station, taking with them 3 Government elephants, without attempting any injury to the lives or property of the European residents, who were completely unprepared for the event.

It was at first expected that they would proceed at once to Comilla, the *sadar* station of the Tippera district; but they soon diverged from the road towards that place, and turned into the jungles and hills of Independent Tippera. At Comilla all the precautions that circumstances admitted of were taken; the ladies and children were sent off to Dacca, whither also the treasure was conveyed, whilst Mr. Metcalfe, the Judge, and Mr. Sandford, the Assistant Magistrate, remained behind at the station with a view to reassuring the minds of the inhabitants (the other civil officers were at the time absent in the district). The Raja of Tippera was at the same time directed to use every means in his power to prevent the onward movements of the mutineers.

On the evening of the 21st November, an express, conveying the intelligence of what had occurred, reached the authorities at Dacca. At a meeting of the officers, civil and military, including Lieutenant Lewis, it was, after some discussion, unanimously decided that the sepoy must be disarmed.

Accordingly, the seamen under Lieutenant Lewis and volunteers assembled at daylight the next morning, and, having disarmed the different guards in succession, and without any attempt at resistance, they advanced on the lines, which were situated in a strong position at a place called the Lalbagh. Here they found the sepoy and a detail of native artillery, with 2 guns, drawn up, ready to receive them; as the party advanced, fire was opened upon them, and a sharp engagement, lasting for half an hour, ensued. It is sufficient to say that the sepoy were driven out of their barracks, and the guns carried with great gallantry. The rebels left 41 dead on the ground, whilst 3 were drowned in attempting to cross the river, and a large number were more or less severely wounded; nor was the victory unattended by loss on our side, 15 were severely and 3 slightly wounded. Of the former 3 died of their wounds. Dr. Green, Civil Surgeon, who in the absence of other medical aid attended the attacking party, was shot through the thigh, and Lieutenant Lewis also received a slight wound.

The volunteers had been left in charge of the treasury and of the disarmed men of the different guards, a few of whom effected their escape, though without their arms, through a window which had been overlooked in the building in which they were confined, 20 prisoners were subsequently taken, 10 of whom were sentenced



to be hung, the remainder to transportation for life. The main body, thoroughly panicstricken, made a hasty retreat from the Division, passed by the stations of Jamalpur and Mymensingh without attempting any attack, and, reaching the Brahmaputra, crossed, as has been previously related, near Bagwa *ghat*, and entered the district of Rangpur. The intelligence of these separate outbreaks reached Calcutta on the same day, and immediate measures were taken to prevent, as far as possible, any further mischief. The Governor-General at once consented to the despatch of a body of European troops, and, as soon as a steamer and flat could be prepared, three companies of H. M.'s 54th were sent off to Dacca to act as circumstances should dictate. With them went a party of European seamen, and a second party followed the next day. These were intended ultimately for the two stations of Rangpur and Dinajpur, but were in the meantime to act as should seem most desirable. With the detachment of the 54th I despatched Mr. C. H. Campbell, of the Civil Service, an officer who was well acquainted with the eastern provinces. Mr. A. Abercrombie, C. S., also accompanied the sailors till they landed at Bagwa *ghat en route* for their destination.

The Chittagong mutineers having, as has been related, entered the hills and jungles of Independent Tippera, remained there for some days, taking short marches in a general north-westerly direction, which would eventually bring them into the Sylhet district, whence they might either march direct upon the station of Sylhet, or choose a westerly or easterly course, in the first case crossing a branch of the Megna into the Mymensingh district and, following in the direction taken by the companies of the 73rd, make their escape into the Rajshahi Division; in the second, skirting along the edge of the jungle, pass into Cachar, and thence attempt to reach Manipur; and this last course they eventually took. There can be little doubt that they hoped and expected to be joined by the greater part of the Sylhet Light Infantry Battalion.

By a lavish expenditure of the treasure they had with them, they managed to procure supplies as well as the assistance of some of the hill tribes, who acted as guides and pioneers. Apprehensions were still entertained at Chittagong, as it was feared that the rebels might return and plunder the station, and similar apprehension was felt at the station of Comilla, in the near neighbourhood of which they remained for some days.

The Commissioner took all means in his power for the defence of the station; the ladies and children were sent on board vessels in the port, whilst a temporary fortification was erected for the protection of the male Christian inhabitants, who formed themselves into a volunteer corps. The Commissioner very strongly noticed the good feeling and loyalty

displayed by the native population. A party of 100 seamen were, as soon as possible, despatched from Calcutta for the further defence of the place. At Comilla the courageous attitude assumed by the Civilians had great effect in reassuring the minds of the natives. Many of the liberated prisoners and some small portion of the plundered treasure were captured in the Tippera district.

The detachment of H. M.'s 54th having reached Dacca left the seamen to proceed to their destination in the Rangpur and Dinajpur districts, (and, had the mutineers eventually determined on taking the westerly route above described, these marine brigades would have crossed and intercepted their line of march,) whilst they themselves left Dacca on the 4th December in the steamer and flat, with an intention of proceeding up the Megna and the Surma to Sylhet, and thus anticipating the arrival of the mutineers at that place, for which they then appeared to be making, or, supposing them to take the western route, the detachment would still be in a position to cut them off, should they not yet have crossed, or, if otherwise, pursue them on the western bank. On the 8th December they reached Lakhi, on the eastern bank of the Surma, and here, finding that a further advance was impracticable, the force landed and proceeded by land towards Sylhet.

In the meantime reliable information had been received that the mutineers had at length left the jungles, and on the 13th December had entered the southern part of the Sylhet district.

Mr. Allen, who was now at Sylhet with the headquarters of the Sylhet Light Infantry, determined on intercepting them on the route they were now evidently taking towards Cachar and Manipur. Accordingly, on the 15th, Major Byng, who was commanding the Battalion, started with the head quarters for Pratabghar, a distance of 80 miles from Sylhet, which they accomplished in 36 hours, reaching the place on the 17th. Here Mr Dodd, Civil Engineer, who accompanied the force for the purpose of procuring information, found that the rebels had taken another route, and would reach Latoo, which was at a distance of 28 miles from Pratabghar, during the next night or on the following morning. It was at once determined to make a night march on that place, which—notwithstanding the long forced march which had been already taken and the difficulties which the route to Latoo presented—was accomplished by the men with the utmost cheerfulness, and, as they marched into Latoo at daybreak in the morning, they were met with the intelligence that the enemy were close at hand. They had barely time to form, when the mutineers came in sight, advancing in good order. A smart action took place, in which the rebels were entirely discomfited and fled into the jungles, leaving 26 dead in the field, and carrying off a

number of wounded. On our side the numerical loss was comparatively small, consisting of 5 killed and one severely wounded ; but amongst the former we had to lament the loss of the Hon'ble Major Byng, who was mortally wounded early in the action, whilst most gallantly leading on his men, and died immediately. Lieutenant Sherer, the adjutant of the Battalion, assumed the command, and brought the action to a successful termination. The behaviour of the men on this occasion was admirable. A detachment, numbering not more than 155, met and defeated a body of certainly not less than 200. The rebel sepoys, by solicitations and taunts, tried all in their power to pervert the Hindustanis who formed half of the small force : but they were only answered by a steady fire.

A Gorkha *jamadar*, named Ganga Ram Bhist, was especially named for the distinguished gallantry displayed by him in the action, and the Commissioner subsequently brought to my notice the conduct of a Gorkha named Subban Khutri, a pensioner, who accompanied his former comrades into the field ; he fell mortally wounded in a hand-to-hand fight. His daughter has since been pensioned.

A *havildar*, who was taken prisoner, was tried by drumhead court martial, and shot immediately after the action. Lieutenant Sherer and Mr. Dodd both received the thanks of Government for the services they had rendered, and the judicious arrangements of Mr. Allen were highly commended.

The headquarters of the Battalion soon afterwards returned to Sylhet, as pursuit through the jungles would have been hopeless ; but detachments were so posted as to intercept the march of the mutineers towards Manipur.

Two Manipur spies, who had given valuable information to Mr. Dodd, received each 100 Rs.

After the return of the headquarters of the Battalion to Sylhet, the *jamadar* Gunga Ram Bhist, who has been noticed above, was sent with 16 men in pursuit of a body of 10 mutineers who were known to be concealed in the jungle near Latoo. He surprised this party, and killed 8 of them.

The main body of the rebels were found to be moving to the eastward, and by the 23rd December had entered the Cachar district. On that day Lieutenant Ross attacked them successfully with a detachment of the Sylhet Light Infantry, inflicting considerable loss on them, and on the following day he again came up with them ; but on this occasion they fled precipitately into the deep jungle, where it was impossible to follow them with any chance of success.

Early in January Mr. Allen was able to dispense with the services of

the companies of H. M.'s 154th regiment, who were ordered to Dacca, there to await further instructions.

This detachment, though they had no opportunity of meeting the rebels, yet did good service in the district, and not only prevented the mutineers from making their escape to the westward, but forced them into the position where they were subsequently attacked and defeated. Colonel Michell, with the officers and men of his detachment, have received from the Government thanks and acknowledgments for the service rendered by them. I have already mentioned that they were accompanied by Mr. Campbell, whose assistance on every occasion was warmly acknowledged by Colonel Michell.

Captain Stevens, who, on the death of Major Byng, had assumed command of the Sylhet Battali, had in the meantime moved into Cachar.

Notwithstanding the defeats they had suffered, there was still a considerable body of rebels who kept together, and were by degrees making their way through the jungle to the extreme eastern boundary of the district, with the persistent object of proceeding into Manipur, and these had now been joined by some Manipur princes, pretenders to the Raj, with a few followers.

On the 12th January they had taken up a position near the direct road to Manipur, not far from the village of Sukiapur, which it was their intention to plunder. They opened fire on a party under Lieutenant Buist, of the Sylhet Battalion, who had approached their position; he immediately advanced against them, whilst a second and third party, under Captain Stevens and Lieutenant Ross, made a simultaneous attack. The rebels fought with obstinacy for about an hour and a half, when they fled, leaving 17 dead; the loss on our side was 2 killed and 2 wounded. This defeat had the effect of detaching their Manipuri allies.

Captain Stevens gratefully acknowledged the assistance he had received from Assistant Surgeon Shircore, who had made himself most useful in obtaining intelligence.

A part of the Kuki Levy was present at this engagement, and vied with the sepoys in courage and devotion.

Again, on the 22nd of January, Captain Stevens surprised a party of the rebels, numbering about 40, of whom 10 were killed on the spot, whilst the rest fled, leaving their arms, cookingpots, and even their clothes.

On the 26th, a party of 20 men under *jamadur* Bagatbir Singh, of the Sylhet Light Infantry, were detached against what was believed to be a small body of mutineers, but which was found to number from 40 to 50 in a strong position on a hill. Again were they defeated by this small detachment, leaving 13 dead.

They were now completely disorganized and dispirited ; numbers had been killed by Kuki scouts who had been offered a reward for every sepoy killed by them. One petty chief, by name Manjihow, had accounted for not less than 12 of them. Others had been brought in prisoners, as well as some women and children who accompanied them. The remainder were in a state of suffering which it is painful to record, and were even said, in some instances, to have destroyed their children rather than see them starve. Some men were found dead in the jungle from actual starvation, and, to be brief, of the 3 companies which left Chittagong not more than 3 or 4 men are believed to have escaped death or capture.

Considerable sums of money were recovered both in Sylhet and Cachar ; but these are included in the rough estimate which I before gave of the recovered treasure. The women and children taken prisoners have since been released, with permission to retire to their homes.

The services rendered by the officers and men of the Sylhet Light Infantry engaged in these operations have received my frequent acknowledgments. Nothing could exceed the loyalty of the men and native officers, and I have had great pleasure in forwarding to the Supreme Government the recommendations of Mr. Allen for a substantial reward to this most deserving regiment. I have recorded my approbation of the proceedings of Lieutenant Stewart, who at a trying time conducted matters in Cachar to my entire satisfaction. Lieutenant Stewart brought to the notice of Government the valuable assistance rendered by the Manager of the Cachar Tea Company, Mr. James Davidson, who gave very valuable information during the time the mutineers were in the jungles. The scouts employed were chiefly from a village in his grant, and acted under his directions. My acknowledgments were conveyed to that gentleman through the Superintendent. I need hardly say how highly I appreciate the judgment and energy displayed throughout the whole crisis by Mr. Allen. His presence at Sylhet conduced most strongly to the success of the entire operations against the mutineers.

The Raja of Manipur had sent a portion of his own troops to occupy the road leading to Manipur. These were now directed to return, as all danger from the mutineers was at an end. The princes who had taken part with them were captured either at this time or shortly afterwards, and this district was again perfectly quiet.

Mr. Allen reported from Cherrapunji that a Khasia of the name of Surka, a chief adviser of the Cherra Raja, who was at that time confined in the jail for some offence, had been found attempting to tamper with

a sepoy of the jail guard. His term of imprisonment was nearly out, but he was in consequence of this detained ; as soon as the disturbances in the plains ceased, he was released on security.

At Sylhet it was reported in the end of January, that a Muhammadan landholder Haji Syad Bakht, had collected arms ; on enquiring he was found to possess 6 small brass cannon, which he had been in the habit of using for firing during the Muharram. It was not thought prudent to allow him to keep these, and they were accordingly taken possession of.

Nothing worthy of further notice seems to have occurred in either the Chittagong or Dacca Divisions.

An incursion of the Khocluk Kukis into the southern part of Sylhet was quite unconnected with the mutinies. Some ill-feeling was reported to exist amongst the Manipuri inhabitants of Cachar in connection with the capture and trial of the Manipuri princes ; but neither can this be said to have much real connection with the prevailing disturbances, and indeed it was itself a matter of trifling importance, rendering necessary mere local precautions.

It remains to mention those who did good service to the State in these two Divisions during the progress of the disturbances.

I have already alluded to the judicious measures adopted by the officiating Commissioner of Chittagong, Mr. Chapman, both before and after the mutiny. His conduct throughout has merited my high approbation. I have also recorded here and elsewhere my approval of all that was done by Mr. Metcalfe at Tippera, whose promptitude, energy and resolution merited and received my warm acknowledgments. Mr. Sandford also conducted the duties that devolved on him in such a manner as to deserve my approbation.

At Noakhali Mr. Simson was most active and energetic, and was able, by his personal influence amongst the inhabitants, to provide means for resistance in case of any attack on his district, which, as he had a considerable sum in his treasury, was a by no means improbable contingency.

I record in a note the names of those native *samindars* and others who have been favorably mentioned by the officers of the Division for assistance rendered, and to whom my cordial thanks have been offered. Mr. Dunne, of the Srimudi factory, was also thanked for his services. Mr. Chapman mentioned having given a reward of 100 Rupees to his coachman, who conveyed to Comilla the news of the outbreak.

The conduct of the Tippera Raja seemed open to some question, as he had done little towards checking the progress of the mutinous detachment ; but the power of this chief is merely nominal, and I trust

that his apparent backwardness will prove to have been the result, not of disloyalty, but of disability to afford Government any substantial assistance.

Mr. Carnac, officiating Collector and Magistrate of Dacca, has acted with great vigour and promptitude throughout the whole course of the disturbances. On the occasion of the actual outbreak at Dacca, he took a prominent part in the attack on the sepoys, and he brought forward very favourably the conduct of his two Assistants, Messrs. Bainbridge and Macpherson. Dr. Green, the Civil Surgeon, who accompanied the body of sailors on this occasion, and, as has been already recorded, was severely wounded, is entitled to very honorable notice, and I must make special mention of the admirable behaviour of the Reverend Mr. Winchester, Chaplain of the station, who, in the service of the wounded men, fearlessly exposed himself in the midst of the fight.

Mr. Carnac has made a separate report of the assistance he has received during the past year from his *nasir*, Jagabandhu Bose, whose services have received acknowledgment and reward.

I take this opportunity of repeating my appreciation of the loyalty of the two Muhammadan gentlemen Khwaja Abdul Ghani and Abdul Ahmad Khan who have been before alluded to in the course of the narrative, and who have been specially mentioned by the authorities.

It has been thought advisable, as a precautionary measure, to strengthen both Dacca and Sylhet. To the former place 3 companies of H. M.'s 10th Foot were some time since despatched, and, on their arrival a portion of the naval brigade, which had hitherto garrisoned Dacca, were pushed on to Sylhet under their commandant, Lieutenant Lewis.

The Manipur Levy, which was raised at Cherrapunji, has been moved to Jamalpur, and all seems to promise a continuance of tranquillity.

#### ASSAM.

What has been said on the situation of Sylhet and other eastern districts will apply with still greater force to the province of Assam, which forms our north-eastern frontier, not only with respect to its position as a frontier province, but also as to its far removal from military resources. Practically all communication with the Presidency is conducted by a long river route. Gauhati, the principal station in lower Assam, is at a greater distance from Calcutta than Sylhet, whilst to reach the furthest stations in upper Assam occupies almost as long a time as a journey to England; add to this the neighbourhood of numerous and formidable tribes of savages (with some of whom we are always more or less in collision) and the comparatively recent occupation of the province

(since the Burmese War of 1826, and it will be acknowledged that these in themselves afford no inconsiderable cause of anxiety.

But it is not only by these inherent sources of weakness that the peace of Assam has, during the past few months, been endangered. The wide-spreading effects of the disturbances in the North-West have been communicated even to this distant part of our dominions, resulting in at least a partial disaffection of the local troops, and, in connection with this a conspiracy, having for its object the subversion of our rule, and I am convinced that had it not been for the judicious measures of the authorities on the spot, and the prompt despatch of assistance from the Presidency, an insurrection would have broken out, damaging not only to the tranquillity of the province itself, but also perilling the safety of the whole of our eastern frontier.

It was not for some time after the occurrence of the first outbreak in the north-west that any cause for apprehension showed itself in Assam. In July the acknowledgments of the Governor-General were transmitted to the 1st Assam Light Infantry at Dibrughar for the offer of service which they had made to Government. How valueless these professions of loyalty have usually been the experience of the past few months has but too plainly shown, but there was then but little reason for distrusting these local corps, far removed as they might be deemed to be from any influence which had worked on the regiments of the line, and to a great extent of different composition from those regiments, and at that time little doubt of their fidelity was entertained. Indeed, in July and for some time afterwards, the Governor-General's Agent, Colonel Jenkins, was more apprehensive of any danger that might arise from the probable breaking out of the 73rd N. I. at Jalpaiguri, and of the effect likely to be produced on the Bhutan and other frontier tribes, amongst whom it was not uncommon to find men from Oudh; and he feared that fugitives from amongst the defeated mutineers might in considerable numbers seek refuge with and take service under the turbulent Bhutan *subas*.

It was not till September that an uneasy feeling began to display itself amongst the men of the 1st Assam Light Infantry at Dibrughar. From carefully conducted inquiries, Colonel Hannay, commanding the Battalion, found that the excitement was produced by letters from Arrah and Jagdishpur, addressed to men, of whom there were many in the regiments, enlisted in the Shahabad district.

The company of artillery at Dibrughar was also composed of Hindustanis, of whom there were a considerable number in the 2nd Assam Battalion in Gauhati, though in a less proportion than in the first.

It was about the same time discovered by the authorities that some of these men, native officers and others, were in communication with



the Sarang Raja, Kandarpeswar Singh, residing at Jorhat, in whose house, whilst proceeding on furlough, they were reported to have held meetings by night.

The men of the old disbanded Assam militia had also been tampered with.

The Raja himself was a mere boy, and was completely the tool of his *devan*, Maniram Dutt, who was at this time in Calcutta.

The Raja was arrested in Assam, and, his house being searched, treasonable correspondence from Maniram Dutt was discovered, as well as other letters in a feigned hand and without signature, but no doubt emanating from the same source.

This traitor was at the same time seized in Calcutta, and, having been kept a prisoner for some weeks in the Alipore jail, was sent to Assam, where he was tried in February of this year, convicted, and hung. Four others concerned were tried at the same time, one of whom was hanged, 2 were transported for life, and one for 14 years. The young Raja, who was brought down from Assam, is still in confinement in the Alipore jail.

Meantime Colonel Hannay and the other officers in Assam exerted themselves strenuously to prevent the spread of disaffection, and with great success. The Hindustanis were sent to the different small outposts, where they had no opportunity for communication with each other and combination, whilst the Gurkhas and hillmen attached to the corps, and who might be depended upon, were gradually drawn into head quarters.

Colonel Jenkins brought to prominent notice the names of Colonel Hannay, Captain Reid, commanding the Artillery, and also of Major Richardson and Lieutenant Chambers, of the 2nd Assam Battalion. Captain Holroyd, principal Assistant Commissioner at Sibsagar, did very good service connected with the discovering of the plot and the well-managed arrest of the young Raja, in which he received very efficient assistance from Captain Lowther, of the 1st Assam Battalion, and the party under his command. Captain Bivar, principal Assistant to the Commissioner at Dibrugarh, was also very favourably noticed by the Commissioner.

As soon as the intelligence of the discovery of the plot reached Calcutta, I despatched, with the permission of the Governor-General in Council, 100 seamen to Assam. They arrived at Gauhati towards the end of September, and, in the beginning of October, Colonel Jenkins was able to report that there was no longer any cause for apprehension. Later in the month the Chairman of the Assam Tea Company wrote to Government, stating that great disaffection still existed amongst the

sepoys at Dibrugarh, and that the hill tribes were threatening an attack. A reference was made to Colonel Jenkins, who reported that there was no ground for supposing that the peace of the province would be disturbed ; he had previously stated that the disaffection was confined to a few of the old nobles of the province who were in a state of great poverty and wretchedness, and that there was no feeling of discontent amongst the people in general.

The Goalpara district, which is the most westerly part of the province, had remained altogether undisturbed ; but Colonel Jenkins reported in September that he had taken means for adding to the efficiency of the police in that district by subjecting them to a periodical drill, and by increasing their numbers. On the occurrence of the Dacca mutiny some fears were entertained for this part of the Division. The mutineers did actually destroy the Kuribari *thana*, which lies in the corner of this district, and having plundered the bazar carried off the *jamadar* and a *barkandaz* belonging to the *thana*. They also plundered Bagwa, and killed, as has been mentioned in a previous narrative, a *barkandaz* of the Goalpara police, who attempted to stop their progress.

At the end of December the Chairman of the Assam Tea Company again called the attention of Government to the defenceless state of Assam and to the danger that was likely to result from the mutinies at Dacca and Chittagong. The Dacca mutineers, as has been seen, had passed hastily through a corner of the province, and neither the Government nor Colonel Jenkins apprehended any danger from the Chittagong mutineers. The Chairman was informed of this, and was told that it was impossible at this time to allot European troops to Assam. Colonel Hannay had also recommended that European troops should be sent to Assam, and mentioned even in December that some disaffection still existed amongst the men of the detachment at Golaghat ; it was therefore determined to send a second party of 100 seamen, who left on the 31st December, and this opportunity was taken to send (as has previously been noticed) Maniram Dutt to take his trial in Assam.

Since the arrival of this reinforcement, tranquillity seems to have been completely restored in Assam.

Some correspondence took place in March on the supposed existence of a plot in the 1st Assam Light Infantry to murder the Europeans at Dibrugarh ; but on inquiry the reports on the subject appeared to be without foundation. Very full details have been received of an expedition, in which a party of the seamen from Dibrugarh and a detachment of the 1st Assam Light Infantry took part, directed against one of the above tribes of savages, but which failed owing to the great and unexpected difficulties of the route and the treachery of a supposed friendly

tribe. The aggression, however, which led to this expedition had no connection with the prevailing disturbances, and need be no further alluded to in this place.

In conclusion I must add that I have the fullest confidence in the experience and judgment of Colonel Jenkins, the Commissioner of Assam, whose proceedings have at all times merited and received my warmest acknowledgments, and who has been ably and zealously supported by all the officers subordinate to him, particularly Colonel Hannay, to whom the greatest credit is due for the prompt and well-conceived measures adopted to meet the impending dangers, and to provide with inadequate means against the threatened rebellion. I believe that there is now no reason for entertaining any apprehensions that the peace of the province will be further disturbed ; but in order to provide against any risk, a further reinforcement of 100 seamen has been sent to Assam. The most recent measures represent everything as perfectly quiet.

The measures which, with the sanction of the Supreme Government have been from time to time adopted for the preservation of peace and order in the different Divisions under the Government, have been mentioned in connection with the narrative. Such for instance, as the despatch of various marine brigades to different quarters, the increase and improvement of the local police, and the raising of various local bodies, which will hereafter form the foundation of the police Battalions recently sanctioned by the Supreme Government.

But there are some subjects which have received little or no notice in the present narrative, and which, though stated elsewhere, may still here also be cursorily alluded to. Amongst these is the improvement sanctioned by the Government of India in the police of Bihar and of the Grand Trunk road, and the addition to the number of Deputy Magistrates—measures which have been already attended with favourable results, and without which much greater confusion would have been caused in the districts of that province.

In connection with this may be mentioned the experimental appointment of Honorary Magistrates from amongst the more influential European and native settlers in the different Divisions. Whatever may be the ultimate success of this measure, there can be no doubt of its beneficial effect during the recent disturbances.

Nor is it for its own protection alone that the means and resources of Bengal have been brought into play. The province may also take credit for the great assistance which has been afforded to the movements of troops towards the north-west by the organised establishments for the collection and supply of carriage and food at Raniganj and the

various depots along the Grand Trunk road. The establishment at Raniganj I had myself an opportunity of inspecting, and I was greatly gratified at the admirable efficiency of all I saw there, and I know that the system worked equally well elsewhere. For all this I am deeply indebted to the late lamented Mr. J. R. Ward, to whom the first organisation of the establishment was due, and to his successor Mr. Elphinstone Jackson, who maintained it in the same high state of efficiency. Mr. Ward was an officer of the highest promise, and in his early death the service has suffered a severe loss. Mr. Jackson has merited my warmest approbation for the manner in which his very responsible duties have been conducted, and a high meed of praise is due also to the officers who worked under him, prominent amongst whom were his uncovenanted assistant Mr. Hampton and Captain Grubb, of the Bengal Army, one of the superintendents of supplies on the Grand Trunk road. But, where all have zealously done their duty, it is almost invidious to distinguish any by name.

The details of this establishment have already been published, and need no recapitulation. The further working of it has been lately made over to the Commissariat Department by order of the Supreme Government.

In connection with the subject of carriage and supplies I take the opportunity of noticing the successful operations of Mr. K. Macleod, of Chapra, who was employed in the purchase of carriage of all descriptions in the districts of Bihar north of the Ganges. He has deserved and received the cordial thanks of Government.

It is not within my province to offer any opinion on the causes of the mutiny, nor indeed have I had the opportunities of forming a judgment on the subject which would render my opinion of any weight ; but I will not refrain from expressing my conviction that the outbreak, as far as the Lower Provinces are concerned, has been simply a military mutiny, and that there has been at no time anything that can be called a rebellion in the sense in which that term may properly be used.

To say that there has been no rebellion in the Divisions of Bhagalpur, Rajshahi, Burdwan, Nadia, Cuttack, Assam, Dacca and Chittagong, would be a simple truism ; but the disturbances which have taken place in Chota Nagpur and in Bihar may be produced in argument on the other side.

The case of Chota Nagpur is easily disposed of. The risings in that Division have been by no means general, but have in every instance been confined to a small and discontented section of the savage tribes and their hardly less savage chieftains, and often as much from personal animosity amongst the chiefs and people themselves as from

any dislike to British rule. That there has been any difficulty in repressing them arose from the nature of the country and climate and the extreme scarcity of troops, not from any inherent strength or importance in the risings themselves, which in ordinary times would have been easily quelled. Unfortunately, at this particular juncture, the very troops which were depended upon for prompt repression of any such outbreaks had themselves broken out into open rebellion, and it is a matter of wonder that an ignorant and savage population, seeing the troops in open mutiny, the prisoners forcibly released from the jails, the treasuries plundered, and the stations abandoned by the authorities, should not have risen *en masse*, as, had there been any wide-spread feeling of disaffection with the British rule, they would undoubtedly have done. And in truth the events which have from first to last occurred in the province of Bihar evince no less clearly that there has been no organised conspiracy to rebel, whilst some of the attendant facts and circumstances testify most unmistakeably to the military nature of the movement.

It is hardly necessary to refer to the riot of the 3rd July in the city of Patna itself, in which Dr. Lyell was unfortunately killed; the very ease with which this attempt was put down, and the entire failure to elicit any sympathy, suffice to show how little of concert or conspiracy there was in the city or in the surrounding district of Patna, nor, as I have noticed in the course of the narrative, have the later disturbances had any effect in evoking symptoms of general disaffection in the neighbourhood. The three districts north of the Ganges may be dismissed with very brief notice. All of them, Tirhut, Saran and Champaran—have been more or less exposed to disturbing causes. In Champaran took place the revolt of the 12th Irregular Cavalry; through Tirhut bands of mutineers have passed; and Saran, particularly at a recent period, has been infested by parties of marauding sepoys. In all these districts the stations were at one time or other abandoned by the authorities, and, in short, inducements have not been wanting had there been any hostile disposition on the part of the inhabitants. But what has been the fact? There has never been any thing in the shape of a popular movement; the mutineers have been met and defeated by levies actually raised in these districts, and, lately, we are told that the mutineers have left Saran in disgust because they met with so little sympathy.

There remain the two districts, Gaya and Shahabad. In the first of these there have been constant sources of apprehension; 3 times the jail has been broken open, and hundreds of prisoners scattered over the country. Last year 3 separate bands of mutineers traversed the district

from end to end, and, lately, bodies of sepoys established themselves for some days within a few miles of the station of Gaya itself ; yet, with these, and with all the convicts loose over the country, the petty outlaw Jodhar Singh is able to collect only some few hundred followers, and is beaten out of the district by less than 300 Sikhs of the Bengal police Battalion ; and it is tolerably evident that except with a few of the bad characters with whom riot and disorder are a trade and profession, the rebels have here also met with but little sympathy.

In Shahabad the case is different ;—but whilst in the other districts of this province the absence of any popular movement shows the absence of any popular sympathy with the rebels, the success attained by them in this district is of itself a testimony to the military nature of the revolt. From this district of Shahabad the army was largely recruited, and consequently here as in Oudh the sepoys found that sympathy and assistance which they seek in vain in those parts of the country from which the military drafts were less taken. Yet even here in August last year, a body of 2,000 sepoys, with all the prestige that attached to the name of Koer Singh, and all the great influence he was able to exert, were driven out of the district by the small force under Major Vincent Eyre, and a portion of these returned only in despair, after being successively dislodged from Oudh and Azimghar. It is needless to enter into the causes which have enabled them for the present to make good their footing here ; but even now their rule is one of terror, and not of affection, and though joined by a portion of the military population, and able, it is said, to raise some hundreds of recruits, they are obliged to maintain their position, and obtain their supplies, by a system of uncompromising severity and barbarity. It has already been noticed in the course of the narrative, that for many months Shahabad, as well as the rest of Bihar, was perfectly tranquil, with the exception of some trifling disturbances arising out of petty local causes ; in short, with the single exception of this district of Shahabad, there is no trace anywhere of a popular movement, either separately or in connection with the mutinies. An abortive attempt at plot on a small scale is discovered in Assam fomented by discontented sepoys ; a few Manipuris take advantage of the presence of the Chittagong mutineers to attempt one of the periodical raids against Manipur, but nowhere is there any sign of combination, nowhere any trace of organised conspiracy. In short, I cannot help expressing my firm conviction, that, as far as I have had any opportunity of forming an opinion, and with reference only to what has come legitimately under my personal observation, there has been no rebellion, properly so called, but simply a military mutiny.

30th. September 1858.

F. J. HALLIDAY.

Although it does not fall within his Lieutenant-Governorship, I think the following account of a *Suttee*, as narrated by Sir F. Halliday 70 years later, will be considered interesting, and it has never been printed elsewhere :—

A *Suttee* anecdote.

“*Suttee* was prohibited by law in 1829. At and before that time I was acting as Magistrate of the district of Hooghly. Before the new law came into operation notice was one day brought to me that a *Suttee* was about to occur a few miles from my residence. Such things were frequent in Hooghly as the banks of that side of the river were considered particularly propitious for such sacrifices. When the message reached me, Dr. Wise of the Medical Service and a clergyman (whose name I forget), who was Chaplain to the Governor-General, were visiting me and expressed a wish to witness the ceremony. Accordingly we drove to the appointed place where a large crowd of natives was assembled on the river bank and the funeral pile already prepared, the intended victim seated on the ground in front of it. Chairs were brought for us and we sat down near the woman. My 2 companions, who did not speak the language, then began to press the widow with all the reasons they could urge to dissuade her from her purpose, all of which at their request I made the woman understand in her own language. To this she listened with grave and respectful attention but without being at all moved by it; the priests and many of the spectators also listening to what was said.

At length she showed some impatience and asked to be allowed to proceed to the pile. Seeing that nothing further could be done, I gave her the permission, but, before she had moved, the clergyman begged me to put to her one more question.—“Did she know what pain she was about to suffer?” She, seated on the ground close to my feet, looked up at me with a scornful expression in her intelligent face and said for answer, “Bring a lamp”: the lamp was brought, of the small sauce-boat fashion used by peasants, and also some *ghi* or melted butter and a large cotton wick. These she herself arranged in the most effective form and then said, “Light it;” which was done and the lamp placed on the ground before her. Then steadfastly looking at me with an air of grave defiance she rested her right elbow on the ground and put her finger into the flame of the lamp. The finger scorched, blistered, and blackened

and finally twisted up in a way which I can only compare to what I have seen happen to a quill pen in the flame of a candle. This lasted for some time, during which she never moved her hand, uttered a sound or altered the expression of her countenance. She then said: "Are you satisfied?" to which I answered hastily, "Quite satisfied," upon which with great deliberation she removed her finger from the flame, saying: "Now may I go?" To this I assented and she moved down the slope to the pile. This was placed on the edge of the stream. It was about  $4\frac{1}{2}$  feet high, about the same length, and perhaps 3 feet broad, composed of alternate layers of small billets of wood and light dry brushwood between 4 upright stakes. Round this she was marched in a noisy procession 2 or 3 times and then ascended it, laying herself down on her side with her face in her hands like one composing herself to sleep, after which she was covered up with light brushwood for several inches, but not so as to prevent her rising had she been so minded. The attendants then began to fasten her down with long bamboos. This I immediately prohibited and they desisted unwillingly but without any show of anger. Her son, a man of about 30, was now called upon to light the pile.

It was one of those frequent cases in which the husband's death had occurred too far off for the body to be brought to the pile, and instead of it a part of his clothing had been laid thereon by the widow's side. A great deal of powdered resin and, I think, some *ghi* had been thrown upon the wood which first gave a dense smoke and then burst into flame. Until the flames drove me back I stood near enough to touch the pile, but I heard no sound and saw no motion, except one gentle upheaving of the brushwood over the body, after which all was still. The son who had lighted the pile remained near it until it was in full combustion, and then rushing up the bank threw himself on the ground in a paroxysm of grief. So ended the last *Suttee* that was lawfully celebrated in the district of Hooghly and perhaps in Bengal.

The prohibition of this horrible custom which had been a subject of grave apprehension to which the Government, until the time of Lord William Bentinck, had always feared to apply itself was effected without the smallest opposition or difficulty. At first applications for leave to perform it were not unfrequent but being in every case



sternly forbidden were at once abandoned, the Brahmins merely remarking that if the widow was not permitted to burn she would infallibly be struck dead. This never occurred in my district or anywhere else so far as I know."





Photogravure

Survey of India Offices, Calcutta, December 1900.

SIR JOHN PETER GRANT, K.C.B., G.C.M.G.

From a photograph by Mess<sup>rs</sup> Bourne & Shephard.

## CHAPTER II.

SIR JOHN PETER GRANT. K. C. B., G. C. M. G.

1859—62.

In the preceding Chapter, Sir Frederick Halliday's successor, Sir John Peter Grant, has been constantly mentioned. He was the second son (born 1807) of Sir John Peter Grant, Kt, (1774-1848), of Rothiemurchus, Inverness, M. P. for Great Grimsby and Tavistock, a Puisne Judge of the Bombay Supreme Court, and subsequently a Puisne Judge of the Calcutta Supreme Court from October 1833 to February 1848: (the latter had succeeded to the entailed estate of the Doune of Rothiemurchus on the death of his uncle, Patrick Grant, in 1790: he died at sea on his passage home, 17th May 1848, and was buried in the Dean Cemetery, Edinburgh.) He was educated at Eton and Edinburgh University; and appointed to the Bengal Civil Service from Haileybury, in 1826. He arrived in India on July 31, 1828, and had therefore done nearly 31 years' service before his appointment to the Lieutenant-Governorship of Bengal. He served in the revenue and judicial departments in the N. W. Provinces, at Bareilly, 1829, Shahjahanpore and Phillibhit, 1832, and in Bengal, as Deputy Collector of Saran, 1833; as Secretary, to the *Sadar* Board of Revenue, Calcutta, and as Assistant Secretary and Deputy Secretary to Government, 1834; Deputy Accountant and Civil Auditor, Agra; Deputy Secretary to the Governments of India and Bengal, Judicial and Revenue departments, and Superintendent of the Botanic Garden 1835; Junior Member and Secretary, Prison Discipline Committee, 1836; Secretary to the Indian Law Commission, 1837; Deputy Secretary and Secretary to the Government of India, legislative, judicial and revenue departments, 1838; Private Secretary to the Governor-General, January 1839, and Deputy Secretary, General and Financial departments, 1839; Deputy-Accountant-General, *ex-officio* Director of the Bank of Bengal, and Junior Secretary,

Financial branch, 1840; on furlough from March 1841 to 1844; Commissioner for payment of the Maharaja of Mysore's debts, 1844-47; Commissioner for inquiry into proceedings regarding Meria sacrifices in Ganjam, 1847; Secretary to the Indian Law Commission, 1848; Secretary to Government of Bengal, 1849; Secretary to Government of India, Home and Foreign departments, 1852-54; Member of the Governor-General's Council, 1854-59, but temporarily Lieutenant-Governor of the "Central" Provinces during the mutiny, 1857-58.

Sir J. P. Grant, it will be seen from the above summary, had a distinguished career. It is recorded of him that his varied abilities, tact and judgment, combined with his unbiassed opinions on all grave questions and his kind feeling for the people marked him as a man suited to the time. His versatile qualities and his knowledge of details of administration in every department, it is said, peculiarly fitted him to deal in a masterly way with all difficult problems. When he was convinced of the soundness of any scheme or measure he would not rest satisfied until he gained over the opposition. Lord Macaulay regarded\* him as one of the "flowers of Calcutta Society": one of the "little circle of people whose friendship I value, and in whose conversation I take pleasure." Both Lords Dalhousie and Canning paid great regard to his counsels.

Mr. Seton-Karr writes (1899.) "The Governor-General, at that time in the very fulness and maturity of his powers and experience, found a colleague who, if he differed on some important questions from a statesman somewhat apt to carry all before him by forcible writing and by personal influence, did not at other times content himself with a brief Minute of concurrence, but supported his chief by State papers, in which cogent arguments were set forth in a style of peculiar dignity and clearness. Mr. Disraeli spoke of Grant's Minute on the Annexation of Oudh as one of the ablest papers in the whole Blue Book. And Lord Dalhousie acknowledged that opposition on some points was almost welcomed by the powerful support brought to bear on the discussion of others on which the Governor-General had set his heart, and in which his colleague concurred."

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\* *Life and Letters*, Chapter VI., 1834-38.

There is a story on record that, when Belvedere was being furnished for the first time, Sir J. P. Grant induced the Governor-General, Lord Dalhousie, against his will, to disallow some of the expenditure incurred by the first Lieutenant-Governor, as not covered by the despatch of the Court of Directors on the subject. It is also on record\* how, after Lord Canning, in the Mutinies, had not accepted the first offer of the European Community of Calcutta to enrol themselves into a Volunteer Corps for the protection of the city, Sir J. P. Grant on the 10th June 1857 pressed the Governor-General to recall his refusal :—"Your Lordship will see that the general question of having a Volunteer Rifle Corps here, when the Europeans come forward, has been settled both by the recommendation of Lord Dalhousie's Government and the Court's decision thereon. Now not only have these inhabitants come forward, but they are grumbling at their offer having been virtually declined. Certainly an emergency has occurred infinitely greater than was contemplated at the time by any member of Lord Dalhousie's Government." The enrolment of Volunteers was promptly sanctioned by Lord Canning. Writing in 1854 Mr. Seton-Karr stated that the whole weight of the Government of Bengal had rested on the shoulders of Sir J. P. Grant. "It is not easy to estimate the invidious responsibility of such a position as was held by him, while Lord Dalhousie was absent from Calcutta. During his incumbency, several long, intricate, and perplexing cases, involving the personal character of officers high in the service, and ending in their removal, were taken up and most carefully investigated, and in *every single instance, without one exception*, the orders of the Bengal Government met with the entire support of the Home authorities. It is rather a wonder that, without a separate and unencumbered Lieutenant-Governor, so much has been done in Bengal, than that more should not have been attempted. The manner of doing the work may, in part, be appreciated by a perusal of such papers as official form and secrecy have permitted to see the light. It has often been a subject of regret to us that there is no way of making important papers known, except through the somewhat laborious process of publishing them in a "Selection." But to such as emanated from the Bengal office during Mr. Grant's incumbency, and under his signature, we shall not hesitate to apply

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\* Kaye's Sepoy War, Book VII, Chapter IV.

the description given by the most judicious and grave of English historians, of the style of one of the most eloquent and sound of our divines, that there was "no vulgarity in that racy idiom, and no pedantry in that learned phrase," and we have reason to know that Mr. Grant's official career is acknowledged by competent judges to have exhibited better things than mere style, however weighty and precise, such as inflexible impartiality, high sense of honour, undaunted love of justice, and unwearied search for truth." He referred also to "the legal acuteness and the luminous precision which mark all the writings of Mr. John Peter Grant."

Sir John Kaye has given a sketch of Sir J. P. Grant, as a Member of Lord Canning's Executive Council at the time of the Mutinies, which shows his fitness for the office of Lieutenant-Governor.

"He was many years younger than his brother civilian, Mr. Dorin, but he had done infinitely more work. In him, with an indolent sleepy manner was strangely combined extraordinary activity of mind. He was one of the ablest public servants in the country. With some hereditary claim to distinction, he had been marked out from the very commencement of his career no less by a favourable concurrence of external circumstances than by his own inherent qualifications, for the highest official success. No young civilian in his novitiate ever carried upon him so clearly and unmistakably the stamp of the embryo Councillor, as John Grant. In some respects this was a misfortune to him. His course was too easy. He had found his way; he had not been compelled to make it. He had not been jostled by the crowd; he had seen little or none of the rough work of Indian administration or Indian diplomacy. It had been his lot, as it had been his choice, to spend the greater part of his official life in close connection with the head-quarters of the Government; and, therefore, his opportunities of independent action had been few; his personal acquaintance with the country and the people was not extensive; and his work had been chiefly upon paper. But as a member of a powerful bureaucracy his value was conspicuous. Quick in the mastery of facts, clear and precise in their analytical arrangement, and gifted with more than common powers of expression, he was admirably fitted to discharge the duties of the Secretariat. He was a dead hand at a report, and if Government were perplexed by any difficult questions, involving a tangled mass of disordered financial accounts, or a great conflict of authority mystifying the truth, he was the man of all others to unravel the intricate or to elucidate the obscure. Comparatively young in years, but ripe in bureaucratic experience, he entered the Supreme Council towards the

close of Lord Dalhousie's administration. But he had sat long enough at the Board to establish his independence. He expressed his opinions freely and fearlessly ; and his Minutes, when Minute-writing was in vogue, were commonly the best State papers recorded by the Government of the day. Closely reasoned, forcibly expressed, with here and there touches of quiet humour or subdued sarcasm, they cut through any sophistries put forth by his colleagues, with sharp incisive logic, and clearly stated the point at issue without disguises and evasions. On the whole, he was a man of large and liberal views, the natural manifestations of which were, perhaps, somewhat straightened by an acquired official reserve ; and no one questioned the honesty of his intentions or the integrity of his life.

Another writer has stated that he was of retiring and inaccessible habits.

Sir J. P. Grant had succeeded Sir F. Halliday as Member of Council, when the latter became Lieutenant-Governor in 1854. In August 1857, when Mr. J. R. Colvin, the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-Western Provinces, was shut up in Agra, the administration of the country about Allahabad, Benares and Cawnpore, fell into abeyance, and it became necessary for closer supervision and more vigorous control to be exercised. Lord Canning determined therefore to depute Sir J. P. Grant there, in the character of Lieutenant-Governor of the "Central" Provinces, to exercise precisely the powers which Mr. Colvin would have exercised, if free to do so. The Viceroy wrote of him—"There is no man in whose capacity for the task of re-establishing order I have so much confidence as Mr. Grant, and certainly none who will act more in harmony with the military authorities." Sir J. P. Grant left Calcutta by steamer on the 7th August and assumed the government of the "Central" Provinces at Benares about the end of August. His deputation lasted till early in 1858, when he resumed his seat in the Council of India on the Governor-General assuming charge of the executive government of the N. W. Provinces from the 9th February 1858. In connection with this period of his service there is a reference to Sir J. P. Grant in letter IX of the "Letters from a competition *wallah*" (avowedly written by the present Sir G. O. Trevelyan, *Bart.*) dated Calcutta, May 11th 1863, which may be quoted here :—

"After Lord Canning, Sir John Peter Grant had the gratification of being the personage most profusely and fiercely maligned by the enemies of the native ; which honourable position he long retained, until of late Sir Charles Wood put in his claim, a claim which has been instantly and



fully recognised. A certain journal made the brilliant suggestion that Sir John Peter, had he dared, would very likely have released the sepoys whom General Neill had ordered for execution, and then proceeded to abuse him as if he had actually so done. This hypothetical case soon grew into a fact. It was stated positively in all quarters that Sir John Peter Grant had set free the murderers of Cawnpore, with a bombastic proclamation, containing the words, "in virtue of my high authority", an expression which at once discredited the story in the estimation of all who knew the man. Sir John and his high authority were reviled and ridiculed in the daily and weekly papers of England and India, in conversation, on the stage, and on the hustings. Meanwhile, with native laziness and good humour, he said nothing, and allowed the tempest to whistle about his ears without moving a muscle. At length the Home Government wrote out to the Governor-General, directing him to take cognisance of the affair; and he accordingly requested the accused party to explain how the matter stood. Then Sir John spoke out, and affirmed that the report was a pure fabrication; that he never enlarged a single sepoy; and that, had he desired to thwart General Neill, such interference would have been entirely out of his power. Hereupon, the press in general proceeded to make amends in a full and satisfactory manner. One newspaper, however, had no intention of letting him off so easily, and put forward an apology which was exquisitely characteristic, and probably diverted the object quite as much as it was designed to vex him. The gist of it was, that Sir John had undoubtedly been falsely charged in this particular instance, but that he was such a confirmed and abandoned friend of the native as quite to deserve everything he had got, and that no contumely, whether rightly or wrongly bestowed on him, could by any possibility come amiss."

In his Minute of the 2nd July 1859 on the services of officers in the Mutinies, Lord Canning alluded to this special duty in handsome terms, thus: "In the Central Provinces the Government for some months availed itself most beneficially of the ability and energy of the Hon'ble J. P. Grant, then a Member of the Supreme Council, and now Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, whose exertions contributed greatly to recall things to order." Sir John Kaye writes of Sir J. P. Grant that "his great abilities had not up to this time been much tested in situations of exceptional responsibility, demanding from him strenuous action in strange circumstances. But although his antecedents, and to some extent, indeed, his habits seemed to fit him rather for the performance of sedentary

duties as Secretary or Councillor, there was a fund of latent energy in him, and he was eager for more active employment than could be found for him in Calcutta." Colonel Malleson describes him as "the ablest member of the Council of Governor-General. Mr. Grant was, indeed, a man of very remarkable ability. He had a clear and sound understanding, a quick and subtle brain, great independence, and great decision of character. If he had a fault it may have been that he did not always make sufficient allowance for men whose intellect was less vast and whose views were less sound than his own. He failed thus to rate at their full influence on the multitude opinions firmly advocated by others, but which he knew to be untenable. His prescience came thus to be mistaken for dogmatic assertion, his keen insight for conceit. But this slight defect, arising from want of European training, was overborne by the powerful intellect, the high and lofty ideas, of one of the greatest members of the Indian Civil Service." Sir R. Temple, writing in 1882, referred to Sir J. P. Grant as a "man of commanding talent, and one of the ablest men that the Bengal Civil Service has ever produced;" and Sir H. S. Cunningham in his *Earl Canning* (Rulers of India Series) alluded to him as "a civilian of exceptional ability."

The *Hindu Patriot* of May 12th 1859 anticipated  
 Anticipation. public approval for Sir. J. P. Grant. It wrote of  
 him :

"His mind is imbued with the large English spirit, while his knowledge of the real circumstances of the people he has to govern is sufficiently extensive. He too has given ample evidences of a vigorous understanding, strong will, independence of character and thorough appreciation of the duties of an Indian Statesman. If he is somewhat reserved in his disposition, his stern uprightness and brilliant intellectual qualities go far to instal public confidence in his favor. His opinions on the salient points of administration are also well-known to the public which will watch his career. He is not a senseless decrifier of the Permanent Settlement; he has refined ideas on the subject of legal reform, he is well conversant with the condition of the judicial institutions of the country, and thinks approvingly of the political aptitude and aspirations of the people whose fate he will have to direct. He is known to be prepared to carry out an imperial system of education; and against an undue and unequal distribution of patronage his unswerving

firmness and decision of character and honesty of purpose offer a strong guarantee."

Sir J. P. Grant then, as Member of the Viceroy's Council was, like Sir F. Halliday before him, eminently eligible for the vacancy in the Lieutenant-Governorship, to which he was nominated and succeeded on the 1st of May 1859. His Private Secretaries were successively Major A. C. Plowden of the 50th N. I. and Capt. J. R. Pughe of the 47th N. I.

The indigo question, as will appear later, occupied the principal place in the Sir J. P. Grant's labours. A brief sketch of other important matters of his administration has been given in Mr. Seton-Karr's "Grant of Rothiemurchus" :—

Brief sketch of  
Lieutenant-Governorship.

"Much was done to facilitate intercourse and to expend judiciously the imperial and local resources in the construction of roads. Railways met with his earnest support, and civil engineers were delighted at the capacity for mastering the details of their business which the Lieutenant-Governor evinced. The improvement in jails and jail discipline went on with steadiness. Fresh rules were laid down for the examination of pleaders in the Civil courts, and means taken to prescribe standard works for all candidates, and to have such works translated into the vernaculars. A great but important change in the Civil Courts of first instance was effected, by which, without increase of expenditure, superfluous officials were removed, and better salaries were given to the real doers of the work, who were receiving a remuneration wholly inadequate to their maintenance, whilst exposed to manifold temptations. The whole machinery for the imposition and collection of the income tax was organised, and the tax itself was collected with as little general discontent as was possible in the nature of things. Act X of 1859, the Charter of the agriculturists, was improved, and a law for the extension of the *samindari* postal service was brought well-nigh to completion. Local resources, especially those raised for the conservancy and police of large towns, were husbanded, and the Lieutenant-Governor went on several of those tours of inspection which tend so much to the real despatch of business, and have the merit of making rulers and subjects acquainted with each other, to their mutual benefit. A broad and business-like scheme for vernacular education, capable of an expansion which has no limit but the wants of the people and the demands on the State purse, was submitted to the Government of India."

The second great despatch on Education (No. 4 of the 7th April 1859) from the Secretary of State reached Education.

India soon after Sir J. P. Grant had assumed office.

It examined the results of the orders of 1854 and, to quote again the words of the Education Commission of 1882, it "reviews the progress made under the earlier despatch which it reiterates and confirms, with a single exception as to the course to be adopted for promoting elementary education. While it records with satisfaction that the system of grants-in-aid has been freely accepted by private schools, both English and Anglo-Vernacular, it notes that the native community have failed to co-operate with Government in promoting elementary vernacular education. The efforts of educational officers to obtain the necessary local support for the establishment of vernacular schools under the grant-in-aid system are, it points out, likely to create a prejudice against education, to render the Government unpopular and even to compromise its dignity. The soliciting of contributions from the people is declared inexpedient, and strong doubts are expressed as to the suitability of the grant-in-aid system as hitherto in force for the supply of vernacular instruction to the masses of the population. Such vernacular instruction should, it is suggested, be provided by the direct instrumentality of the officers of Government on the basis of some one of the plans already in operation for the improvement of indigenous schools, or by any modification of those plans which may suit the circumstances of different Provinces. The expediency of imposing a special rate on the land for the provision of elementary education is also commended to the careful consideration of the Government." The Secretary of State also drew attention to the question referred to in Sir F. Halliday's Minute of 1858, viz., whether there was any connection between the recent disturbances in India and the measures in progress for the prosecution of education, with special reference to the feeling of jealousy prevailing in Bihar previously to the outbreak in 1857. The Annual Reports on Education contain ample statistics, and show that the lines laid down by the Secretary of State were followed, but progress was impeded by the state of the finances. Sir J. P. Grant made a beginning with Primary Education, as will appear later.

Sir J. P. Grant had been Lieutenant-Governor only two months when the following Proclamation was issued by Lord Canning :—

"The Restoration of Peace and Tranquillity to the Queen's Dominions in India makes it the grateful Duty of the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council to direct that a Day be appointed for a Solemn Thanksgiving to Almighty God for His signal Mercies and Protection.

"War is at an end ; Rebellion is put down ; the Noise of Arms is no longer heard where the enemies of the State have persisted in their last Struggle ; the Presence of large Forces in the Field has ceased to be necessary ; Order is re-established ; and peaceful Pursuits have everywhere been resumed.

"The Viceroy and Governor-General in Council desires that Thursday the 28th of July be observed as a Day of General Thanksgiving for these great Blessings, and as a Holiday throughout British India, by all Faithful Subjects of the Queen.

"Especially His Excellency-in-Council invites all Her Majesty's Christian Subjects to join in a humble Offering of Gratitude and Praise to Almighty God for the many Mercies vouchsafed to them."

The Bengal Administration Report for 1859-60 is the first of the series that contains any attempt at a literary style.

Dacoity.

The previous reports were, with hardly any exception, mere compilations of facts and statistics : this one was evidently composed with some attention to the manner as well as the matter, and with the intention of inviting rather than repelling perusal. For instance, it was found possible to make the subject of *dacoity* interesting in the following paragraphs :—

"Gang-robbery or *dacoity* is one of the most prevalent of Indian crimes. But it is not of an uniform nature ; it wears a different complexion in different districts. In the frontier provinces of Arracan, Chittagong, and Tippera, the crimes which are reported as *dacoities* are generally mere border raids, committed by savage and uncivilized tribes, sheltered by inaccessible mountains and dense forests from our observation and revenge. At times they are impelled from their mountain fastnesses by the pangs of hunger and the hope of plunder in the peaceful villages of the plains. At times they are urged on by a murderous thirst for human blood, with the sole object of obtaining heads to place round the grave of some departed chieftain.

"But the *dacoits* in Bengal have nothing in common with these savage mountaineers. They differ little from the common thief. Armed with clubs, swords, and torches, they attack a defenceless family or waylay some unguarded boat ; but they are arrant cowards, and seldom persist in their attempt if the slightest show of resistance is made. Still

the very existence of gang-robbery in any shape, however modified, must, if not checked, reflect discredit upon the Government. But in this country crime is difficult to reach, more difficult still to eradicate. We have to deal with a people who are too apathetic to exert themselves individually for the suppression of crime, and with landowners, who too often are more interested in sheltering the criminal than in giving him up to justice. But in spite of all these disadvantages much has been done. The Commission for the suppression of *dacoity* has during the last year greatly extended its operations and it has now its ramifications in nearly every district of Bengal. Great, too, has been the success of its exertions. In many districts the crime may be said to be almost extinct. The following statistics will show at a glance how vigorous have been the exertions of Government to check this indigenous and once prevalent crime :—

Year.	No. of cases.	Year.	No. of cases.
1852 ... ..	520	1858 ... ..	190
1856 ... ..	292	1859 ... ..	171

“These statements do not, however, include the whole of Bengal, but only those districts which are immediately under the Commissioner for the suppression of *dacoity*.”

The success of the *dacoity* Commission in Bengal determined J. P. Grant to establish a similar Commission for Bihar, and to commence operations in the next cold season.

“There is one class of *dacoits* against whom our operations have not at present been equally successful. River *dacoits*, as a body, have been far more fortunate in evading justice than their brethren on land. The reason of this is obvious. The large rivers, which in Bengal are the highways of traffic and in many places the only channels of communication between one part of the country and another, afford great facilities for the commission of *dacoity* and oppose great obstacles to the discovery of the perpetrators. For when a boat is attacked and plundered in a solitary place, far removed from any village or other habitation, the unfortunate traveller, ignorant of the locality generally, prefers continuing his journey to instituting an inquiry, which involves certain trouble, and promises but doubtful success. Where a *dacoity* is committed upon land, it is comparatively easy to track the footsteps of the *dacoits* but it is almost impossible to do this upon water.

“The Sundarban channels and the rivers of the Backergunge district have been long infested with powerful gangs of river *dacoits*. The impunity which these men have long enjoyed convinced the Lieutenant-Governor that some special measures were necessary for the protection of the numerous merchants and travellers who passed by the Sundarban

route to the districts of Eastern Bengal and Assam. It was accordingly determined as an experimental measure to send a small steam gun-boat under the charge of the Assistant *Dacoity* Commissioner, to cruise about those localities in which *dacoities* were of the most frequent occurrence. From the short trial the experiment has had, there are good grounds for entertaining hopes of its ultimate success. The Assistant Commissioner has collected a mass of useful information regarding the chief *dacoits* of the district; the gangs with which they are connected; and the beats within which their operations are confined. It appears that the greater number of *dacoities* in those parts are committed by professional clubmen, who divert themselves with *dacoity* when they can find no employment in their own line upon land.

"In addition to the information collected, the Assistant Commissioner succeeded in making several arrests and in one case the arrested *dacoit* turned approver, and disclosed the names of his former accomplices. In cases of *dacoity*, where direct evidence of the crime is seldom procurable, the evidence of an approver often discloses a chain of circumstantial evidence which leads to the conviction of a whole gang, and the Assistant Commissioner entertains hopes that, by judiciously following up the information he has obtained, both from approvers and private sources, he will, in a short time, be able to break up the greater number of the gangs which now infest the Sundarban channels to the great detriment of travellers and commerce".

A proposal made by the Civil Finance Commission in 1861 to abolish the *Dacoity* Commission was successfully resisted by Sir J. P. Grant on the ground of the utility of the Department and the cheapness of its working.

Sir J. P. Grant made several tours in the year 1859-60 both by water and by land. One of these extended from  
 Tours. the 3rd January 1860 into March, chiefly in the Chota Nagpur and Patna Divisions. Throughout his whole march in Bihar, including the Shahabad district, which had been so long and so lately disturbed, he was much struck with the very marked respect which the whole demeanour of the people showed to the British Government.

In Sir J. P. Grant's time the advantages of the Parasnath hill  
 Parasnath. as a sanitarium were fully examined. It is the highest of the range of hills separating Lower Bengal from Bihar, through which the Grand Trunk road runs. It stands off from the range on its south-eastern face, thus overlooking

the plains between the valleys of the Damodar and Barakar rivers : it is 48 miles from Barakar, and 16 from Karharbali. on the East Indian Railway. Its summit is 4624 feet above the sea, and the mass of the hill overhangs the Grand Trunk road between 189 to 198 miles from Calcutta. Sir F. Halliday ascended the hill in February 1855, but was not favourably impressed with its capabilities as a sanitarium : later examination, however, showed it to possess many desirable qualities. As several Engineers spoke well of it in regard to water and in other respects (as the thermometer did not rise above  $73^{\circ}$  and showed a minimum difference of  $15^{\circ}$  as compared with the plains), Sir J. P. Grant inspected it personally in January 1860, and strongly recommended that a small sanitarium should be formed there, with a barrack for about 60 invalid soldiers, and bungalows for a few officers and other Europeans. As the Jain pilgrims evinced a strong feeling against the eastern portion of the hill being made a military sanitarium, the western portion (divided from the eastern by a deep cut) which the pilgrims never visited, was chosen for the building sites. Sir J. P. Grant ordered a road to be cut in anticipation of the approval of the Government of India. The Governor General approved. Sites were accordingly cleared, a road was cut up the western side of the hill, and the foundations of a bungalow laid. Owing to a remark of the Secretary of State that Parasnath, though of limited extent, appeared in other respects to be suited for a sanitarium, that any remaining doubt on the subject would be cleared up if a few thatched tents were erected and occupied during the hot season, and that in the meanwhile no permanent buildings should be commenced, Sir J. P. Grant resolved to try the climate himself. Tents having been thatched for his accommodation, he left Calcutta on the 17th of April 1861, and remained on the top of the hill till the 20th May, when a fire, accidentally breaking out, destroyed the tents, and compelled him to return to the Presidency. About the 31st of May he returned to Parasnath, where he lived in unthatched tents, transacting business, till about the end of June ; the rainy season having for some weeks previously set in, and very heavily. The results of these visits convinced Sir J. P. Grant that, so far as climate was concerned, no further knowledge of it could be gained, or was required. By the year 1863-64 accommodation for 32 men on



the hill had been completed. For 4 years invalids were sent there and derived benefit from its climate. But in 1867-68, the hill was abandoned by Government as a military sanitarium (although several improvements had been but recently effected,) on the grounds of insufficiency of water and space, of unfavourable medical returns, and of the greater economy of Darjeeling. The various buildings were made over to the Public Works Department and disposed of. Certain members of the Svetambara sect of Jains set up a claim to the exclusive use of the hill, under a document purporting to be a *firman* of the Emperor Akbar. But Government acknowledged no obligation to recognise the claim, and the genuineness of the document was doubtful.

Tea. An inquiry made by the Secretary of State in regard to the success which had attended the cultivation of the tea plant in Assam led to the submission of reports from the local officers, and the subject came prominently under the consideration of Government. Clearances of land were found to be steadily advancing throughout the districts of the North-East Frontier Agency. Large beneficial results had attended every advance so made, not only by the reclamation of extensive tracts of waste and jungle lands, but also by the large introduction of capital into the province, and its employment under European direction in the highly remunerative cultivation of tea. The Assam Tea Company, formed in 1837, produced 10,000 lbs of tea in 1840: in 1858 the production was 7,70,000 lbs: in 1859 there were 20 factories at work and the profits of the Assam Tea Company were 9 per cent. *per annum*. At the time of the inquiry, there were reported to be 7,599 acres, in a more or less forward state, under cultivation in Assam for tea: the produce of which, for the last year, was 1,205,689 lbs. It was stated that an acre well cultivated would give something more than 6 maunds of tea, and that if the land under cultivation only gave the low average of 5 maunds per acre the produce would be upwards of 3 millions of pounds. The difficulty of procuring sufficient labour in the Province was already felt, attributable partly to the scantiness of the population and also to the natural indolence of the Assamese. The hire of the labourers had risen from Rs. 2/8 and Rs. 3/ *per mensem*, to Rs. 4/ and Rs. 4/8 nominally, but really higher, as extra wages could be earned. Certain proposals were made and complete

considered, and suggestions for a system of cooly immigration under regulation were offered by Government. In Cachar tea cultivation had commenced only about 4 years before : the last year's crop was about 1000 maunds, and a portion of it had realized in the London market 2s. 2 $\frac{1}{10}$ d. per lb. and was pronounced quite as good as, if not superior to, the teas grown in Assam. On the 4th January 1856 the magistrate of Sylhet announced the discovery of the tea plant. Several hundreds of acres were under cultivation in Darjeeling, where the first trial of the tea plant was made in 1841 with a few seeds grown in Kumaon from China stock. In 1856 the first plantation was started at Kurseong and another at Darjeeling, and progress was being made on a considerable scale. The Superintendent of Darjeeling confidently anticipated that the district teas would very soon rank with the highest class of Indian teas : the labour difficulty did not present itself in Darjeeling, coolies being almost always obtainable from Nepal.

Allusion has previously been made to the question of the suppression of the *Charak Puja*. The Calcutta Missionary Conference again petitioned the Legislative Council to prohibit hookswinging at this festival ; and the petition was forwarded to the Secretary of State. Her Majesty's Government were of opinion that every opportunity should be taken of discountenancing the practice, and they suggested the propriety of inserting, in all leases for Government lands, a provision hostile to the celebration of the festival ; of enlisting in the same direction the sympathies of the leading members of the native community, and of quietly making known the disapprobation with which such spectacles were regarded by Government. Sir J. P. Grant called on the Commissioners of Divisions to furnish reports on the subject. From these it appeared that hookswinging was confined to Bengal proper and Orissa. Where this practice existed as a long established custom the local authorities were directed, by using their personal influence, and by obtaining the co-operation of the *samindars*, to induce the people voluntarily to abandon the practice. On the other hand, where *Charak* swinging was not an established custom but a mere occasional exhibition, the Magistrates were authorized to prohibit its celebration as a local measure of police for the preservation of order and decency. The practice was reported to be gradually dying out.

The Sonthal *Parganas* were reported in 1859-60 to have greatly improved under the able administration of the Commissioner, Mr. Yule, c. s. A fair rice crop enriched the agricultural portion of the population, and the great demand for labour which the railway created afforded a remunerative occupation for those not engaged in agricultural pursuits. The people seemed generally contented and happy. The system of bond-labour, fully discovered in 1858, was broken up. The bondsmen were of two descriptions, known by the names of Kameoti and Hurwahi bondsmen. A Kameoti bondsman was one who, in consideration of a sum of money, bound himself and his heirs to serve the giver of the loan until the money was repaid with interest. The Hurwahi bondsman similarly bound himself to work for the money-lender whenever his services might be required. The Kameoti bondsman generally lived with the bondholders and was, in fact, his domestic servant. The Hurwahi bondsman, on the contrary, was a sort of out-door labourer and was only employed when his services were required. The bondholders, for the most part, consisted of shopkeepers, merchants, and *chaudhris* who found it profitable to take land and cultivate it by slave-labour. Several cases of bondage came to the notice of the authorities, and the bondsmen were at once released from their securities. The system of bondage which had once extensively prevailed gradually disappeared under the protection afforded by a vigorous administration.

In the Sonthal country there was some excitement in the Naya Dumka division, caused principally by the proceedings of Mr. C. Barnes, a farmer of an estate under the Court of Wards, who had had the lands measured, and had enhanced the *rai-yats'* rents—chiefly in one *pargana*—to an extent beyond their power to pay. Mr. Barnes finally agreed to accept an increase of 25 *per cent.* and quiet was restored.

The people and Government of Bhutan had, in 1856 and subsequently, carried off several of our subjects and would not release them. At last, after 4 years of fruitless forbearance, Government was compelled to carry into execution a threat long since made, of taking possession of the portion of the Bhutia territory situated on the west bank of the Tista, within the district of Rangpur. This tract had been given up to the Bhutias in 1779 by the order of Mr. Hastings, from political

considerations and a desire to avoid all misunderstandings with the Bhutia Government. In 1842, it again came into our possession, subject to a yearly rental of 2,000 rupees, which was regularly paid to the Bhutan Government. This annual payment was accordingly stopped in 1860, but it was considered doubtful whether this single measure of retributive justice would bring the Bhutias to their senses.

All representations to the Bhutan Government regarding aggression on the frontier proved ineffectual. Payment of the rents of Ambari Falakata was frequently demanded. Further depredations were reported. The *Subas* and *Kutmas* (the Bhutia officials) were suspected of being the instigators. An interview took place between the *Suba* of Mainaguri and the Deputy Magistrate of Titalya. At the beginning of 1862 the Superintendent of Darjeeling and the Government officers on the frontier reported that the Bhutias were making hostile preparations for the purpose of entering our territory and occupying Ambari Falakata, and that an attack on Darjeeling was apprehended. Two companies of Her Majesty's 38th Foot and a wing of the 10th native infantry were immediately despatched from Dinapore to the neighbourhood of Darjeeling, and a wing of Irregular cavalry from Oudh to Jalpaiguri. The presence of these troops restored confidence on the frontier. In March there took place an interview between the Darpan Raja and the Agent to the Governor-General, North-East frontier. The letters purporting to be replies from the Deb Raja to the demands of Government for redress were believed to be spurious. At last, Government resolved to send a mission into Bhutan, as the only means of explaining the precise nature of our demands and the measures they would be compelled to adopt if those demands were not conceded.

The hill tribes of the district of Chittagong had for a long time given serious trouble and annoyance to Government. The nature of the country they inhabited rendered it extremely difficult to retaliate against them with any effect. The tribes were, in their social condition, but little removed from savages: and for several years the tract of hill country had been the scene of murderous raids committed by them. The Shindus, a numerous and powerful race in the south-east of the Chittagong district, and the

Chittagong Hill  
Tribes.

Kumias, were the chief perpetrators of these outrages, and their incursions extended from Manipur to Arracan. The causes of these raids were various. A private quarrel with a neighbouring clan, a scarcity of women and domestic servants, and the consequent necessity of procuring a requisite number of captives to supply the wants of the tribe, the simple desire of plunder, or of obtaining heads to grace the obsequies of some departed chieftain, were the principal causes which led to the commission of these raids. When an outrage of this nature had been committed, it was very difficult to reach the offenders. Before troops could arrive upon the spot, the marauders had retired with their booty to their labyrinth of hills, and pursuit was almost hopeless in a country everywhere intersected with precipices and watercourses, and covered with densest jungle. The villages, too, in which these savages resided, were stockaded, and the paths strewed with caltrops and other devices to render the approaches as dangerous and difficult as possible. Hitherto it had been the policy of Government to manage these wild tribes as much as possible through the influence of a powerful family called the Poangs, whose authority was considered to extend over the whole country south of the Chittagong river, to the borders of Arracan. Arms and ammunition were distributed to the Poangs, and a considerable remission of revenue was made to enable them to keep up the necessary stockades for the defence of the frontier. To some extent these measures were attended with success. But forays were still made upon our subjects of the plains, and the marauding tribes seldom met with the punishment they deserved. Government accordingly resolved to commence a different policy. The hill tracts to the east of the plain country of Chittagong were withdrawn from the operation of the general regulations; and a Superintendent, with Magisterial powers, was appointed to exercise due supervision and control over the numerous tribes who inhabited that almost unknown country. It was hoped that, by the information which frequent intercourse with the various Chiefs would enable the Superintendent to collect, Government would eventually be able to adopt measures for the civilization of these wild tribes, and for the effectual check of these border raids, which had hitherto proved so disastrous to the inhabitants of our eastern frontier.

At the beginning of 1860 the Kukis, a tribe living in the Chitta-

gong hills between the Karnafuli and Fenny rivers, left their  
Kukis, mountain fastnesses and attacked some hill villages  
under our protection, near the source of the Fenny.

Following the course of the stream, they attacked and destroyed the village of Ramghar: and from thence, inclining to the north-west, they made a sudden descent on the plains of Tippera. They killed 187 persons in the plains and above 100 were carried off as slaves. The outrages committed in the hills were equally atrocious, and it was believed that 300 persons in all were killed, and 200 more carried captive. So great was the alarm caused by this inroad that whole villages along the frontier were deserted; and even in the town of Comilla serious apprehensions of an attack were for a time entertained. But the savages had no intention to face the attack of an organized body of troops. Before the military police had arrived upon the spot, the marauders had retired to their hills, and the season of the year rendered it inexpedient to pursue them. The punishment of this barbarous tribe was of necessity deferred till the next cold season.

The Kukis were punished in 1860-1, as contemplated, for their raids into frontier villages in the Chittagong district in the previous year. Early in January 1861, a force of 1,250 military police under Captain Raban started from Chittagong, penetrated into the Kuki country, carried the stockade of Rutton Poea, the ringleader, and retired. A survey of the country visited was acquired. The Kukis, however, invaded the territories of the Raja of Independent Tippera, and subsequently made a less serious incursion into our own hill country lying to the south-east of the Karnafuli river, beyond our outposts, but under the protection of the Poang Raja. One party was, however, intercepted and dispersed with loss, and another was partly cut up. For the future security of the eastern frontier, in addition to the frontier posts which had already been established with marked success within our own territory, the civil police were supplied with fire-arms and endeavours were made to train the villagers to habits of self-defence. The Superintendent was instructed to keep a vigilant watch upon the trade of the hills, and to exclude from the markets of the plains all tribes which displayed a spirit of opposition to his authority. Such exclusion, (it was expected), would be severely felt, for these markets were the chief

outlet for the productions of the hills, where the savages bartered their hill cotton and coarse cloth for rice, salt, hardware, gunpowder, and matchlocks. The Poang Raja was compelled, as required by his agreement, to keep up his own chain of frontier posts in an efficient state of defence; and an officer was despatched to the *darbar* of the Raja of Independent Tippera to insist upon similar measures being adopted along the Tippera frontier.

The outrages committed in the Mymensingh district by the Garos, who inhabited the range of hills between Assam and Bengal proper necessitated the despatch early in 1861 of 2 forces of Military police under Captain Morton and Lieutenant Chambers, which successfully inflicted punishment on the offenders. To reclaim these hill-savages from barbarism, and bring the people into closer contact with civilization it was proposed to intersect the country with roads.

About the same time there was a rising among the Khasias of the Jaintia hills to the north of the district of Khasia rebellion. Sylhet and adjoining Cachar on the west. This country came into our possession in 1835, when the Raja Raj-Indra Sing voluntarily resigned his authority over an unprofitable tract, for a pension of 500 rupees a month. In 1858, it was resolved to impose a house-tax on the country. The people resisted and were punished, and the tax was paid without demur.

A rebellion took place again among the hill Khasias in January 1862, and a display of military force to quell it was required. Two native regiments were despatched from the Presidency to assist the local troops. By the end of March Brigadier-General Showers and Major Rowlatt considered the military operations at an end. The causes of the outbreak were very obscure. The revolt was attributed by Bengali merchants, who were in the habit of trading in these hills, to the Income Tax; and by others to undefined anticipations of further taxation. On the other hand, there were no visible signs of discontent when the tax was collected, as it was, throughout the Jaintia hills. Some of those questioned by Major Rowlatt again made no mention of taxation as a cause, but spoke of the establishment of a Christian Mission; of a prohibition to burn dead bodies in a certain place, which had been issued on sanitary grounds, but was interpreted to affect religion; and of the interference of the

Jowai *daroga* with a festival at Jalong. General Showers also mentioned the taking away of the shields of the Singtengs, or chiefs. Major Rowlatt thought that all these causes might have had more or less effect in inciting to rebellion a people naturally turbulent.

Shortly after the outbreak of the Khasias, the Kukis committed raids on the Sylhet valley, and on Independent Tippera. No connection was established between the Kuki outrages and the Khasia rising. A very serious riot took place at Phulguri in Nowgong on the 18th October 1861. in which Lieutenant Singer, the Assistant Commissioner, lost his life at the hands of the mob.

In Sambalpur, Major Impey, by a policy of conciliation, induced the surrender of the rebel chiefs who had been out since 1857.

He offered free pardon and restitution of confiscated property to all rebels with the exception of Sarundar Sahai, Udant Sahai, and Mitter Bhan, son of Sarundar Sahai. By a notification of 30th April 1862 Sambalpur and its dependencies were made over to the Central Provinces.

In the beginning of 1862, a disturbance broke out in *kila* Boad, in the Tributary *Mahals* of Cuttack. It apparently originated indirectly in some dispute between the Rajas of Sonepur and Boad respecting the right of a tract of country called the Bara Bhaya Des, which was divided into 12 Des or Muthas, and was principally inhabited by Kundhs. The country was formerly under the nominal sway of Boad, but it was alleged by the people that it was made over to Sonepur by the Boad Raja. The Kundh rebels attacked the Boad Raja who had exasperated them. They agreed to accept our terms with a view to settle their grievances, and retracted when expeditions were sent against them. Subsequently the rebels proved anxious to make their peace with Government, and Narain Mullick their ostensible leader, as well as the principal *sardars*, surrendered.

In 1871-72 Sir G. Campbell wrote that "the Government of the second Lieutenant-Governor was a continued struggle with questions arising out of past lawlessness and affecting important interests which suffered by the transition from an old-fashioned state of things to a rule of law and order. He succeeded in this task, and achieved a very lasting improvement, but he was, it is believed, wearied by the struggle;

Indigo distur-  
bances.



and retired before completing the usual term of office." The disputes connected with indigo cultivation in Bengal had long been a subject of anxiety to Government. In the years 1854-55 a proposal to re-enact sections II and III of Regulation V of 1830, for the purpose of enforcing the execution of contracts relating to the cultivation and delivery of the indigo plant, was much discussed, but no special legislation was thought to be necessary. In the year 1856, reports were called for from several Divisional Commissioners as to how the indigo sowing season of that year had passed off in respect of such disputes ; but nothing of importance calling for the immediate interference of Government, or of the Legislature, was then brought to notice. It was not until the commencement of 1859, a little before Sir J. P. Grant's succession to the Lieutenant-Governorship, that the question began to press itself unavoidably upon Government. In April of that year a planter in the district of Barasat complained of a general disinclination among the *raiyats* of his concern to cultivate indigo. This feeling he attributed, not to the unremunerative price for the crops, but to the conduct of the district Magistrate, which he averred was openly hostile to the interests of indigo planting. On inquiry, however, it appeared that the conduct of the Magistrate complained against had been perfectly legal and impartial. In cases of such disagreement, it was manifestly the duty of the Magistrate to leave the parties to make their own bargains as their mutual interest might direct, and this was what the Magistrate appeared to have done. At the desire of the previous Lieutenant-Governor, the Magistrate used his good offices to bring the complaining planter and the *raiyats* together, but no good seemed to come of the attempt. About the same time, a difference of opinion arose between the same Magistrate (the Hon'ble Sir A. Eden) and Mr. A. Grote, the Commissioner of the Division. on the question of the general interference of the police in cases of disputes arising from planters sowing or attempting to sow the land of the *raiyats* with indigo against their will, on the plea of a contract. An application had been made to the Magistrate by certain *raiyats* for protection against a planter who, they said, was going forcibly to plough up their lands, and to sow them with indigo. The Magistrate had ordered the police to proceed to the spot, instructing them, if the land appeared to be really the property of the

*raiya*s, not to allow any one to interfere with it. Mr. Grote objected to this order, on the ground, chiefly, that it imposed upon the *daroga* undue responsibility. This difference of opinion was referred for the decision of Government, as a general question respecting the employment of the police. The Lieutenant-Governor gave it as his opinion that Sir A. Eden's principle was a true exposition of the law as it stood, according to which the police were bound to protect persons and property from unlawful violence, and to abstain from entering into disputes respecting alleged contracts, which were only cognizable by the Civil Courts. In the case in question no claim was made of the ownership or possession of the land entered upon, which were confessedly the *raiya*s'.

In the month of August Sir J. P. Grant, while on a tour by water through a part of the Bengal districts, received petitions from numerous *raiya*s of the Nadia district, complaining that in indigo cases they did not obtain due protection and redress from the Magistrate; that *raiya*s obnoxious to the factory were frequently kidnapped, and that other acts of great violence were committed with impunity in open day. These complaints met with the consideration their importance deserved. It appeared after due inquiry that, on the whole, the petitioners had not always received that redress from the law, and that practical protection from the police, to which they were entitled. Some of the cases, though many months old, had not been disposed of, and one case, in which a *raiya*, after having been wounded in an affray in which factory people were the aggressors, was carried off from factory to factory, and undoubtedly died in duance from the effect of his wounds, was most weakly and improperly treated at the commencement. The local authorities were admonished that such remissness on their part could not fail to produce in the minds of the natives a suspicion of partiality. They were directed vigorously to prosecute all pending cases, and to bring them to such a termination as might satisfy the ends of justice. As the year advanced, complaints on both sides began to thicken. In November 1859, an influential planter in the Nadia district represented to Government that a spirit of opposition to the factory was manifesting itself in the conduct and action of his *raiya*s, and that to encourage this opposition a rumour had been sedulously circulated that the Government was

opposed to indigo planting. On the other hand, numerous petitions were received from the *raiyats* complaining of cruel oppressions practised upon them by the planters, and of the compulsory cultivation of a crop, which they represented, not only as unprofitable but as entailing upon them a harassing, vexatious, and distasteful interference.

On the 10th of February 1860, a representation was submitted by the Commissioner of Nadia from another planter in the Nadia district, alleging that mischief had been done in the indigo factories under his management, by the issue, from the Deputy Magistrate's court at Kalaroa, in the district of Barasat, of a *parwana*, on the subject of the interference of the police in indigo disputes. This *parwana* was said to be based on the correspondence of 1859, previously mentioned. It appeared on inquiry that, although the publication of a *parwana* by the Deputy Magistrate was certainly not a discreet measure, there was no proof that it had done any harm anywhere, whilst all the circumstances of time and place were against the supposition of its having had any influence in Nadia, where no one probably ever knew of it.

To petitions from *raiyats* complaining of indigo cultivation, Sir J. P. Grant's reply was, that *raiyats* who had contracted to cultivate indigo must expect to be forced to fulfil their obligations; but no *raiyat* was forced to contract to cultivate who did not choose to do so.

In March, when Sir J. P. Grant returned to the Presidency from his tour in Bihar, his attention was directed to reports regarding misunderstandings between the planters and *raiyats* which were represented as likely to lead to serious consequences. A very general indisposition on the part of the *raiyats* to cultivate indigo during the ensuing season had been manifested. The same subject was pressed upon his attention by a deputation from the Indigo Planters' Association, who, at an interview, laid before him a petition from their main body. The Association represented the state of feeling manifested by the *raiyats*, attributing it in part to a mistaken belief as to the views of Government in regard to the cultivation of indigo. To protect their interest, thus endangered, the Association asked for two things: *first*, that Government would take steps to remove the mistaken impression stated to exist among the *raiyats*;

*second*, that a special law should be enacted to make the breach of an agreement to cultivate indigo punishable summarily by a Magistrate. To the first prayer, Sir J. P. Grant at once acceded. A Notification was issued, on the 14th March 1860, having for its object the correction of any erroneous ideas as to the wishes and policy of the Government, and impressing upon the *raiyats* the necessity of fulfilling existing engagements.

The second prayer involved questions of a very serious nature. On the one hand there was the fact that laws and Courts already existed to redress any grievances proceeding from breach of contract or other causes; on the other, there was reason for believing that a great commercial calamity was threatened by the refusal of a combination among the mass of *raiyats* to fulfil lawful contracts for the approaching season, duly entered into, and on which actual cash advances had been received. The danger was a great, a sudden, and a pressing one. Sir J. P. Grant came to the conclusion that the regular procedure was inadequate to the occasion, and that a special law of limited application as to time was called for, which should, however, be accompanied by a promise of full and thorough inquiry into the past practice, and thereafter of a well-considered law which should afford equal and complete protection to the *raiyat* and to the planter. In accordance with his views, a Bill was introduced to the Legislature on the 24th. and passed as Act XI of 1860 on the 31st. of March. It was "an Act to enforce the fulfilment of indigo contracts and to provide for the appointment of a Commission of inquiry."

The Act made temporary provision for enforcing, by summary process, the execution of agreements to cultivate indigo during the current season, for which an advance in cash had been received, except agreements obtained by fraud, force, or unlawful intimidation; and it provided for the punishment of certain unlawful acts connected with such cultivation, namely, intimidating or attempting to intimidate persons with the intention of inducing them to break their agreements, maliciously destroying or damaging, or commanding, compelling or persuading others to destroy or damage any growing crop of indigo.

The Act also made provision for the appointment of a Commission to inquire into and report on the system and practice of indigo

planting and the relations between the indigo planters and the *raiya*s, and holders of land in Bengal. It provided for the filling up of vacancies among the Commissioners in case of the death or resignation of any of them, and for the attendance and examination of witnesses.

In the meantime, the excitement against the cultivation of indigo had become so strong as to lead to acts of violence in some of the indigo districts. The first disturbances occurred in the Aurungabad sub-division, where the Ancoora factory, belonging to Mr. Andrews, and the factory at Baniagaon, belonging to Mr. Lyon, were attacked by a mob of *lathials* and *raiya*s. In the district of Malda, the Bakrabad factory, also belonging to Mr. Andrews, was similarly attacked and plundered. It appeared upon inquiry that the *raiya*s in this part of the country had been goaded into rising by the long continued oppressions and extortions of the factory servants. While, therefore, the rioters, who were concerned in the disturbances were promptly punished, stringent measures were ordered to be taken to bring to justice those whose oppressive acts lay at the root of all this evil. In the districts of Nadia and Jessore, although the excitement was as strong as anywhere else, no disturbances of a serious nature occurred. In the district of Pabna, a Deputy Magistrate, with a small party of military police was (partly in consequence of his own injudicious conduct) repulsed by a body of armed *lathials*, who had assembled to resist the cultivation of indigo. On receipt of intelligence of the first of these occurrences, Government at once acted with promptness and vigour. Troops were rapidly collected in the districts where the excitement prevailed, and by a judicious display of force in suitable places the *raiya*s were overawed, and all tendency to any violent outbreak was suppressed. The best available Magistrates were placed over the indigo districts and the staff of Magisterial officers in those districts was considerably strengthened. On the passing of the new indigo Act, Sir J. P. Grant issued certain instructions to the local Magistrates, enjoining them carefully and patiently to sift the evidence and to decide in the truest spirit of equity all cases instituted under it. Subsequent results proved that these cautions were needed. Legal opinion on several doubtful points connected with the practical operation of the law was obtained, and circulated for the information and guidance of all officers engaged in carrying it out. The number of

suits under the Act in the Nadia district increased so largely towards the end of May, as to threaten to stop all the regular work of the district. Upon an application from the Commissioner, 2 Principal *sadar Amins*, with Magisterial powers, were specially deputed to Nadia for the trial of the breach of contract cases, the Magisterial officers reverting to their own proper work including the trial of cases under the penal clauses of the Act. Except in Nadia, the indigo Act was not worked to any very great extent. And, notwithstanding the great excitement displayed at the commencement of the season in 3 out of the 4 excited districts, the usual or nearly the usual quantity of indigo was sown. In the month of June, some apprehensions of a breach of the peace were entertained in the district of Pabna, in consequence of certain differences between the *rai-yats* and planters of 2 of the largest concerns: but these differences were amicably adjusted by the exertions of the district authorities. Difficulties had also been experienced by planters in the

district of Jessore in obtaining delivery of the ripe indigo plant; but these were met by some judicious concessions on their part.

Meanwhile all parties being eager for the proposed Commission of Inquiry, the gentlemen

The Indigo Commission.  
W. S. Seton-Karr, Esq., C. S. President.  
R. Temple Esq., C. S. Member.  
Rev. J. Sale, to represent the interests of the *raiyats* in the Committee, and the Missionaries. W. F. Fegunsson Esq., nominated by the Indigo Planters' Association to represent the interests of that body; and Babu Chandra Mohan Chatterji, nominated by the British Indian Association to represent the landholders' interest.

named in the margin were appointed to form the Commission. Two private sittings were held on the 14th and 16th of May 1860, when the course of action to be followed was determined upon and a list of witnesses was drawn up. The public sittings commenced on the 18th of May and terminated on the 14th of August. With the exception of a fortnight, when the Commission sat at Krishnagar, the meetings were all held in Calcutta. The number of witnesses examined was 134, of whom 15 were officials and servants of Government covenanted and uncovenanted; 21 were or had been planters; 8 Missionaries; 13 native *zamindars* or *talukdars*; and 77 *rai-yats*, tenant proprietors, or occupiers of land.

The Report, dated 27th August 1860, was signed by Messrs Seton-Karr and Sale, Babu C. M. Chatterji and, with a reservation, by Mr. (afterwards Sir Richard) Temple. Appended to the Report was a Minute by Sir R. Temple in which

Their Report.

Mr. Fergusson concurred; also a Minute by Mr. Fergusson, and a reply to it signed by 3 of the Commissioners.

The evidence collected by the Commission bore on every point connected with indigo cultivation, as practised in different parts of Bengal; on the attitude of the planters to *zamindars* and *raiyats*, and on the feelings of natives, high and low, as regards indigo; on the profitableness of the cultivation to the *raiyats* or the reverse; on the cultivation of the poppy, and on agricultural pursuits generally; on the conduct of the police and the executive authorities, on the tenures of land and the facilities for its acquisition; on the working of certain laws; and on the general condition, advancement, and social prosperity of the country. The subject of indigo planting had for many years engaged the attention of the public and had occasioned much controversy in the columns of the Indian Press and of periodicals. The main features of the question at issue were thus formulated. It was asserted on the one hand that the cultivation of indigo was not voluntary on the part of the *raiyat*; that he was compelled to plough, sow, and weed his land, and to cut and cart the plant at times when he would prefer being engaged in other agricultural work of superior profit; that the land devoted to indigo was selected by the servants of the planters, was the best land very often, and was sometimes forcibly ploughed up to be resown with indigo when it was already sown with other crops; that the cultivation was thus rendered irksome and harassing to the *raiyat*; that he invariably became indebted to the factory and was obliged to bequeath his debts to his posterity, which almost deprived them of personal freedom; that he was oppressed by the servants of the factory, kidnapped, imprisoned and outraged; that the planters used unjustifiable means to obtain estates in *patni* from the *zamindars*; and that the system generally was vicious in theory, injurious in practice and radically unsound.

On the other hand, it was maintained that the rule of the planter, as proprietor of lands, was milder and more temperate than that of the native; that the object of the planter in securing *zamindari* rights was to have that influence over his tenants, without which, from interference on the part of others, he could not carry on the cultivation properly; that the *samindar*, aware of this, extorted exorbitant terms from the planter; that the planter's difficulties were increased by the jealousy and suspicion of the executive authorities, the

corruptness of the police, the distance of the courts and the slowness of legal procedure; and that his presence in the country was beneficial to the natives and the Government, in diffusing civilization, protection and progress.

The Report gave an account of the various systems of indigo cultivation existing in Bengal and Bihar: and divided the subjects of inquiry into 3 heads: (1) the truth or falsehood of the charges made against the system and the planters: (2) the changes required to be made in the system, as between manufacturer and cultivator, such as could be made by the heads of concerns themselves: (3) the changes required in the laws or administration, such as could only originate with, and be carried out by, the legislative and executive authorities.

Sir J. P. Grant's Minute of 17th December 1860 is the best comment on the Report and the whole situation, and will be found *in extenso* at the end of this Chapter.

The temporary Act of 1860 for the summary enforcement of contracts for the cultivation of indigo ceased to be in operation on the 4th October. On receipt of the Act in England Sir Charles Wood had written:—

“In regard to the first point, it is to be observed that the authority of the Magistrate is to be called into action on the complaint of the planter for the enforcement of indigo contracts, under specified penalties, in the event of a failure to perform the same. The provision of the Act, by which a violation by a *raiyat* of a civil contract, of the nature specified in the Act, is made the ground of criminal prosecution by the planter, appears to the Home Government to be open to serious objection.” As the Act had already been brought into operation, was for a limited duration, and had been passed to provide for a sudden emergency, the Secretary of State did not disallow it, while declining to perpetuate it. The moral effect of the Act and of the public assurance given to the complaining *raiyats* that proved grievances should be remedied for future seasons, was such that most of the planters were able to complete to a great extent their spring sowings. Some difficulty was experienced by the planters in securing the cutting and delivery of the ripe indigo plant, but this was got over by the exertions of the Magisterial authorities, and in some instances by the judicious concessions made by some of the planters. In the autumn of 1860 things looked very critical. “I assure you.”

Subsequent oc-  
currences and  
action of Govern-  
ment.



wrote Lord Canning, "that for about a week it caused me more anxiety than I have had since the days of Delhi," and, 'from that day I felt that a shot fired in anger or fear by one foolish planter might put every factory in Lower Bengal in flames.' Evidence of the popular excitement in the districts is forthcoming in the following passage of Sir J. P. Grant's Minute of 17th September 1860: "I have myself just returned from an excursion to Sirajganj on the Jamuna river! where I went by water for objects connected with the line of the Dacca Railway and wholly unconnected with indigo matters. I had intended to go up the Mathabhangra and down the Ganges; but finding, on arriving at the Kumar, that the shorter passage was open, I proceeded along the Kumar and Kaliganga, which rivers run in Nadia and Jessore, and through that part of the Pabna district which lies south of the Ganges.

Numerous crowds of *raiyats* appeared at various places, whose whole prayer was for an order of Government that they should not cultivate indigo. On my return a few days afterwards along the same 2 rivers, from dawn to dusk, as I steamed along these 2 rivers for some 60 or 70 miles, both banks were literally lined with crowds of villagers, claiming justice in this matter. Even the women of the villages on the banks were collected in groups by themselves; the males who stood at and between the river-side villages in little crowds must have collected from all the villages at a great distance on either side. I do not know that it ever fell to the lot of any Indian officer to steam for 14 hours through a continued double street of suppliants for justice; all were most respectful and orderly, but also were plainly in earnest. It would be folly to suppose that such a display on the part of tens of thousands of people, men, women, and children has no deep meaning. The organization and capacity for combined and simultaneous action in the cause, which this remarkable demonstration over so large an extent of country proved, are subjects worthy of much consideration."

Towards the end of September the Government of India authorised the issue of a notification, in the excited parts of the indigo districts, to disabuse the minds of the rural population of an erroneous impression said to have been conceived by them, that Government was opposed to the cultivation of indigo; to convey an assurance to the *raiyats* that their position in regard to

past arrangements would not be made worse than it was, and that, in respect of all future arrangements, their right to free action in regard to indigo, as in regard to all other crops, would be respected in practice : to warn all parties against having recourse to violent or unlawful proceedings, and to announce the intention of Government not to re-enact the temporary law of 1860. The only remedy the Committee recommended, which it was in the power of Government to apply, was a good and effective execution of the law as it stood. Accordingly new Subdivisions were created, measures were adopted for the introduction of an improved system of police throughout the Lower Provinces. Courts of Small Causes under Act XLII of 1860 were established at the most important places in the indigo districts ; the efficiency of the existing Civil Courts was much improved by the new Code of Procedure ; and, at the suggestion of Government, a system of classification of suits, and setting apart particular days of the week for the trial of cases of the description of Small Cause Court cases, was introduced. Twice in 1860 Sir J. P. Grant had to submit lengthy answers to charges contained in 2 memorials of the Bengal Indigo Planters' Association against the course of action taken by him, which the Association declared would be ruinous to their interests. The conduct of the Bengal Government was approved by the Government of India. Sir J. P. Grant's refutation of the charges was regarded as complete and the Governor-General's full and cordial support was promised him in acting on principles on which he had hitherto acted. Reports that the *raiya*s would prevent the October sowings led Government to strengthen the military police in the indigo districts, to send 2 gun-boats to the rivers of Nadia and Jessore, and Native Infantry to these 2 stations. The indigo excitement, which had been hitherto confined to the Nadia and Rajshahi Divisions, towards the end of October manifested itself in a part of the district of Faridpur, chiefly inhabited by the Ferazis, the sect of Muhammadans who had on previous occasions shown unity of action and some disposition to turbulence. Timely precautions were taken by the Magistrate for the preservation of the peace, and beyond a few cases of petty assaults on factory workmen and servants, which were brought to the notice of Government, the excitement in this district was confined to a passive refusal in some quarters to cultivate indigo.

The Government of India on the 27th February 1861 acknowledged that Sir J. P. Grant's Minute had dealt with the subject fully and clearly, that the statement of the case, the review of the evidence, and the conclusions were eminently just and fair. The Governor-General agreed that the cause of the evils in the system of indigo cultivation in Lower Bengal was to be found in the fact that the manufacturer required the *raiya*t to furnish the plant for a payment not nearly equal to the cost of its production : and that it was to the system, which was of very long standing, more than to the planters themselves that blame attached. The ability of the Minute was recognised by the Secretary of State and by the Governor-General in private letters.

In the spring of 1861 the planters complained of the difficulty of realising their rents, of being forcibly dispossessed of their *nizabad* lands, and of danger to their own lives and those of their servants. The difficulty as to rents was apparent and extra officials were appointed where required. On the 4th March 1861 a deputation of the Indigo Planters' Association represented these evils at Government House to the Governor-General, and Messrs. C. F. Montresor and G. G. Morris of the Civil Service were appointed Special Commissioners to settle the rent difficulty, the former for the Nadia district, the latter for Jessore, Pabna and Faridpur. Meanwhile the planters were assisted by a protective force, and extra Courts, and periods of grace were allowed to 1 or 2 of those who were *zamindars* for the payment of the land revenue. There were a few cases of serious outrage and even affrays attended with loss of life. At the village of Sadhuhati in the Jhenidah sub-division of Jessore, 6 of the villagers were killed and wounded. But all cases were promptly dealt with by the authorities. The principal difficulties complained of by the planters during the indigo crisis may be summed up as follows:—*First*, wilful repudiation of rents by the *raiya*ts, and their inability to measure their lands owing to the refusal of the *raiya*ts to attend the measurement and point out their respective holdings; *Second*, forcible dispossession of their *nizabad* lands by the *raiya*ts, and the insufficiency of the summary process under Act IV of 1854 to restore them the possession of such lands in time for the season's cultivation: *third*, wilful destruction of indigo crops by cattle; and *fourth*, the commission of outrages on their servants and property by large masses

of people, in which it was difficult to obtain individual conviction.

Suitable recommendations were made by Sir J. P. Grant for legislative action in all these matters, which, if adopted, would tend in a great measure to remove these difficulties. These recommendations were as follows :—

*1st*, Provision by law for the award of penal damages in a suit for rent when the plaintiff had been inexcusably forced into Court by unreasonable refusal or contest; *2nd.*, receipt of rent by the Collector in certain cases; *3rd.*, improvement of the process for the realization of rents under Act X of 1859, by attachment of all the property of the defendant at the outset at the discretion of the Judge; *4th.*, provision by law for the official measurement of lands when applied for by either *zamindar* or *raivat*; *5th.*, practical provision for registration of *niz jote* lands and other lands in *raiya* tenure, so as to enable the police in cases of dispute to give prompt possession to the party registered; *6th.*, amendment of the Cattle Trespass Act, so as to meet cases when the cattle were not trespassing, i. e., when they were causing damage to their owner's land or crops, by which damage another person having some interest in the crops was injuriously affected; *7th.*, joint village liability to fine for offences by masses. These recommendations were duly considered, and some of the most important of them were embodied in Act VI (B. C.) of 1862 (an Act to amend the law relating to the recovery of rent). But it is hardly worth while to go into further detail. The indigo interest had long been doomed and never recovered its former position in the districts of Lower Bengal. When, in the spring of 1861 the Report of the Indigo Commission came under the consideration of the authorities in England, the question they had to decide was—were criminal proceedings for breach of contract necessary? Sir Charles Wood and his Council, after a careful review of the Report, were of opinion (so wrote his *quondam* Private Secretary) that breaches of contract ought not to entail criminal proceedings; that the relation between planters and *raiya*s should be held to be dependent on mutual good will,—on the interests of both being fairly considered,—on proper caution being exercised in making contracts, and on integrity and forbearance. The necessity for their relations with the *raiya*s being regulated by such considerations would not

be realized by the planters, relying, as they did, on Government assistance, and the strong arm of the law being exercised in their favour against the *raiyyat*, "who," Lord Canning thought, "had been left too long in ignorance of the protection which he might claim against the proceedings of any planter who had bound him by unreal obligations, and who had enforced them by illegal means;" and the decision arrived at was ably expressed in a despatch to the Governor-General, on the 18th of April, 1861, in which, when reviewing a Bill transmitted to the Home Government,—the object of which was "to provide for the punishment of breaches of contract for the cultivation, production, gathering, provision, manufacture, carriage, and delivery of agricultural produce,"—Sir Charles Wood said :—

"The question of making breaches of contract for the cultivation and delivery of agricultural produce punishable by criminal proceeding is not one which now for the first time presents itself for consideration. It has been maturely considered, and the deliberate judgment of the Indian Law Commissioners, of the Legislative Council, of the Secretary of State in Council, of the majority of the Indigo Commissioners, of the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, and even, as it appears to me, of your own Government, has been recorded against any such measure. I am not prepared to give my sanction to the law which you propose, and to subject to criminal proceedings matters which have hitherto been held as coming exclusively under the jurisdiction of the civil tribunal; and I request that the Bill for the punishment of Breaches of Contract recently introduced by you into the Legislative Council may be withdrawn."

The subject of the indigo disturbances may be completed here.

The bad feeling between the classes concerned produced an unforeseen episode. In 1861 considerable excitement and annoyance were created in Calcutta by the circulation, from the office of the Secretary of the Government of Bengal, of a translation of the *Nil Darpan* (lit. the "mirror of indigo"), a Bengali drama on the subject of indigo cultivation. The original play having aroused great interest a wish for a translation was expressed by several Europeans: this was accordingly made by a native under the superintendence of the Rev. J. Long: both the original drama and the translation were *bona fide* native productions, depicting the indigo planting system as viewed by the natives at

The *Nil Darpan*  
case.

large. The play was described, in an introduction to the translation, as giving "the annals of the poor," though exhibiting no marvellous or very tragic scenes: it "pleads the cause of those who are the feeble; it describes a respectable *raiyat*, a peasant proprietor, happy with his family in the enjoyment of his land till the indigo system compelled him to take advances, to neglect his own land, to cultivate crops which beggared him, reducing him to the condition of a serf and a vagabond; the effects of this on his home, children, and relatives are pointed out in language, plain but true; it shows how arbitrary power debases the lord as well as the peasant; reference is also made to the partiality of various Magistrates in favour of planters and to the Act of the last year penally enforcing indigo contracts."

The translation, with a preface by the author, Rai Dinabandhu Mitra Bahadur, a man of some erudition and poetical ability, was circulated with the sanction of the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Mr. W. S. Seton-Karr. The Landholders' and Commercial Association through their Secretary, Mr. W. F. Fergusson, addressed Government, asking whether the publication had been circulated with the sanction and authority of the Government of Bengal, and for the names of the parties who had circulated "a foul and malicious libel on indigo planters tending to excite sedition and breaches of the peace," with a view to their prosecution. In the correspondence which ensued Government pointed out that indigo planters were not the only class, native or European, criticised in the Bengali play: as faults had been imputed as unsparingly to European Magistrates, native officials, and native factory *amla*, as to indigo planters. The Association took action in the Courts. Mr. Manuel, the printer of the translation was prosecuted in the Supreme Court for libel, and fined: the Reverend Mr. Long, who had superintended the translation of the play, was fined and imprisoned for a month by the same Court. The fine was at once paid by Babu Kali Prosanna Singha.

The whole matter was dealt with officially by the Government of Bengal and the Government of India. On the 19th June 1861, Sir J. P. Grant recorded a Minute on the facts, and submitted it to the Governor-General. This Minute ran as follows:

"The words charged as libellous, I understand, are not in the play, but in a preface by the author prefixed to the play.

"The issue of the pamphlet in question in any manner was not by my

order, or with my knowledge, and I never saw it, or knew a word that was in it, until it had been circulated in the manner described by Mr. Fergusson.

The issue was made through a very unfortunate error of the late Secretary. Mr. Seton-Karr, several months ago, mentioned to me that he had been informed that a curious Bengali play had been written, the subject of which was indigo,—a genuine native production,—a translation of which might be made by a private hand, and some copies printed off at a trifling cost. I wished to see the work, partly as a curiosity, and partly because I thought it likely that it would show what the real popular feeling was on the subject better than anything else.

I thought it probable that, besides any value the work might have as a literary curiosity, it might prove to be such that a few copies might with propriety be privately given to friends in official and private positions, with the same object as that which made me wish for an opportunity of seeing what the work was like myself.

I have always been of opinion that, considering our state of more than semi-isolation from all classes of native society, public functionaries in India have been habitually too regardless of those depths of native feeling which do not show upon the surface, and too habitually careless of all means of information which are available to us for ascertaining them. Popular songs everywhere, and, in Bengal, popular native plays, are amongst the most potent, and most neglected, of those means. I have always attributed our unforewarned condition, when the shock of 1857 occurred, to this popular defect. I did not on this occasion regard the matter as one of importance; but still the opportunity seemed a good one of knowing how natives spoke of the indigo question among themselves when they had no European to please or to displease by opening their minds.

Mr. Seton-Karr's ideas on this point were the same as mine, and I had thought it was understood, when our conversation on the subject was ended, that the translation and the printing of a few copies were to be a wholly private affair.

I do not believe I ever heard a word more about the matter till a copy of the printed publication was sent to me at Parasnath without any accompanying letter, shortly before an accident happened to my camp there which obliged me to return for 2 or 3 weeks to Calcutta.

On my first interview with the Secretary, which was before the excitement caused by the official circulation of the pamphlet had shown itself, I found that he had been under some impression that the translating was to be a Government act paid for by Government, which impression I

immediately corrected. I found also that the pamphlet had been circulated, and circulated under official frank, which was past remedy.

It is obvious, and the point is candidly admitted and deeply regretted by the late Secretary that, even upon his understanding of the affair, not a copy should have been circulated till the Lieutenant-Governor had seen the work and authorized its circulation. Had this error not been fallen into unadvisedly, the Secretary's mistaken impression would have had no ill consequences.

The occurrence is extremely unfortunate, and has distressed me beyond measure. It has excited irritation, when it was an object to allay irritation. But before I was made aware of it, the mischief was done."

Mr. Seton-Karr (who was then Legislative Member for Bengal of the Governor-General's Legislative Council) made an explanation to the public by addressing the *Englishman* newspaper, and stated his connection with the matter in the following letter dated the 29th July 1861 to the Government of Bengal :—

"As in the late trial of the Revd. J. Long, before the Supreme Court, there was mention, in the evidence, of the Bengal Office, and allusion was made to my orders as Secretary, I think it right to lay before the Lieutenant-Governor an official statement regarding my connection with the drama called the *Nil Darpan*.

I take this opportunity of enclosing a copy of the *Englishman* newspaper of this day's date, containing an explanation which I have thought right to make public at as early a date as possible, and I solicit the Lieutenant-Governor's attentive perusal of the same.

The printed statement in question is intended to clear up charges of unfair dealing, and of personal hostility to the planters, made against me ; to make such explanation as was due to persons who felt themselves aggrieved by the publication ; and to explain some passages in the play itself which I cannot but think have been greatly misrepresented. What I know of the history of this drama will be found in my printed statement ; and I can only add hereto, that the Revd. Mr. Long has been known to me and others as having, for years, devoted his attention to the vernacular literature of Bengal, and to the various publications which issue from the Native Press, and circulate among the middle and lower orders, to an extent of which very few Europeans are aware.

Publications on divers social questions of interest have been by him brought to the notice of the authorities, of which a record will be found in the Bengal office.

I believe that, at this period of Indian history, no one will seriously dispute the paramount importance of the Government of the country



being kept well informed of the state of feeling among natives, as shown by their periodical and other vernacular literature.

I mentioned the work to the Lieutenant-Governor in the belief, as just expressed, that it was my duty to bring to his notice all native publications illustrative of popular feeling. The Lieutenant-Governor, as well as other persons, expressed a desire to see a translation of this drama, and Mr. Long informed me that a native was willing to translate it. A translation was accordingly made under my sanction.

I think I am correct in stating that up to this point all I had done was also with the knowledge and sanction of the Lieutenant-Governor. He approved of my noticing the work and of the act of translation, and of the printing, but he never intended that so large a number as 500 copies should be struck off. I believe that he contemplated that a small number of copies should be printed, to be dealt with as he might think fit.

When the work of translation and printing was completed the copies were brought to my notice, and Mr. Long gave me the names of the several persons to whom he was desirous that the work should be sent; other names were also added by me to the list, and I must here distinctly repeat, what I have avowed already, that the circulation under the official frank took place with my sanction and knowledge, and without that of the Lieutenant-Governor. I would observe that copies of this translation were sent to the persons to whom copies of official documents about the indigo crisis had been sent. Unfortunately, I did not reflect that it was one thing to send off copies of official documents printed by order of Government and therefore generally available for distribution or even sale, to any person requiring them, and another thing to send off copies of a translation of a native play which had not been regularly submitted to the Lieutenant-Governor but merely mentioned in the course of conversation to the Head of the Government.

Nor can I refuse to admit that this course may seem to place the Government of Bengal in the position of having acted apparently without due consideration for the Government of India, and that His Excellency the Governor-General in Council may find in this grounds for grave complaint. This is a subject of deep regret to me, but I cannot do otherwise than take the blame of this proceeding, and of its consequences, entirely on myself.

I had not however the least intention of showing the least disrespect either to the Government of Bengal or the Government of India, and I may remark that no mention of the *Nil Darpan* has been made in any public discussion in England, while it is not yet known that the copies have arrived at their destination.

I must urge that the duty of bringing such publications as the *Nil*

*Darpan* or any other such publication to the notice of Government is one which it behoves every officer not to neglect, and that in the situation of Secretary I should not have been justified in disregarding the work. My error lay in not examining it more carefully before issue; and in issuing it, in the manner I did, without the knowledge of the Lieutenant-Governor.

I take this opportunity of placing on record the fact that, after the termination of the trial of Mr. Long, I considered, looking to all that had taken place, that the retention by me of my appointment might be a source of embarrassment to the Government which I have the honor to serve and in this view I deemed it my duty, on Thursday, the 25th instant, or the day after the sentence, to place my resignation of my present appointment as Legislative Member for Bengal at the disposal of the Lieutenant-Governor, as well as to renounce my right to revert to my previous appointment as Secretary to Government, which had been reserved to me in the event of changes taking place in the constitution of the Council.

But His Honor did not see reason to act on the power which I then placed in his hands.

I now leave the subject in the hands of the Government, and the Lieutenant-Governor will probably do me the justice to believe that, if I say no more on this subject, it is not because I do not deeply regret the general irritation which has been excited, the attacks to which the Government has been exposed, and the consequences to a very earnest, zealous and single-hearted Missionary, for whom, in his misfortunes, I cannot but feel the deepest sympathy.

In a further brief Minute of 30th July Sir J. P. Grant sent up Mr. Seton-Karr's letter to the Government of India. He wrote:—

“Mr. Seton-Karr's narrative correctly describes the circumstances. He candidly acknowledges the serious error committed, but I am sure that, in circulating the translation in question, he did not contemplate either giving offence to any class, or placing the Government in a false position. In putting his resignation of his office of Member of the Legislative Council at the disposal of Government, he has acted the part of an honorable and high-minded man, consistently with his own established character. I did not think that the public interests would be served by acting upon the power thus placed in my hands; but my judgment does not affect the case so far as Mr. Seton-Karr's disinterested conduct is concerned.”

The Governor-General thereupon, on the 8th August 1861, issued the following Resolution on the whole case:—

"On the 22nd June, the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal submitted to the Governor-General in Council His Honor's Minute of the 19th June, and a correspondence with the Landholders' and Commercial Association, relative to the circulation, under official frank, of a translation of the *Nil Darpan*, a Bengali drama on the subject of indigo cultivation.

In one of their letters the Association indicated an intention, under certain contingencies, to appeal to the Government of India; and the announcement of this intention, combined with the subsequent adoption of legal proceedings by the Association, rendered it undesirable for the Governor-General in Council to enter on the questions raised with any view to their final disposal, even had the case been fully before the Government of India.

His Honor's Minute was therefore transmitted to the Secretary of State, without the expression of any opinion by the Governor-General in Council.

His Honor now forwards a copy of a further Minute by himself on a letter from Mr. Seton-Karr, who was, when the occurrence referred to took place, Secretary to the Government of Bengal. It encloses a statement which that gentleman has, with permission, published relative to his share in the translation and circulation of the drama.

The whole transaction has in the meantime formed the subject of 2 trials in the Supreme Court. The Printer has been fined and the Revd. Mr. Long, who superintended the translation of the work, and took part in the other proceedings complained of by the Landholders' and Commercial Association, has been fined and imprisoned by sentence of the Supreme Court.

No appeal has yet been received by the Government of India from the Landholders' and Commercial Association, and no further legal steps have, as far as is known, been taken in that body. But their case is stated fully in the published proceedings of the trials, and there is no reason why the Government of India should longer delay to express its opinion on an act of a high officer of the Government of Bengal, which has been openly challenged as incompatible with the duty of a public servant.

The work itself, and the meaning of the passages complained of, have been made the subject of formal judicial inquiry and decision in the Supreme Court.

It would therefore be unbecoming for the Government of India to discuss any questions connected with the character of the work.

But, while expressing no opinion regarding the work itself, and willingly accepting the most favourable interpretation of it; while feeling the fullest and most unreserved confidence in the assurance of Mr. Seton-Karr, that the passages complained of never presented them-

selves to his mind as capable of being read in the light in which they appeared to the parties who are aggrieved by them ; and while utterly discarding all imputation of hostility to those parties in an officer who had lately discharged, in an impartial and conciliatory spirit, functions almost judicial in their bearing upon the interests of the indigo planters of Lower Bengal, the Governor-General in Council cannot but say that the most complete vindication of the passages impugned would go but a small way to lessen the regret with which he views the whole proceeding.

His Honor the Lieutenant-Governor, in sanctioning the translation of the play, had no knowledge that it contained any passages of the circulation of which any person, or body of persons, could suppose that they had a right to complain. He was not aware of the steps taken to distribute the translation, until it was too late to prevent the distribution. And here the Governor-General in Council can find nothing to regret in what His Honor did, unless it be that the examination, and, if necessary, the translation or circulation of an original vernacular work, throwing light on any political question, was not undertaken as a part of a regular system ; and subjected to all the checks of supervision usual in any department of ordinary administration.

But His Excellency in Council cannot impute blame to the Government of Bengal that this has not been done, for the subject of systematically and officially reporting on the publications of the Native Press is one the importance of which had been repeatedly noticed by His Honor and regarding which, but for more pressing calls on his attention, some definite and regular course would doubtless, ere now, have been adopted.

It is, however, a subject of great regret to the Governor-General in Council that, after the peculiar circumstances of the distribution of this work, under the official frank of the Government of Bengal, were brought to His Honor's notice by the Landholders' and Commercial Association, His Honor confined himself to disavowing and disapproving the unauthorized proceedings of the Secretary to the Bengal Government. It is possible that His Honor was as imperfectly informed, as the Government of India has till lately been, as to the particulars of the case. But these particulars ought, in the opinion of the Governor-General in Council, to have been searched out by the Government of Bengal and, where condemnation from the Head of that Department was due, it should have followed at once, in such manner as to mark unmistakeably His Honor's displeasure and to render it impossible to implicate his Government in acts which were not only unauthorized but quite unjustifiable.

The Governor-General in Council is well aware that the intimation conveyed in the letter from the Landholders' and Commercial Associa-

tion; that any information given by the Lieutenant-Governor would be made use of to prosecute "with the utmost rigour of the law" the parties concerned was a sufficient reason why His Honor should not prejudice the rights of possible parties in the case, by communicating information which he was warned might be used in legal proceedings, the exact nature and extent of which could only be conjectured.

But the Governor-General in Council does not doubt that the Lieutenant-Governor's displeasure might have been emphatically signified without entailing this or any other evil consequence; indeed His Excellency in Council believes that the consequences would have been good rather than evil; and, at all events, it was incumbent on His Honor to lay the case fully before the Governor-General in Council, in order that His Excellency in Council might pass his judgment upon acts which, besides a breach of the duty of a Secretary to the Government of Bengal, trenched upon the authority of the Government of India.

It appears from the published proceedings of the trial of the Revd Mr. Long, that although no copies of the translated pamphlet have yet been officially furnished to the Government of India, and although none were supplied to the individual Members of the Government until they were applied for after the distribution had become the subject of public discussion, numerous copies had been sent, as if by the authority of the Government of Bengal, to Members of Parliament and Public Bodies in England, to some parties at a distance in this country, and, to the amount of no less than 20 copies, to the office of the Secretary of State in London. More than this could not have been done to give emphasis and currency to the publication of opinions endorsed by the Government of India. Nevertheless the most important features of the apparent sanction thus given to the circulation of the pamphlet have only become known to the Government of India through the published reports of the trials.

This course, even had it been authorized by the Lieutenant-Governor, would have been a grave irregularity, and, in the case of a document having an important bearing on great controversial questions, would not have been excusable as an inadvertence. It would have evinced a disregard of the relative position of the Government of Bengal, the Governor-General in Council and the Secretary of State, and would have called for prompt notice by the Government of India.

The proceeding, however, was not only unauthorized by, but unknown to, His Honor, and remains the act of the Secretary, and one for which Mr. Seton-Karr admits that he, and he alone, is responsible.

Mr. Seton-Karr now expresses his regret that the Government of Bengal should, by his unauthorized circulation of the pamphlet, have

been placed in the position of having acted apparently without due consideration for the Government of India ; but no explanation or apology is offered by him for having omitted to impart to the latter Government information which he regarded as of paramount importance to it, and the preparation of which in an English form had been justified by him, and very properly justified, on that ground. He is therefore chargeable, not only with an unwarrantable assumption and indiscreet exercise of an authority which did not belong to him, but with a neglect of duty which it is difficult to reconcile with the motives that led him to such an assumption.

The Governor-General in Council could have wished that these errors had been noticed by His Honor the Lieutenant-Governor with the gravity which they deserve, as very serious infractions of the Secretary's duty. His Excellency in Council is fully sensible that to have caused, even by inadvertence, a great public scandal, to have thereby embittered the strife of parties and classes ; to have wounded, however unintentionally, the feelings of many of his fellow-countrymen ; and to have involved others in criminal prosecution and punishment, are of themselves penalties as severe as can well be suffered by a zealous and high-minded public servant who has at heart the honour of that Government, which for many years he has served with the highest credit, and which has lately placed him in the foremost rank of its public functionaries. Nor does the Governor-General in Council forget that regret for all this has been expressed by Mr. Seton-Karr in a most honourable spirit, and that he has becomingly tendered to the Lieutenant-Governor the resignation of his office. But His Excellency in Council cannot consider that the Government is thereby absolved from the duty of making sure that the important ministerial functions of the Secretary to the Government of Bengal shall not be resumed by an officer by whom, from whatever cause, they have been exercised with grievous indiscretion. And in this view it is decidedly the opinion of the Governor-General in Council that, when Mr. Seton-Karr shall no longer have to discharge the duties of his present position in the Legislative Council, he should not be allowed to return to the office of the Secretary to the Government of Bengal."

A statement, dated the 20th June 1861, was printed by the Revd. Mr. Long to explain his connection with the *Nil Darpan*. He dwelt on his acquaintance with the Native Press and their publications, and on the importance of the Europeans knowing the tendency of the native mind as manifested therein : it was this, he said, that had induced him to bring to the notice of certain persons the *Nil Darpan*, " which though highly coloured appeared to give the native

view of the effects of the indigo planting system.' At the same time he expressed his regret that, while the coarser passages of the play had been expunged or softened in the translation, any that had given offence had been inadvertently allowed to remain. It does not appear that this statement affected the case in any way.

On the 12th August 1861, Mr. Seton-Karr submitted a full apology to the Government of India for having omitted to impart to that Government information which he regarded as of paramount importance to it. This apology was willingly accepted by Lord Canning. The Secretary of State, who had stated his entire disapproval of the circulation of the translation under the official seal and frank of the Bengal Government, agreed that Mr. Seton-Karr should not be allowed to resume his Secretaryship, but expressed no doubt that "so able and distinguished a public servant as Mr. Seton-Karr has shown himself to be, will, on his ceasing to sit in the Legislative Council, be placed in some suitable situation where the public may have the benefit of his service". He became subsequently a Judge of the High Court, and Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

Some anxiety was felt in 1861 for the tranquillity of the indigo districts during the sowing season, and every possible precaution was taken for the prevention of disturbances. The new arrangements for subdivisions in the Nadia Division had been completed before the season commenced, and a Magisterial officer was appointed to each new subdivision: extra Deputy Magistrates were also posted wherever their services were required, and detachments of Native Infantry, of the strength of 200 men each, were placed at the *sadar* stations of Nadia and Jessore. The Magistrates of the indigo districts were authorized to entertain extra bodies of police wherever they might find it necessary to do so, and directed to keep them in readiness, in compact bodies of not less than 25 men, for rapid movements as required. In spite of these precautions there were a few specific acts of violence, and in most of them the offenders were arrested and punished. There were also illegal assemblies in several places, but the prompt appearance of the police put down these demonstrations in almost every case. It was alleged that the planter-*zamindars* experienced great difficulty in the realization of their rents.

Further official  
action.

Government directed their officers to give all assistance in the way of exhortation and explanation, and offered to assist indigo planters holding *talukdari* tenures with loans of money to save the tenures from sale for arrears of rent. Government endeavoured to persuade planter-*zamindars* to receive, and their *raiya*s to pay, on account, where the only dispute between them was about the rate or amount of rent due; and ordered a postponement of the demand for revenue from any planter-*zamindar* who might satisfactorily establish that his efforts to collect the rents due to him had been successful.

When, in the autumn of 1861, the Government of Bengal laid before the Government of India the Reports of the Special Commissioners, Mr. Montresor and Mr. Morris, some very animated correspondence ensued between the Government of India and Sir J. P. Grant. The former stated that the primary object which they had in view, in suggesting on 11th March 1861 (just after the deputation of landholders to the Viceroy) the appointment of a Special Commissioner had not been fully apprehended either by the local Government or the special officers, and that the success of the measure had accordingly been partial: their primary object was, they said, to bring about a settlement as to the matter of rent and a permanent and final adjustment of the differences existing between the landholders and the *raiya*s, that is by reconciliation and arbitration: and on failure of all attempts at adjustment to administer the law. Sir J. P. Grant had understood the primary object to be the enforcement of the prompt payment of arrears of rent justly due, and the checking by strong official action of all tendency to a general or extensive withholding of rents, of which fears had been expressed. Both Governments had agreed that the special officers were to deal only with the question of rent and to have nothing to do with indigo. Sir J. P. Grant contended that the permanent and final adjustment of differences, at the bottom of which was indigo, was impossible, as the special officers were expressly ordered to avoid that subject. The Government of India disclaimed the intention of attributing any blame to Sir J. P. Grant or the special officers for having acted on his construction of the orders of the 11th March 1861, but added that the tone of disrespect which pervaded Sir J. P. Grant's letter was not justified and was inconsistent with the relative positions of the Government of India and the Government of



Bengal. The Government of India at first desired that another Special Commissioner should be deputed to carry out their views of effecting reconciliation. But this order was subsequently modified on its being explained that, though indigo was the origin of the differences, and was still, more or less directly, the main cause of misunderstanding, yet the form which the troubles had assumed was that of a general and vast enhancement of rents and eviction of *raiyats* in masses; that the work to be accomplished was something approaching to the re-settlement of the districts where the excitement prevailed; and that the only plan which was likely to succeed in such circumstances consisted rather in the appointment of an officer to exercise the united powers of a Collector, Judge, and Commissioner in respect of all suits under Act X of 1859, who could authoritatively settle the conflicting rights and interests of parties at variance. The course suggested was approved by the Government of India, and was carried out by the appointment of 2 additional officers, Messrs. E. Jackson and C. H. Campbell, to exercise the powers indicated in the districts of Nadia and Jessore respectively.

On the day of his retirement, the 23rd April 1862, Sir J. P. Grant apologized, in a Minute of that date, for the wording and tone of his language in defending his conduct, which had been pronounced to be disrespectful. As the letter of the Government of India, which had been understood to be equivalent to a severe censure, had been published, Sir J. P. Grant asked for the publication of the papers which withdrew all imputation of blame, but Lord Elgin, who had become Governor-General, decided on the 3rd May not to publish more papers, as Lord Canning, two Members of his Council, and Sir J. P. Grant had all meanwhile retired.

While the indigo disturbances were occurring, Sir J. P. Grant contrived to devote considerable time to the subject of Primary Education. The existence of indigenous schools throughout the province of Bengal was not unknown to Government, but, instead of working upon them as a basis and obtaining results from them, attempts had been made, somewhat spasmodically from time to time, to establish vernacular schools of a higher type as models. Sir J. P. Grant consulted 25 gentlemen, and on information received from them proposed a scheme of

Primary Education as fully set out in his Secretary's (Mr. Seton-Karr's) letter of the 19th October 1860, to the Government of India, on the subject of providing cheap schools for the masses, and of improving and extending vernacular education generally :—

“ The Lieutenant-Governor has referred to Lord Stanley's despatch on the subject of education generally, which was received after the first of your letters under acknowledgment had been forwarded, and in which various important points connected with education are discussed, but the present communication will be confined to an exposition of his views regarding Vernacular Education for the lower classes, and to the question of the funds from which such education must be supplied. The Lieutenant-Governor has consulted on this important subject not only the officials of the Education Department, but several other gentlemen, Europeans and natives, who have either had practical experience in dealing with village schools, or have always shown an interest in the elevation and well-being of the *rai-yats*. The information given by the above gentlemen is herewith forwarded, and aided by their opinions, as well as by a consideration of the means hitherto employed for this object, the Lieutenant-Governor is now enabled to explain the plan which he recommends for the attainment of the object in view.

The Lieutenant-Governor clearly understands the intention of the Government of India, and of the Home Government, to be that grants-in-aid are not to be applied to the extension or support of purely indigenous or vernacular schools, but are to be reserved for English schools, for Anglo-vernacular schools, and for vernacular schools of a comparatively high order. The present object then is to devise some scheme for the instruction of the lower agricultural classes which may be tried at once experimentally, but shall be capable of easy extension ; and be not ill-adapted to any existing system ; suitable to the wants of the people ; not calculated to offend their prejudices, and, above all, which shall not be attended with inordinate expense, not only at first, but when developed to its fullest extent.

Bearing this in mind, the Lieutenant-Governor has come to the conclusion that our best chance of success lies in basing a new scheme on the indigenous schools already existing throughout the districts of Bengal, and, indeed, to be found more or less in every part of India. He has fully considered everything that can be said, and that has been said, to the disparagement of these primitive institutions. The poor appearance of the sheds used as school-houses ; the ignorance, obstinacy and prejudice of the *gurus* who preside over them ; the almost total want of school books ; the very humble character of the instruction

generally imparted ; and the poverty of the scholars, have not been overlooked. But if we are to convey instruction of any kind to the lower orders, we must not, the Lieutenant-Governor thinks, affect to disregard the kind of instruction that the people have hitherto sought and approved. All attempts made to reach the mere agriculturists, however praiseworthy, and by whatever amount of talent and energy supported, must fail wherever they are not in unison with the habits and feelings of the people. The kind of instruction which the people naturally desire must not be forgotten. The aid of the village school-masters must be invoked. The possibility of elevating and improving both the schools, and the race of school-masters, should not be hastily disregarded. Any scheme involving the abolition of all existing village schools, and the deprivation of all the school-masters must create for itself obstacles that may be insurmountable.

The ground-work of the plan which the Lieutenant-Governor contemplates must therefore be the present indigenous schools. That they exist in numbers, in Lower Bengal especially, is unquestionable. Mr. Long estimates that in Bengal alone there are 30,000 village *gurus*, and indeed all persons who have been consulted at any time when the question of vernacular education has been under consideration, from the time of Mr. Adam downwards, however they might differ as to the possibility of improvement, have had no doubt as to their existence, or as to their numbers. The Lieutenant-Governor, then, approving only of a scheme which shall openly recognize the existence and utility of these institutions, would set about this recognition in the following manner.

Lists of every village school in each *silla* that may be included in the scene of operations should be prepared by the Education Department, in communication with the District Officers. The Inspector, aided by Deputy Inspectors, should then proceed to make his selection of those schools which he may think most important, and most capable of improvement. In doing this he would naturally be guided partly by personal and partly by local considerations. In this selection much will depend on the judgment and tact of the inspecting officer.

When the requisite number of schools shall have been selected, the Inspector must endeavour to induce the *gurus*, or the proprietors and supporters of the schools, who are often *talukdars* and middlemen, to submit to periodical inspection. To this end the Lieutenant-Governor would not propose that any pledge should be demanded from either school-masters or proprietors, as to the repairs of the school-house, or the number of scholars ; or that any weekly or monthly returns or statements of any kind should be forwarded to the Inspectors. This

officer, before admitting the school on his list, must take care to satisfy himself that there is a school-house in existence, and that it has a fair daily attendance of scholars ; also that the master is willing to receive the support of Government. The erection and repairs of the school-house being left to the inhabitants, the teacher would be chiefly remunerated, as he is now, by the fees of the scholars. In this way the cost of the institution of the school, and the greater part of the expense of its maintenance, being still defrayed by the people of the neighbourhood, the scheme, even when fully developed, need not be impracticable from its costliness. But, in order to enlist the sympathies of the teacher, and to overcome his prejudices, as well as to raise the character of the institution, the following means are suggested. Books should be supplied to the school at a very low price. These books should contain, in a compact form, all that has hitherto been taught at such places by dictation, namely, arithmetic, agricultural and commercial accounts, forms of agreements, quittances of rent, bonds, &c., and even models of the complimentary or formal letters which inferiors constantly address to their superiors. The Lieutenant-Governor does not feel warranted in despising this last kind of instruction, because it is not conveyed to the son of an English peasant. It is sufficient for our purposes that such instruction has been imparted in India for generations. The above course will enable any lad of ordinary intelligence to read and write correctly, and to see that he is not cheated in his accounts by the *mahajan* or the agent of the *samindar*. A book of this kind has been in use in some schools in Calcutta, and, as being in every way suited for the purpose, should be largely supplied to other similar schools.

On this rude and primitive foundation, the Lieutenant-Governor would build a structure of a better kind ; taking great care, however, that the higher and better instruction offered should not be too much in advance of the requirements of the people. He would rigidly exclude all attempts at English instruction ; or at imparting to Bengal village boys information which can in their case serve no purpose but to puzzle their heads with strange names, and foreign ideas. He would restrict the improved course to the measurement of land : to some short Bengali grammar of the simplest kind ; and to the very first elements of geography, and of Indian history. If the sons of *raiya*s, in addition to the present course of village instruction, can be induced to read books of instruction and amusement (which must be for the most part written for the purpose ; ) to write with neatness on leaves or paper ; to measure their own lands correctly ; and to know a little about the existence of other countries and the history and condition of their own, with the

prospect of a better education for their sons, a great step will have been made.

When the selection of certain schools has been made, and when it has been formally announced that the course of instruction shall not be hastily changed, and shall be supplied with the mechanical aids of which it has hitherto been destitute, it will still be necessary to secure the co-operation of the *guru*. But, to this end, the Lieutenant-Governor thinks that any compulsory examination, which some gentlemen have recommended shall be forced on such persons, would defeat the object which we have in view. It is useless to expect that the ordinary race of village teachers would submit to any ordeal of the kind. All that can be done is, by conference, by judicious advice, and by holding out hopes of reward, to stimulate the best men of the class to greater exertion, and to lead them to adopt an improved course of study. This, it must be conceded, is the one difficulty of the scheme. But it does not seem an insurmountable difficulty. When a certain number of *gurus* shall have been induced to adopt the improved system, the feeling of the people will be so much in favour of it as to force it upon the remainder, or to drive them out of employment.

It is here, of course, that the substantial aid of Government must come in, and there can be no inducement so powerful as a payment of a reward in cash. The Lieutenant-Governor would take care that these rewards should be quite distinct from any system of grants-in-aid. They would be distributed within a fixed limit by the Inspector, on his being satisfied that the school had been well-attended by scholars who had passed a fair examination in the subjects to which it is proposed in this letter to limit the education of the *raiyat*. In this way the minute returns, the lengthy statements, and the constant supervision necessary in the system of grants-in-aid, and noticed as prejudicial by Dr. Mouat in his letter of the 20th of August 1859, would be quite unnecessary; while, on the other hand, care must be taken that rewards are not given for mere musters of boys collected together to make a good show. Visits should take place only as often as is necessary for a fair knowledge of what is going on. We know that when the inhabitants want a school they will maintain one: if the son of an agriculturist wishes to learn anything at all he will attend such a school; and, if the *guru* is capable of teaching at all, he will find scholars. It is to the improvement of such schools, when brought into existence by the voluntary act of the inhabitants, that the State must look. The reward given to the *guru* need in no case exceed half the fees which he receives from his scholars, or, say, a sum of Rs. 30 or Rs. 36 a year; and often it need not amount to so much. Taking the average of a teacher's earnings at

Rs. 5 a month, the sum spent in rewards to each school-master would not on an average exceed Rs. 30 a year, and the Lieutenant-Governor believes that the prospect of such a sum would stimulate all but the most apathetic and bigoted teachers. If any *guru* proves impervious to advice, encouragement, or the hope of reward, or, having promised largely, fails to fulfil his promises, he will at once be struck off the Government lists. But if, by advice, conciliatory treatment, books and substantial rewards, even a dozen schools were led to adopt a better and higher kind of instruction in any one *zilla*, the latent energies of neighbouring school-masters would in time be excited, and, if a scheme so based should once gain a secured footing, there might eventually, the Lieutenant-Governor thinks, be no limit to the extension of vernacular education, except the wants of the people.

The Lieutenant-Governor has no objection to see a few vernacular schools established by Government, to serve as models to the indigenous schools. He thinks that about half a dozen of these should be established in each district, on a scale to be explained hereafter; but he would avoid the error of establishing them at the *sadar* stations, or even necessarily at the stations of sub-divisions. These places have been sometimes selected under the idea that supervision could there be most readily exercised. This is true, but the tendency of the native servants of Government, whose sons mostly frequent schools at such places, is to wish for English education, and vernacular schools so situated might not attract the class of scholars for whose benefit the present scheme is intended. The places selected for the model schools to be established by Government should be, not *bazars*, but the thickly populated rural villages, inhabited partly by artizans, but mainly by agriculturists of rather the better class. The things taught in the Government institution should be absolutely identical with those taught in the indigenous institution. The house will be better built, and the teachers better educated and better paid, and books and writing materials will from the first take the place of dictation and scribbling on sand. Of course such schools cannot be established at the cost of Rs. 50 a year, which sum, by the plan now under discussion, it is proposed shall be the limit of expense for all purposes in each purely village school. The Government would have to build the school-house and to keep it in repair, and the salary of the head teacher, which might be available for the occasional inspection and examination of other schools, could not be fixed at less than Rs. 20 a month; this sum to be paid exclusive of the fees, which should be demanded from the scholars at the monthly rate of 1 anna or 2 annas a head. Books must be supplied at a very trifling cost, as to the other schools previously in existence.

The arrangements being approved for the supervision of the indigenous, and for the establishment of Government schools to serve as models, there remains for consideration the staff by which the schools are to be selected, supervised and in some degree controlled. For this it would be necessary to have a staff of Deputy Inspectors. But, as repeated visits and constant supervision by such Inspectors do not form a part of the present proposal, it would be possible, the Lieutenant-Governor thinks, to have the work performed by a moderate number of such officers. Taking the scale of indigenous schools to be visited at 100 per *zilla* at first, and each school to require visits not much more than once a quarter, there would be 400 visits to be performed annually. To do justice to this number, not less than 4 Deputy Inspectors would be required, who would each have 25 schools to look after in his own circle. The Deputy Inspectors might reside near the model schools, and bestow a close attention to their improvement at such times as they were not going the round of the villages. Institutions wholly supported by Government obviously demand, and can endure, a more strict superintendence than independent institutions, presided over by *gurus* self-elected, or chosen and paid by the *talukdars* and *raiya*s, and one main object of the plan which the Lieutenant-Governor is now proposing is that the retention of the indigenous schools on the Government list should depend, not on minute control, but on the results shown at each examination.

The expense of this scheme would be as follows. The Lieutenant-Governor will take the number of 100 schools, with 6 model schools and their necessary staff, as one suitable for an experiment, and capable of being enlarged by doubling, or trebling, or quadrupling the scale of the whole expenditure; thus 100 indigenous schools in each district, costing Rs. 50 a year in all, would amount to Rs. 5,000 a year. The model schools could not be supported at a less cost than Rs. 30 a month, including the salary of the head teacher fixed at Rs. 20 or Rs. 360 a year. The salaries of the Deputy Inspectors must be liberal, to secure the services of men of independence, honesty and energy; and the Lieutenant-Governor does not think that qualified persons could be secured for less than Rs. 100 a month, including travelling allowances. Thus the whole expense for one district would be as follows:—

	Month.	Year.
100 indigenous schools      ...      ...      ...		5,000
6 model schools, each at Rs. 30 a month,	180	2,160
4 Sub-Inspectors, each at Rs. 100 a month,	400	4,800
		<hr/> 11,960
Total in round numbers Rs.      ...		<hr/> 12,000

It is by no means the intention of the Lieutenant-Governor to recommend that the support of the State should be limited to 100 schools in a district, with half a dozen model schools, and a corresponding staff of inspecting officers. The above is taken as a fair proportion to start with, on a reasonable scale of expenditure, worthy of being tested; and, should the plan succeed, it will be a mere question of money whether the numbers, as before stated, should not be doubled, trebled, quadrupled, or still more

\* Note.—The number of villages in a large district is about 5,000; this would give one school to every 5 villages.

largely multiplied. If the time should ever arrive when we could show\* 1,000 village schools to a

district, aided by Government, and affording the agriculturists a simple and practical education, commensurate with their wants, the State, in such a case, might be held to have fairly done its duty by the neglected portion of its subjects.

The above plan has already been tried in some of the districts of Bengal to a very limited extent, and it is now under trial in Assam.

Another plan of dealing with indigenous schools has been tried by Mr. Woodrow, the Inspector for East Bengal. Its basis of operations is partly the same as that of the plan above recommended. The village schools, with their primitive instruction, are taken as they are found. The difference is in the treatment of the schools and of the master.

Mr. Woodrow selects 3 village schools within a circle of 2 or 3 miles of each other. To these 3 schools one *pandit* is attached by Government, who receives a salary of Rs. 15 a month, and who visits each of the 3 schools once a week, spending 2 days at each school. It is the business of the *pandit* to prevail on the village *guru* to adopt an improved course of instruction, and to show him practically the details of this course. For this end money is freely spent in rewards to such *gurus* as consent to enter on the new system, and these rewards are of course exclusive of the salaries of the *pandits*. It often happens that of the 3 schools one assumes a marked superiority over the other 2, and when this result takes place, and the inhabitants exhibit an anxiety for a permanent teacher to supplant the *guru*, the *pandit* is then appointed to be their teacher on a salary not of Rs. 15 but of 10, the difference being made up to him by the fees of the scholars; and the school thus becomes in every respect a vernacular school, wholly maintained by Government. This experiment, as tried by Mr. Woodrow, already embraces in round numbers 200 schools in an aggregate of 3 or 4 districts. The cost of each of the 3 schools, to which the *pandit's* salary is chargeable, has been hitherto Rs. 6, i. e. Rs. 5 salary and Re. 1 for reward, and the cost of any 1 school, when fairly converted into a Government school, could not be taken at less than Rs. 15, i. e. Rs. 10 salary and Rs. 5 incidental expenses,



The expense of this plan, when fully developed, seems to the Lieutenant Governor to be excessive, for the cost of each school when perfect would be Rs. 180 a year. A district of ordinary size contains about 5,000 villages; and 1 school to 5 villages is a fair allowance. The ultimate expense then in such a district would be Rs. 1,80,000 a year; besides the cost of model schools and Inspectors. By the plan recommended, the amount for the village schools *only* would not exceed Rs. 50,000.

It is not the intention of the Lieutenant-Governor to recommend normal schools for teachers as part of this scheme, because he thinks that no normal school other than a provincial one for each district would ever supply to the fullest extent requisite teachers for the lower class of schools. It would be unreasonable to expect any teacher brought up in a normal school at Calcutta or Hooghly to proceed to teach scholars in the Province of Cuttack, or the Division of Dacca, on such a moderate salary as must be assigned to teachers of schools in those localities. The teachers for each district must be furnished in and by the district; and in this view the Lieutenant-Governor thinks it unnecessary to make a district normal school for teachers in village schools a part of his scheme. For the purely vernacular schools contemplated by this project, we ought to look to the model vernacular schools proposed to be established. If the support extended to the native village schools should result in success, that success will immediately raise the character of the schools and of the indigenous teachers, and will call forth fresh teachers as a natural consequence, and thus we shall attain our object.

The experiment may be tried at any time in some of the populous districts of Lower Bengal, when the money is available. The Lieutenant-Governor thinks that it will be wise to commence not with the most civilized parts of the 24-*Parganas*, Barasat, or Hooghly, where the cry of the inhabitants is for an English education as tending to employment and preferment, or, at any rate, not with the portions of those districts in the vicinity of Calcutta, but rather with more distant *zillas* almost equal in population, but not so constantly brought into contact with the advantages of civilization.

Considering the new schemes of taxation now being everywhere introduced, the Lieutenant-Governor is opposed to any attempt to impose any special cess for any educational purpose. By the present scheme, the people pay for the chief cost of vernacular schools. The aid to be given by Government may fairly come from the general revenues.

The main features of the scheme now recommended seem to have the merits of simplicity, cheapness, and facility for indefinite extension. Several of them are recommended by the united judgment of experienced gentlemen of different professions, European and native. There are

difficulties in all plans ; but whatever difficulties there are in this plan, it is believed that they are not more than can be surmounted by the known tact, ability, and earnestness of those to whose hands its execution would be entrusted."

This scheme was not definitely sanctioned by the Government of India, apparently for want of funds. For the year 1862-3 that Government allowed the sum of Rs. 30,000 for the purpose of initiating a scheme for the extension of Vernacular Education in Bengal, and, after some correspondence, the Government of Bengal in July 1862 issued the following orders to the Director of Public Instruction:—

"You now propose, instead of the 6 model district schools which formed part of the original scheme, to establish in each of the districts of Nadia, Burdwan, and Dacca, one model school, with a normal training school attached, for the instruction of the *gurus* of indigenous schools. It is intended that a certain number of the village *gurus* of the district shall be withdrawn from their schools and placed at this institution, with stipends of Rs. 5 per mensem, to learn their duty as teachers, their places being temporarily filled by normal school pupils on a salary of Rs. 12 *per mensem*. At the end of the year of training, each *guru* will, on returning to his school, receive, on examination and approval by the Inspector, a certificate carrying with it a stipend of 1 rupee *per mensem* to continue in force for 2 years, and to be renewable periodically on proof of continued efficiency. In addition to this fixed stipend of Rs. 12 *per mensem* these village teachers will, as originally intended, be entitled to rewards which you propose to fix provisionally on the scale recommended by Mr. Woodrow. The total cost of each indigenous school will, under this system, be for the first year Rs. 204 *per annum*; but after the return of the *guru* from the training school the expenditure will be so far reduced as to bring the whole expenses of each school, including stipends, rewards, and children's prizes, within the fixed limit of Rs. 50 *per annum*. This plan has, you report, already been tried with great success by Mr. Woodrow, though on a smaller scale.

In reply, I am desired to inform you that the Lieutenant-Governor (Sir C. Beadon) agrees with you in thinking that 1 training school, such as it is now proposed to establish, is more likely to be useful as a means of improving the indigenous schools by imparting to the *gurus* a knowledge of their business as teachers, than a larger number of model schools, which may or may not be visited by those for whose benefit they are intended as an example. For this reason the Lieutenant-Governor is averse to the establishment of any model school of this kind; especially

if it is to limit the number of *gurus* who can receive instruction in the normal schools.

With this exception, the Lieutenant-Governor entirely approves of the modified scheme proposed by you, and authorizes its immediate introduction into the districts of Burdwan, Dacca, and Nadia.

The expense of the entire scheme for the current year, the Lieutenant-Governor thinks, will probably be entirely met from the assignment of Rs. 30,000 in the Budget, and, if there should be any excess expenditure owing to the establishment of normal training schools, it will not be more than can be defrayed from savings in other directions.

In conclusion, I am to observe that no system of popular education can be complete or effective unless provision be made for supplying the people with cheap books."

The enactment of the Indian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860) passed on the 6th October, marked an era in the laws applicable to Bengal. The question of enacting a general Penal Code had long been under consideration. In 1835, the preparation of it was entrusted to the Indian Law Commissioners (of which body Sir J. P. Grant was for some time Secretary) by whom it was completed and submitted to Government in 1837. In 1851, a revised edition of the Code was prepared by Mr. Bethune. On the 3rd June 1854, the Code prepared by the Commissioners was referred to a Select Committee of the Legislative Council for consideration and revision. On the 7th of the following month, the Committee, in reference to a despatch from the Court of Directors, made a special report in which they recorded their opinion that the Code, as originally prepared, should form the basis of a system of penal law for the whole of the British territories in India. The Code, as revised by the Committee, was introduced into Council on the 20th December 1856. It was in due course again referred to a Select Committee for further revision after considering the observations and suggestions which might be elicited by its publication. The Code, as then further revised, was brought up for final consideration, and was at length passed into law on the 6th October 1860. It was provided that it should take effect from the 1st May 1861 throughout the whole of Her Majesty's territories in India embraced by the Statute 21 and 22 Vict. C. 106 except the Straits' Settlements, and be applicable alike to the Supreme Courts and to the *mufassal* Courts. By providing a uniform

system of criminal law throughout India, this law superseded the Muhammadan law; and, by defining offences and punishments, it rendered unnecessary the employment of Muhammadan law officers in the *mufassal* Courts. The copious use of illustrations was a striking peculiarity in the framing of the Code, which was thus at once a Statute and a collection of decided cases. The illustrations, however, were not intended to supply any omission in, or to put a strain on, the written law, but merely to be instances of the practical application of the written law to the affairs of mankind. On the third reading of the Code, its history and principles were reviewed in a speech by Sir Barnes Peacock, the Vice-President of the Legislative Council. Subsequently, by Act VI of 1861, the time for the Code to take effect was postponed till the 1st January 1862.

The first Code of Criminal Procedure came into force in Act V of 1861.

In 1860, the Government of Bengal undertook the rearrangement of sub-divisions in the districts throughout the Province, making a commencement with the Nadia (now the Presidency) Division. No more important measure, with a view to bringing justice home to the doors of the people, was ever undertaken. The views of Government were contained in a Resolution of the 7th November of that year. The sub-divisional system had grown up under the pressure of circumstances. The first sub-division was created at Khulna in Jessore, and none of those first created were placed with any intentional reference to what would be the best position when a complete and thorough system of sub-divisions should be generally established; for no such complete and thorough system was originally contemplated, or at least none such was then thought practically attainable. Sub-divisions were placed (as was the case with Khulna) where perhaps some man of influence and power happened to reside, who mis-used his position; or in the centre of some distant part of an unusually extensive district; considerations which had either no permanence in themselves, or ceased to tell when an adequate number of sub-divisions were constituted. Hence arose the necessity, in an arrangement intended to be permanent, of not treating every existing sub-divisional station, without exception, as a fixture. On the other hand, some of the older sub-divisions had been constituted in large

towns or marts, places of intrinsic and permanent importance ; and such positions were in their nature fixed.

The re-adjustment of the old and the placing of the new sub-divisions in the Nadia Division were undertaken with the above considerations in mind, and may be fully described as examples of the action generally taken. An inspection of the map of this Division showed that the head-quarters and areas of the sub-divisions, as well as the *thana* and district boundaries, were arranged with little regard to the general convenience. In some sub-divisions, apparently, the situation of the head-quarters had been determined without fully considering whether it was at the largest and most populous town in the neighbouring country, and therefore at a place particularly requiring the presence of a Magistrate; or whether it was easily accessible from the *sadar* station of the district and other important places, and generally from the villages situated within its limits. Again, in the assignment of *thanas* to the several sub-divisions, attention had not been given to the advantage derivable from reductions and extensions of their limits, so as to bring every part of the country as equally as possible under the inspection of the police, and to give all persons as short a distance as possible to travel in attending the Magistrate's court. These defects were the consequences, not of any disregard of principle, but of the accidental and occasional manner in which new sub-divisions arose. In some cases the result had been so much at variance with these important considerations, that the incorporation of a *thana* with a new sub-division, so far from conferring any benefit upon the people within its limits, actually placed some villages in a worse position as to their communication with a Magistrate than they were before. To remedy these defects in the Nadia Division Sir J. P. Grant, in personal communication with the Commissioner, subjected the sub-divisions to a careful revision. After much trouble, it was found impossible to produce a successful result, by the allotment of *thanas* as existing ; or by any arrangement founded in the main on the principle of an allotment of existing *thanas*. It became then necessary to fix upon those places which appeared to be in themselves best suited to form the head-quarters of a subdivision, without any regard to the position and area of the *thanas* around them. In this view the leading considerations were, whether the

sites chosen were at the most important places in that part of the country as regards trade and population; whether they were so situated as to distribute the subdivisions, of which they would form the centres, pretty equally over the country in the requisite numbers; whether they were on a navigable river or highway, or, if not, whether a good road, to be recommended on other grounds, could be conveniently made through them\* so as to afford them easy means of communication with the *sadar* station and other important places; and whether they were easily accessible from all parts of their own sub-divisions. It was not always possible to combine all these advantages; but it was generally possible to select sites which, on the whole, were advantageous in most of these respects. The principle which it was found necessary to adopt, was to treat artificial limits, such as those of *thanas*, as secondary considerations; and to be guided mainly by local circumstances not under control.

After the selection on the above principles of the head-quarters of the sub-divisions, a suitable tract of country was apportioned to each, so as to make the head-quarters as near as they could conveniently be to the centre of the sub-division. In some instances this could not be obtained, as in Kushtia, on the banks of a great river, dangerous to cross for many months of the year, though in all other respects it was the proper place for head-quarters, being the river terminus of a railway, with a town already rapidly rising around it. Again, it was not to be expected that each sub-division would be of the same size exactly as its neighbour. In some cases the areas were in some measure affected by the distance of the head-quarters of circumjacent sub-divisions; and in other cases, by the advantages to be obtained by adhering to some river, or other well-marked line, as the boundary. But the only great variations of size were where a thinly scattered population rendered an extensive jurisdiction unavoidable, and of comparatively little consequence.

With regard to the district boundaries, the endeavour was generally to adhere to them, so as to place each sub-division wholly within one district; whereby the sub-divisional officer would be under only one chief. But these arbitrary distinctions were not allowed to stand in the way, where they would clearly operate to the material inconvenience of the public, and to the prejudice of the speedy administration of justice.

The following arrangements were made in the Nadia Division. The districts of the Division, with part of the district of Pabna, was formed into 18 main sub-divisions, with head-quarters at the following places :—1. Kushtia, on the Ganges and railroad. 2. Meherpur. 3. Jhenidah, on the Noboganga. 4. Chuadanga, on the railroad. 5. Krishnagar (*sadar* station). 6. Magura, on the Noboganga. 7. Kotchandpur, with a metalled road to the railway, and a road to Jessore. 8. Narail, with a raised road to Jessore. 9. Jessore (*sadar* station). 10. Bangaon, on the imperial metalled road to be made from Calcutta to Jessore, with a road to the railway. 11. Ranaghat, on the railway. 12. Khulna, on the main channel of the eastern navigation. 13. Satkhira. 14. Basirhat. 15. Barasat (the district of that name being abolished) 16. Alipore (*sadar* station). 17. Port Matla (now Baruipur), with a road and railway to Calcutta. 18. Diamond Harbour, with a road to Calcutta.

These places were at an average distance of about 25 miles from each other. Besides the above, the Cantonment Joint-Magistries of Barrackpore and Dum Dum were formed into small sub-divisions, embracing some of the surrounding country : and a new sub-division was to be formed in the Suburbs, by posting one of the Alipore officers at Sealdah.

The result was the distribution, pretty equally over the 4 districts, of 21 Magisterial courts, where only 4 existed up to 1843, and only 13 on the 1st of May 1859. All other Commissioners were instructed to propose similar arrangements for their Divisions.

In 1860 Sir J. P. Grant had to deal with a reference on a proposal that Bible-reading classes should be allowed in Government schools. The point at issue and the decision were thus given in his Minute of the 14th November : “The exact point which I consider to be doubtful in the course proposed by Mr. M.—is whether any master of a Government school should be allowed to lecture a class *in the school house* upon religious subjects.....On the whole I conclude that the wise and just answer to Mr. M’s application is, that he is at perfect liberty to hold such a class as he wishes to hold in his own house, or elsewhere out of the college ; but, as Government schools and colleges are not intended for any but secular education, and do not undertake

Bible-reading  
classes in  
Government  
schools.

and could not regulate theological instruction, his class of theology must not be held in the Berhampore College."

Towards the close of 1859-60 our relations with the Government of Sikhim had become unfavourable. Constant Sikhim, raids had been made upon our territory, property had been plundered, our subjects had been carried off and sold as slaves or detained in Sikhim, and no redress could be obtained. The Raja of Sikhim was an old man of nearly 80 years who had relinquished all cares of State and retired to Chumbi in Tibet. The Government was entirely in the hands of the Chief Minister, Dewan Namguay, the man who had seized Dr. Campbell and Dr.\* Hooker in November 1849, and was the real author of the raids into our territory. After 6 months' negotiations, reparation was refused and Dr. Campbell, the Superintendent of Darjeeling took possession of that portion of Sikhim lying to the west of the Great Rungit and to the north of the Rumman River, the western boundary of which is the Singalela Range, and the northern the Snowy Range. On the 1st November 1860, he had only 160 natives and a complement of English and non-commissioned officers, and when attacked was forced to retreat for lack of ammunition. Immediately Government despatched 300 military police and 400 Europeans to his assistance. Subsequently Colonel Gawler of H. M's 73rd Regiment, at the head of a force of 2,600 men, including 2 mountain howitzers and a detachment of Artillery, with Sir A. Eden as Envoy and Special Commissioner, started for Darjeeling on 1st February 1861 and reached Tumlong, the Sikhim capital, early in March 1861. The Dewan fled, the force dismantled the forts, the old Raja abdicated in favour of his son and, on 28th March, Sir A. Eden effected a treaty with the new Raja. It stipulated that full compensation should be made to those of our subjects who had either been kidnapped or pillaged by the Raja's people: it provided for full indemnification for public losses sustained in Dr. Campbell's retreat; it guaranteed the opening-out of the country to trade, and the removal of all restrictions on travellers and merchants; it fixed the maximum rate of transit duties to be levied on goods between British India and Tibet; it provided for the construction of roads, and the security of those who traversed

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\* See Hooker's *Himalayan Journals*, Chapter XXV.



them ; and lastly, it contained provisions for the banishment of Dewan Namguay, and for the future good conduct of the Sikhim Government.

The following paragraphs from Sir A. Eden's final report are of interest, with reference to subsequent events :

“The instructions under which I acted enabled me from the very first to give the most solemn assurances that we did not wish to retain possession of any portion of the Sikhim territory ; and I attribute it entirely to the confidence which was placed in these assurances that the surrounding states held aloof altogether from the quarrel. Nepal is tributary to China, Tibet is tributary to China, and Sikhim and Bhutan are tributary to Tibet, and therefore secondarily to China. Had these States not distinctly understood that we were not advancing with any intention of annexation, it is impossible to believe but that, with such combination of interests, they would all have joined to oppose us, if not avowedly, at least secretly. From what I was enabled to learn at Tumlong, however, I was confident that our final proceedings in Sikhim have been viewed in Tibet with thorough satisfaction. The Tibetans, always slow to take offence, and, so far as they are able to act independently of China, hospitable, and disposed to encourage trade, have been considerably re-assured by our policy with Sikhim : and I do not think that we should now have any difficulty in establishing relations with Lhasa, more especially if the Chinese authorities have acted conscientiously in carrying out the provisions of the Treaty of Pekin.

If commercial intercourse is more fairly established, it is certain that a very considerable trade will spring up between Tibet and Bengal. They will give gold, silver, ponies, musk, borax, wool, turquoise, silk, and *munjeet*, for broadcloth, bleached goods, tobacco, and pearls. The Kashmir merchants resident at Lhasa have long been endeavouring to get the road opened through Sikhim, and a deputation of them offered to pay heavy transit duties to the Sikhim Government, provided they were afforded protection on the road. The late Dewan, however, would not give up his profitable monopoly, and persuaded the Raja not to accede to this request.

With a view of furthering this trade, a very good road has been constructed from Darjeeling to the Tista during our occupation of the country. Laden carts can now pass over this portion of the route with ease, and the Sikhim authorities have undertaken to complete

the remaining portion between the Chola Pass and the Tista. They anticipate no difficulty in persuading the Tibetan authorities to repair the road between Phagri and the Chola Pass, and beyond that there is an excellent road to Lhasa and Jigutishar."

In 1860-61 the Volunteer movement, which had sprung up in England, manifested itself in India. The disposition to form Volunteer Corps originated in the North-Western Provinces, but the Government of India signified its willingness to aid the movement in every case by the allotment of arms and accoutrements under certain conditions laid down for the purpose of ensuring uniformity and discipline. The following Corps were accordingly formed in the Lower Provinces:—(1) The Calcutta Rifle Corps, of 2 companies, of a maximum strength of 80 men each: the entire strength of the Corps, including Volunteers from Serampore and Alipore, thus reaching to about 160 men, under Captain G. B. Malleson, (the historian): (2) the Howrah Rifle Corps, 59 men: (3) the Shahabad Volunteer Rifles, 64 men: (4) the Rajshahi Cavalry Volunteer Corps, dating from the Mutiny, composed of 40 effective men: (5) the Purnea Cavalry Volunteer Corps, also raised during the Mutiny, subsequently recognised as a Corps of 30 members.

The Order of Knighthood, to be designated, "The Most Exalted Order of the Star of India" was created by the Queen, by Letters Patent dated the 23rd February 1861, to consist of the Sovereign, a Grand Master, and 25 Ordinary Knights, together with Extra and Honorary Knights. The preamble of the Notification ran as follows:—

"Victoria, by the Grace of God, of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Queen, Defender of the Faith, To all to whom these presents shall come, Greeting: Whereas We taking into our Royal consideration that it hath been the custom for Princes to distinguish Merit, Virtue and Loyalty by public marks of Honor, in order that Eminent Services may be acknowledged, and to create in others a laudable emulation, and We, being desirous of affording to the Princes, Chiefs, and People of Our Indian Empire a public and signal testimony of Our regard by the Institution of an Order of Knighthood, whereby Our Resolution to take upon Ourselves the Government of Our Territories in India may be commemorated and by which we may, at the same time, be enabled to reward conspicuous merit

and loyalty, &c., &c.," The Viceroy, Lord Canning, was appointed to be first Grand Master; none of the first 25 Knights were connected with Bengal.

The order was enlarged by further Letters Patent dated the 28th March 1866, to enable the Sovereign "to reward in a more extended manner persons of conspicuous merit who have rendered or may render important service to Our Crown in India." It was to consist of 3 classes, viz., 25 Knight Grand Commanders, 50 Knight Commanders and 100 Companions of the Order (besides Princes of the Blood Royal as Extra Knights Grand Commanders). Sir Cecil Beadon was knighted and other gentlemen, European and Native, connected with Bengal, were included in the dignities then conferred.

The subject of the connection of Government with native religious endowments is one of constant recurrence, and came under consideration in 1860-61. The Missionaries having submitted a petition to the Legislative Council concerning the relations of Government with these endowments, the Secretary of State desired that measures should be taken for severing all connection between the officers of Government and the religious institutions of the natives. To attain this end Sir J. P. Grant proposed that Regulation XIX of 1810 should be repealed so far as it related to religious endowments, and it was stated that this could be done without difficulty by provision being simultaneously made for an appeal to the Courts of Law in cases of dispute or malversation in regard to such endowments. As the Governor-General concurred in this view of the case, a Bill was introduced into the Legislature to repeal Regulation XIX of 1810 and a corresponding enactment of the Madras Code. It took time to settle the details in regard to the provision necessary to be made for the adequate protection of the trusts. The Bill was eventually passed into law as Act XX of 1863, "to enable the Government to divest itself of the management of religious endowments." It provided for the transfer by the local Government, to independent Trustees, Managers or Superintendents, of all the property belonging to their respective Trusts, &c., which had hitherto remained either in charge of the Board of Revenue or of local Agents. It contained other provisions for the appointment of Committees in certain cases, and for the management of endowments which are partly religious partly secular.

Religious endow-  
ments Act, XX.  
of 1863.

In 1860-61 the Excise Revenue of Bengal showed an increase from 37 to 41 *lakhs* of rupees. Sir J. P. Grant considered the financial results very satisfactory and creditable to the department: but he expressed a hope that, in the course of 1861-62, even if the Board were unable wholly to complete the abolition of outstills, substituting for them *sadar* distilleries (whereby the tax was levied at a high fixed rate on the quantity of spirits actually consumed and the ground of the charge made against the department that it encouraged consumption was removed), they would be able to accomplish "this most needful reform" over the greater part of the country. The Commissioner who had said that "the *Abkari* department can never be respectable till the outstill system is absolutely abolished, and the tax is levied at so much a gallon" was quoted with approval. Thus the policy of the Government of the time was in favour of *sadar* distilleries.

The appointment of Honorary Magistrates to assist the judicial work of the country dates in Bengal practically from the year 1860-61. A number of Honorary Magistrates were appointed in Bengal in the year 1857, in fulfilment of an intention expressed by the Governor-General, to the effect that the influence, services, and means of information of the landholders and European residents in the *mufassal* should be more largely utilized than previously for the proper administration of the country. These offices were afterwards abolished by Sir F. Halliday in 1859, but Her Majesty's Government, in noticing the circumstance, desired that, as the measure was reported to have worked very satisfactorily, the expediency of resorting to it again should be early taken into consideration. It was therefore proposed by the Government of India that the system already adopted in Oudh and the Panjab of entrusting magisterial functions to carefully selected landholders and others, should be introduced in Bengal; and the expediency of this was at once admitted by Sir J. P. Grant, who suggested that the Honorary Magistrates should be vested with the judicial, and not with the police, powers of the Magistracy. The Government of India, in acceding to the above suggestion, took occasion to point out that the employment of Honorary Magistrates should not be confined to the *mufassal* districts, as extension of the measure to Calcutta would also be attended with much advantage, and, in accordance with these orders, Sir J. P. Grant

appointed 45 Honorary Magistrates to the *mufassal* districts, and 45 others in Calcutta. The latter were all included in the Commission of the Peace.

A memorial was presented to Government about the middle of 1861 by the Trades' Association, complaining of the insufficiency of the municipal arrangements in Calcutta, which led to the appointment by Government of a mixed Commission under Mr. Seton-Karr to enquire into those allegations. Their Report, dated the 31st August 1861, stated the conviction of the Commission that the main want of Calcutta, as regards conservancy, was an adequate supply of funds and that without such funds it was vain to look for those great works of which the city stood confessedly in need and to which, from its importance and size, it was entitled. The Commission gave their opinion that the existing form of administration might with advantage be exchanged for one in which the inhabitants could take a more direct and active part in municipal arrangements, under which much of the duty that fell on the Board of Commissioners might be divided amongst local Committees, and which, without much extra expense, might exercise a spirit of emulation amongst the residents, such as could not fail to have beneficial results on the sanitary state and general economy of the city. They submitted a recommendation that for the existing Municipal Commissioners (under the Act of 1856) should be substituted a Central Board, consisting of 6 members, with the Commissioner of Police as President, and 6 Local Boards: the members all to serve gratuitously. The Local Boards were to have the control of merely local works, and the Central Board the allotment of the funds of the whole, as also the direction of all works of general utility to the population of the city. A Bill based on the Commissioners' Report was prepared, and power was taken in it to raise in various ways the money which had been declared to be the main want of Calcutta. Leave to bring the Bill into Council was given on the 29th March 1862. Sir J. P. Grant had retired before further progress was made with this Bill.

The commencement of the cultivation of Cinchona (from which so much benefit has been derived) in Bengal in 1861-62 deserves at least a brief notice. It had for some time, in fact since 1835, been considered desirable

Calcutta municipal  
arrangements.

Cinchona.

to extend to the hills of the Bengal Presidency the experiment of cultivating *Cinchona* which had succeeded so well in the Nilgiris, the plants or seeds having originally been brought to the Madras Presidency from Peru under the superintendence of Mr. Clements Markham. The first *Cinchona* seeds received in Bengal were some sent by Sir W. J. Hooker, in 1861, to Dr. Thomas Anderson, Superintendent of the Calcutta Botanic Garden, who conducted the whole *Cinchona* experiment in Bengal until he left in 1869. In 1861, Government took up the matter in earnest and deputed him to inspect the *Cinchona* plantations in Java. He received every assistance and attention from the authorities there, and brought back with him a large number of healthy plants. A few were retained for the experiments in Bengal, the rest he took to the nursery at Ootacamund, whence other plants were brought to Calcutta. Dr. Anderson suggested the establishment of a *Cinchona* nursery in (British) Sikkim, as affording the greatest hope of success: the proposal was approved, and a site was selected near the summit of Sinchal in the midst of dense forest. Owing to accidents in transit only 211 plants reached their destination, but the stock soon increased to 1611, as the plants could be propagated rapidly. The situation on Sinchal proved too severe for *Cinchonas*, so in April 1863 the plants were temporarily removed to a garden at Lebong, a warm, well-sheltered spur below Darjeeling, at a height of 6000 feet above the sea. For a permanent plantation space was found, 12 miles from Darjeeling, at Rangbi, on the S. E. slope of a long spur projecting from Sinchal, at an elevation between 1300 and 4000 feet above the sea, where work began in 1864. In 1866-68 various Commissions of medical officers reported favourably on the merits of other alkaloids obtainable from the *Cinchona* bark, as being as efficacious febrifuges as Quinine. In 1868-70 proposals were submitted by Dr. T. Anderson for the manufacture of a cheap but powerful febrifuge, well suited for use in native hospitals and charitable dispensaries, at the Rangbi plantation, by separating the *Cinchona* alkaloids from the young *Cinchona* bark; the purchase of machinery for the experiment was sanctioned: and a factory established in connection with the Rangbi plantation. A special Quinologist, was sent out by the Secretary of State, and actual manufacturing operations began in 1875. The whole work has

since been under the Superintendent of the Botanic Garden, Calcutta. -

The Indian Councils Act, 1861 (24 and 25 Vic. c. 67) to some extent affected the position and duties of the Lieutenant-Governor. It provided (s. 9).—and this was confirmed by s. 3 of 33 Vic. c. 3,—that, whenever the Governor-General's Council met for the purpose of making laws and regulations at any place within the limits of the territories under a Lieutenant-Governor, he should be *ex-officio* an additional member of the Council for that purpose. Also a Senior Civil Servant was from time to time appointed from Bengal to be an additional member (under section 10) of the Governor-General's Legislative Council. By section 44 of the same Statute the Governor-General was authorised to establish a Legislative Council for the Bengal Division of the Presidency of Fort William, and to specify the number of Councillors whom the Lieutenant-Governor might nominate for his assistance in making Laws and Regulations: and it was made lawful for the Lieutenant-Governor in Council to make laws for the peace and good government of his province. But the Council was restricted from dealing with certain classes of subjects.

The Bengal Legislative Council was accordingly established from the 18th January 1862 by the Governor-General's Proclamation of the 17th idem. The provisions of the Indian Councils Act regarding the making of Laws and Regulations in Madras and Bombay were extended to the Bengal Division of the Presidency of Fort William: the Lieutenant-Governor was empowered to nominate 12 Councillors (for legislative purposes).

By sec. 45 of the Statute it was provided that not less than  $\frac{1}{3}$  of such Councillors should in every case be non-official persons, the nominations to be subject to the sanction of the Governor-General. The Lieutenant-Governor nominated 4 official, and 4 unofficial Europeans and 4 native gentlemen, 2 of whom were official: so that the provisions of the law were complied with, and the Governor-General approved the nominations. An Assistant Secretary to the Government of Bengal in the Legislative Department was appointed. Rules for the conduct of business were framed to suit a Council which was not to sit permanently but was to be summoned for occasional sessions when projects of laws had been prepared. The first meeting

of the Bengal Legislative Council was held on the 1st February 1862. In February 1863 a rule of business was passed by the Council to enable any person whose interests might be affected by any pending Bill to be heard by himself or his Counsel, on the subject of that Bill. The Governor-General, in the exercise of his statutory power under the Indian Councils Act, section 48, disallowed the rule.

It may be here mentioned that, the want of accurate information on many subjects on which it had to legislate having been felt by the Bengal Legislative Council, an Act was passed, *viz.*, III (B.C.) of 1866, to empower the Lieutenant-Governor, by summons, to require any person residing in Bengal to appear and give evidence before Council and to produce all documents required: the Act also provided for the apprehension and confinement of recusant witnesses, and for the payment of the expenses of persons summoned.

In July 1860 Sir Charles Wood's Minute on the principles on which a police force should be organized throughout India was sent out, and Lord Canning at once took up the question by appointing a representative Commission of experienced officers to deal with it. A thorough reform of the police was determined upon, and partly carried out in 1861-62 under Act V of 1861. The reform consisted in the substitution of a single body of organised and efficient civil constabulary for the mixed system of a civil and military police which had hitherto existed in Bengal. (Civil police had been substituted for military guards in Calcutta in October 1860). The plan was suggested by the Commission appointed by the Government of India to inquire into the several existing police systems throughout India, and the expenditure for Bengal was estimated at 49 *lakhs* of rupees, an opinion being however at the same time expressed that the features of the province and the character and habits of its population would probably not necessitate a larger expenditure than 40 *lakhs*, which was sanctioned. The scheme provided for an Inspector-General, 8 Deputy-Inspectors-General, 25 District Superintendents with 90 Assistants, and a force of Inspectors, Sub-Inspectors, Overseers and Privates. It was proposed to have a separate Corps, partly mounted, for purely military protection, but this was not approved: and the retention of some of the military Battalions was only permitted until the civil police should be completely organised, after which they were all to be disbanded or absorbed: the duty



of defending the province against either external attacks or serious internal disturbances was to be entrusted to the regular army. An Inspector-General was at once appointed, with 3 Deputies, whose charges corresponded with the Commissionerships of Patna, Bhagalpur and Assam, and the requisite district staff and force.

The death of Lady Canning in November 1861 cannot be passed by unnoticed: it was more than a private affliction.

Death of Lady Canning. She had visited Darjeeling for a brief change in the autumn and been entertained by Sir J. P. Grant, while the Viceroy was on tour in Upper India. Passing through the unhealthy *Tarai* on her way down she was attacked by fever, which proved to be of a malarious type. In his *Earl Canning* Sir H. S. Cunningham writes thus:—"On her arrival in Calcutta she was found to be seriously ill. The disease rapidly assumed an alarming aspect, and in a few days it was apparent that her vital energies were fatally impaired. She rapidly sank and expired in the early morning of November 18th. The death of this accomplished and gracious lady affected all classes profoundly." The country mourned her loss: universal sympathy was shown for the Viceroy on the death of his wife. She was buried in the park at Barrackpore; and her epitaph was written on the 22nd November by Lord Canning. He himself died in London on the 17th June 1862 and was buried in Westminster Abbey. The author above quoted has added as follows: "At a lovely bend of the river—Lady Canning's favourite haunt—her body rests. Honours and praises," so runs the epitaph, which her husband's hand inscribed, "written on a tomb are, at best, a vain glory:" vain, too, the regrets of the saddened hearts, which mourned far and wide in India the loss of the beautiful and gifted woman who had with such fortitude and devotion shared the anxieties and lightened the labours of Lord Canning's troubled reign. Her serene courage in hours of danger and anxiety, when the hearts of many were failing them for fear—her readiness to help in all beneficial projects—her sympathy with human suffering—her nobility of character, shining bright above catastrophe and vicissitude, made her death a public loss—a common sorrow—and made her memory now one that Englishmen treasure among the precious relics of their country's past." Some lines of Sir J. P. Grant's written on the 23rd November 1861 are equally eloquent: "I can hardly even now realize, to my own mind, the fact. I parted

with her exactly one fortnight before her death, when she was all life and spirits and seemingly in the highest health and strength, and it is but little more than that time ago that she was the life of this house. A better woman never lived than she was, and she was as charming as she was good."

Mr. Seton-Karr has recorded some points of interest about Sir

Method of work  
and correspond-  
ence.

J. P. Grant, which may well be mentioned. "For

years Grant insisted on the paramount necessity of

looking carefully into what had taken place before,

if you were to estimate the chances and contingencies of the future.

And in all the discussions and controversies it might be said of him,

as 'it was said of Chancellor Thurlow by Dr. Johnson, that "he laid

down his mind fairly alongside" of his opponent. In dealing with

a colleague or a subordinate he never acted on any assumed or

inherent superiority of position. He was ready to meet each argu-

ment by another, and to convince by reason and logic. And if in

the course of a debate, oral or written, his distinctions might occasion-

ally seem too finely drawn, his conclusions were clear and consistent

and generally convinced or silenced his opponents.

No man was more ready to accept fulness and completeness of

reform in any one department. but he more than once remarked,

pathetically, that he had in all his long career seen many desirable

alterations and improvements indefinitely postponed, on the plea

that they would soon form part<sup>1</sup> of some contemplated structural

and organic change. And these grand swelling projects, though

constantly debated and criticised, were apt to end in failure or smoke

while much good might have been effected by a moderate instalment

of reform." ... ..

"Grant was not in any sense a Bureaucrat, or what in Anglo-

Indian phraseology is denominated a "*Bahadur*." He did not hastily

bestow his confidence, and he was not lavish of praise in his dealings

with his subordinates, but no man in such a position was more

ready to acknowledge good service and devotion to the State, and,

his mode of conducting business once understood, no unpleasantness

could arise. But it must be admitted that he was not much given

to private correspondence, though he was fortunate in the attachment

of many friends, and in the devotion of his school of followers.

Of demi-official letters there is abundance. Letters to friends and

relations are comparatively few. Writing to an old Indian subordinate from Jamaica, in 1874, he gravely tells him—

“Understand my principles; they are that everybody whom I wish to hear from is bound to write to me, but I am not bound to write to anybody.”

On the eve of his departure, the leading native journal, the *Hindu Patriot*, wrote eulogistically of Sir J. P. Grant's Lieutenant-Governorship. “The service which he has rendered to the country by his past indigo measures will be never forgotten. He has awakened in the *raiya*s a community of feeling for a community of suffering, a spirit of independence and an appreciation of their position and rights, which will not fail to bear their fruits. He has set the stone rolling which nothing can now hinder. For this one work of his reign his memory will ever live in the hearts of millions. ... Though indigo was the all-engrossing subject of his reign, he was not less busily occupied with those judicial and police reforms which were indispensable to a proper solution of the indigo question. He has brought justice near the home of every poor man. To the higher officers in the Uncovenanted Judicial Service he gave good encouragement, while he endeavoured to ameliorate the condition of the much abused *amlas*. In the construction of roads and communications, he displayed the skill and wisdom of at once an efficient engineer and a competent financier. He pleaded ably and earnestly for financial justice to Bengal, and to him we believe Bengal is indebted for its narrow escape from the Tobacco tax. Though during the period of his Government the state of the public funds did not admit of large expenditure in the department of education, yet the community may remember that they are indebted to him for the preservation of the Sanskrit and *Madrasa* Colleges.

“Two qualities pre-eminently distinguished Sir John Peter Grant, viz. uncompromising conscientiousness, and unflinching courage. He was often theoretical, because he had seen little of the country, but his instincts in the main led him right. He was not happy in the selection of his agents, but that was more the fault of the theorist than of the administrator. He broke down latterly in his indigo measures, but that was owing to the opposition of the Supreme Government. But take him all in all, it will not be easy to find his

A native journal  
on Sir J. P.  
Grant's retire-  
ment.

match in the Bengal Civil Service. Such is the man whom the community propose to honour at the time of his departure."

At a public meeting of the inhabitants of Calcutta and the Suburbs held by the British Indian Association in honour of Sir J. P. Grant on the 16th April 1862, a Resolution was carried unanimously, acknowledging his eminent services during his administration of Bengal. The address which was presented may be quoted as summarizing the views of the native community.

"A momentous social revolution in the history of Bengal has been effected under the auspices of your rule, establishing the liberty of the subject beyond question to the full exercise of his rights of labour or property. In the prosecution of your just and enlightened policy on this vitally important question, Your Honor naturally met with much personal opposition, misrepresentation and obloquy, but the calm courage and the lofty sense of duty and justice with which you nobly pursued your object, not only materially advanced the righteous cause in which you were embarked, but greatly enhanced the public respect for your administration.

Amidst the cares and anxieties of watching and directing this important social revolution, you were not unmindful of other pressing administrative reforms and improvements. By multiplying magisterial sub-divisions in some of the leading districts of the country, you have struck with awe the oppressive and the evil-disposed, and lent the weak and helpless an effective shield of protection. By the enforcement of strict discipline, you have impressed the subordinate authorities with a just sense of their duty, and carried out the objects of many hitherto neglected Acts of the Legislature. By a wise, thoughtful and ingenious distribution of the Local Public Works funds, you have given the country an earnest of improvement in the multiplication of roads and communications—as important to the cause of commerce and intercommunication as beneficial to the people. By earnest intercessions with the Supreme Government, you have opened a prospect of financial justice to Bengal hitherto unknown. By a liberal construction of the policy of the Government of India, regarding the sale of waste lands and the redemption of the land-tax, you have recommended arrangements which, if adopted, will secure important advantages to capitalists. By these and other similar measures, you have diffused over the country elements of progress and prosperity which, it is hoped, under the fostering care of your successors, will not fail to produce the desired fruits.

Opinions may differ regarding particular acts of Your Honor's Government, but we unhesitatingly declare that your general administra-

tion has won the respect and the lasting gratitude of the people of this country. Nor have your claims to the approbation and support of Her Majesty's Government been the less fully recognised. More than once was that approbation expressed in the Imperial Parliament by Her Majesty's Indian Minister, and, just at the termination of your administration, we have had a solid proof of the estimation in which your services are held by Her Gracious Majesty in the bestowal on you of the high honours of the Bath.

We deeply regret, Hon'ble Sir, that ill health has compelled you to close prematurely your administration of Bengal."

While these were the sentiments of the native community it is not surprising that Sir J. P. Grant should have been unpopular among the planters and the non-official community. He had been compelled by circumstances to express himself as opposed to their interests. It was written of him that his lot was cast in the thorny times of the Bengal indigo troubles, and that, because he could not and would not struggle against what he saw to be inevitable, he passed the latter part of his Governorship under a ceaseless chorus of reproach and execration. The gravity of the crisis in 1860 may be judged by the remark attributed to Lord Canning, "that it caused him more anxiety than he had felt since the fall of Delhi." Much of the best work done by Sir J. P. Grant had been performed by him as Member of Council. It was in that capacity that he introduced and carried the Hindu Widows' remarriage Bill, one of his best titles to fame, and other important legislative measures. But these were overlooked or ignored when the controversy arose about the cultivation of indigo.

Sir, J. P. Grant's name was much considered in connection with the vacancy in the Governorship of Bombay caused by Sir G. Clerk's retirement in 1862, and it was understood in some quarters that he was to be appointed: but the choice eventually fell upon Sir Bartle Frere, of the Bombay Civil Service, then a Member of the Governor-General's Council.

Soon after Sir J. P. Grant's retirement, the Chief Justice of the (new) High Court, Sir Barnes Peacock, delivered Libel case. judgment in the libel case, John MacArthur v. Sir J. P. Grant. MacArthur had been tried and acquitted in the Supreme Court on a charge of being accessory to a murder committed in the factory in his charge. Papers relating to the

case were published by the Government of Bengal in a certain volume of "Selections No. III." Sir B. Peacock found that the defendant had published defamatory matter against Mr. MacArthur without any legal ground or cause, that there was an absence of "malice in fact" on the part of the defendant, and that no damage was proved to have been sustained by the plaintiff: he was therefore awarded nominal damages of one rupee without costs.

Jamaica.

After resigning the Bengal Civil Service in 1862, Sir J. P. Grant was Governor of Jamaica from 1866 to 1874. A few words may be added concerning the work done by him there. He found the Colony in a most unprosperous condition, the result of years of mismanagement and of the recent outbreak among the negroes and its consequences. For many years the finances had shown an excess of expenditure over revenue, that of the year preceding his arrival there amounting to £ 80,656. In 2 years he was able to show a surplus of £ 5,599, and he was never without an annual surplus during the whole period of his government. This was not the result of increased taxation, but of improved administration, and was concurrent with a largely increased expenditure on public objects of every kind. The experience gained in Bengal was well utilized. A new Revenue system was established, a new Police organised, the Judicial establishment was re-constituted, District Courts were introduced; a Government Savings Bank was opened; elementary Education, the postal system, the supervision of roads, were all re-organised; a Medical Department was created; a Public Works Department was constituted, the Public Buildings repaired, and hospitals, police stations, and other necessary public buildings were constructed. Perhaps no more speedy improvement ever resulted in any community from the application of sound political and fiscal principles, than was the case in Jamaica under the administration of Sir John Peter Grant.

He died on the 6th January 1893 at the age of 85.

He married, in 1835, Henrietta, daughter of Trevor Chichele Plowden, B.C.S., and left 5 sons and 3 daughters. Two of the sons, John Peter and Trevor John Chichele were in the Bengal branch of the Civil Service; another son, George, belonged to the Bombay Civil Service. Of the daughters one married Sir James Colville, the Chief Justice, and another married General Sir Richard Strachey, R.E., G.C.S.I.

## APPENDIX. \*

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### MINUTE BY THE LIEUTENANT-GOVERNOR OF BENGAL ON THE REPORT OF THE INDIGO COMMISSION.

The records of Government show that the system of indigo manufacture in the Province of Bengal proper has been unsound from a very early time. Whilst in all other trades all parties concerned have been bound together by the usual commercial ties of mutual interest, in this one trade, in this one province, the indigo manufacture has always been a remarkable exception to this natural and healthy state of things. It would be doing injustice, both to the present race of planters and to the administration of later years, not to admit, at the outset of any discussion of the case between the indigo manufacturer and the producer of the raw plant, who are now at issue, that there has been in later years a gradual, but what is now a marked and great diminution of the gravest and most striking cases of abuse and oppression, as well as of the most serious sorts of affray, connected with this business. But, substantially, the system at the beginning of the present year was as false as ever it had been.

2. In the year 1810, the licenses granted to 4 planters to reside in the interior of the country were withdrawn, on account of the severe ill-usage of the natives proved against them; and the Governor-General-in-Council found it necessary to issue a Circular in that year, of date the 13th. of July, from which the following is an extract :—

“The attention of Government has recently been attracted in a particular manner, to abuses and oppressions committed by Europeans, who are established as indigo planters in different parts of the country. Numerous as those abuses and oppressions have latterly been, the Right Hon’ble the Governor-General-in-Council is still willing to hope that this imputation does not attach to the character of the indigo planters generally, considered as a body or class of people. The facts, however, which have recently been established against some individuals of that class before the Magistrates and the Supreme Court of Judicature are of so flagrant a nature, that the Governor-General-in-Council considers it an act of indispensable public duty to adopt such measures as appear to him, under existing circumstances, best calculated to prevent the repeti-

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\* See page 191.

tion of offences equally injurious to the English character and to the peace and happiness of our native subjects.

The offences to which the following remarks refer, and which have been established beyond all doubt or dispute against individual indigo planters, may be reduced to the following heads :

1st.,—Acts of violence, which, although they amount not in the legal sense of the word to murder, have occasioned the death of natives.

2nd.,—The illegal detention of natives in confinement, especially in stocks, with a view to the recovery of balances alleged to be due from them or for other causes.

3rd.,—Assembling, in a tumultuary manner, the people attached to their respective factories, and others, and engaging in violent affrays with other indigo planters.

4th.,—Illicit infliction of punishment, by means of a rattan or otherwise, on the cultivators or other natives."

3. The Magistrates were directed by the same Circular to cause stocks kept by planters to be destroyed ; to report to Government cases of illegal corporal punishment, not sufficient to warrant a commitment to the Supreme Court ; and to impress on all Europeans who wished to continue to reside in the country the necessity of abstaining from ill-treatment of the people.

4. In a subsequent Circular, of the 22nd. of July 1810, Magistrates were directed to report all proved instances of planters who were convicted of "obliging the *raiya*t who reside in the vicinity of their respective factories to receive advances, and of adopting other illicit and improper means to compel them to cultivate indigo"; the Governor-General-in-Council observing that he had reason to believe that this was a "habit" of the planters.

5. In the following year, viz. on the 28th. of May 1811, the Government having received a proposal from the Magistrate of Jessore, to the effect that indigo factories should not be allowed to be established within 6 or 8 miles of each other, negatived the proposal for reasons expressed in the following terms :—

"The natural tendency of a such a restriction as that recommended by you would be to give a single individual an absolute monopoly of the produce of all the lands appropriated to the cultivation of indigo over a tract of country comprising many thousand *bighas* round his factory, and, consequently, to place the whole body of *raiya*t within that tract in a state of complete subjection to that individual with respect to the price of the commodity.

Under these circumstances, the *raiya*t would be precluded from deriving that benefit from the cultivation of this valuable article which is



the natural effect of a free competition, and which is equally essential to the amelioration of his own condition, and to the general agricultural prosperity of the country.

It is not stated in your letter whether it is proposed that the *zamin-dars*, and other holders of land, should be precluded from the privilege of establishing indigo works (as is now done by many of that class of people) within the stated distance on their own estates. If so, it would be a palpable infringement of their natural rights: if not, the object proposed by you to be effected, of preventing disputes, would be very imperfectly effected."

6.\* These proceedings of half-a-century ago, when considered in connection with late events, will be seen to be of great interest now, and to have a strong practical bearing on the present position of affairs.

Similar abuses  
still exist.

7. I have said that grave crimes connected with indigo have much decreased in frequency; but it cannot be said that the character of the abuses to which the system of Bengal indigo manufacture is subject is essentially altered now from what it was 50 years ago; seeing that the published records of Government show examples that have occurred within the last 18 months of each one of the 4 heads under which the offences connected with indigo, as prevalent in 1810, are classified in the above-cited Résolution. Of the first head, that fatal case of Seetul Tarafdar is a very melancholy example. Of the 2nd head, the case of the men whom Mr. Bainbridge, the Acting Joint Magistrate of Backergunge, released from the godowns of a planter, is but one of many instances. Of the third head, the fatal attack on the village of Mullickpur, wherein one man was killed and 3 men were wounded, reported by the Commissioner of Nadia, (except that the attack was not made upon a rival factory) is a strong instance; the more remarkable as occurring long after the rupture between planter and *raiyyat* had attracted public attention to the indigo question, and when all police authorities were on the alert to repress disorder. Of the fourth head, the case which was made matter of complaint against the Magistrate, for sentencing a factory servant to imprisonment for one month, for dragging a man to the factory and flogging him severely, because he would not plough for the planter, will serve as an example. How frequently the peace of the country is still broken by offences connected with indigo, committed by one party or the other, will be seen from the long list of 54 such cases that occurred within the last 5 years in the single district of Nadia, and from the latter part of the list of serious cases given in by the Honorable Mr. Eden, both of which will be found in the Appendix of the Report. The sole cause of all such offences is the

system under which indigo plant is required by the manufacturer, without paying nearly the cost of its production to the *raiyat*. The evidence taken by the Indigo Commission fully proves that the "habit" denounced on the 22nd of July 1810 was still the habit of 1859. And it is perhaps still more remarkable and significant, that the very state of things which Lord Minto's Government, as shown by the orders of May 1811 above quoted, was anxious to avoid, namely the universal establishment of local monopolies of manufacture, has actually come to pass, though not by the action of Government.

8. Commencing from a time about 15 years ago, and especially since the establishment of the Indigo Planters' Association, the planters, having portioned out the country amongst them, now honourably abstain from interfering with the portions of their neighbours. The result has been advantageous to themselves, and it has removed one fertile source of affrays. But, though it has saved Magistrates much trouble, and has been good for the general peace of the country, the result has been anything but good for the *raiyat* as a grower of indigo plant. When he stood in the midst of rival manufacturers, many of them at feud with each other, he had some refuge from oppression or vexation under any one; and there was some check upon planters in their relation with *raiya*s, which has now ceased to exist. It is only this system of local indigo seignories that made it possible for the planters to commit the fatal error of insisting upon indigo plant at the old price, in the last few years, when the prices of agricultural produce have doubled, or nearly doubled.

9. Another change of a somewhat similar nature has had the same tendency. Of late years indigo planters have very generally acquired *samindaris*, *taluks*, and farming leases, giving them permanently or temporarily a superiority in the lands around their factories. In a general view, this is quite as it should be. If the law had been strong enough to enforce a sound and fair system of trade and manufacture, this change would have been a benefit. These tenures do not affect the rights of the *raiyat* in his *raiya*ti land, over which he has the dominion as long as he pays to the superior his legal *jama*, or rent. But under the unsound and unfair system of trade and manufacture which the weakness of the law permitted, the change told hardly upon the indigo *raiyat*. When the *raiyat* has a *samindar*, who is not an indigo manufacturer, he has some protector in indigo matters. When the same man is indigo manufacturer and *samindar*, or *samindar's* representative, the *raiyat* has no such protection.

And planters have  
acquired landed  
tenures.

10. These two silent but important changes must not be overlooked, when we come to discuss the causes of the late sudden casting off, by the *raiya*t, of a yoke which galled him 2 generations ago.

Importance of these changes.

11. At the same time, that is to say in 1811, the same Government of Lord Minto declared that it could not "discern the smallest necessity for converting the remedy already opened to the indigo manufacturer, of a suit in the Civil Court, into a criminal prosecution": and further on, in the same letter, the Government said: "Even at present complaints are but too frequently preferred against indigo manufacturers for the violence of their conduct towards the native. Cases of that nature have regularly received every attention from Government. In some instances criminal prosecutions have been instituted against the offenders; in others, they have been deprived of their licenses for residing in the interior of the country. But still the Vice-President in Council apprehends that the evil, however much it may have been checked by those means, is at the present moment only partially eradicated."

A special law in favour of planters refused in 1811.

12. Thus we see that 50 years ago, as now, there was a demand by the indigo manufacturer for a special law in his own favour, to punish criminally a breach of contract by one party, and only by one party, in a commercial bargain, and that then, as now, the demand was pronounced to be one which it is impossible in justice or policy to grant.

13. In this way matters went on till the year 1830, complaints of oppression being made by one party, and complaints of unfaithfulness and fraud by the other. In that year, a law (Regulation V) was passed which made *raiya*ts who broke indigo contracts liable to prosecution and penal consequences, in the Magistrate's Court, as for a misdemeanour.

A special law in favour of planters passed in 1830.

14. The papers connected with this piece of legislation are interesting and instructive. In no way do they support such a law as was passed. What they really showed to be necessary, as was ably demonstrated by Mr. Ross, then a Judge of the *Sadar* Court, and then, as always, a man of large mind, remarkably free from all prejudice, and one of the earliest promoters of the policy of throwing India widely open to English enterprise and capital, were primarily, the provision of a sufficiency of local Civil Courts, by multiplying and reforming the Munsifs' Court; and secondarily, a procedure somewhat in the nature of a decree for specific performance, to meet cases of poor *raiya*ts contracting for but not sowing indigo, and permission to Europeans to hold land in their own names. It is to be observed that the first of these reforms was

What improvements the inquiries in 1830 really showed to be necessary.

very soon afterwards carried into execution by Lord William Bentinck's Government ; and the Munsifs Courts are now numerous and are daily becoming more efficient. A few years afterwards the third measure proposed by Mr. Ross was carried into effect : and now, under the admirable new Code of Civil Procedure, specific performance can be decreed in all suitable cases, whilst Civil suits are decided with all practical despatch.

15. The law treating one and one only of the 2 parties to a civil contract as a criminal if he failed to fulfil it was held <sup>Special law re-</sup> by the Home Government to be manifestly unjust and <sup>pealed in 1835.</sup> oppressive and contrary to all sound principles of legislation, and it was ordered to be rescinded. After inquiries into the working of the law, and considerable discussion, it was repealed in 1835 by Act XVI of that year.

16. A reference to papers which will be found in the Appendix of the Commission's Report, namely, the Minutes of the late Lord Macaulay and of Mr. Macleod, of the Indian Law Commission ; the petition of the Merchants of Calcutta of 16th July 1835 : and the searching and elaborate despatch of the Court of Directors dated the 10th April 1832—all connected with these proceedings—will show that exactly the same complaints were made then as now, by one party and by the other, respectively. The merchants of Calcutta complained of want of protection, of fraudulent evasion on the *raiyat's* part, and of the interference of *zamindars*. On the other hand, the absence of all fair and healthy competition, and the forced cultivation from which the *raiya*t's could not free themselves, were represented. The same admissions as now were made *on both sides* of the fraud and oppressions of the factory servants, and there was talk of a Commission. The questions of the registration of indigo contracts and of special measures for the protection of the *raiya*t were discussed, and both proposals were rejected in accordance with Lord Macaulay's opinion. But the authorities unanimously refused to continue a special and exceptional law in favor of the stronger of the 2 parties and unanimously determined to leave indigo transactions, like all other commercial dealings, to the settlement of the constituted Civil Courts.

17. The Commission talked of more than a quarter of a century ago has now sat. It has laid bare the radical unsoundness of the system ; and has shewn incontestably that the break-up of such a system was a mere question of time, which might have occurred at any moment, from the slightest of causes.

18. It is to be regretted that one executive reform was not undertaken in 1835, which would of itself, I believe, have purified the system in a very short time, I mean the practical introduction of law, order, and legal protection, in ordinary cases into the Bengal districts ; by stationing officers with magisterial powers in sufficient numbers over the great tracts of country which Bengal districts comprise, so as to make justice and the protection of the law really accessible to the mass of the people. When in such districts as Nadia and Jessore, each of which is taken as having nearly a million of inhabitants, there was only one Magistrate's Court in each, from which many parts of the district were 60 or 70 miles off, as was the case in 1835, and for many years afterwards, it is not difficult to see why the weak had little chance against the strong. This fatal defect is now supplied, the necessary reform having been going on rapidly of late years. In the Nadia Division, which contains the 2 chief indigo districts in Lower Bengal, there were before 1843 only 4 Magisterial Courts. On the 30th of April 1859, there were 13 and now there are 19. Under a thorough re-arrangement of sub-divisions in the Nadia Division, which I have just completed, there will be 21 mostly at distances of 25 miles from each other. This is a third point to be taken into consideration, together with those mentioned in paragraph 10, when considering why a system of coercion, which has lasted so long, has only now at last broken down.

19. I have said that there has been of late years a great and marked decrease of the gravest and most striking classes of cases of oppression and open violence. It will be asked, how then has it happened that the general renouncement of indigo *raiya*ti cultivation, which has just occurred in the principal indigo districts of Bengal proper, has only now occurred, when things in this respect are better than they were? I believe the answer is found in a combination of various circumstances. The improvement of the police which has checked affrays has, I believe, driven those to whom some means or other of forcing a cultivation unprofitable to the cultivators was a matter of necessity to other methods of induce ment more harassing, on the whole, than an occasional terrible example. The stoppage of all competition amongst planters for *raiya*ts must, of late years, very greatly have increased the weight bearing down the individual *raiya*t ; and the withdrawal from him of such protection as he before obtained from *zamindars* not being indigo planters must have had a like effect. There have been less friction, fewer stoppages and less noise of late years, and the pressure of the machine must have been more effective in consequence.

The scanty provision of Magisterial Courts the great defect in 1835, which is now supplied.

Why the *raiya*ts have only now renounced indigo.

There is reason also to infer from the evidence that the demand, in some places at least, has been more severe of late upon the *raiya*t in the quantity of indigo cultivation required of him, and in the labour required in weeding and tending the crop, than was formerly the case. But the great aggravation of all is due to the late rise of prices. It is in evidence that all agricultural produce has risen in value, within the last 3 years or so, to double or very nearly double its former price, and that day labour and the cost of the maintenance of cattle have increased in price in the same way. As the single root of all that was at any time wrong in the Bengal indigo system is in the one fact that the manufacture did not pay the full cost of the plant ; and as there has been no increase in the price paid for this one crop since the above-mentioned extraordinary rise of prices generally ; here alone is a cause which must have doubled all the evil of the cultivation to the *raiya*t. The direct money loss was doubled ; and, as that was the cause of all the other evils, it seems reasonable to assume that they also were increased in the same ratio. No planter pressed upon *raiya*ts without an object ; and his only possible object was to obtain indigo plant which would not be spontaneously grown for him at the price he gave. We may be sure that the pressure which is enough to induce a *raiya*t to sacrifice Rs. 10 must be materially increased to induce him quietly to sacrifice 20.

20. It is indeed in itself an all-sufficient exposition of the character of the Bengal indigo system to state, what is denied by none, that, whilst within a few years the prices of all agricultural produce have doubled or nearly doubled, the price paid or nominally paid for indigo plant has not been raised by a single anna ; and that until the *raiya*ts had, as it were, declared open war, it is not shown that a single planter, for several years past, had ever entertained thought of any increase of price.

21. Whilst the pressure had in this manner become intolerable, the improved administration which, by an increase of sub-divisions, gave the *raiya*ts access to Magisterial Courts, showed them that practically the protection of the law was no longer hopeless ; and they came to realize the fact that in the matter of contracting to grow indigo, they were, in truth, free agents. The case of the Jessore planter, to be found in the indigo records lately published, is instructive enough on this point. The planter in question had strenuously objected to the head-quarters of one of the new sub-divisions being placed near a factory of his, where he said he had a *raiya*ti cultivation of 2000 *bighas*, on the ground, amongst others, of the proneness of natives to litigation "with the means at their doors". Whilst the question of fixing the head-quarters remained in abeyance, the Joint-Magistrate, on going to pay an acci-

dental and private visit to the factory, was appealed to on his way by a villager who alleged that certain persons were confined there. On instant search being made by the Joint-Magistrate, several men (3 at least, for so many prosecuted successfully) were found in confinement in a godown, having been so confined, it would appear, there or in other places about 2 months; and the planter being prosecuted was fined for the offence, whilst 5 of his *amla* were sentenced to both fine and imprisonment for it.

22. The indigo Commission, as has been said, report that the crisis which occurred in 1860 might have occurred in any other year. The combined effect of all the foregoing considerations upon my mind is, that no human power exerted in defiance of the law, in support of the system, could have upheld it much longer; and that, if the Government had disregarded justice and policy so far as to make the attempt, it would have been speedily punished by a great agrarian rising, the destructive effects of which upon European and all other capital no man can calculate.

23. Having made the above remarks, conveying my formed conclusions on the general subject, I proceed, as concisely as I can, to follow the points taken up by the Commission in this able Report.

24. The Commissioners draw an important distinction between the *niz-jot* cultivation, which is conducted by the indigo planter at his own expense, on his own land, and the *raiya* cultivation, which is conducted by the *raiya* at his own expense, on his own land. It is only the latter sort of cultivation that is a subject of complaint. Whether the former is or is not profitable and prudent is no affair of any one but the planter. It is admitted to be unprofitable to the planter in comparison with *raiya* cultivation, and it has consequently diminished in extent. The great Bengal Indigo Company make it their object, therefore, to decrease their *niz* and to increase their *raiya* cultivation; a result which is sufficiently significant in itself, in regard to the question of the profitableness of indigo cultivation on present terms to the *raiya*. There is another, and a cross classification of indigo cultivation which it is necessary to make, namely that conducted on high lands, and that on *char* lands, or new alluvial formations annually inundated. The mass of *niz* cultivation is, I believe, conducted upon

The crisis could not have been prevented.

The points taken up in the Report.

Distinction between *niz* and *raiya* cultivation.

and between cultivation on high lands and on *char*s.

\* Where a planter owns or forms a *char* and cultivates it by means of *raiyats* who have no rights of occupancy and who agree to grow so much indigo as a part of their bargain the cultivation is to all intents and purposes equivalent to *niz*.

*char* land, more especially in the eastern districts; and it is unquestioned that on *char* land indigo is subject to comparatively small

competition with other crops, and sometimes to none. This may account for the absence of complaints from the eastern districts. The evidence, when carefully analysed, shows that it is a doubtful question whether indigo, at the present prices of the dye and of agricultural produce generally, can be grown on fair terms, without loss, on the fine high lands of western Bengal; the richer the soil, the less being the comparative return from indigo. But the evidence does not raise this question in regard to *char* land. In fact, then, the subject of the present inquiry may be restricted, for most practical purposes, to *raiyyati* cultivation on high lands.

25. The Commission assign reasons, in their Report, why it would not be a practical recommendation to *Niz* and *char* cultivation injured unfairly by enforced *raiyyati* cultivation, suggest to planters generally that they should abandon *raiyyati* cultivation, which is the subject of so much complaint, and resort exclusively to *niz* cultivation, which no one can complain of. It appears to me hardly to be doubted that a *raiyyat* could cultivate indigo as cheaply as a European planter. And if in any soil indigo plant cannot be remuneratively grown by a *raiyyat*, at the highest price which the manufacturer can afford to give, we may be sure that a European planter would waste his money in attempting himself to grow the plant in similar soil. But I hold it to be certain that *niz* cultivation, as well as *char* cultivation, is unfairly discouraged by enforced *raiyyati* cultivation. As far as the manufacturer, all things considered, really profits by getting his plant for less than it costs, so far the manufacturer, who is also *really* an indigo planter, that is to say, a man who grows his own plant, is unjustly injured. It would be free trade, as between the real planter and the *raiyyat*, if the latter grew the plant for his own sake as he grows every thing else. But the real planter who grows and manufactures his own plant is, in fact, injured by the manufacturer who undersells him, because he gets his plant at a less price than any free cultivator in his senses would grow it for. In this view the Indian *raiyyat* is very far from being the only person injured by the false system in force.

26. The first head discussed in the Report is the position of the indigo planter, so far as the tenure of land is concerned, and his relations with the native *samindars*. The Commissioners show conclusively that in this respect there is nothing to complain of, or to amend. A European is as free to acquire any tenure as any other person is, if he has the money to pay for it, and can find a holder willing to sell. Practically, though native *samindars* will never, till constrained by the prospect of absolute ruin, sell their tenures, there is no difficulty in purchasing from them under-tenures.

First head: tenure of land, and relations with *samindars*.



which are as effectual, and can be made, under an Act (XI of 1859) I had myself the pleasure of introducing, as secure as the chief tenure. The *zamindari* tenure and all derivative and subordinate tenures confer the right to rents, variable or invariable ; subject to the payment therefrom of the Government revenue ; and they are valued because of their money profits, and the influence over the *raiya*s which they give ; but they do not generally convey the dominion of the land, which resides for the most part in the *raiya*t having the right of occupancy, whose tenure is anterior to, and independent of, that of the *zamindar*. As far as the *zamindari* tenure goes, it is shown that planters have, in practice, every reasonable and natural facility for obtaining, permanently or temporarily, all the rights which that tenure gives ; and that native *zamindars*, generally, have no hostility to them as a class.

27. On this point, however, I must observe that some great *zamindars* will not part with the management of their own *zamindari* ; and it is known that some object to the extension of the existing system of indigo planting in their *zamindari*, not on their own account, but on account of their *raiya*s. The enforcement of a healthy system of indigo planting, beneficial to grower as well as to manufacturer, would remove this objection.

28. It has never been doubted that a planter or any one else can purchase what *raiya*ti tenures he can pay the price for, if he pleases. But the cost would be excessive, by reason of the value of the property ; and, when planters do all they can to get rid of *niz* cultivation, they are not likely, save in exceptional cases, to spend much money in paying large prices for *raiya*s' *jots*.

29. One practice is mentioned, which is known to be not uncommon, and which, I think, deserves more reprehension than it has received ; I refer to the practice of a *zamindar* giving a lease of his *zamindari* right to a planter, at a rent which not only leaves no margin for expenses and risks of collection, but which is largely in excess of the gross rental lawfully demandable from the *raiya*s. In such cases the only possible reason for agreeing to pay the excess is the expectation that, by the misuse of the *zamindari* right, the holder may be able to extract in some way, directly or indirectly, more from the *raiya*t than is legally demandable. When a native *zamindar* does this directly in the form of money, he is said to impose an illegal cess, and he is liable to a penalty of 3 times the amount imposed, for the entire period of such impositions, under the provisions of Section 65, Regulation VIII of 1793. I cannot see that the extraction of the same value, in the form of indigo plant, is, in any legal or moral view, different from an illegal cess of money. Such a mode of levying

Practice of taking  
under-tenures at  
excessive rents.

an illegal cess, being more indeterminate, is obviously liable to greater abuse in practice than a direct money cess. The planters complain of this practice ; and it is certainly very wrong in the *zamindar* to sell, as it were, not only his own rights but those of his *raiya*s. But I cannot think that it is right in the planter to become a party to the act. This practice is one of the smaller traits of the system that go far to explain the whole system. If the planter spent the excess rent upon the *raiya*s, instead of upon the *zamindar*, the amount would enable him to obtain willing cultivators for some part of his required plant.

30. There seems no other objectionable point in the ordinary relations between planter and *zamindar*, or in the system under which tenures are obtainable by planters.

31. The Commissioners next proceed to discuss the relations between the planter and the *raiya* ; and under this head may be classed the following questions :—the profitableness or unprofitableness of the crop to the *raiya* ; the willingness or unwillingness of the *raiya* to grow it ; and the means taken to induce the *raiya* to grow it, which includes the question of the oppressions which the *raiya* complains of.

Second head: relations between planter and *raiya*.

32. The Commissioners pronounce conclusively that the cultivation is unprofitable to the *raiya*, supporting the conclusion by the consentaneous evidence of the planters themselves. This is indeed the one point upon which the whole indigo question turns ; and it is not disputed. I do not find that the Commissioners have gone so far into this point as to settle to what degree, pecuniarily, the cultivation is unprofitable, though that it is so to a very extreme degree is sufficiently apparent from the strength of the feeling against it, amongst those who would profit by it if it were profitable, and who ought to profit by it, and must profit by it, if it is to be carried on at all. There is however a great mass of most valuable evidence upon this point in the Appendix of the Report. I have gone into it to satisfy my own mind upon this point, and the result has convinced me that the loss of the *raiya* in the cultivation of this crop on the high lands of Nadia and Jessore is, at the present time of agricultural high prices, greatly beyond even the general opinion on the subject. In a separate note appended to this Minute, I have referred to the evidence proving this. Rejecting all extreme cases, and giving indigo the benefit of all doubts, I cannot put the absolute loss to the *raiya* at a low average, reckoning the net loss on the cultivation of indigo at the highest price now allowed, and the loss of the net profit the *raiya* would make by any other ordinary crop at the market price, at less than Rs. 7 a *bigha*, equivalent at the least to 7 times the rent of the land.

Indigo cultivation unprofitable to the *raiya*.

33. Now, if one remembers that these *raiya*ts are not Carolina slaves, but the free yeomanry of this country, and indeed, strictly speaking, the virtual owners of the greater part of the land in the old cultivated parts of Bengal, so heavy a loss as this will fully account to us for the strength of the opposition to indigo cultivation which we have just experienced. One-sixteenth of his whole land is a common proportion which, it is insisted, an indigo *raiya*t shall sow in indigo. This is as though a farmer in Great Britain, farming under a long lease 160 acres of land, at a rent of 2 pounds an acre, were, by some sort of pressure, forced to cultivate 10 acres, say in flax, which he was compelled to sell to a certain neighbouring manufacturer at a dead loss of £140 a year. This is precisely a parallel case, in the legal and economical view. In the social and political view, the case of a new English landlord, forcing a corresponding loss upon several thousand Irish cotters, would perhaps be a fairer illustration.

34. On the planter's side some reliance has been placed on certain incidental advantages claimed for an indigo *raiya*t. So far as such alleged incidental advantages are of a tangible character, they have faded away before the search of the Commission. But there is really little use in discussing such a point. There is but one judge of the relative value of the advantages of the cultivation, direct and incidental, and that is the *raiya*t. And he has delivered his judgment on the point in an unmistakeable manner.

35. The most tangible of the incidental advantages sometimes put forward is an alleged benefit in the form of a low rent. But not a single instance is advanced in which rents have been reduced by an indigo planter on obtaining a lease or *taluk*. The extent of the claim goes no further than the assertion that indigo planters refrain from raising the rents. But as to this, also, few instances are advanced in which a neighbouring *zamindar* has raised his rents, whilst those of indigo *raiya*ts were not raised. In the concerns of Mr. Hills in Nadia the rents, I understand, have not been raised to the *pargana* standard. On the whole, I think it very probable that there may be some reality, in certain cases, in this alleged incidental advantage; and it is to me a subject of consolation to think that a moderate, proper, and lawful increase of rents, may be a compensation to some planters who hold tenures of land, and may be constrained to abandon the indigo manufacture. But it is to be remembered that the rents of a very large class of *raiya*ts cannot be raised at all; that no rents can be raised, except under due form and process of law; and that rents cannot be raised arbitrarily, or beyond certain determinable rates, when

raised at all ; whilst no reasonable increase of rent upon 16 *bighas* would be *to the raiyat* equivalent to a loss of Rs. 7 upon one *bigha*.

36. To the indigo planter holding a tenure, indeed, the case will be different. The evidence goes to show that the market value of the indigo dye made from the average produce of a *bigha* of land does not, at most, exceed Rs. 10. The net profit of the manufacturer, under any system of payment for the raw plant, must of course be very much less. It may well be that *to him*, therefore, a moderate, proper and lawful increase of rent upon 16 or 20 *bighas* of land, will be a compensation for all the profit possible from the indigo of one *bigha* ; and, if this should be the case, all parties would have great cause to rejoice.

37. On the actual question of fact as to the dislike of *raiya*ts to indigo cultivation on the old system, the Report of this Commission is conclusive as to the intensity of the feeling. Indeed the Report, which in the mildness of its tone is admirable, can give but a faint impression of the intensity of the feeling on the *raiya*ts' part, compared to that which a reader will derive from a perusal of the appended evidence of the *raiya*ts themselves, and of the Missionaries who, living in unconstrained private intercourse with the *raiya*ts around them, know the feelings of the whole class of *raiya*ts better than any other Europeans do.

38. This is the great point of political bearing in the whole question, and it cannot be too attentively considered by all who have any responsibility for the tranquillity of the country, and the strength of the British Government within it. If any one thinks that such a demonstration of strong feeling, by hundreds of thousands of people as we have just witnessed in Bengal, has no meaning of greater importance than an ordinary commercial question concerning a particular blue dye, such a person, in my opinion, is fatally mistaken in the signs of the time.

39. The next point is the means taken to induce the *raiya*t to grow this crop, which has been proved to be very unprofitable, and intensely disliked. The fact is, that the larger part of the dislike is due to the means indispensable to make people do what is very unprofitable, and the smaller part only to the actual loss of money involved. Probably, most *raiya*ts would grow a small quantity of indigo for nothing to please their *samindars* ; and this is the system which native *samindars* who manufacture indigo, knowing their men, adopt. The European, more devoted to the trade, less fearful of ulterior consequences, and knowing his men less, has strained the band till it has broken.

40. The Commission show that the bait of advances is not now operative to bring new men into the factory books ; cases of fresh ad-

vances to new men being of very rare occurrence. Sons, succeeding to their fathers' property and debts, are said to conceive the impression that they are liable for their fathers' engagements, and so are persuaded to sow. The price allowed for an average crop of indigo not being, in the vast majority of cases, enough to clear the advances, and the heavy charges for seed, stamps, &c. the debt increases constantly. The average produce is stated by planters to be 8 or 9 or 10 bundles a *bigha*. The average price fixed is shewn to be between 5 and 6 bundles for the rupee; the highest anywhere given being 4 bundles. But when there is a balance against the *raiya*t, as there is in the vast majority of cases, a small part only of the 2 rupees is really advanced, that is to say, is paid in cash, the remainder being merely transferred in account. The charges are from 4 annas to 8 annas a *bigha* for seed; 2 to 4 or 4 or even 8 annas for stamps, and in many cases 4 to 7 or even to 13 annas a *bigha* for carting. Of 33,200 indigo *raiya*t's who cultivated for the Bengal Indigo Company's concerns in 1858-59, only 2,448 were shewn by Mr Larmour to have received any payment for plant delivered, beyond the trifle of cash advanced. Many written engagements contain a clause that any balance shall be paid, not in money, but in indigo, at the low rate fixed. These I gather are the lawful, or *quasi*-lawful, means of insisting on the *raiya*t's, or families of *raiya*t's, who have once touched an advance, continuing to cultivate. But against so strong a motive of self-interest as there is in the *raiya*t's mind for not cultivating indigo, lawful and *quasi*-lawful means of inducement were necessarily of little power. Consequently contracts seem to a great extent to have fallen into desuetude, luckily for the *raiya*t's, and other means in many cases have been exclusively relied upon. Babu Jai Chand Pal Chaudhri, a great *samindar*, who is or was also a great indigo planter (having had 32 concerns in his estate and shares in 9 other concerns,) is asked: "if the *raiya*t's have for the last 20 years been unwilling to sow indigo, how then have they gone on cultivating the plant up to the present time?" to this he answers: "by numerous acts of oppression and violence, by locking them up in godowns, burning their houses, beating them, &c." The whole of this gentleman's evidence is very instructive, as proceeding from a great *samindar* and practical native indigo planter. This, diluted into becoming official language, I find to be the conclusion of the Commission; and it is certainly the inevitable deduction from the whole body of evidence.

41. The question of the alleged oppression and unlawful violence practised upon *raiya*t's, in relation to indigo cultivation, though from its nature it has naturally attracted a greater degree of public attention than any other part of the whole subject, is but a branch of the last point

discussed, namely, the means taken to induce people to undertake the cultivation of what to them is a very unprofitable crop.

42. The Commission report that comparatively few cases of actual destruction of human life have been brought to their knowledge, as proved, of late years; that premeditated affrays with hired clubmen are rare in some districts, and in others unknown; that there is no proved instance of the burning of bazars and houses, though one planter, whose high character entitles him to great respect, "has known of such acts"; that the demolition of houses, either by the direct or indirect order of the planter, does, the Commission fear, occasionally occur; that the practice of imprisoning people in the factory or its out-offices is of common occurrence; that the seizure of cattle, though the cases are not so numerous, is also spoken of as a common occurrence; and that the Commissioners are afraid that in some instances date-gardens and plants are up-rooted to make room for indigo. Of outrages to women, the Commission most fully, and most justly, acquit all planters. It is much to be regretted that any charge so gross and so unfounded was ever made in any quarter; for it is neither true, nor has it any likelihood of truth in it.

43. The Commissioners lay most stress on the proved and undeniable prevalence of seizing cattle, and more especially of kidnapping. The last crime they reprobate in strong, but not too strong language. A country where both these offences are committed habitually, and for the most part with impunity, is a country in which the law affords the weak no protection. The fact is a disgrace to the Administration. It is not simple confinement in one go-down that is practised. Respectable men are seized, and sent about from one factory to another, to escape discovery; and, as in Seetul Tarafdar's case, they are not always ever heard of again. I trust that late measures will have had some appreciable effect in preventing the impunity of such offences, and very earnestly I hope that un-official Englishmen in India will take to heart the exhortation contained in the 105th. paragraph of the Commission's Report.

44. The Report treats more lightly than I should myself have been disposed to do the list of 49 heinous cases given in by Mr. Eden, as taken chiefly from the records of the Supreme and *Sadar* Courts. No one will have a complete idea of this part of the case, without perusing that very remarkable list which will be found in the Appendix. Although there is one case of 30 years ago, and 7 of more than 10 years standing, no less than 41 of the cases mentioned occurred within the last 10 years, and 15 of them within the last 5 years.

45. Of one of the causes of the most bitter complaints, namely, the

oppressions and extortions of the factory *amla* the Commissioners have taken the evidence of *raiya*s. In some instances they consider this evidence to be exaggerated, as to the number of rupees taken, or of trees cut down, in the cases specified. But they justly draw, from the evident exasperation of the *raiya*s, the conclusion that a strict enough hand has not been kept over the servants of all factories, and that in some instances their oppression has been considerable. The Commission has omitted to notice the case of the *gumashta* of the Ancoora factory in the Aurangabad sub-division, whose frightful oppressions were only the other day the cause of a very dangerous tumult. Probably the omission was due to the fact that the case had been already printed, and laid before the public.

46. On the whole, my conclusion on this point is, that setting aside individual cases! having no connection, or at least no necessary connection, with the indigo system, that system is fairly chargeable with a very notable portion of those classes of offences, the peculiar prevalence of which in Bengal has been from the first a blot in our Administration. In my opinion it is rather the system than the planters individually who are to be blamed. It is to the unprofitableness of the cultivation of indigo, at the extremely inadequate price given for it under the system, necessitating either a forced cultivation, or the abandonment of the manufacture from Bengal *raiya*ti plant, that this and every other evil connected with indigo is attributable. An individual manufacturer could not live upon a fair and free system, surrounded on all sides by competitors who get their raw produce without paying nearly its full value. That a whole class did not spontaneously reform itself from within is not surprising. The chief fault was in the defective, and, I fear I must say the not impartial, administration of the law, which allowed such a vicious state of things to exist, where our fellow countrymen were concerned; a state which very certainly would have been put down with a high hand if only native gentlemen had been concerned.

47. On minor points, the Commission find that, when the assistance  
 Minor points : of the police is required in disputes between *raiya*t and  
 police. planter, their venality must be to the present advantage of the richer party, whilst ordinarily the police have no concern with the bargains of planter and *raiya*t. They find too, from the admissions of the planters themselves, and from the whole tenor of the orders usually  
 No opposition to planters from Civil officers. passed in disputes about indigo, that the charge so often brought against the Civil officers of Government, of favoring native *samindars* and *raiya*s from dislike to their own countrymen and from a desire to keep them out of the country, falls completely to the ground; as I may say so preposterous a charge,

whenever examined by sensible men, could not but do. On the contrary they find that Magistrates have not always been sufficiently alive to the position of the *rai-yats* nor accorded to them a due share of protection and support. They say "It is not too much to say that, had all Magistrates held the scales in equal balance, a cultivation of the character which we have clearly shown indigo to be would not have gone on for such a length of time." I am obliged to support the finding of the

Missionaries have not caused the refusal to sow.

Commission on this point. The Commission entirely exonerate the Missionaries of the charge of having taken upon themselves the character of political agitators; they show that these excellent men, circumstanced as they were, would have been inexcusable had they turned a deaf ear to the well-founded complaints of the people in close and kindly intercourse with whom they were living, and some of whom belong to their own flocks; and the Commission find that the assertion that the refusal to sow indigo was owing to the preaching of the Missionaries is one which is "entirely without foundation of truth."

48. I must not pass this last point, without respectfully expressing

Conduct of the Missionaries.

my admiration of the conduct of the Missionary body, throughout these trying events.

49. The Commission conclude their findings by reporting that the

Conduct of the zamindars.

discontent of the *rai-yats* was not fostered by the *zamindars*; and that there is no foundation in the stories of emissaries from Calcutta going about the country encouraging

Why the system broke down.

*rai-yats* to abandon indigo. In short the Report concludes that the system broke down because it was hateful to those on whom it pressed.

50. I shall not attempt to follow the Commissioners in the excellent

Commissioners' recommendations to planters

recommendations they make to planters, for the recovery and future management of the indigo manufacture in these districts. I believe these recommenda-

tion to be for the common advantage of all concerned and I trust that the Committee of the Indigo Planters' Association will use their

extensive and just influence in causing their observance.

All depends on the price, which the parties must settle.

But I conceive the whole matter to rest so completely upon the one question of the price of the plant that I do not think it necessary to say more on the point. If

indigo plant is to be grown, it must be grown to the satisfaction and profit of both producer and purchaser. It is for the *rai-yat* and for no one else to judge what he will take for his crop; and it is for the purchaser, and for no one else, to judge what price he will bid for it. If the 2 cannot agree, it cannot be helped. The indigo manufacturer must



grow his own crop in that case, or the manufacture must be shifted to some other part of the country, where, for want of any more remunerative crop, indigo can be grown to the profit of all parties. On this point I beg to record my complete agreement with the opinion of Mr. A. Forbes, a witness on the planters' side of the question, who, when asked his opinion as to what terms should be offered in future by the planters' to the *rai-yats* answered: "I beg to record my opinion that this is a question which must be left to be settled by the planter and the *rai-yats* themselves. Any interference on the part of Government can only complicate the question, and should be confined to providing good Magistrates, good Judges, and good police, who shall see justice done to all, and leave no room for oppression on the one part, or fraud on the other.

51. I hope, however, for their own sake, that the planters will act in the spirit of the recommendations above alluded to:   
Concessions recommended. and particularly that they will adopt the recommendations of Mr. Temple and Mr. Fergusson in the separate Minute, extracted on the margin. I believe the remark there made upon cases in

"But we deem it right to declare our apprehension that, unless some important concessions are at once made by the planters to the *rai-yats* in several districts, nothing short of actual force could induce the *rai-yats* to sow. In such cases, if an attempt were made by the planters to perpetuate by compulsion the present system, the *rai-yats* would, in their present temper, meet force by force, and serious disturbances would result. Or if in virtue of previous contracts the *rai-yats* were even legally coerced to sow, still a contest would arise that must seriously damage the interests of the planters. In either case, we believe that judicious concession will be the best policy for the planter to adopt towards the *rai-yat*."

which, by virtue of still existing contracts, *rai-yats* may be legally coerced to sow on the old terms, to be one of the utmost practical importance. Coming from the experienced and intelligent man of business who so efficiently represented the general body of planters on the Committee, a gentleman in whose great ability and candour all parties have the fullest reliance, I strongly hope that the advice will be acted upon.

52. In the paragraph of their Report noted on the margin, the Commission speak of the economical importance of the Bengal indigo trade, and of the great political advantage of having a large body of European gentlemen scattered over the country. Certainly the Commission do not in the least degree overrate the importance of these things, and no one feels their great importance more strongly than I do.

General importance of the indigo trade.

53. As to the indigo trade of this Presidency, however, which is correctly valued at nearly £2,000,000 sterling a year, it must be borne in mind that it is not the whole, or the chief part of this trade, which the refusal of the *rai-yats* in the indigo districts of Western Bengal to continue the cultivation has placed in jeopardy.

The chief part of the trade is not now in jeopardy.

54. A valuable table in the Report shows the quantity of indigo made in each district of Bengal, Bihar and the North Western Provinces, for the last 10 years; the aggregate of which, exported from the Port of Calcutta, constitutes the staple of the Bengal Presidency. Taking the last of these years, 1858-59, as an example, the whole number of maunds made in the year, was 106,087, which were made in the following Provinces:—

Province.	Maunds.	Percentage of the whole crop.	
North West Provinces ...	21,643	20 $\frac{2}{5}$ ths.	
* Bihar ...	32,699	30 $\frac{4}{5}$ ths.	* Including
Bengal ...	40,763	38 $\frac{2}{5}$ ths.	Patna, Shaha-
Native, of all parts ...	10,982	10 $\frac{2}{5}$ ths.	bad, Monghyr
			& Bhagulpur, as
Total ...	1,06,087		well as Chapra
			and Tirhut.

Thus it appears that of the whole indigo trade, in maunds, very little more than 38 per cent is produced by the European planters in Bengal proper, where only any difficulty has arisen. But considerable reductions must be made from even this quantity, for all indigo produced from *chars*, and for all indigo produced by *niz* cultivation everywhere in Bengal. The only districts in which any difficulty whatever has been reported are here noted, with the production of each in maunds:—

	Maunds.
Rajshahi ...	3,512
Malda ...	2,777
Murshidabad ...	4,912
Nadia (Krishnagar) ...	8,023
Jessore ...	8,635
Faridpur ...	1,488
Total ...	29,347

After deducting for *niz* cultivation, and such *char* cultivation as the *raiya*ts are satisfied with, it will probably be an excessive calculation to say that 20,000 maunds are in jeopardy, owing to the inadequate price offered to *raiya*ts in Bengal. This is less than  $\frac{1}{5}$ th part of the whole indigo trade of the Bengal Presidency. Madras makes nearly double this quantity of indigo.\*

Note:—It appears that in 23 concerns in these districts the relative proportions of *niz* and *raiya*ti, as given in the Appendix No. 1 compiled from returns furnished by planters themselves are as follows:—

*Niz* 85,413 *bighas*; *raiya*ti 250,154. One quarter of the whole cultivation in these concerns is *niz*.

\*In 1859 — 2,531,726 lbs.

Adding 34,000 maunds for Madras to the Bengal aggregate above given, the whole indigo trade of India will be seen to be about 140,000 maunds. Of this whole only about 14 per cent in quantity is in any jeopardy, owing to the refusal which the Bengal *raiyats* have declared to continue this cultivation at existing rates. In value, a somewhat higher figure must be taken, because, though Tirhut indigo is improving yearly in quality, and already runs Bengal indigo close, and the same improvement is going on in Madras indigo, the Nadia and Jessore indigo is still the finest in India.

55. I have not gone into this calculation with any intention of under-rating the risk to which the indigo manufacturers of Nadia and Jessore, and a few neighbouring districts, are exposed. Those manufacturers deserve sympathy for themselves personally, as much as if indigo were made nowhere else in all India. But a large question is in hand, and, in treating that large question, we must be careful to take no narrow or partial view. I have still to discuss proposals for exceptional protective legislation and executive action, and, for the proper discussion of these, the national and comparative importance of that section of the trade for whose interests, exclusively, such exceptional protective measures are proposed, must neither be over-rated nor under-rated.

56. As to the local value of the manufacture to the districts in which it is conducted, a point much insisted upon by many, that must depend upon the return both to the producer of the raw material, and to the manufacturer, together. If both make a profit, then the trade must be locally valuable. If neither makes a profit, then it must be locally valueless, or wasteful. But if one party, as we find is the case, loses largely, the question of local value depends upon whether his loss is or is not fully compensated by the extraordinary and exceptional gain of the other party. Now I do not know that indigo manufacture is so extraordinarily and exceptionally gainful anywhere, as to compensate for a loss of 7 rupees upon every *bigha* of land producing the plant. I do not think it is. But I believe that, under a sound system, there is still an untouched fund of profit available in the stoppage of that incalculable drain of money spent unproductively, and much worse than unproductively upon leases at losing rents, upon troops of extortionate servants and overseers, upon licentious clubmen, upon bribery to the police, and upon law expenses, which would all be unnecessary if a price were paid which engaged the producer's self-interest on the

Answer 1693; Revd. S. J. Hill:—  
 "The enemy of the soil is indigo; The enemy of the labourer is idleness; so the enemy of caste is Padri Hill". (The above is a local Bengali saying).

Answer 1156; Dinu Mandal;

manufacturer's side, but which perhaps the best intentioned planter cannot avoid, whilst all his dealings are with exasperated antagonists, who, as the evidence has shown us, have no interest in the success of the business and abhor the very name of indigo.

"But if my throat is cut I won't sow indigo".

Answer 1165; "I will die sooner than cultivate indigo".

Answer 1180; Jamir Mandal:—"I would rather go to a country where the indigo plant is never seen or sown."

Answer 1216; Haji Mulla:—"Rather than sow indigo I will go to another country; I would rather beg than sow indigo".

Answer 1249; Kabi Mandal: "I would sow indigo for nobody, not even for my father and mother".

Answer 3214; Panju Mulla: "No, I would be rather killed with bullets."

57. As to the advantage of having English gentlemen, with the loyalty, courage, energy, perseverance and skill which Advantage of having European settlers. is their patrimony, scattered over the country, it is impossible, in general terms, to rate the political and social value of this too highly. But it is only when these gentlemen are in relations of mutual benefit with the people of the country that their residence is of social or political advantage. The very same reasons which, in the circumstances of India, make the residence of Europeans an especial source of strength and improvement, when it is, and is felt to be a benefit by their native neighbours, make it an especial source of weakness and corruption, when it is, and is felt to be, an evil by their native neighbours.

58. Mr. F. Gubbins (to whose conduct and knowledge of the people is greatly due the preservation of Benares in 1857) Benares planters a blessing to the country. says of the indigo planters in the Benares Division—and says, I am sure, most justly—that "they are almost invariably a blessing to the surrounding country". Now there is nothing in the air of Benares to make a class of men blessings there, who would not with equal chances be blessings elsewhere. It is that there the Because the system is sounder. system is sounder, and the planter works with the *raiya*t instead of against him. I desire earnestly to see European planters in Bengal "blessings to the surrounding country"; and that is one great reason why I desire earnestly to see a sounder system of indigo manufacture established in Bengal.

59. What an enterprising European can do, both for himself and

for the people, when he marries his interest to theirs, is shown in a conspicuous manner by the evidence of Mr. Morrell. In 10 years Mr. Morrell has cleared 60,000 or 65,000 *bighas* (upwards of 20,000 acres) of Sundarbans jungle. He has granted his cleared land, under permanent *pattas*, at a rent of 1 rupee 2 annas a *bigha*, never liable to enhancement ; he gets as many *raiya*s as he wishes, but they repudiate the system of advances, fearing that "eventually they may have to take to *nil*, or indigo", though they know of indigo only from common report. Mr. Morrell told me that the building of a good two-storied brick-house on his grant was one of the most fortunate things he did, because it assured the *pattadars* and *raiya*s that he would stay amongst them ; and it will be seen in his evidence that the same people who were so anxious to keep him near them, on one occasion, when his gardener had sown in his garden some indigo seed that had been sent from Calcutta in a packet of seeds by mistake, on the plant growing up, "insisted upon having it pulled up and thrown away." Mr. Morrell has in 10 years created for himself an estate which cannot now be worth less than from £80,000 to £100,000 ; and, in doing so, he has covered what were 20,000 acres of uninhabited jungle with a happy and thriving population, anxious to keep him near them. This he has accomplished by working on sound principles, to the profit of the people instead of to their loss. In striking contrast to the indigo planters' remonstrance mentioned above in paragraph 21 of this paper, when I had the pleasure of seeing him a few months ago, his only request was that a subdivision might be established with its head-quarters at his residence of Morrellganj.

60. When Indian officers, whose first duty is the improvement of India, cease to admire and encourage English residents, who work upon the sound system which produces such results as this, it will be just to accuse them of prejudice against their own fellow-countrymen. But it is not just or reasonable to accuse them of such prejudice because they wish all their countrymen to work on a system that tends to such results, and disapprove of an unsound system, which produces contrary results.

61. I now come to the last great head of the Report : the discussion of the several recommendations that have been made for legislative or executive action, in relation to indigo planting in Bengal.

62. Before remarking upon the recommendations in detail, it will be well to look back, in order to ascertain what are exactly the proved evils requiring to be met by such action. It is impossible to judge of the suitability of a remedy, till we have a clear conception of what it is exactly that

Instance of European enterprise on a sound system in Bengal.

A sound system the desideratum.

Proposed changes of law and administration discussed.

What are the proved evils to be remedied.

requires to be remedied. If we have but a confused, incorrect, and inadequate notion of the real evils, our remedies will be useless and perhaps hurtful.

63. There is nothing in the evidence to prove that before this year Planters' com-plaints. planters experienced any material difficulty in getting *raiya*ts to sow in indigo the quantity of land required of them, for which cash advances were actually taken, whether such requisition was supported by a contract, as the planter would generally hold, or was the mere command of the planter, as the *raiya*t would often hold. There are no longer now complaints that *raiya*ts take advances for indigo from one planter and sell the produce to another ; nor is it the staple of the complaints made before this year, that the *raiya*ts took advances for indigo and cultivated on their own account something else instead. There are general charges that *raiya*ts are of a fraudulent and evasive disposition, but I have seen in the whole evidence no specific charge of the above nature, in a single instance, before this year.

64. There are, however, on the part of the planters, loud complaints of the carelessness of the *raiya*t, after taking advances, in regard to his indigo crop ; of his inattention to it ; and of his indifference to whether it is eaten down by cattle, or choked up by weeds, or goes into the planter's vat, notwithstanding the daily urging of the planter's servants. I cannot doubt that this is a true complaint.

65. And there are complaints that *raiya*ts sometimes cannot be got to engage for indigo because of the machinations of third parties. But of this I find no proof ; and I see no reason to think the complaint well-founded, because no motive needs to be looked for, when a *raiya*t refuses, beyond his own self-interest. I find no other complaints on the part of the planters.

66. On the part of the *raiya*ts the complaints are that, by oppression Raiya's com-plaints. and acts of unlawful violence in themselves very harassing, they are compelled to engage to cultivate indigo, or to cultivate it without engagement, for the planter, at a nominal price, which even if fully paid would be ruinously unprofitable. The fact of frequent acts of unlawful violence and oppression is fully proved ; and the motive is manifest ; also the extreme inadequacy of the price paid by the planter, and the unwillingness with which indigo is cultivated by the *raiya*t, are fully proved.

67. Also the *raiya*ts complain that the deductions from the nominal price are so heavy, the unfairness of weighing so great, the extortions of the factory *amla* so excessive, that the nominal price dwindles to little or nothing, so that if they realise from the whole produce of their

indigo land, in cash, what pays the rent of the land, they are lucky ; wherefore they lose the whole value of that land to themselves besides all the cost of cultivating it for the planter. And this appears to me, from a careful examination of the evidence, to be about the true state of the case, as a question of profit and loss to the *raiya*t.

68. It is also made matter of complaint, though I think more by the friends of the *raiya*t than by the *raiya*ts themselves, that the *raiya*t is constrained to cultivate indigo by reason of the debt claimed from him by the factory, on account of the balance of account being against 9 *raiya*ts out of 10 always.

69. On the part of the Magistrate, it is fully proved that the peace  
Breaches of the peace. of the country is constantly broken by disputes about indigo, to so great an extent as to be a discredit to our Administration.

70. Complaints relating to the events of this year being quite ex-  
Complaints in this year exceptional. ceptional, and having been exceptionally met by temporary legislation, need not be now regarded. The *raiya*ts in certain districts, after the season of advances had passed and after the mass had taken advances, showed a disposition to refuse in mass to cultivate. But now, their refusal to contract new engagements, or to take advances on the old terms, or on any terms yet offered, cannot be made, in form, matter of reasonable complaint by any one ; although doubtless it is this legitimate refusal on the *raiya*ts' part that constitutes the present difficulty of the planter. It is quite natural that those who are under the pressure of this difficulty should decry any course which will not get them over it. But as the *raiya*t is not a slave, and cannot be made a slave ; and as his right in his own land is indefeasible ; however much every one must sympathise with the planter suddenly involved in this difficulty, every disinterested person must see that the *raiya*t must be left in practice, as he is left now by law, free to do what he thinks best with his own land.

71. Now, looking at all these complaints, I do not see one that re-  
Special legislation not required to meet those evils. quires special legislation, in favour of one side or of the other. The law is now perfectly equal and fair for both ; and that is what it ought to be. I see nothing wrong that would not be remedied by adequate executive action, whereby the protection of the law should, in matter of fact, be properly and equally extended to both parties, which practically, until now, it has not been. It is not the law, neither is it the administration of the law, that is responsible for the complaints of the planters above admitted. When a man is hopelessly in debt to a factory ; when such a price is given for the produce of his land as does not at the most pay him more than the

rent of it, and often not so much ; and when, generally speaking, the whole of the trifle of cash he ever touches at all is given him in the form of an advance ; with what degree of reason can it be expected that he will bestow his labour upon that produce with the same interest as he bestows it upon produce the real profit and loss upon which is his own ?

72. If this subject of complaint can be removed at all, it can only be removed by the adoption by the planter of a sound system of traffic for the plant, that is to say, by paying for it a price which will afford the *raiyat* as good a return as another crop would afford him, and by not paying the whole of that price in the way of advance. This would engage the *raiyat*, by his own self-interest, to bestow as much care upon the crop as he now bestows on his rice and other crops, the profit of which is his. If, at the present price of the dye, the manufacturer cannot afford to give such a price for the plant, there really is nothing for it but to abandon the attempt to force indigo upon land of the quality in question. To continue the attempt in that case is to waste the resources of the country and to fight against nature ; a battle the issue of which, notwithstanding any number of special and onesided laws, in the end is never doubtful.

73. I perceive that the British Indian Association have come to the conclusion, from the evidence taken by the Commission, that indigo cannot be profitably cultivated in the neighbouring districts, because it is shown that the value of the manufactured dye made from the average produce of a *bigha* does not exceed 10 rupees ; whilst the value of the raw produce in other crops would be about as much. This is a practical question. Early rice is the crop with which indigo can be most fairly compared. The average value of a *bigha* of early rice in Nadia is stated to be Rs. 8 As. 10. In Jessore the average is taken much higher ; viz : Rs 14. But, having reference to the oral evidence on the same subject, I take the average above given for Nadia to be a very fair average, at present prices. I believe the mere manufacturing charges for 2 seers, or 10 rupees worth, of indigo are taken at one rupee 8 annas, so that this calculation would leave less than nothing for all the general charges of the factory. But I do not think it follows that the present average produce, which is less than 10 bundles of indigo, would not be materially increased if the crop were grown by the cultivator who had some real interest in the out-turn. This question, however, if it is to be solved, must be left to nature, and to the skill of the persons interested. Laws can do nothing in such a matter, but leave the trade free.

74. As to the complaints of the *raiya*s, it is obvious that the practical and effectual protection of the law for person, property and rights, with absolute freedom of trade, is all that is required to remove the



grounds of them. And the same may be said of the Magistrate's complaint, which is the consequence only of the inadequate protection he has been able, until lately, practically to afford to the people.

75. The complaint on the ground of the hold given by the debt of the *raiya*t to the factory remains. These debts in the mass are admitted to be bad debts. They are bought with a factory, as giving a hold upon the *raiya*t's, with no reference to their nominal amount. But wherever a *raiya*t really does owe money to a planter, he ought to pay it, and he ought to be made to pay it. If the planter's claim is good, he will certainly get a decree in the Civil Courts; and, as the *raiya*t has been shown by events this year in Nadia and Jessore to be generally solvent, the planter will thereby obtain full payment. There is only one conceivable reason that can keep a planter from so claiming a real debt, which is that he will thereby get payment in money of standard value, and not in indigo plant at his own price, which seems to be not one third of its cost. But all that justice requires is payment in cash.

76. On the whole, I conclude that all reasonable ground for any special legislation, or special executive action, in connection with indigo in Bengal proper is knocked away by the inquiry of the Commission. The production of Bengal proper, we have seen, is 40,763 maunds of this dye; the production of Madras is 34,000 maunds. There is no special law for indigo in Madras. Yet the official papers, a copy of which for facility of reference is appended to this Minute, show that there are no complaints or difficulties in the business there. The *raiya*t's "have no dislike to its culture," "contracts for the supply of the plant are readily and voluntarily entered into, its cultivation being profitable"; "indigo contracts are not found to be productive of more litigation, disputes, or disturbances, than contracts of any other description"; differences about indigo "are adjusted, like other ordinary disputes, without recourse to measures\* unsanctioned by the laws."

Why should Bengal require a special law, when the general law works so well in Madras? So the North-Western Provinces produce 21,643 maunds of indigo without complaint or disturbance, and also with no special law Bihar, under the very same local Government, and the very same law as Bengal proper, produces 32,699 maunds of indigo, with

\* I may observe that the Madras Board of Revenue make the common mistake of supposing that the Bengal *samindari* tenure affects the legal position of the *raiya*t. A Madras *raiya*t is not a *samindar* there being there no recipient of the *raiya*t's *jama* between the *raiya*t and Government. In Bengal, there is; but the *raiya*t's legal position, if he has a right of occupancy, is the same in both Presidencies.

A small section only of the trade asks for any special law.

no demand for a special law in favor of any party.

77. My conclusion therefore is, that whereas in the great majority of cases special legislation is bad, and in all cases one-sided legislation is bad, in this indigo matter any such legislation would be quite indefensible, because devoid of even plausible grounds in fact.

78. The first suggestion of a change discussed in the Report is the vesting of indigo planters with magisterial powers as Honorary Magistrates. In a paper which is already before His Excellency the Governor-General in Council, I have recorded my opinion on the general subject of Honorary Magistrates. I object to any Honorary Magistrate having any thing to do with the police; and I object to any Magistrate, Honorary or Stipendiary, trying cases judicially in which he is directly or indirectly interested, or which from private reasons he cannot try without risk of private injury to himself. But under the above conditions, which I consider to be of universal application, I approve of the system of Honorary Magistrates. Wherever the indigo system is sound, I would make no distinction between indigo planting and any other business, in this respect. Therefore, though I go a part of the way, I do not go the whole way with the Commission on this point.

79. The next point is the multiplication of subdivisions. This subject, on which I quite agree with the Commission, has already had my best attention.

The Nadia Division in which the chief indigo districts are, has been, I believe, most satisfactorily arranged into sub-divisions; and the other Divisions will be taken up one by one in the same way. The arrangement is explained in detail in a Resolution of the Bengal Government dated the 7th November 1860.

80. The next point is the reform of the police. The police has somewhat improved, and, I believe, is improving, though slowly. If the Madras system can be applied to Bengal, it will be applied; and whatever can be done to improve the police will be done. The subject is too large to enter upon here in detail.

81. The next point is the improvement of the Civil Courts. The new Civil Code, as was to have been expected from the remarkable qualifications for such a work which the learned and experienced gentlemen who prepared it possess is admirable, and is working excellently well. All the complaints of the action of the Civil Courts are made in reference only to the Code which

has just been superseded. I do not believe that more can be done in this direction than to take care that there are Courts enough to be free from arrears. So far as the indigo districts are concerned the Courts, both of first instance and of appeal, have been specially strengthened, with this object, by additional Munsifs and an additional Civil and Sessions Judge, expressly for indigo cases. Of cases connected with indigo, I believe there are no arrears.

82. A practical improvement has just been introduced, at my suggestion, with the concurrence of the *Sadar*, whereby all causes of the nature of Small Cause Court causes, such as indigo contract cases are, are kept upon a separate file, and will be disposed of by the Courts of first instance as rapidly as though such Courts were special Small Cause Courts. And the *Sadar* have made corresponding provision for appeals from decisions in such causes.

83. I do not follow the Commission in their remarks on Act X of 1859; not because I do not feel their value, or intend to give them the fullest attention; but because I do not consider that the subject is connected with that of this Minute so closely as to require discussion here, in a paper which is already much too long.

84. Two members of the Commission, in a separate Minute, recommend the enactment of a law rendering breach of an indigo contract, on the part of a *raiyat*, a criminal act punishable by the Magistrate. The majority of the Commission strongly object to any such law, and I fully concur in their objection, for the reasons they assign. No one-sided legislation is ever justifiable and I believe such legislation in the end generally injures the interest it is meant to favour. An indigo contract differs in no respect from any other sort of contract for the delivery of goods. To subject either 1 of the 2 parties in such a contract to be treated as a criminal, for what is acknowledged by the general law not to be a crime, seems to me quite indefensible. All the arguments above urged against any special legislation for indigo business at all, apply with peculiar force against special penal legislation, in a sense contrary to all the received principles of distinction between civil and criminal law. In 1810, in 1832, and in 1835, in India and at home, the highest authorities have concurred in rejecting such a law.

85. Indeed, a proposition for such a law seems to me to follow strangely upon the result of the Commission's inquiry. The whole Bengal indigo system has been upon its trial: and, though only 4 out of 5 Commissioners have signed the Report, I do not understand that the fifth Commissioner, who represented the planters, differs from his colleagues substantially in regard to the findings on matters of fact;

Proposal to make breach of a civil contract in a *raiyat* a criminal offence.

and he has signed, with another member, a separate paper which, in my judgment, is as conclusive against the system as the body of the Report itself is. The result is that the *raiya*t is found guilty of nothing ; and that his complaints are in the main fully established. It would be natural, upon such a finding, to discuss some project of a special law of protection in his favor ; but to follow up a verdict in favor of a successful complainant by a sentence to subjection to a special penal law, making him criminally liable for what no other person is criminally liable, does seem to me to be somewhat hard upon him.

86. I agree with the majority in thinking that, in the interest of the planter, such one-sided legislation would be unwise. The planter's present difficulty is to get *raiya*ts to agree to cultivate indigo, and he must succeed in that before he can talk of punishing them for not cultivating. If the object were to make indigo cultivation still more unpopular than it is, to stigmatise it by making those who undertake it liable to be treated as criminals might be a wise measure ; but as the object is the contrary I cannot think it would be a wise measure\*.

87. The same 2 members recommend the appointment of 1 or more special officers in each of the principal indigo districts, to exercise civil and criminal judicial powers and fiscal powers, in indigo matters exclusively, subordinate to the regular civil, criminal and fiscal officers of the district. I do not see how such a scheme is practicable ; and, if practicable, it would be a very great change for the worse. There are no fiscal duties connected with indigo, and in many criminal cases it will be doubtful, and in others it will not be ascertainable till the case is concluded, whether indigo was or was not at the bottom of it. Then I do not see how one man can have the management of the police at any one place, in matters connected with indigo, and another man have the management of the same police at the same place in other matters. When there is a breach of the peace, the first thing to do is to put an end to the disturbance ; but, on this system, it would have to be ascertained what the first cause of the disturbance was before it could be known which of 2 men should take the affair in hand. Again, the inconvenience to the public would be extreme. There are now 8 Munsifs in the Nadia district and 5 Magisterial Courts ; and in Jessore there are now 10

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\* NOTE. Mr. Seton-Karr in his 'Grant of Rothiemurchus' writes : "No one now, in Press or Parliament, Radical, Unionist, or Conservative, would propose to convert a breach of Civil Contract into a Criminal offence in support of any one industry or trade. But it required much strength of character and tenacity of purpose, in 1860, to resist a proposal to place a law of the above kind permanently on the Statute Book".

Munsifs, and 6 Magisterial Courts. In all indigo cases, this scheme would substitute for those 13 or 16 authorities, scattered equally over the district, 1 or 2 authorities in each district who would be 50 miles away from the majority of suitors. The harassment to suitors and witnesses would be intolerable. And, to set against so much that is disadvantageous, I can see absolutely nothing in the shape of an advantage, for the 1 or 2 special indigo officers would in no way be better than 1 or 2 of the regular district officers. Moreover, all special Courts for particular classes of cases, from English Star Chambers to Indian resumption Courts, become always hateful, and generally deservedly so.

88. Surely the object is, with a limited number of officers available in a district of nearly a million of inhabitants, to make the most of them by spreading them equally over the whole surface. The supporters of the scheme most justly say, that "the necessity of a reference on the spot is one of the few points on which both parties agree". But this is the very reason why I object to passing over the sub-divisional officer and Munsif on the spot, or at most 12½ miles off, in order to go to a special officer 50 miles off. If I am to be allowed 1, 2 or more additional officers in a district, I hope that they may be so used, by multiplying sub-divisions, as to bring justice and protection nearer home to the people, and not so used, by neutralising even existing sub-divisions, as to send justice and protection, in one of the most important classes of cases, very much further away from home than they now are.

89. The same 2 Commissioners also recommend the appointment of a special indigo Commissioner, to travel about to allay excitement, and to mediate between planter and *raiyat*. I am quite of opinion that good is to be done in this way; but I do not think that any officer is in so good a position to do what good can be done as the regular Commissioners of Divisions, who must know more about the affairs of their Divisions than any new officer could know for a long time. The attention of the Divisional Commissioners being given to the people of their Divisions, in all their relations with business of every sort, and not being narrowed to one peculiar relation seems to me an advantage. They are all picked men of the class from which any special Commissioner would be taken. After all, any extra-official action, as I may call it, must stop at a certain point. No Government officer could take it upon himself to dictate to a planter the price which he can afford to offer for plant; or to dictate to a *raiyat* the price at which it will be for his pecuniary interest to grow the plant. The two parties interested must be left to settle that themselves. All that a disinterested person, official, or unofficial, could do,

is to allay irritation, and to endeavour to make both act reasonably, temperately, and fairly. The Commissioner of the Division, who has all the district executive officers under him, and who has not judicial functions, civil or criminal, seems to me the *official* person most likely to meet with success in this work of mediation. I have already issued such instructions to the Divisional Commissioners as will have the required effect, as far as these officers are capable of producing it. The Commissioners of Nadia and Rajshahi are now on tour, with this special object, amongst others, in view. Nothing however, can be done unless the planter will recognize the legal and actual position of the *raiyat*, and unless, even where the law is on his side, he will act upon the advice of the planters' most able and judicious representative in the Commission, by making such reasonable and equitable concessions as will avoid a contest "that must seriously damage the interests of the planters." It should be seen, that to attempt to conduct commercial transactions profitably, in the midst of a hostile and intensely exasperated population, is mere foolishness, when the law is also against one, and is a very hopeless adventure even when it is on one's side. I trust, therefore, that the Committee of the Indigo Planters' Association will support this good advice, with all their influence.

90. The majority of the Commission are opposed to both the recommendations last discussed, and I agree in their arguments.

91. The last point is the enactment of a law for the registration of indigo contracts, in such a special manner as to remove all doubt of the reality of the engagement; which however should not make unregistered contracts invalid. The minority of the Commission propose such a law, but the majority do not recommend it. I have submitted to the Governor-General in Council my opinion on this point. I think the information before us shows the necessity of going the length of invalidating all contracts for the delivery of agricultural produce not registered in accordance with a special registration law such as is above described. The practices of charging the *raiyat* for a stamp without using any stamped paper at all, and of taking the marks and signatures of *raiya*s to blank papers, seem to me to require the check of registration, and, more especially, the frightful length to which late reports from Mr. Bell and Mr. Herschel, corroborated by the result of the Nadia cases, show that factory *amla* are ready to go in forgery and perjury, proves to me the necessity of protecting the *raiyat* by a thoroughly good system of registration. It is to these factory *amla* that the whole work of taking engagements in writing is avowedly left. It is necessary, in my opinion, that the registration should be so conducted, that the identity of the person signing the engagement with the person

named in the document should be ascertained, and capable of being proved at any time ; and that the fact that both parties fully understand all the conditions of the deed should be ascertained, and recorded by a disinterested officer. The great length of some forms of bond adopted, and the generally illiterate character of the poorer of the 2 parties, make this last provision in my opinion very desirable. From such a system of registration both parties will derive great advantage and much unsatisfactory litigation will be prevented.

92. The separate Minute, signed by Mr. Temple and Mr. Fergusson, treats of some points not noticed in the Report. These 2 gentlemen remark that district Magistrates have ample power to investigate and prosecute British subjects in the *mufassal*, and that they ought to exercise that power. This is true, though the trial (except in cases of simple assault punishable by a fine of Rs. 500) under the present law can only be at the Presidency. In grave cases, I trust that this duty is never neglected. But the expense both to the public and to private persons of a prosecution at the Presidency, for an offence committed at a distance, is very heavy ; and the inconvenience and loss to prosecutors and witnesses are so great, that such prosecutions are a misfortune to the neighbourhood, in which the person injured is the most certain sufferer. It is not in the nature of things that these considerations should not operate to a certain extent, as an exemption from amenability to all criminal law, in minor matters. These 2 same members recommend the general disarming of all natives in Bengal, but without taking away clubs. The long, heavy, iron-bound club in use is a formidable *lethal* weapon ; and a disarming in Bengal, which should not touch the most common *lethal* weapon used in affrays, would be operative, I fear, only for harm. It would disarm the peaceable man, and allow the professional bravo of the country to carry his own peculiar arms. I would rather reverse the operation. I do not see in the evidence anything to show that the mass of the people in Bengal, a quiet and well behaved race, should be disarmed. I should like to see them much more ready and more stout in self-defence than they are. But I would disarm and punish the hired clubmen, and I would punish all who employ them, without exception of classes. I trust that a provision in the Penal Code introduced by the Bengal Member of the Legislative Council, in consequence of a suggestion from me, will have the effect of enabling the Magistrate to cut off the root of affrays, by imposing some responsibility on those in whose interest they are committed, as recommended by those 2 Members of the Commission.

Minor points in  
Minute of Messrs.  
Temple and Fer-  
gusson.

Prosecution of  
British subjects.

Responsibility of  
prime movers in  
affrays.

93. The body of the Report is signed by 4 Members. The fifth, Mr. Fergusson's Minute. Mr. Fergusson, the able representative of the planting interest in the Commission, has not signed it, and has put in a separate Minute, explaining his reasons. I understand that his dissent, in the main, is to the tone of the Report, which in his opinion leads to the inference that planters, as a body, are lawless. The inference I myself draw from the Report is, that the planters as a body, and naturally, are like any other class of our fellow-countrymen ; but that, being within the meshes of a false system, in all that concerns that system, they cannot but act as the system constrains them. Like all such bodies they comprise men of all temperaments, but it is and has ever been my conviction that there are in this body many as good men as any in India ; and I see nothing in the Report to the contrary. Mr. Fergusson objects to certain views in the Report, as tending to disturb the acknowledged principles of the Permanent Settlement, and to give *rai-yats* notions of their rights incompatible with that contract between Government and the *zamindar*. I conceive that there is here some of that misapprehension of the nature of the Permanent Settlement which is very common. That measure in no respect differs from any other Indian revenue settlement, except in being permanent, instead of for a term of years. It is only a settlement of the Government demand of revenue. It in no way touches any rights, interests, or tenures of land, all which it leaves as it found them. It is truly described as a contract between Government and the *zamindar* ; and therefore necessarily it could not affect third parties, whose rights, titles, and interests, indeed, it acknowledges especially, and excepts in terms. Mr. Fergusson freely admits that the recent crisis must sooner or later have occurred, because planters did not raise their prices as other prices rose. He comes thus, I think, in effect, to the same practical conclusion that the majority of the Commission and I myself come to, namely, that the root of the whole question is the struggle to make *rai-yats* grow indigo plant, without paying them the price of it.

94. My high opinion of the manner in which the Commission have conducted their inquiries, and reported to Government their conclusions, upon this extensive and long controverted subject, has been expressed to the gentlemen who composed it, in a separate letter. At a moment of passionate excitement, the careful impartiality with which they conducted their inquiries was admitted on all sides. And though every one will form his own judgment as to their conclusions and recommendations, the cautious, temperate and kindly manner in which they have framed their Report, will, I am sure, be cordially acknowledged by every one."



## CHAPTER III.

SIR CECIL BEADON, K.C. S. I.

1862—67.

LIKE his two predecessors Sir Cecil Beadon stood out prominently before all others as the officer designate *omnium consensu* for the Lieutenant-Governorship whenever a vacancy should occur in that office. He had held all the qualifying appointments, his record was unblemished, he was in the prime of life. He was born in 1816, the youngest son of Richard Beadon Esqre., and grandson of the Right Reverend Richard Beadon, D. D., Bishop of Bath and Wells. His mother was a sister of the first Lord Heytesbury. He was educated at Eton and at Haileybury, and at the age of 18 was presented with an appointment to the Bengal Civil Service, which had been placed by the Court of Directors at the disposal of Lord Heytesbury, upon his nomination to the post of Governor-General of India,—a nomination which was shortly afterwards cancelled on the return of the Whig Government to office. He arrived in India on the 31st December 1836, and held the following appointments in the earlier years of his service: July 1837, Assistant, Patna Division: from August 1837 at Saran: September 1838, Superintendent of *khas mahals*: March 1839, Joint-Magistrate and Deputy Collector of Champaran: from August to October 1839, Joint-Magistrate and Deputy Collector of Saran, Bihar, Patna, and Bhagalpur successively: January 1842, Magistrate and Collector of Bhagalpur: when Magistrate of Murshidabad in 1843 he was appointed Under-Secretary to the Government of Bengal. He was Secretary to the Board of Revenue in 1847, and was selected in 1850 by Lord Dalhousie to represent Bengal on a Commission of inquiry into the Indian Postal System. This inquiry resulted in the establishment of a uniform postage in India analogous to the English penny postage. He was also Secretary to the Government of Bengal, 1852; Secretary to the Government of India in the Home Department, 1854; Foreign Secretary, 1859; Member of the Council of the Governor-General, 1860; and became Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal in 1862. There is a short account of Sir C.



Photo-gravure

Survey of India Offices, Calcutta, December 1900

SIR CECIL BEADON, K C S I

From a photograph by Mess<sup>rs</sup> Johnston & Hoffmann



Beadon's career in the Dictionary of National Biography, which will serve as an introduction to the rest of this Chapter.

“Beadon's career was eminently successful up to the last 5 years of his service. Three successive Governors-General, Brief sketch of Lieutenant-Gov-ernorship. Lord Hardinge, Lord Dalhousie and Lord Canning, entertained the highest opinion of his judgment and ability. In 1847 Lord Hardinge spoke of his appointment as Secretary to the Board of Salt, Customs, and Opium, which was deemed an improper supersession by his seniors, as “highly advantageous to the interests of the public service.” With Lord Dalhousie Beadon carried on a confidential and unreserved correspondence, which was continued throughout his government, and ended only with his death. It was often said in India at that time that Beadon was the only man in the country who had any influence over Lord Dalhousie, and there can be no question that in all matters relating to the internal administration of the country Lord Dalhousie placed the greatest reliance upon Beadon's judgment. Lord Canning promoted Beadon to the post of Foreign Secretary, and afterwards recommended him for the Lieutenant-Governorship of Bengal.

“During the greater part of the mutiny Beadon was Home Secretary, and naturally shared much of the unpopularity with which his Chief, and the Government generally, were regarded by certain classes of the English community in Calcutta at that excited time. It was groundlessly alleged that Beadon under-estimated the gravity of the crisis. After having conducted the duties of Foreign Secretary for several years with marked ability, and served for a time in the Supreme Council, Beadon was placed in charge of the Government of Bengal with general approval. An article which appeared a little before that time in the leading Calcutta newspaper full of hostile criticism, not only of Beadon, but of the Indian Civil Service generally, highly praised Beadon's honesty and resolution, but predicted for him much unpopularity.

“This prediction was fully verified. The stars in their courses appear to have fought against the new Lieutenant-Governor almost from the commencement. Measures, unquestionably wise, taken by him after a careful personal inspection of the province of Assam, in order to improve the condition of the important tea-planting industry there established, were followed by an unexampled depres-

sion in the tea industry, and the calamity was charged against Beadon. The unsuccessful mission to Bhutan, accompanied by a gross insult to the British envoy, and the war which followed, commencing with a repulse of our troops, were equally discouraging. Last of all came the famine in Orissa, with its terrible mortality, extending to some other districts in Bengal, and inflicting upon the Lieutenant-Governor's reputation for administrative capacity a blow from which it never recovered. Here again circumstances were very much against him. His health, seriously impaired by a prolonged residence in the climate of Bengal, was in so critical a condition, that he was imperatively ordered by his medical advisers to repair to Darjeeling, at a time when the Head of the Government would naturally have wished either to remain at the capital or to visit the afflicted districts. Beadon, at personal risk, returned to Calcutta, when the extent of the calamity became apparent, but after a short stay was compelled by a fresh access of his malady to revisit the hills. At that time it would have been impossible for him, had he been in the full vigour of health, or for any one else, to avert or to alleviate the calamity which had settled upon the doomed province. All was done that could have been done at that juncture, but it was all too late. Still, there can be no doubt that the Lieutenant-Governor's absence at a hillstation at that particular juncture, unavoidable though it was, greatly contributed to an unfavourable opinion as to his treatment of the famine. The real error dated from an earlier period when, at the commencement of the scarcity which preceded the actual famine, the authorities, as well those of the districts concerned as the superintending authorities at the capital, the Board of Revenue, and the Lieutenant-Governor, failed to discern the exceptional circumstances of the case. A personal visit which the Lieutenant-Governor had paid to the province at an early period of the scarcity failed to impress him with a due conception of the impending calamity; and his favourable view of the situation—unduly favourable as the result speedily proved—was accepted by the Member of the Government of India upon whom it specially devolved to deal with such matters, and was acquiesced in by the Governor-General, Sir John Lawrence, who, though entertaining misgivings, did not feel justified in overruling his Lieutenant. The Report of a Commission of inquiry, afterwards appointed under the orders of the Secretary of State, was unfavour-

able to the Lieutenant-Governor, and that unfavourable verdict was ratified by the Governor-General in Council in language which, having regard to the previous concurrence of the Supreme Government in the Lieutenant-Governor's policy was considered by many to have been unduly severe. A few months later Beadon, who had been created for his previous services a Knight Commander of the Star of India, when the order was extended in 1866, left India, his brilliant reputation overshadowed, and his health seriously impaired by long residence in a tropical climate and by the anxieties of the later years of his official life.

“ While the success of Beadon's government was thus marred, there was much in his general administration deserving of the highest praise. The clear judgment, the unflagging industry, the independence of character, for which he had been conspicuous in his previous posts, were all turned to good account in many matters of great importance to the well-being of Bengal. His endeavour to improve the administration of justice by the establishment of Courts of Small Causes, his development of municipal institutions, his educational policy, the careful supervision which he exercised over the revenue administration, over the police and other departments of the public service, his efforts to check *ghat* murders and Kulin polygamy, his intolerance of official incompetence and neglect of duty, his discerning appreciation of merit, irrespective of creed, colour, or caste—all these things told upon the progress of the province, and proved that, notwithstanding his failure in one conspicuous instance, he was an earnest, conscientious, and in many respects, extremely able administrator. And in the one instance in which he signally failed, the failure is to be attributed to the sanguine temperament which was a marked feature in his character, and which in difficult conjunctures is so often essential to success. A gracious and conciliatory manner, and accessibility to all who desired to approach him on business, Sir Cecil Beadon possessed in a remarkable degree. The late Lady Canning, no mean judge of manners, is said to have remarked that the most perfect mannered men she had ever met were Sidney Herbert and Cecil Beadon. Beadon survived his return to England rather more than 13 years. He died at Latton, Wiltshire, on 18th July 1880, in his sixty-fifth year. He was twice married, first in 1837 to Harriet, daughter of Major R. H. Sneyd of the Bengal Cavalry ;

and secondly in 1860 to Agnes, daughter of Mr. W. H. Sterndale. He left several children."

In his Minute of the 2nd July 1859 on the services of officers in the mutiny Lord Canning had thus written of Sir C. Beadon as Home Secretary :—"The labour of the Secretary of the Home Department, Mr. Cecil Beadon, has been rendered unusually heavy and anxious from the very commencement of the mutinies ; much work connected with transport by land and water and with the despatch of the naval brigades, beginning with that under the late Sir W. Peel, was thrown upon his department, and the efficiency with which it was done, although for the most part of a very novel nature, has been most creditable to him. I desire to record my very high appreciation of the value of Mr. Beadon's services."

Sir C. Beadon's accession to the Lieutenant-Governorship was welcomed by the leading native newspaper of the day, which wrote :—"That Mr. Beadon's past training and the eminent ability which he has displayed in various capacities eminently qualify him to rule Bengal will we think be disputed by none. In one point we believe he has an advantage over his predecessor. Sir John Peter Grant was a closet thinker : he had seen little of the people or of the country. Although Mr. Beadon has likewise neither seen much of the interior, he still knows Calcutta well, and for many years the man who will know Calcutta thoroughly will also know the country well. Easy of access and amiable to a degree, Mr. Beadon is very popular as a member of society. His free intercourse with both Europeans and natives has made him fully acquainted with the workings of the society of both classes. There is not a man of mark or influence among them whom he does not know ; there is not a section of them with whose peculiar opinions and feelings he is not acquainted ; there is not a subject regarding which, if he chooses, he cannot obtain the most accurate reports of the opinions of the different classes of the community. This we confess is no rare advantage for a ruler of Bengal, and we hope Mr. Beadon will turn it to good account.

Like Lord Elgin, Mr. Beadon enters office under peculiarly happy auspices : the indigo question all but solved, judicial and police reform in full swing, public works in rapid strides of improvement,

and a fair share of financial justice secured to Bengal. Under such circumstances we confidently hope his reign will prove one of unprecedented success."

Sir C. Beadon assumed charge of the Lieutenant-Governorship on the 23rd April 1862. His Private Secretary was at first Lt.-Col. H. R. James, and subsequently Lt.-Col. H. Raban. During the rains he made a long tour to Assam, going up to Sibsagar, Sylhet and Cachar: he spent February 1863 in Bihar. His first years of office were years of normal progress: the various measures of administration which came before his Government will be duly mentioned. For instance, the question of reorganising the Subordinate Judicial Service was taken into consideration. The expediency of revising the salaries of the native Judges and of readjusting them on a scale more commensurate with the importance and responsibility of their duties, and of the position which they ought to hold in society, had been fully admitted on several previous occasions, but the state of the finances had prevented anything being done, as every scheme of improvement necessarily involved a considerable increase of expenditure. While however nothing had been done to improve the position and status of the native Bench, the qualifications both of the native Judges and the native Bar had been subjected to much severer tests than had previously been required. The claims of the Subordinate Judicial Service were thus still further strengthened and it became imperative on the Government to deal with the question. Sir C. Beadon considered that, fully to meet the requirements of the case, no mere slight increase in the scale of salaries was necessary. He believed that a reform was wanted which would raise the character and standard of the Judicial Service generally by enabling Government to recruit its ranks from a higher stratum of native society, and which would at the same time have the effect of qualifying the native Judges for a seat on the bench of the highest Court in the country. To effect such a reform he proposed a scheme the object of which briefly was to amalgamate the whole native Judicial Service and redivide it into 3 classes, with distinct powers and salaries graduated in each class, and from class to class, from Rs. 200 up to Rs. 1,500 monthly, abolishing the native designation and substituting the more intelligible nomenclature of Subordinate Judges of the 1st.



2nd, and 3rd class. The cost of the service, as constituted, amounted to Rs. 7,18,200; the cost of it, as proposed to be constituted, amounted to Rs. 11,28,000 *per annum*. The proposal was submitted to the Government of India. As there was likely to be some delay in disposing of the general question, Sir Cecil Beadon subsequently requested that that portion of it which provided that no judicial officer should receive a lower salary than Rs. 200 should at once be sanctioned. After the close of 1862-3, the Government of India gave partial effect to this recommendation, by raising the salaries of the Munsifs to Rs. 200 and 150 in the 1st and 2nd classes respectively. The Secretary of State eventually sanctioned a general increase of pay to the uncovenanted Judges of the Civil Courts in Bengal, the Principal *Sadar Amins* were divided into 2 grades with pay at Rs. 800/ and Rs. 600/, and the *Sadar Amins* and Munsifs into 3 grades at Rs. 400/, 300/, and 250/. By a subsequent Act, XVI of 1868, the office of *Sadar Amin* was abolished, and the new nomenclature of "Subordinate Judge" adopted. In 1862 Government had occasion to appoint a Principal *Sadar Amin* and a Small Cause Court Judge to be additional Judges, temporarily, under the Statute 24 and 25 Vic. c. 64. in the absence of qualified Civilians.

On the 6th August 1861 a Statute was passed (24 and 25 Vic. c. 104) empowering the Crown to establish, by Letters Patent, a High Court at Calcutta. The Supreme Court (established by the Regulating Act 1772-73) and the *Sadar Courts* established by Warren Hastings, viz., the *Sadar Diwani Adalat*, or principal court of civil justice, and the *Sadar Nizamat Adalat* or appellate court of criminal jurisdiction, were at the same time abolished. The High Court exercises the powers and authorities of the abolished courts, i. e., jurisdiction original and appellate, civil and criminal, admiralty, testamentary and intestate, insolvent and matrimonial. Its ordinary original jurisdiction is confined to the Presidency town, thus preserving a distinction which dates from the Charter of 1726. By its extraordinary original jurisdiction and its appellate jurisdiction, it controls all the other Courts of justice, both civil and criminal, within the limits defined by the Letters Patent, which issued on 14th May 1862; the Calcutta High Court commenced to sit on 1st July 1862. The first Chief Justice and 12 Puisne Judges were named in the Letters Patent. On the 28th

High Court established.

December 1865 fresh Letters Patent issued, and further provision was made respecting the jurisdiction of the High Court. The High Court consists of a Chief Justice and as many Judges not exceeding 15 as Her Majesty may think fit to appoint. A list of the Chief Justices and Puisne Judges of the old Supreme Court and *Sadar* Court since 1854, and of the High Court since its establishment, will be found in an Appendix. The foundations of the High Court building, between Government House and Chandpal *ghat*, were commenced in March 1864, and its completion was expected to take 4 years ; it was occupied by the Court in May 1872.

The Bill "*for appointing Municipal Commissioners for the town of Calcutta and for levying rates and taxes in that town*" was read in Council and referred to a Select Committee on the 3rd May 1862. A curious and unlooked for result ensued. On the 3rd January 1863 the Select Committee recommended the withdrawal of the Bill, (and of a concomitant Bill for the conservancy and improvement of the town), being agreed that not only would the scheme proposed be utterly impracticable and unsatisfactory but that it would be almost impossible to provide fit machinery to carry it out. Sir A. Eden (then Secretary) thereupon brought in a totally different measure. Its general principle was "to vest in the Justices of Calcutta, as representatives of the ratepayers, a general control over the government of the town, leaving the executive administration in the hands of a single officer responsible to the Justices. Under such an arrangement, if it should turn out that any work was not carried on in a proper manner, there would be no difficulty in fixing the responsibility, and any evil or error could very soon be rectified. It was clear that all responsibility which was divided must be unreal and impossible to enforce." Accordingly, after the usual stages and discussion in the Legislative Council, the Calcutta Municipality was remodelled by Act VI (B.C.) of 1863, in supersession of the Acts XIV. XXV, and XXVIII of 1856. The new law vested the municipal Government of the town in a Corporation consisting of all the Justices of the Peace for Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa, and all the Justices of the Peace for the Town, with a salaried Chairman to be appointed by Government. All executive authority was vested in the Chairman, but the Justices (all of them appointed by the Lieutenant-Governor, and many of them natives)

received a large measure of financial control, both in regard to taxation and administration. The funds to be raised by the Corporation, by municipal rates and taxes, were to be administered under a system of account and audit; annual Budget estimates of income and expenditure were to be submitted to the Justices by the Chairman. The Corporation (with the sanction of Government) was empowered to carry out a system of drainage and of water-supply, and to construct wharves upon the banks of any river or canal within the town, on any such property becoming vested in them. For works of permanent utility the Corporation (with the sanction of Government) was authorised to raise money by debentures on the security of the rates. Provisions for conservancy &c. were included. The measure was regarded as the first important step towards Self-Government in local administration in Bengal. The Justices, who represented all classes of the community, indicated a cordial desire to co-operate with Government in giving effect to the Act. In anticipation, it may be mentioned that, in course of time, out of about 129 qualified persons, only about 25 took an active part in municipal affairs. Subsequently the British Indian Association complained that the number of native Justices was only  $\frac{1}{3}$  of the number of working European Justices. Practically the native Justices formed about  $\frac{1}{2}$  of those present at the meetings, as many of the European Justices were always absent and could not attend. As a grievance was felt, it was enacted by an amending law that the resident Justices for Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa should no longer be *ex-officio* members of the Municipal Corporation, but that only such of them as might be from time to time specially nominated by the Lieutenant-Governor should be members.

The insanitary state of Calcutta attracted attention in other quarters soon after the passing of the Act of 1863. On the 5th. March 1864 Mr. (afterwards Sir) John Strachey wrote thus, as President of the Sanitary Commission for Bengal :—

Insanitary State  
of the Town.

“For many years past the sanitary condition of Calcutta has been a constant subject of complaint, and this condition has probably never been much worse than it is at the present time. The state even of the southern division of the town, which contains the fine houses of the principal European inhabitants is often most offensive and objectionable,

while with regard to the northern or native division of Calcutta, which contains some hundred thousand people, it is no figure of speech, but the simple truth, to say that no language can adequately describe its abominations. In the filthiest quarters of the filthiest towns that I have seen in other parts of India, or in other countries, I have never seen anything which can be for a moment compared with the filthiness of Calcutta. This is true, not merely of the inferior portions of the town, or of the bye-ways and places inhabited by the poorer classes, but it is true of the principal thoroughfares and of the quarters filled with the houses of the richest and most influential portion of the native community. If a plain unvarnished description of the streets of the northern division of Calcutta, bordered by their horrible open drains, in which almost all the fifth of the city stagnates and putrifies, were given to the people of England, I believe that they would consider the account altogether incredible.

"The condition of the river upon the banks of which Calcutta stands is as abominable as that of the city itself. I need only mention one fact regarding it. More than 5,000 human corpses have been every year thrown from Calcutta into the river which supplies the greater part of the inhabitants with water for all domestic purposes, and which for several miles is covered with shipping as thickly as almost any river in the world. Fifteen hundred corpses have actually been thrown into the river in one year from the Government hospitals alone. That such things should be true seems really to be hardly credible.

"I am aware that measures have now been taken by the Government of Bengal for putting a stop to this shameful practice, but they have only been taken during the last few days, and I have referred to it here because it serves as a good index to the state of things which has hitherto existed. Of the many other ways in which the water of the river is polluted it is not necessary now to speak.

"It is not my wish to attempt to describe in detail the condition of Calcutta. To all who are here upon the spot the facts are notorious. The state of the Capital of British India, one of the greatest and wealthiest cities in the world, is a scandal and a disgrace to a civilized Government. The questions that are involved are not mere questions of ordinary sanitary improvement, such as those which commonly arise in other cities and in other countries. The condition of this city is such that it is literally unfit for the habitation of civilized men. Even if we put aside all questions of public health, and look on the matter as one of common decency, or as one of good Government, the state of Calcutta is disgraceful to the last degree.

"It cannot be too prominently stated that the condition of Calcutta

is not the normal condition of Indian cities. I have seen the most important towns of the N. W. Provinces, of the Panjab, and of the Central Provinces. Their sanitary state is doubtless often in many respects most objectionable, but in comparison with Calcutta they are really almost faultless. There is no apparent reason why the difficulty of keeping Calcutta in at least a tolerable state of cleanliness should be greater than that experienced in other Indian cities. It is true that Calcutta is larger, but on the other hand it is incomparably richer, and it possesses greater natural facilities for carrying out a proper system of conservancy than any which exist in the cities of Northern India. Even, however, if it should be considered that the difficulties of cleaning Calcutta are greater, there is certainly no necessity that there should be such an extraordinary difference as that which actually exists.

"It is often said that nothing effectual can be done for the purification of Calcutta until the great system of drainage now in progress is brought into operation. In reply to this it appears to me quite sufficient to point to the fact that the cities of northern India are kept in a state of at least tolerable cleanliness, and free from all, especially disgusting, nuisances, without any such system of scientific drainage. What is possible there is, beyond the slightest doubt, possible here also."

Sir John Strachey urged that the municipality did not possess the necessary power to enforce sanitation and suggested that it, as the body responsible to the public and to Government for the proper administration of the city, should be vested with full authority over the police. "The municipality should rule the police, not the police the municipality." He advocated also the combination of the two offices of Chairman of the Justices and Commissioner of Police, and that the Chairman should be invested with magisterial and other powers. Sir C. Beadon expressed his thanks for this Minute and took action on it: and in a few months the Chairman of the Justices was appointed to be Commissioner of Police. Sir C. Beadon also carried a measure through the Governor Generals' Legislative Council (Act XXI of 1864) to enable the Calcutta Magistrates (1) to deal summarily with offences against Chapter XIV of the Penal Code, (2) to inflict minor punishments, and (3) to prevent injury to human life, health and safety, and deal generally with local nuisances.

Progress was made in the organisation of the new police in the Patna, Bhagalpur, Chota Nagpur and Burdwan Divisions. The distinctive feature of the new sys-

tem consisted in the detailed management of the police of each district being vested in the District Superintendent and not as previously in the Magistrate, who was left no authority to interfere in the internal organisation and discipline of the force, but he was still to be responsible for the general police administration of the district, (the District Superintendent was to be in effect an aid to the Magistrate for the superintendence of the police in the district). Rules were framed by Government to define the powers of the police officers in their several grades, explain the manner of communication between the Magistrate and police, and recapitulate all the necessary instructions for the working of the force. The military police were gradually disbanded and absorbed into the civil police, their retention having been allowed only as a temporary arrangement until the civil police were completely organised. Various considerations, chiefly arising from changes in the law and the constitution of the police, led to the conclusion that the *dacoity* department should no longer be maintained. While its abolition in Bengal was under contemplation, the separate office in Bihar, which had not realised expectations, was terminated. The whole department was abolished in 1863-64, and absorbed into the new police by the creation of a special detective force. .

In October 1861 Lord Canning's Government published a Resolution regarding the sale of waste lands in fee simple and the redemption of land revenue. An idea prevailed that there would be a great influx of enterprising capitalists who would develop the resources of the land. The proposals of Government were to the effect that all unoccupied waste lands throughout British India should be sold to any buyers at a fixed price of Rs. 2'8 per acre for uncleared, and double that rate per acre for cleared, lands. Within 30 days after an intending purchaser had put in his application any one claiming the property applied for might assert his right to it: if however that period of 30 days elapsed without any claim being advanced the property was to be allotted to the applicant, whose absolute possession was not thereafter to be disturbed, even if a right of property in the land so allotted should be established. Compensation might be awarded to any one proving a title to the land within a year of the sale; but the original possessor was not allowed to have any claim for the restoration of the land,

The Waste  
Lands policy and  
the rules of 1862.

In August 1862, after lengthy despatches between the Secretary of State and the Government of India, rules for the sale of unassessed waste lands and for the redemption of the revenue of such lands already granted for a term of years, were issued by Sir C. Beadon. The principal rules ran as follows :—

“All unassessed waste lands in which no right or proprietorship or exclusive occupancy is known to exist, or to have existed and to be capable of revival, are available for purchase under these rules, unless specially reserved under rule 21.

“No greater quantity of land than 3000 acres shall be sold in one lot except with the express sanction of the Government. If for special reasons, in particular localities, a lower maximum area than 3000 acres should be determined upon, it will be duly notified hereafter.

“Every lot shall be compact and shall include no more than one tract of land in a ring fence ; and when the land touches a public road or a navigable river the length of the road or river frontage shall not exceed  $\frac{1}{2}$  the depth of the lot. No lot will be sold unless it has been previously surveyed and demarcated or until it shall have been surveyed and demarcated in consequence of an application for purchase. The survey need only be in sufficient detail to ensure the ready identification of the boundaries of the lot and to ascertain its gross area. If on completion of the survey it shall appear that the area of the lot applied for exceeds the prescribed maximum, the excess shall be excluded.”

The demand for labour in Assam, Cachar, and Sylhet having been met by the river transport of native labourers to those districts from Bengal, and certain evils, e.g., fearful mortality, having manifested themselves in connection therewith, Act III (B. C.) of 1863 was, after inquiry by a Committee of experts, passed to secure the proper treatment of these persons in transit, and the full comprehension by them of the nature of their contract. The provisions of this Act were such that labourers proceeding to those districts had at several stages to be brought under the observation of officers of Government. Persons contracting to supply labourers, and those who acted as recruiters for engaging them, were required to be licensed by Superintendents of labour transport, who, as well as Medical Inspectors of labourers, were to be appointed by Government. Contractors were directed to maintain, under the inspection of these officers, depots for the reception of labourers, who, on making their engagements with recruiters, were

Labour Emigration.  
t.on.

required to appear with them before a Magistrate, or, if in Calcutta, before a Superintendent. The terms of the engagement were to be explained, and the names of the labourers to be registered, by an officer; and they were to be forwarded to a depot, where they were to be examined by a Medical Inspector. A contract had to be signed by each labourer, and by some one on behalf of his employer, in the presence of the Superintendent, by whom it was to be explained; and an abstract of it had to be registered, and a copy sent to the Magistrate of the district where the service was to be performed. Contracts for a longer period of service than 5 years were prohibited. Provision was made for the licensing and victualling of steamers and boats, carrying parties of labourers and for each party being accompanied by a certain proportion of females. The labourers were to be landed under the supervision of the local Magistrate, assisted if necessary by the Medical Officer of the nearest station. The Magistrate was required to report their arrival, and to make arrangements, if necessary, for forwarding them to the place of their destination.

This Act regulated the manner of engaging and contracting with labourers for the Assam districts and their passage and transport thereto, but had no effect from the moment the labourers arrived at their destinations. It was found that the interference of Government was necessary, as in the case of Colonial Emigration, so long as the contract existed, such interference being required both in the interests of the employer and the labourer. The employer complained that he imported labourers at a very great expense, and that, as soon as they arrived, they refused to work, or left his service; that the punishment for desertion was slight, and carried with it a release from all engagements, and that, therefore, the labourer willingly incurred the liability to punishment in the hope of being set free from his contract. The labourer, on the other hand, declared that he was not paid at the rate which he expected to receive when he agreed to go to those districts; that, when there, he was ill-used and neglected; and he therefore considered himself free from all liability under his contract.

An Act, VI (B. C.) of 1865, was accordingly passed to provide for securing to the labourer, by the contract, a certain minimum monthly rate of wages; for the appointment of Protectors of



Labourers, and of Inspectors; and for the payment of salaries and the maintenance of establishments by means of a rate for each labourer calculated upon the average number of labourers on each estate; for the punishment of the labourer if he refused or neglected work; for the provision of sufficient hospital accommodation and medicines; for the periodical inspection of the estates by the Protectors, and the submission of inspection-reports to Government. It also provided for the apprehension and punishment of deserters and the investigation of complaints, the cancelment of contracts under certain circumstances, and the release therefrom by purchase on payment of a sum of money equivalent to the minimum rate of wages for 2 years, or, if the term of engagement had less than 2 years to run, of a sum equivalent to such rate for the unexpired term.

One of the most important administrative changes of the year 1862-3 was the abandonment by Government of its Salt Manufacture and its final disconnection with the so-called monopoly. The strong prejudice which the people of India had previously maintained against the Liverpool boiled salt had rapidly disappeared before the low prices at which, owing to the cheapness of freights and to the want of other cargoes, English salt had lately been available in the Calcutta markets. Simultaneously with this tendency to increased cheapness in English salt, the manufacture of Government salt showed a constant tendency to become more expensive; and at the commencement of 1862-63 Liverpool salt had, in consequence, complete possession of the market. It was pointed out at the same time that, so long as Government salt was sold at cost price, in addition to a fixed duty which was the same for all descriptions of salt, the Government would be in no degree pecuniarily interested in their manufactured salt being consumed in preference to that exported from Liverpool, while, on the other hand, it was obviously for the benefit of the community that the cheapest salt should be also the most widely consumed. These considerations all tended to the conclusion that Government might ultimately dissolve its connection with the salt manufacturer; but, in regard to the possibly temporary nature of the causes which led to the unprecedentedly low prices of Liverpool salt, and on the other hand to the obligations which Government had by engaging

in the manufacture incurred of providing a sufficient supply of salt to meet all contingencies, it was considered expedient not to retire too suddenly from the manufacture, but greatly to contract it, and, while ensuring a supply equal to the sales of the past year, to allow the foreign salt trade every facility for establishing itself on a firm and permanent basis.

With this object in view, in deciding upon the course to be adopted in the manufacturing season of 1862-63, it was determined that the Chittagong salt agency should be closed; the Hooghly and Tamluk agencies were united under one officer; the manufacture of *karkach* or solar evaporated salt was stopped; and of boiled salt the manufacture was limited to 9,00,000 maunds. Rules were at the same time drawn up to enable private persons to continue the manufacture, should they wish to do so, under the excise system, and to transfer to them such portions of the salt agency lands no longer required by Government as might be applied for. The manufacture of the season was ordered to be closed as speedily as possible, and it was announced that it would not be reopened in the current year.

Government thus definitely abandoned a system which, from its first establishment by Lord Clive, in the shape of a pure monopoly, had lasted with various modifications almost a century; and the goal which the Parliamentary Committee of 1836 distinctly pointed out as the final object of the principle they laid down in determining the system under which Government salt was to be priced, viz, the ultimate displacement of the Government manufacture by imported salt, had after 27 years been fully attained.

In the cold weather of 1862-3 active operations were continued against the Khasia rebels, as they had failed to understand the pacific measures adopted for the settlement of the country. The rebels were altogether unable to make head against the force brought to bear on them: on the 25th December the chief leader and instigator of the rebellion was captured. Before the end of March the Commissioner reported the rising to be at an end. Measures were taken for the introduction of civilization and order among the Khasias. *Inter alia*, the superiority of Shillong over Cherrapunji as the chief civil station of the Khasia and Jaintia hills was recognised, and it was adopted as the sanitarium and military station of Assam.

On the Assam frontier, friendly relations were established with the Abors; measures were taken with the Angami Frontier tribes.

Nagas, to prevent the recurrence of outrages on British subjects: the Chittagong Hill Tracts were being brought into order by the newly appointed Superintendent; but the Howlong and Sylhoo tribes of Kukis still held aloof; rejecting all overtures towards amity, they looked on the presents offered by the Superintendent as magic gifts intended to bewitch them, and requiring to be aired in the wind before they could be safely accepted. No dependence could be placed on the good faith of the savages generally, and after all Government had to depend for the preservation of peace chiefly on the maintenance of an efficient line of semi-military posts on the frontier. The Shindus of the trans-frontier raided and massacred unoffending villagers and wood-cutters: while the Kukis refused to release British subjects whom they were said to hold captive: at the same time the existence of a trade for supplying the Kukis with arms and ammunition came to light. A survey of the hill country between the plains and the frontier tribes was completed and Sir C. Beadon authorised the immediate construction of roads, to connect the military posts and afford means of general communication.

In 1863-4 the Nagas raided on Cachar, but the Kukis made no attempts on the villages of the Chittagong frontier: negotiations were entered into with a Kuki chief named Sukpoilal, to induce him to release a number of British subjects from captivity. In subsequent years there was continual trouble, or fear of trouble, with the frontier tribes. At one time it was caused by the Nagas, at another by the Shindus, the Kukis for the most part remaining quiet: the police posts were strengthened, and attempts renewed to recover the captives. Before undertaking an expedition into the unexplored jungles inhabited by the Lushais, efforts were made from both the Cachar and Chittagong sides to obtain some knowledge of the geography of the region.

Vernacular Education received a fresh impetus from Sir C. Beadon. Normal schools were established at Burdwan, Krishnagar and Jessore, for the purpose of training masters for elementary village schools, under the scheme for Vernacular Education originally devised by Sir J. P. Grant. This

scheme had received several important modifications, as experience had been gained: its general object was the improvement of the indigenous schools of the country by the offer of money rewards to the *gurus*. The plan consisted of the villages, where there were *pathsalas* sending their *guru*, or some suitable person, to the training school, with a monthly stipend, under reciprocal agreement that the *pathsala* and their nominee should work together after the course of training. The normal schools were easily filled.

The Secretary of State in July 1864, reviewing the reports of the Director of Public Instruction in Bengal for the 3 years 1860-1 to 1862-63 wrote :

"The least effective part of the operations of the educational department in Bengal has always been that which relates to the elementary education of the people. In the so-called "Vernacular" schools an insignificant number only received instruction, and it has been the opinion of many of those who took the warmest interest in the subject that the improvement of existing indigenous schools was the most likely means of extending to the people generally the opportunity of receiving an education directed to their station and circumstances. The circle system, founded on this basis and introduced into Bengal by Mr. Woodrow, seems to have produced some effect; but the measure which promises to be most effective is that which has been in operation for the last 3 years, under which masters are trained for indigenous schools in normal establishments expressly provided for them, and a small stipend is added by Government to the salaries of all those masters who successfully pass their examination when they are placed in charge of their schools. I have perused with much interest the report of Babu Bhudeb Mukerji the Inspector specially appointed to superintend the working of this system."

In connection with Education it may be mentioned that in 1863-4 Sir C. Beadon induced the Government of India to sanction, as a Government Institution, under a Principal the Industrial school of Arts which had been founded in 1854 by a number of gentlemen designated 'the Society for the promotion of Industrial Art,' as the school had become practically dependent on Government. The objects of the school were to introduce among the natives an improved taste and an appreciation of the true principles of Art, in matters both of decoration and utility, and to supply Draftsmen, Designers, Engineers, Modellers, Lithographers, Engravers &c., to meet the demand for them in this country.

The railways in Bengal reached a stage of completion about this time. At the end of 1861-2, 379 miles of the East Indian Railway were open to Monghyr (with branches): on the 5th January 1863 the Viceroy officially opened the extension to Rajghat, opposite Benares. A direct line from Raniganj to Lakhisarai was under consideration. On the 15th November 1862 the Eastern Bengal line was opened through to Kushtia for general traffic, and the Calcutta and South Eastern Line to Canning Town was opened on the 15th May 1863.

A very fatal epidemic had of late years shown itself in some of the villages of the Presidency and Burdwan Divisions, but the steps taken to afford relief, viz., the appointment of native doctors and the gratuitous distribution of medicine, failed to check its progress. Towards the close of 1862 a special officer, Dr. J. Elliot was deputed to visit the affected districts. He traced the progress of the disease, from the Jessore and Nadia districts to Hooghly, Barasat and Burdwan, and explained the various predisposing causes which enabled an ordinary epidemic fever to become a scourge, less virulent but in its effects not less desolating than cholera. The disease was described as differing only in its intensity from the ordinary form of malarious fever, "being of a more congestive character than the ordinary intermittent, but presenting all the grades of severity between the remittent and intermittent types," and its excessive virulence in these districts was attributed solely to villages being undrained, houses unventilated, tanks uncleaned and overgrown with noxious weeds, and to the tangled growth of jungle and rank vegetation with which the Bengali loves to surround and to obscure his dwelling.

The mortality from the epidemic fever arising from this sanitary neglect had in some villages amounted to 60 per cent of the population: and, in the presence of this constantly recurring visitation the remnant who had escaped immediate death lingered on in a state of apathy and despair, unable to help themselves, and destined, unless vigorous external aid was afforded them, to fall certain victims to the fever which had already nearly depopulated the neighbourhood. Government at once proceeded to carry out the remedial measures proposed by Dr. Elliot, namely, the removal of superabundant and useless trees, shrubs, bamboo clumps, and plantain groves, from the

immediate vicinity of houses; the pruning and thinning of trees; the removal of trees and bamboos from the sides of tanks; the uprooting and burning of low bushy jungle, vegetation, and rank grass; the deepening and cleaning of the larger tanks, and the filling-in of all useless tanks, water-courses, and other excavations in the neighbourhood of houses; the appropriation of particular tanks exclusively for the supply of drinking water; the construction of a few drains and paths in each village; and the proper ordering of burial-grounds and burning-ghats. This is one of the first notices of the so-called "Burdwan" fever which recurred again several years after this date, and will be mentioned in due course. It not only carried off its victims in large numbers, but the health of the whole population appeared to be deteriorated thereby. The sanguine hopes that were entertained in 1862-3 of the measures adopted were never realized. The fever was, generally speaking, an unusual phase of the malarial fever from which Lower Bengal is never free. The efforts of Government to mitigate its ravages were to some extent successful: after a time it appeared to die away of itself. But in 1863-4 this epidemic fever again appeared. The sanitary measures ordered had, wherever carried out with tolerable efficiency, greatly mitigated the intensity of the scourge, but they failed generally through the want of willing co-operation on the part of the people and their *zamindars*, and this again was owing to their inability to understand that a comparatively new visitation like the epidemic could be in any way connected with the unwholesome state of the villages, which was assuredly no new thing. A special Commission drew up a Report on the subject, containing a full and complete account of the nature, history, and probable causes of the disease, and offering some valuable suggestions for dealing with it. The epidemic was described as a congestive remittent fever, running its course to a fatal termination, usually with great rapidity and, where not at once fatal, leaving the patient so shattered as to be generally unable to resist a recurrence of the attack. So fatal was it that no less than 30 per cent. of the whole population of the affected area were carried off by it. The Commission came to the conclusion that the miasma, which was the immediate cause of the disease, was the result of the great dampness of the earth's surface, and that this damp had been intensified to an unusual degree of late years owing

to the fact that there had been a gradual filling up of the *bils* by the deposit brought in from rivers, and that this again had been supplemented by a gradual, but continuous, rise in the level of the river-bed itself, thus causing a general derangement of levels so as seriously to affect the natural drainage of the country. The remedies proposed were—an improved system of drainage throughout the country, the burning of weeds, dried grass, and jungle in the villages, especially at night time; the filling-up of the small and filthy holes and clearing of the larger pools and tanks in the villages; and the removal of low brushwood and the thick accumulations of fallen leaves and branches. It was proposed that steps should be taken for a supply of pure drinking water, by reserving certain tanks under the charge of the police for drinking water only, and by the erection, if possible, of public filters. The Commission insisted very strongly on the necessity of stringent measures being taken in all larger villages for the proper disposal of dead bodies. They condemned the practices of uneducated medicine-vendors who went about the villages making money out of the ignorance of the people by the sale of drugs of the nature of which they equally were ignorant, and suggested the registration of qualified practitioners. It is on record that “the epidemic fever disappeared entirely after the cyclone of 1864, and there was no return of it in 1865 to attract attention.” But it reappeared in 1866 and 1867.

The most important legislation of the year 1864 was Act III (B. C.), the district Municipal improvement Act, <sup>Mufassal Muni-</sup> cipalities. (which was again amended in 1867). The previous Act, XXVI of 1850, had failed because few towns in Bengal made the necessary application for its extension thereto, and because the powers in it were insufficient to enforce sanitary rules. Act III was intended mainly for large towns, but it enabled Government to establish a municipal system by appointing Municipal Commissioners for any town, station or suburb not within Calcutta, including if necessary adjacent tracts of country, without application from the inhabitants. Not less than 7 of the inhabitants, to be nominated by Government, together with the Commissioner of the Division, the District Magistrate, the Superintendent of Police and the Executive Engineer, all *ex-officio*, were to be Municipal Commissioners.

with the Magistrate as Chairman. The Act provided for the main taxation on houses, buildings and land, but gave power to tax also carriages, carts, horses, trades, &c.; it also authorized works of improvement and the borrowing of money for permanent works of public utility. The Commissioners were to provide the whole cost of the police, besides attending to communications and conservancy. They generally received from Government the proceeds of ferries, tolls and pounds, on condition of managing them. The Act was applied to several towns forthwith, and to others in subsequent years.

The Government of India having directed that the productions of the Native Press should be carefully examined, that all matters of political importance contained in them might at once be brought to the notice of Government, and materials be at the same time collected for an annual report on the Native Press, the Lieutenant-Governor entrusted the duty of examining and reporting on all native periodicals, &c., published in Bengal to the Revd. J. Robinson, Bengali Translator to Government, who was also directed to prepare and submit an annual Report on the operation of the system. The Reports submitted by Mr. Robinson dealt only with papers published in the native languages, all papers written by natives in the English language being examined by the Secretaries. Copies of Mr. Robinson's weekly abstracts were forwarded regularly to the Government of India and to the Secretary of State, and inquiry was frequently made as to the truth of the statements published by these papers.

The Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain having applied for assistance in rendering a knowledge of the current literature of India available to scholars in Europe, the Secretary of State directed that a catalogue of the works already published in India should be prepared and an annual Return of all new books and pamphlets furnished. The work, which had been partly done by the Rev. J. Long, was continued by Mr. Robinson. As a part of the general scheme, a Bengali Library, to contain all the most important and interesting books published in the vernacular, was established by Government and located in the Bengal Secretariat.

Sir C. Beadon proposed and matured in 1862-3 a scheme for holding a public Agricultural Exhibition on the ground adjoining Belvedere, with a view to promote

The  
Bengal Library.

Agricultural Ex-  
hibition.



an improved system of agriculture throughout the country, and more especially to enlist the interests of the *zamindars* in it. It was to be conducted under the general direction of Government with the assistance and co-operation of the Agricultural and Horticultural Society of India. Its immediate object was to bring together, from all parts of the country, for the purposes of show, competition, and eventual sale, cattle and other live stock, agricultural implements and machinery, and all kinds of produce. It was anticipated that the show would be self-supporting, and that the expense of it would be covered by the sale of admission tickets to the public. The funds required at the outset were advanced by Government.

To carry out the details of the Exhibition, arrange preliminaries, and communicate with intending exhibitors, a provisional Committee was appointed, composed partly of members of the Agricultural and Horticultural Society of India, and partly of Government officers and others interested. The Commissioners of Divisions were directed to appoint Local Committees in each district, to explain the objects of, and the benefits expected to result from, such an exhibition to the landholders, and endeavour to obtain their co-operation and assistance. Ample time was given to exhibitors to prepare for the occasion. It was intended, if the Exhibition realized the expectations of the Lieutenant-Governor, to repeat it annually, either at Calcutta, or elsewhere within Bengal.

The Exhibition was opened at Alipore on the 18th January 1864 by Sir John Lawrence ; it was his first public appearance as Viceroy: he spoke of the backwardness of Indian Agriculture, and of the desirability of encouraging it by such means as Exhibitions. The Alipore Exhibition remained open for a fortnight. The articles exhibited were arranged in 3 great classes, viz., (1) live stock, (2) machinery and implements, and (3) produce. The general interest taken in the Exhibition was evinced by the numerous contributions received from all parts of Bengal and from many other places in India, as well as by the great concourse of all classes, European and native, who assembled on the occasion. The number of admission tickets sold was 42,348, including season-tickets, the holders of which must have visited the yard more than once. On the last day the public were admitted free of charge, and the number who passed the entrance gates was 26,419. It was calculated that

not less than 70,000 people visited the Exhibition during the fortnight that it remained open. Considering the novelty of the undertaking, the vague and mistaken impressions that prevailed as to its nature and objects, and the little attention previously paid to the improvements of stock, the show of horses, cattle, sheep, and poultry was creditable. A great variety of produce, chiefly grain and pulse, teas, and fibres was exhibited; and the native implements from Burma attracted much attention. But by far the most interesting department of the Exhibition was the machinery imported from Europe, comprising oil mills, flour mills, threshing machines, steam ploughs, centrifugal and other pumps, tea-making machines, cotton and jute-presses, and many other implements useful for purposes of agriculture and agricultural commerce in India. The steam plough trials were well attended, and excited much interest among the native *samindars* who witnessed them. The expenditure connected with the Exhibition amounted to Rs. 1,16,540 and the receipts to Rs. 86,627, leaving a balance of nearly Rs. 30,000 to be defrayed by the State.

The success of the Exhibition and the strong desire expressed in many quarters that it should be repeated induced Sir C. Beadon to recommend to the Government of India that there should be local agricultural shows for live stock and the products of agricultural labour every year, in different parts of the country, the primary object being to encourage improved methods of culture and care in the breeding of cattle. As a necessary complement of these annual Divisional shows it was proposed by Sir C. Beadon and sanctioned by the Government of India that there should be a central Exhibition in Calcutta for live stock and agricultural implements every 3 years and a general Exhibition for agricultural machinery and all other products of Industrial Art in 1869-70. In the cold weather of 1864-5, agricultural shows were held in 8 of the Divisions of Bengal (and Assam). They were all without exception most popular and successful and were carried out entirely, or almost entirely, by the people themselves without any cost to Government. Sir C. Beadon himself opened the shows at Tirhut, Bhagulpur and Burdwan, and took the opportunity of expressing his satisfaction at the ready manner in which the importance of the Exhibitions had been recognised not only by the officials but also by

the *zamindars* and the people, and of explaining their aim and object, urging the necessity of supplementing them with agricultural associations whereby the knowledge gained at the Exhibition might be diffused and put to a practical purpose. Agricultural shows were held again in 1865-66, in the Divisions which were free from scarcity, but after that they seem to have died out. It was said that, though the first Exhibition had some educational effect upon the natives, its influence in improving their agriculture was inappreciable.

The practice of throwing dead bodies into the river in and near Calcutta was one which Government had long desired to stop. In 1854 an attempt was made to prevent it by legislation, but it was ascertained that such a prohibition would be regarded as an interference with the religious observances of the natives, and the idea of stopping the practice was consequently abandoned. Government was obliged to content itself with employing an establishment, under the Commissioner of Police, to sink as many floating bodies as they could find on the river opposite Calcutta. The arrangement was necessarily incomplete, as many corpses escaped the vigilance of the police : and both above and below the town, as well as on the tidal creeks leading to the river, bodies both of men and animals continued to float up and down with each tide, repulsive to sight, smell and decency. One of the consequences of the epidemic fever in the Presidency and Burdwan Divisions was that the number of human bodies floating down the river to Calcutta increased ; the establishment proved insufficient : the state of the river attracted general attention, and Government determined to take immediate action. Before 1862 there was no law under which the intolerable nuisance above described could be effectually prevented : but the Penal Code contained a section under which the practice might be dealt with as a common nuisance. The principal source of the evil was traced to the burning places at Nimtala *ghat* and Kasi Mitter's *ghat*, in the centre of the native town, where it was usual for Hindus to bring their dead for cremation, but where a larger proportion of the corpses, instead of being burnt, were either at once thrown into the river, or consigned for dissection to the Medical College hospital, to be afterwards disposed of in the same way. The recent Calcutta Municipal Act, VI (B. C.) of 1863 had empowered the Justices

The floating  
corpses and burning  
*ghat* nuisances.

of the Peace, selected from all classes of the community, to certify with the sanction of Government that these burning places were dangerous to the health of persons living in the neighbourhood, and thereupon to close them. Sir C. Beadon accordingly deemed it proper to prohibit absolutely the practice of throwing bodies of men and animals into the river, as the practice could be prevented at once by law: and he addressed the Justices, requesting them to give their immediate attention to the necessity of stopping the practice of burning the dead within the limits of the town or on the banks of the river, where the practice was a nuisance to the populous neighbourhood, and also to prevent the skinning of animals at Nimtala *ghat* or elsewhere. He expressed a strong opinion as to the character and evil consequence of these nuisances, and it was intimated to the Justices that a place on the bank of Tolly's *nala* which, in native estimation, is the real course of the sacred Bhagirathi, would be assigned for the purposes of a burning-*ghat*. The subject was first considered by a Committee of the Justices, who reported that, although the removal of the burning-*ghat* at Nimtala would be an improvement, yet that it should not be removed, because its removal to Kasi Mitter's *ghat* would be inconvenient to persons residing near the former place, and because it was not a nuisance. The Committee entirely approved of the removal of the skinning-*ghat*, and of the prevention of the practice of throwing corpses into the river, and recommended that the bodies of paupers should be burned at the expense of the town. This Report was adopted by the Justices at a full meeting, after a warm discussion, and by a very small majority; and they further resolved to appoint a Special Committee to devise means for making the burning of dead bodies, where the *ghats* stood, as unobjectionable as possible.

The result was reported to Government by the Chairman and the Justices were informed in reply that Sir C. Beadon regarded the appointment of a Committee to mitigate the nuisance as a decidedly forward step, and hoped that the Committee's Report would enable the Justices to deal with the question of the burning-*ghats* in a more satisfactory way afterwards. Sir C. Beadon entertained no doubt whatever that in the course of a few years these standing nuisances would be removed by

the spontaneous action of the Justices themselves, and that, as the native Justices had unanimously condemned the practice of throwing corpses into the river, a practice the proposed suppression of which 10 years previous an eminent Hindu gentleman declared would be regarded as a violation of the Hindu religion, they would be equally unanimous in voting for the removal of the burning-*ghats* from the centre of the town to some suitable place beyond the suburbs, where cremation might be effected without violence to the feelings of the public, or injury to the health of the City.

On the 5th October 1864, Calcutta and the neighbouring districts were visited by a hurricane of unprecedented violence, commonly remembered as the Cyclone of that date. The gale had its origin somewhere about the Andamans, travelled from that point in a westerly direction, and, inclining towards the north, struck the coast of Bengal about the Balasore Roads and Hijli. Here during the night of the 4th it raged with great force, and hence the centre of the storm appears to have travelled northerly, inclining eastward along the right bank of the Hooghly at a pace varying from 8 to 26 miles an hour. The full violence of the storm was felt at Calcutta from 10 a.m. to 4 p.m. on the 5th. Between 11 and 12 o'clock, a noise like that of distant thunder gave warning, as it gradually increased, that something worse was coming. In about 2 minutes the cyclone was upon the town. According to the observations at the Meteorological Observatory, the wind which had been blowing from N. E. suddenly veered at 9 a.m. to E. raging very strongly and in great gusts, varying in pressure from 5 to 32 lbs. per square foot, till about 2 p.m., when the wind shifted to S. E. The gale was accompanied by heavy driving rain. At 11 a.m. the barometer stood at 29.46 inches, gradually and continuously descended to 28.80 inches at 2 p.m. and rose at 6 p.m. to 29.66 inches. The storm crossed the Ganges between Rampur Boalia and Pabna, swept the whole length of the Bogra district, and curved to the eastward when it had reached 25° N., after which it became expended in the Garo hills. While the violence of the wind caused widespread destruction to houses and trees, the storm-wave brought up by the gale carried havoc over the country to a distance of 8 miles inland on either side of the river. This wave rose in some places to a height of 30 feet, sweeping over

the strongest embankments, flooding the crops with salt water, carrying away entire villages, and in its effects was more disastrous than the violent wind. The town and suburbs of Calcutta suffered greatly, especially the northern part of the town where the native huts were blown down in great numbers. About 17 persons were killed in the town, and 32 in the suburbs, by falling houses and trees: over 100 masonry houses were destroyed and 500 to 600 damaged: about 40,600 tiled and straw huts were ruined or injured. The roads were obstructed by the fallen trees and the water in the tanks was rendered less wholesome by the leaves &c., swept into them.

The gale was felt severely at Hooghly, Serampore, Kalna, Krishnagar, Rampur Boalia, Pabna, and Bogra, where the jail was blown down: many of the Government buildings at those places were greatly damaged.

But the principal agent of destruction was the storm-wave. Only after its force was expended by being spread over a wide extent of country and after it had arrived near Achipur, within 20 miles of Calcutta, was the wave so far diminished as to be confined in the main between the actual river banks. Had the embankments below been large and strong enough to keep the wave within their boundaries, the result to Calcutta would have been infinitely more disastrous than it was, and the total destruction of life and property would have been immeasurably greater. The reports from the districts affected by the storm-wave showed terrible losses of life and property: in Howrah nearly 2,000 persons and 12,000 head of cattle were returned as killed or drowned: in Midnapore over 20,000 persons were said to have perished, and 40,000 head of cattle: in the 24-*Parganas*, 12,000 persons and 80 per cent of the cattle. At Daulatpur (in the Midnapore district) the wave was 30 feet in height, and above the Rasalpur river it rose still higher. At Saugor island, it was 15 feet above land-level, and appeared to cut a channel straight across the island, dividing it into 2 halves. Saugor island, in fact, suffered perhaps more severely than any other portion of the tract inundated. The embankments, all the houses, huts, *golas* and buildings, were destroyed: scarcely a living creature was left. A few human beings escaped, by climbing up trees, or floating on the roofs of their houses, which the wave swept away and carried

many miles inland. Out of a population of nearly 6,000, less than 1500 survived: 7000 cattle were drowned. At Diamond Harbour the wave was 11 feet high. The villages on either side suffered more or less: in some every house was swept away with most of the inhabitants. The Government buildings sustained severe damage. The distress and suffering to which the survivors in the affected tracts were exposed after the disaster were very great. For several days food was not obtainable, the local stores had been swept away, and relief could not be sent from Calcutta. In some places, a kind of grass was eaten as food, and at others which escaped the storm-wave the stores of the rice merchants were broken open and plundered.

But by far the greatest harm done by the Cyclone was the damage caused to the shipping in the river. On the 5th October there were 195 vessels within the limits of the Calcutta Port. They withstood the force of the wind with success: but when to this, at about 1 P. M., was added the storm-wave, the force of which was still not entirely spent, one vessel after another broke from her moorings, and, as each ship was swept on, she fouled others in her course, and they, carrying others with them, getting massed in hopeless and inextricable confusion, were driven in heaps on the Sumatra Sand and along the Howrah shore from Shibpur to Ghosery. (There was no bridge between Calcutta and Howrah in 1864). Ten vessels were sunk in the river and 145 driven on shore. The *Govindpore*, a new ship of 1200 tons, capsized and sank off the Custom-House: the crew were saved by the gallantry of a sailor named Cleary, who swam off to the wreck with a line, by means of which the crew clinging to her masts escaped to shore. The *Ally* met the gale a little below Diamond Harbour. She had on board 348 coolie emigrants for the Mauritius, and went down with all on board save 7 of the crew and 22 emigrants. Six tug steamers were lost. The P. and O. Co's *Hindustan*, an old hulk, broke loose, turned over and went down off Garden Reach: their mail steamer *Bengal* stranded on the opposite side of the river, but was got off without serious damage: the Burma mail-steamer foundered off the Sand-heads with nearly all hands: a hospital ship was carried on to the top of the Diamond Harbour embankment. Two light vessels were lost with all hands. Many smaller vessels were more or less

seriously injured. Three salt ships foundered, others threw away their cargoes ; many smaller boats sank : altogether the destruction of salt was very large. At 6 p. m. the Strand Road was flooded throughout, and in places the water stood breasthigh. On land very extensive injury was inflicted on the public works and buildings in the Presidency Circle, including those in Fort William, at Barrackpore and Dum Dum. The avenues in Fort William and the Botanic Garden were destroyed : the Eden Gardens were turned into a wilderness : the Barrackpore Park lost 50 per cent of its valuable trees, and the avenue on the Barrackpore road was even worse injured. The emigration depots were wrecked, but there was little loss of life there. The roof of St. Paul's Cathedral was completely torn off, and the building presented a ruinous appearance. The roof of the Free School was blown away : so also the minarets of the Dharmtala mosque, and many roofs, steeples and elevated buildings.

Relief measures were promptly adopted. The district officers of the 24-*Parganas*, Midnapore and Howrah lost no time in sending out supplies of rice for the starving population and in providing for the burial of the dead, and the removal of the carcasses of animals, and other substances likely to injure the public health. Measures were taken for the clearance of tanks and the removal of salt water. Sir C. Beadon deputed a special officer to proceed in charge of the supplies and to direct the relief operations. He also authorised the continuance of the relief measures until the people could provide means of subsistence for themselves. Work was offered to the whole population in the repair of embankments on ordinary wages without a strict exaction of tasks. The Marine Department at once despatched steamers to render aid to distressed vessels and their crews, and to visit and relieve the river stations. Sir C. Beadon directed that the whole of the sea-coast should be examined and as far as possible all the creeks in the Sundarbans also. A public meeting was called to organise relief measures, and the subscriptions to the relief fund soon exceeded 3 *lakhs*. By the middle of November the people were generally resuming their occupations, but in Saugor island and on the west of the river they were fed by charity for some time as no work was procurable. The tanks, even those flooded with salt water,



soon recovered their freshness by natural process. The storm was declared by old Calcutta residents to have surpassed those of 1842 and May 1852 in intensity. A daily journal referred to the hurricane of the 11th and 12th October 1737 in which about 30,000 were said to have perished, and the Ganges to have risen 43 feet higher than usual.

Subsequent reports showed that the losses caused by the storm wave of 1864, inundating an area of 1500 sq. miles, amounted as follows :—Human beings, 47,800 ; Cattle, 136,000 ; Shipping, Rs. 1,00,00,000 ; Government standing property, Rs. 8,50,000 ; Private standing property, beyond computation. In 1865 the Government of India called for a Report on the exact nature of the protection hitherto given to the country at the mouth of the Hooghly on both banks from inundation from the river or the sea, and as to the feasibility of affording complete protection of that region against irruptions of cyclone waves by a sea-dyke like that constructed in the Balasore district. The Astronomer Royal and other distinguished scientific officers were consulted. Their opinions generally concurred in the view that the construction of such embankments would materially increase the elevation and force of a stormwave in the upper channels of the river. The Lieutenant-Governor (Sir W. Grey) of the time was of opinion that the subject of protecting the districts bordering the Hooghly should be further considered, and, if the project of embanking these districts were decided upon, arrangements should be simultaneously made for providing protection for Calcutta. The Government of India thought the collation of more facts was necessary to admit of a decision of any weight being given, and that a special study of the actual rise and fall of the tides in various parts of the Hooghly under various circumstances was the first essential towards arriving at any sound conclusion. They called for a definite proposal for undertaking a series of such observations and thought it desirable to obtain all possible information before either abandoning the scheme of embanking the river or embarking on the large expenditure which its execution must involve. The subject as a whole appears to have dropped, as no general scheme of embankments exists, though there are embankments on both sides of the river. Tidal observations were carried out for all India many years later.

The relations of Government with the Bhutan Government continued to be unsettled and unsatisfactory. The latter failed to send messengers to explain their views and, as the outrages which for a series of years had been committed by subjects of the Bhutan Government within British territory and Kuch Bihar and Sikhim did not cease, Sir C. Beadon urged the Government of India to carry out its expressed intention of sending an Envoy to Tassisudan in Bhutan for the amicable adjustment of all pending matters of dispute and to revise and improve the relations existing between the 2 Governments. The reasons for sending a Mission remained, in his opinion, as cogent as ever but it was found impossible to despatch one in 1862-3. Subsequently, Sir A. Eden was selected by the Viceroy for the office and furnished with instructions for his guidance by the Government of India. He left for Bhutan by Darjeeling and Dalimkote, towards the close of 1863, accompanied by Captain Godwin Austen as his Assistant, Dr. (Sir) Benjamin Simpson as Medical Officer, Cheeboo Lama as Interpreter, and an escort of 100 men under the command of Captain Lance. The Envoy was charged by the Governor-General with proposals of a conciliatory character, being at the same instructed to demand the surrender of the captives taken and the restoration of the property plundered from British territory, and also that security should be given for the future peace of the frontier. Every obstacle was put in his way, and he pressed on with the greatest difficulty to Punakha. The overtures made were, however, rejected by the Government of Bhutan, and not only were restitution for the past and security for the future refused, but the Envoy was insulted in open *darbar* and compelled, as the only means of ensuring the safe return of the Mission, to sign under protest a document for the renunciation of the Bhutan Duars situated on the Assam Frontier, which were the property of Bhutan, but which were administered by our officers, a payment of Rs. 10,000 being made to the Bhutan Government as the revenue of the tract in question. It appeared that the Deb and Dharm Rajas of Bhutan were mere puppets, and that the Tongso Penlow had usurped the chief power in the State: it was he and his faction who treated Sir A. Eden with indignity. There was no real Government in the country. With difficulty Sir A. Eden and his party left the capital during the night, and returned to Darjeeling in April 1864.

This treatment of our Envoy led to the annual payment hitherto made to the Bhutan Government on account of the Assam Duars being withheld, and to the formal annexation of Ambari Falakata, which had long been in the occupation of the British Government. Still anxious to avoid an open rupture, the Government of India addressed at the same time a formal demand to the Deb and Dharm Rajas for the release of the captives detained against their will, and for the restoration of the property carried off within the last 5 years; but, this being only met by an evasive reply from the Dharm Raja, it was determined by the Government of India to annex the Bengal Duars and so much of the hill territory including the fort of Dalingkote (i. e. Dalinkote), Pasaka, and Dewangiri, as might be necessary to command the passes and to prevent a repetition of hostile and predatory incursions into the plains below.

A Proclamation to this effect was issued by the Government of India on the 12th of November 1864 in the following terms:—

“For many years past outrages have been committed by subjects of the Bhutan Government within British territory, and in the territories of the Rajas of Sikhim and Kuch Bihar. In these outrages property has been plundered and destroyed, lives have been taken, and many innocent persons have been carried into and are still held in captivity.

The British Government, ever sincerely desirous of maintaining friendly relations with the neighbouring States, and especially mindful of the obligations imposed on it by the Treaty of 1774, has endeavoured from time to time, by conciliatory remonstrance, to induce the Government of Bhutan to punish the perpetrators of these crimes, to restore the plundered property, and to liberate the captives. But such remonstrances have never been successful, and, even when followed by serious warning, have failed to produce any satisfactory result. The British Government has been frequently deceived by vague assurances and promises for the future but no property has ever been restored, no captive liberated, no offender punished, and the outrages have continued.

In 1863 the Government of India, being averse to the adoption of extreme measures for the protection of its subjects and dependent allies, despatched a special Mission to the Bhutan Court, charged with proposals of a conciliatory character, but instructed to demand the surrender of all captives, the restoration of plundered property, and security for the future peace of the frontier.

This pacific overture was insolently rejected by the Government of

Bhutan. Not only were restitution for the past and security for the future refused, but the British Envoy was insulted in open *darbar* and compelled, as the only means of ensuring the safe return of the Mission, to sign a document which the Government of India could only instantly repudiate.

For this insult the Governor-General in Council determined to withhold for ever the annual payments previously made to the Bhutan Government on account of the revenues of the Assam Duars and Ambari Falakata, which had long been in the occupation of the British Government, and annexed those districts permanently to British Territory. At the same time, still anxious to avoid a open rupture, the Governor-General in Council addressed a letter to the Deb and Dharm Rajas formally demanding that all captives detained in Bhutan against their will should be released, and that all property carried off during the last 5 years should be restored.

To this demand the Government of Bhutan has returned an evasive reply, from which can be gathered no hope that the just requisitions of the Government of India will ever be complied with, or that the security of the frontier can be provided for otherwise than by depriving the Government of Bhutan and its subjects of the means and opportunity of future aggression.

The Governor-General in Council has therefore reluctantly resolved to occupy permanently and annex to British territory the Bengal Duars of Bhutan, and so much of the Hill territory including the Forts of Dalingkote, Pasaka, and Dewangiri, as may be necessary to command the passes, and to prevent the hostile or predatory incursions of Bhutanese into the Darjeeling District or into the plains below. A military force amply sufficient to occupy this tract and to overcome all resistance has been assembled on the frontier, and will now proceed to carry out this resolve.

All chiefs, *zamindars*, *mandals*, *rai-yats*, and other inhabitants of the tract in question are hereby required to submit to the authority of the British Government, to remain quietly in their homes, and to render assistance to the British troops and to the Commissioner who is charged with the administration of the tract. Protection of life and property and a guarantee of all private rights is offered to those who do not resist, and strict justice will be done to all. The lands will be moderately assessed, and all oppression and extortion will be absolutely prohibited. The future boundary between the territories of the Queen of England and those of Bhutan will be surveyed and marked off; and the authority of the Government of Bhutan within this boundary will cease for ever.

Accordingly, a military force of sufficient strength assembled

under the orders of the Military Department to advance simultaneously in 4 columns to carry out the measure and take up posts at Dewangiri, Sidli, Pasakha and Dalingkote. No overtures from the Bhutan Government were to be admitted except on condition amounting to their submission. Brigadier Generals Mulcaster and Dunsford, c. b. were in command. The opposition made by the Bhutias, though at one time much exaggerated, was generally of the most contemptible kind. They were found to be efficient only in throwing up stockades and offering resistance from behind them ; but in the plains they proved to be as despicable a foe as could well be conceived. The fortresses named in the Proclamation were taken possession of with the greatest ease, Dalingkote being taken on the 6th December, Pasaka on the 7th, and the whole of the Duars was completely occupied by the middle of January 1865.

The attempts which the Bhutias made to recover possession of the posts occupied by our troops were few in number, and only 2 of them were successful to any extent. The first was an attack made on Dewangiri on the 30th January by the Tongso Penlow, which being persisted in resulted in the evacuation of that place by its garrison, chiefly composed of a local corps, on the 5th of February, after a very feeble and inefficient resistance on the plea of deficient water and ammunition. The other successful attempt of the Bhutias was an advance on Tazigong (or Tajagaon) which the officer commanding deemed it expedient to evacuate on the 2nd of February. Both these places were afterwards re-taken without any difficulty, Tazigong on the 15th of March by General Tytler who had succeeded General Dunsford, and Dewangiri on the 2nd of April by General H. Tombs, v. c. who had superseded General Mulcaster, the enemy at the latter place losing 120 men. After this Dewangiri was again evacuated by our troops on the 6th of April, after everything in it had been completely destroyed, as it was considered unnecessary to occupy it during the rainy season. The most important events of the campaign were the captures of Dalingkote, Chamurchi, and Buxa, the double capture of Balla or Tazigong, and the final capture of Dewangiri.

The operations of the Bengal Government during the campaign were mainly confined to the provision of supplies and carriage for troops, to the construction of roads and collection of ferry boats

required for facilitating their passage, to the establishment of fair weather communications between the several military posts occupied by them, to the procuring of materials and skilled labour for the erection of barracks and other buildings required for their accommodation, and to the collection of information of every kind which might prove useful in carrying on the military operations. For these purposes Lieutenant-Colonel J. C. Haughton was appointed Chief Officer with the Duars Field Force. He was also appointed Political Agent and placed in entire charge of our relations with the Bhutan Government. Mr. C. T. Metcalfe, c. s. was also appointed a civil officer with the force, and Messrs. T. A. Donough and J. J. S. Driberg, assistants to the civil officers, that the requirements of each division of the Field Force might be promptly attended to. The civil authorities at Gauhati, Gawalpara, Kuch Bihar, Jalpaiguri, Purnea, Rangpur, Dinajpur, and Darjeeling were moreover directed, to comply with all requisitions of the military authorities as promptly as possible. The manner in which all these calls upon them were met by the several officers referred to received the entire approval of the Lieutenant-Governor.

At the close of the year 1864-65 the newly annexed Duars of Bhutan were occupied by a strong military force. The Bhutias, though cut off from all communication with the plains, both in Assam and Bengal, refused at first to treat except upon the basis of the surrender of the annexed territory. This being out of the question, the Government of India determined to send an expedition into the interior of Bhutan as soon as the cessation of the rains should admit of the movement. The Deb and Dharm Rajas were accordingly warned that if they did not come to terms *i. e.* the terms of November 1864, before the cold season, their country would be invaded, and preparations for the expedition were at the same time vigorously pushed on, with a view to the despatch of 2 columns against Punakha and Tongso. No defensive preparations were made by the Bhutan Government who seemed to trust to the difficulty of their country to prevent the advance of our troops, and for some time persisted in their unreasonable demands. At length, Colonel Bruce, c. b., who had succeeded to the political charge of the frontier, distinctly announced the terms on which alone the British Government would

consent to treat. These were the absolute cession by Bhutan of all the Duars, and of the hill country between the Tista and Jaldaka rivers; and the release of all captives detained in Bhutan against their will. The Government of Bhutan was also required to give up the treaty extorted by force from the British Envoy and to submit an apology for the misconduct of its officers, and to enter into mutual arrangements for the extradition of criminals and the reciprocity of trade. On the other hand, the British Government agreed, in consideration of the cession of territory, to make an annual allowance beginning with Rs. 25,000, and rising gradually to Rs. 50,000, the payment thereof being made conditional on the good conduct of the Bhutan Government and its adherence to the provisions of the treaty.

To these conditions the Bhutan Government for a long time hesitated to accede; but when preparations for the proposed invasion were almost complete they yielded, the treaty extorted from Sir A. Eden was given up to Colonel Bruce on the 8th November, and, on the 11th November 1865, a treaty of peace was signed by Colonel Bruce on the part of the British Government, and by 2 authorized envoys on behalf of the Deb and Dharm Rajas. The Bhutan Government ceded the whole of the 18 Duars bordering on the districts of Rangpur, Kuch Bihar and Assam, together with the *taluk* of Ambari Falakata and hill territory on the left bank of the Tista: the territory ceded was attached to Bengal under the Lieutenant-Governor, but not subjected to the general Regulations. By a separate agreement the payment of the first instalment of the allowance due to the Bhutan Government under the treaty was made conditional on the previous delivery of the 2 British guns which were abandoned on the retreat from Dewangiri and had fallen into the hands of the Tongso Penlow. The envoys agreed on behalf of the Bhutan Government to compel the Penlow to deliver up these guns in 2 months from the date of the agreement; as they were not delivered up within the time appointed, preparations were made for an expedition to Tongso for their recovery. Accordingly, in February 1866, a small but well-equipped and efficient force started from Dewangiri, but it had advanced only a few days' march and seized the bridge at Sahlia over the Monas, when the 2 guns were surrendered on the 25th February 1866 at the Monas to Colonel Richardson, and the force returned. The stipulations of the treaty which were susceptible

of immediate fulfilment were complied with, 72 captives were set at liberty, and the cession of the territory completed. The whole of the Bhutia possessions in the plains thus became British, and a slip of British hill territory was interposed between Bhutan and Sikhim, whereby it became practicable to open a direct route into Tibet without passing through any intermediate foreign territory. The survey of such a route and of the frontier generally was to be undertaken as soon as possible. The moderation of the terms on which peace was concluded with Bhutan excited no little indignation on the part of the Press and the public, but the treaty having been concluded the terms could not be reopened and the Government of India showed no inclination to modify their policy. The best proof of the justice of the terms, it has been said, lies in the fact that our relations with Bhutan have been satisfactory ever since.

The Secretary of State. ( Sir C. Wood) in a despatch dated the 1st. February 1866, thus reviewed the chain of events connected with the negociation and execution of the treaty of peace of November 1865 with the Bhutan Government :—

“The long-continued aggressions of the Bhutias upon your frontier, by which not only much property had been carried off, but many subjects of the British Government, or of our allies, had been made prisoners and slaves, had induced Lord Canning to entertain the question of despatching an expedition into the Bhutan country, but his attention was diverted from it by the Mutiny in 1857.

“On the restoration of tranquillity, the subject of this expedition was again brought under the consideration of the Government of India. The outrages, which had so long rendered insecure the property and the liberty of our people on the Bhutan frontier, still continued, and the necessity of some interference on the part of your Government was as urgent as before. In order, however, if possible, to obtain reparation for the past and security for the future, without resorting to hostile measures, it was determined to despatch a British officer on a mission to the Bhutan Rajas.

“As on former occasions, British missions, which had been despatched to the Bhutan capital, had been well received, there was no reason to believe that the officer deputed to proceed to Punakha would be otherwise than courteously treated in the Bhutan country.

“The Envoy selected for this duty was the Hon'ble Ashley Eden, who had before been employed in adjusting your relations with the Sikhim State, on which occasion he had perfectly succeeded and had evinced, in difficult circumstances, ability and energy of a high order.



“Mr. Eden had not, however, penetrated far into the country, when it became obvious that unanticipated difficulties would be thrown in his way. In my despatch of 18th. July 1864, No. 39, I had concurred in the opinion expressed by your Excellency, that it might have been better if Mr. Eden had abstained, in the face of these difficulties, from advancing further than Paro. In any circumstances, Her Majesty's Government could not severely condemn what could only be considered as an error in judgment on the part of a public officer, resulting from a determination to carry out the instructions committed to him, and to endeavour at any personal risk to avert the contingency of war. But it now appears, from the correspondence forwarded to me with your Foreign (General) Letter of 5th. October (No. 39) 1865 (to which I have replied in a separate despatch), that Mr. Eden was encouraged in the course which he pursued of advancing to Punakha, by those under whose authority he was acting.

“On his arrival at Punakha, Mr. Eden was subjected to such gross insults and indignities at the hands of certain high officers of the Bhutan Government, that it became impossible for your Excellency to refrain from exacting reparation from a State that had so outraged the British Government in the person of its Envoy. Accordingly, a military expedition was equipped for service in Bhutan in the cold season of 1864.

“It is unnecessary in this despatch to enter into the military operations of 1864-65. They were necessarily brought to a close by the rains of the latter year. No satisfactory results having been obtained, you proceeded to make preparations for the renewal of operations at the commencement of the ensuing cold season.

“Before, however, any hostilities had taken place overtures were made on the part of the Bhutan Rajas, which shewed that they were anxious to enter into negotiations for peace.

“Colonel Bruce was therefore instructed to communicate to the Bhutan authorities the terms upon which your Government were prepared to enter into negotiations with them and, pending such negotiation, to suspend hostilities.

“The preliminary terms were to the effect that the Government of Bhutan must tender an ample apology for the insults offered to the British mission; that they must surrender the treaty extorted from Mr. Eden at Punakha, give up the British guns abandoned at Dewangiri, and liberate all the subjects of the British Government and of the Kuch Bihar and Sikhim Rajas detained against their will in Bhutan.

“The Bhutia authorities having agreed to these preliminaries, and the treaty extorted from Mr. Eden having been actually surrendered,

Colonel Bruce proceeded to negotiate the terms of the permanent arrangement of a new treaty.

"The Bhutan Government agreed to surrender all British subjects and all subjects of Kuch Bihar and Sikkim detained in Bhutan against their will, and subscribed to articles for the mutual extradition of criminals, the maintenance of free trade between the two countries, and the arbitration by the British Government of all disputes between the Bhutan Government and the chiefs of Kuch Bihar and Sikkim.

"They were further required to cede, in perpetual sovereignty, to the British Government the whole of the plain country known as the Duars, not only those which had been for some time in British occupation, but also the western Duars adjacent to Bengal, which had not been so occupied before the commencement of hostilities (making in the aggregate 18) together with certain hill posts protecting the passes into Bhutan. The country thus ceded was estimated to yield an annual revenue of about a *lakh* and a half of Rupees, or £15,000 per annum.

"In respect to the Duars which had for many years been occupied by the British Government, a certain annual payment from their revenues had always been made to Bhutan; and, now that a much larger tract of country was to be made over in full sovereignty to the British Government, it was proposed to extend this system, and to increase the amount to be paid to the Bhutias from 25,000 Rs. progressively, in 3 years, to 50,000 Rs. during the good conduct of the Bhutia Government.

"Her Majesty's Government have fully considered the reasons which have induced your Excellency to adopt this course.

"Although the British Government had no desire to extend its frontiers by taking possession of the Duars, it was necessary that you should mark your sense of the misconduct of the Bhutia rulers in the most palpable and lasting manner; and still more was it necessary for the due protection of the inhabitants of the British provinces on the borders of Bhutan, and also of the people of Sikkim and Kuch Bihar, that, after the experience of so many years of rapine, the Duars should be occupied by the British Government. But it was not necessary, and I concur in opinion with your Excellency's Government that it was not desirable, to impoverish the Bhutan State, by absorbing the entire revenues of the country which you had determined to annex, and which yielded a large part of the public income of Bhutan. To have alienated from its former Government the whole of those revenues would have seriously weakened the power of the Bhutan authorities, and this might have led to a continuance of the anarchy within the territories of the Bhutia Rajas, and those continual maraudings and depredations across the frontiers, which have rendered necessary the intervention of your Government. The existence

of a strong Government in the neighbouring States, and the prosperity of their subjects, are among the best securities for the permanent peace of our frontiers. To deprive the Government of a contiguous country of the means of enforcing its authority over its chiefs and functionaries and of compelling them to execute the engagements which it has entered into for the maintenance of the peace and security of our frontier, can in no case be sound policy. In this view, it would not be advisable to impair the resources of the Bhutan State to the extent that must have resulted from the abstraction of the entire revenues of the Duars.

"Moreover, as the arrangement into which you have entered provides for the non-payment of the stipulated sums, in the event of any infraction of the terms of the Treaty or any acts hostile to the peace and security of the British frontier, you will hold in your hands a material guarantee of the most stringent kind for the good conduct of the Bhutan Government and for the due observance of the treaty.

"Her Majesty's Government are therefore of opinion that what your Excellency describes as your liberal treatment of the Bhutias is equally sound as a measure of policy, and is more likely to conduce to the great objects of an enduring peace and the protection of the inhabitants of the frontier country, than the infliction of any severer measure of punishment upon the existing rulers of Bhutan ;— and they fully approve of the course which you have adopted in treating with the Bhutan Government upon the basis described.

Your despatch further states, that execution of the Treaty was to depend upon the actual delivery of the British guns, for which a separate engagement had been signed, a period of 2 months being allowed for their surrender. In the event of their not being given up within that time, military operations, in conjunction with the Deb and Dharm Rajas, were to be undertaken for the purpose of compelling the Tongso Penlow to surrender them. Your Excellency, however, was of opinion that the Rajas were thoroughly in earnest, and it was believed by your officers in Bhutan that the guns would be given up without much further delay. It will afford Her Majesty's Government satisfaction to learn that this has been done, and that peace has been established between the 2 countries, with every prospect of its permanent continuance."

In 1864-65 the subject of hook-swinging at the *Charak Puja* came up again. After consulting the British Indian Association and obtaining from them a recommendation that all cruel practices should be suppressed, so long as no religious observances were interfered with, Sir C. Beadon issued the following Resolution on the 15th March 1865 :—

Suppression of  
hook-swinging  
and barbarous  
practices.

"The practice of hook-swinging and other self-torture such as *banphora* and the like, in public at the *Charak* festival, which has been either voluntarily discontinued or authoritatively suppressed in most parts of India, still prevails in many districts of the Lower Provinces of Bengal.

These practices are cruel to those who suffer hurt from them whether of their own will or otherwise, and revolting to humanity. They also present a demoralizing public spectacle and tend to keep alive among the people a feeling of indifference to the sufferings of their fellow-creatures and to the value of human life. They have long been discountenanced and discouraged by the Government and its officers, as well as by the more enlightened, intelligent, and respectable Hindus. An influential body of Hindu gentlemen has lately recommended that they shall be suppressed; and one of the Hindu members of the Council of the Lieutenant-Governor has still more recently brought forward a project of law for that purpose.

The measures which have hitherto been taken to discourage hook-swinging, though partially successful, have in many places failed to produce any perceptible diminution of it, and it accords therefore, with the instructions given in the despatch of Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated the 24th February 1859, that more decided steps should be taken. In now adopting such a step the Lieutenant-Governor is supported, not only by a sense of what is due to the feelings of all classes of Her Majesty's subjects, but by a decided expression of enlightened opinion on the part of the leading members of the Hindu community.

All Magistrates of districts in the Lower Provinces are accordingly hereby required, under the powers vested in them by law—whenever they shall consider that such direction is necessary to prevent annoyance to persons lawfully employed or danger to human life, health, or safety—to direct any person to abstain from the act of hook-swinging or other self-torture, in public, and from the abetment thereof, or take such order with property in his possession or under his management as may serve to prevent the commission of the act. Persons who disobey any such injunction should be prosecuted and punished according to law.

All Commissioners of Divisions and Magistrates of districts in which hook-swinging prevails are further required to make known to the public that the Government regards the practice with abhorrence; to enlist the sympathy and co-operation of influential landholders and other members of the native community in its prevention; and to warn all who are concerned, or are likely to be concerned in it, that if they persevere they will make themselves liable to legal punishment.

It is to be understood that this order is not intended to authorize or justify any interference with the religious observances of the *Gharak* festival, or with the popular amusements, other than hook-swinging and its attendant cruelties, usual on that occasion."

The result of these orders in Calcutta and its suburbs was most successful; no cases of hook-swinging occurred in the town itself, and only 3 instances came to light in the suburbs.

During 1864 the Government of India laid the foundation of a system of forest administration for all India, to provide for the careful conservation of Government forests, their preservation from wanton or unscientific destruction, and the proper development of this part of the resources of the country. To carry out the scheme in a satisfactory manner it was necessary to place a special officer in charge of the forests under the Bengal Government, and the Superintendent of the Calcutta Botanic Garden was appointed Conservator of Forests in all the districts of Bengal. His attention was directed first to British Sikkim (which had 105,000 acres of forest land) and then to Assam. It was recognised that there were forest lands belonging to Government in Dacca, Chittagong and Cuttack; also some forests in Palamau in Chota Nagpur, and in the Rajmahal hills. Special measures were ordered by Sir C. Beadon to be adopted for the protection of the forests about Darjeeling, at an elevation of above 6000 feet, where the wholesale felling of timber which had followed the introduction of tea-planting had been most injurious to public interests.

Among the administrative acts of the year 1864-65 was the establishment of a number of new sub-divisions: viz. 7, 5, 6, and 7 in the Patna, Bhagalpur, Rajshahi and Dacca Divisions respectively. The Government of India ordered that no new sub-divisions should be formed without their previous sanction.

Ever since the Prison Discipline Committee of 1838, of which Lord Macaulay was a member, much attention has been paid in India to the subject of jail discipline"—so wrote the Government of India in 1868. An Act for the regulation of jails &c. was passed, II (B. C.) of 1864, and during the year 1864-5 Sir C. Beadon submitted a definite and matured scheme for the introduction of a system of central jails—the policy of cen-

tral jails having been affirmed by the Prison Committee of 1864—each under the superintendence of a qualified medical officer in professional as well as general charge. Regard being had to the extent of the criminal population and to the limitation of the number to be confined in each central jail to 1000 as the maximum, it was found that, in order to accommodate all prisoners sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for 1 year or upwards, besides the Alipore jail, which it was proposed to convert into a central jail, for the confinement of long term prisoners from the 24 *Parganas*, Calcutta, Howrah, and Hooghly, 8 others would be required. For these the following positions were selected, and sanctioned by the Government of India:—1. Deega. 2. Bhagalpur. 3. Hazaribagh. 4. Krishnagar. 5. Rampur Boalia. 6. Dacca. 7. Midnapore. 8. Tezpur. It was proposed that these prisons should be built upon the radiating plan adopted in the Lahore and Meerut jails, and that sleeping accommodation in separate cells should be provided for the total number of convicts (1,000) which each jail was intended to contain. To each jail was to be attached a garden of sufficient extent, not only to furnish the whole supply of fresh vegetables necessary for the prisoners but to afford the means of giving every convict his turn of work in the open air, to counteract the scorbutic tendency of strict intramural confinement and occupation. Jails thus constituted and placed under the sole charge of medical officers specially selected for the duty would, it was hoped, prove self-supporting, an expectation fully warranted by the results given by the Alipore jail. All the central jails thus contemplated were not constructed immediately: in 1868 the Government of India noticed the unnecessary delay which had occurred in their construction, and attributed it to the irreconcilable differences of opinion among high authorities in the local jail department: at the same time they wrote of “the very worst of our jails, those of Lower Bengal.” In 1868-69 the commencement of the construction of 4 central jails at Deega, Bhagalpur, Hazaribagh, Midnapore was authorized.

Sir C. Beadon interested himself greatly in the development of

Canals.                      canals. A contract was entered into in June 1862,  
between the Secretary of State and the East India

Irrigation and Canal Company for the execution of certain canals for irrigation and navigation and of works connected therewith in the

province of Orissa. In 1864-5 the Lieutenant-Governor sanctioned the project for the section of the Kendrapara Canal from the Beropa branch of the Mahanadi opposite to Cuttack, to Attabua on the Nuna branch of the Mahanadi. General approval was also accorded to the first section of a high level canal in the Cuttack district, extending from the left bank of the river Beropa, near the village of Chowdwar, to the right bank of the Brahmini river, as well as to projects for the canal from Ulubaria on the Hooghly river to Midnapore on the Cossye river, called the "Midnapore Canal," and for the canal from Gopalpur on the Rupnarain river to Balasore called the "Balasore Canal." A contract with the East India Irrigation and Canal Company for irrigation works to be carried out in Bihar, in connection with the river Sone, and within the limits of a scheme submitted to Government by Lieutenant-Colonel C. H. Dickens, R. A., some years before, was concluded during the year. The date for the submission by the company of their proposed scheme of works under this contract was fixed at 1st January 1866. Both the projects *i. e.*, the Orissa project for the construction of a system of canals to comprise almost all the rivers between the Hooghly and the Madras frontier; and the Bihar project, for building an anicut across the Sone at Dehri and constructing canals in Western Bihar, were transferred from private companies to Government on the 1st. January 1869.

In 1868 also a number of irrigation projects were under investigation; *first*, a system of 16 reservoirs on the river Selye in Midnapore; *second*, a canal for irrigation and navigation from the Damodar at Raniganj to the Hooghly opposite Calcutta; *third*, a system of canals from the Gandaka for the benefit of the Champaran, Sara and Tirhut districts; *fourth*, a navigation canal from Rajmahal on the Ganges to Calcutta, combining provision for the irrigation of the Nadia district and an investigation into the feasibility of protecting it from the effects of inundations. The Damodar canal was to be 100 miles long, from opposite Raniganj, through Burdwan, to the Baidiabati *khal* near Serampore. Its commencement was sanctioned by the Government of India in March 1869: it has never been made.

In the year 1863 the question of substituting a pure water-supply for Calcutta for the water drawn from tanks, wells and the river, which had for some time been under

consideration, was seriously dealt with. The Municipal Engineer had contemplated drawing it from Cossipore, but this project was abandoned, after reports received from the Chemical Examiner to Government that the intake should not be below Barrackpore, owing to tidal influences and the impurity of the river at and near Calcutta. The Sanitary Commissioner also applied pressure on the Municipality, advocating a scheme for bringing impure water to Calcutta through an open channel to be there filtered. A new scheme was proposed by the Municipal Engineer, having for its object the conveyance of filtered water by a covered aqueduct leading from filters at Palta, above Barrackpore, which, after some discussion, and testing of the water, received in 1865 the sanction of the Lieutenant-Governor. The net cost of the work was estimated at nearly 52 *lakhs*, and the annual charges at 5 *lakhs*: the latter amount it was settled to meet by the imposition of a water-rate of 3 percent on the rental of holdings.

The offices of Commissioner of Police and Chairman of the Union of offices of Chairman of the Justices and Commissioner of Police, Justices were united during the year, under Act VI (B. C) of 1863. It appeared to the Lieutenant-Governor that the fusion of the 2 offices was really necessary for the purpose of strengthening the executive authority in carrying out the Municipal law, and of preventing a collision between the Municipality and the police. With the sanction of the Government of India, the Chairman of the Justices was appointed Commissioner of Police, and charged with its general discretion and control, its immediate and detailed administration being placed in the hands of a Deputy Commissioner.

The Wahabi conspiracy. During the progress and at the close of the Mulka and Sittana campaign in 1863, it was discovered that supplies, both of men and money, had been regularly forwarded to the so-called Wahabi fanatics of those places from within British territory. The inquiries set on foot by the Panjab Government proved that there existed an extensive conspiracy among a certain Muhammadan sect in Lower Bengal, formed for the purpose of aiding what was held to be a religious war against the British Government; this sect had persistently and liberally supplied the hostile frontier tribes and communities with the means of carrying on the struggle then pending. The measures adopted in consequence of this dis-



covery by the Governments of the Panjab and Bengal, led to the arrest of 11 persons implicated in the conspiracy, who were tried at Umballa and sentenced to various terms of imprisonment. Of these, 5 were residents of that district, 5 of the city of Patna, and the eleventh of Kumarkhali, a town in the district of Pabna. (now in Nadia). It was suspected that the prime mover of the conspiracy in Lower Bengal was a Muhammadan named Ahmedulla, of good position in Patna, who had been employed by Government in a situation of trust. Further inquiry made this complicity quite clear, and he was accordingly arrested, tried and sentenced by the High Court to transportation for life.

A full report regarding the state of affairs in Patna, and the measures adopted for the suppression of the conspiracy by the Government of Bengal was laid before the Government of India in 1865-66. The conviction of the guilty parties placed a considerable amount of real and personal property at the disposal of Government, and it was determined that all the escheated property, both within and without the city of Patna, should be sold, and the proceeds applied to purposes of public improvement in the city and district. Descriptive lists of such Wahabi agents as became known to the officers conducting the inquiry were forwarded to all Magistrates, and instructions given to watch them.

In the latter part of 1861 an application was addressed to the Government of Bengal by persons interested in the Port Canning scheme. Matla as an auxiliary port to Calcutta, for the appointment of a Municipal Commission. The Lieutenant-Governor agreed, and in 1862 a Committee was duly appointed for the town of Canning under Act XXVI of 1850. Early in 1863 Government made over to the Municipal Commissioners the whole of its proprietary right in Lots 54 and 50, as so marked in the map of the Sundarbans, subject to its control as to the manner in which the lands should be disposed of, for the benefit of the town and Port: i.e., with a reservation of the sites required for imperial purposes, such as railway station, officers, Courts &c. Some of the sites were in 1864-65 exchanged for others. The Municipal Commissioners wanted a loan of above 20 lakhs of rupees to construct the public works essential to the establishment of the settlement. Government agreed to advance 4½ lakhs, but the Municipality could not raise the

remainder. An offer was made, in the height of the speculative mania of 1864, by Mr. F. Schiller, of the firm of Borradaile, Schiller & Co., who was also Vice-Chairman of the Port Canning Municipality, as reconstituted under Act III (B. C.) of 1864, to subscribe a sum of  $2\frac{1}{2}$  lakhs to the Canning Municipal Debenture Loan, if certain concessions were granted to him with a view to enable him, with the aid of a Company, named "the Port Canning Land Investment Reclamation and Dock Company", to be formed by him, to construct docks, tramways etc., for the improvement of the town. The proposal having been accepted by Sir C. Beadon the following concessions were made to the Company, viz., (1) the gift in freehold of 100 acres of ground in the centre of the town, (2) the exclusive right of constructing tramways in such directions as might be required by the Municipality for a period of 50 years, and (3) in consideration of their undertaking the conservancy of the river bank for a period of 50 years, the right of constructing wharves and jetties and such landing and shipping facilities as might be required, and of levying such tolls in connection therewith as might be sanctioned by the Municipal Commissioners. The Company were to excavate within 2 years a dock for the reception of country boats, not less than 2500 feet by 200 feet in width and 10 feet in depth. No work was to be undertaken by the Company or their assignees without the approval of the Commissioners. In return for these concessions the Municipal Commissioners were to obtain an immediate subscription of  $2\frac{1}{2}$  lakhs to the Municipal Loan, and also the prospect of sharing in the profits accruing from the works intended to be carried out when the returns exceeded 10 per cent. on the capital invested, and the right of repurchasing the works after the 50 years for which the concessions were to be granted. The Government, in assenting to these concessions, added a condition that, should the docks and other works not be completed within 2 years, or such further period as might be allowed by the Municipal Commissioners, or should the land be at any time diverted to purposes other than those for which it was granted, it should lapse to the Commissioners.

The Company commenced operations vigorously. It was found however that the sums raised from the public and the Port Canning Company were not sufficient for the works in hand. The Municipa-

lity thereupon applied for a loan of  $4\frac{1}{2}$  *lakhs*, which Sir C. Beadon supported on general grounds connected with the interest of Government in the success of the scheme, and it was granted on certain securities, on the ground of the public and mercantile community having subscribed over 60 *lakhs* of rupees to the Company for similar purposes. This transaction was completed in May 1866. In 1866-67 measures were in rapid progress to improve Port Canning as a Port, by lightships, buoys and screw moorings.

A project for the clearance and cultivation of the unappropriated waste lands of the Sundarbans by Joint Stock  
Sundarbans re-  
clamation. Agency was brought forward by Mr. F. Schiller and others. The scheme promised well, and the Government of India consented in February 1865 to sell by auction in one lot the Sundarban lands in the 24-*Parganas*, comprising more than a million of acres, at an upset price of Rs. 2 annas 8 an acre : but, owing to the unfavourable state of the money-market and to other circumstances (including a misunderstanding between Government and the promoters as to the sale of the Jessore Sundarbans as well as those in the 24-*Parganas*) the scheme was withdrawn. Mr. Schiller subsequently came forward again with his original plan for the organization of a Company to reclaim the whole of the Sundarbans tract. He applied for a lease, under the Waste Lands Rules, of the whole of the remaining unappropriated lots of the Sundarbans from the Matla to the Megna : and this, with some modification of the terms, was granted by Government. The Secretary of State subsequently directed that the precise conditions, on which it was intended to place Mr. Schiller in possession of the lands, should be submitted for his approval, and that there should be a distinct provision for the payment of the first subscription promised by Mr. Schiller of £150,000 to £180,000 within a reasonable time, as evidence of good faith of the projected Company in carrying out their operations. Mr. Schiller was accordingly asked to organize a substantial Company within a year, and informed that, on the Company paying down the specified deposit within 2 years from the date of the despatch of the Secretary of State, *pattas* would at once be issued in their favour for the lands to be made over to them, either under the rules of 1853, or under any modification of those rules which might be specially arranged. In the meantime, no fresh grants of land in the Sundarbans

were to be made to other parties within the year allowed to Mr. Schiller.

While these questions were pending, leases of the forest products of the unallotted portion of the Sundarbans were put up to auction in convenient blocks, for terms of 5 years, with a reservation to Government of the power to cancel any lease on giving 6 months' notice; and all these blocks, with the exception of 6 were, for want of higher bidders, knocked down to the Port Canning Company. Subsequently, on the grant of the entire tract of unallotted Sundarbans being promised to Mr. Schiller on behalf of a new Sundarbans Reclamation Company which he was about to form, 6 months' notice of cancellation was given to the Port Canning Company as required by the terms of their lease. The formation of the new Company being afterwards temporarily postponed, the Government of India wrote that "it will be no more than just and equitable to allow the notice to remain inoperative, and to permit the lease of the forest products to run on for the present, in the expectation that Mr. Schiller will form a Company to whom the unappropriated Sundarbans will be granted:" or that, if necessary, a fresh lease should be given, sufficiently guarded by a clause enabling Government without question to re-enter on possession on 6 months' notice.

But in 1868-69, as numerous complaints had been received of oppressions committed by the servants of the Company on woodcutters and others, and inquiry clearly established that the monopoly was mischievous and hostile to public interests, Government asserted its right and terminated the lease, by giving notice to the Company.

A suggestion was made by Mr. Schiller that the Sundarbans should be formed into a separate district with Port Canning as *Sadar* Station; but this idea found no favour with Government. The whole scheme of Reclamation of the Sundarbans, launched in the height of the speculative mania of 1864, resulted in nothing beyond wild speculation in shares.

A Committee summoned by the Government of India reported on the junction of the East Indian and Eastern Bengal Railways, on the formation of Wet Docks in Calcutta, and on other matters concerned with the convenience of the trade and shipping of Calcutta. In regard to the formation of a Trust to carry out the measures of improvement

Calcutta Wet  
Docks — Port  
Trust.

for landing and shipping goods in the Port as proposed by the Committee, Sir C. Beadon expressed his willingness to bring before the Bengal Council the Bill on the subject submitted by the Committee, if the scheme were approved by the Government of India, but he at the same time stated that he considered the arguments urged in favour of such a Trust, as opposed to the direct action of Government, to be inconclusive.

The necessity for the improvement of the Port of Calcutta by furnishing greater facilities for the landing and shipping of goods had long been admitted, and the Government of India and the Chamber of Commerce had expressed opinions in favour of carrying out the desired improvements through the agency of a body of trustees. Accordingly an Act was passed, X (B.C.) of 1866, which made the corporate body of Justices trustees for the purposes of the Act, the immediate administration of the powers and trusts vested in the Justices being confided to a Committee of 10 selected from their number. The usual objects of a Port Trust were provided for in the Act.

By a notification dated the 7th January 1862 Sir C. Beadon authorised the application of the Jury system under section 322 of the Criminal Procedure Code to 7 districts, in the trial of offences defined in certain Chapters of the Penal Code. During the year the system was extended to offences under another Chapter of the Code, and to abetments of all the offences defined in those Chapters. In 1863-4 the reports of the Magistrates and Commissioners on the working of the system were all more or less unfavourable. In the next year it was reported to have on the whole worked well. Greater care was ordered in preparing the Jury lists. It was subsequently proposed that the system should be extended to other districts, and that it should be made applicable to the trial of offences other than those to which it had been at first restricted. In connection with these suggestions, it was also proposed that Judges should be empowered to empanel special Juries for the trial of cases of peculiar difficulty, and that arrangements should be made for preventing access being had to Jurors during the continuance of a trial. While these questions were still under consideration, Sir C. Beadon, before retiring from office, considered it right to place on record his conviction that the trial of

offences of all classes before the Courts of Session in all parts of the Lower Provinces ought to be by Jury, and that the system could be generally adopted without prejudice to the administration of criminal justice, and would be attended with decided benefit to the Courts, and increased confidence of the public in their judgments.

The High Court on the contrary maintained, in their Annual Report on Criminal Justice for 1866, that the working of the system in the 7 regulation districts in which it had been already introduced had not been so successful as to warrant its extension to other places at present.

In 1865-67 some Hindu practices came prominently under the notice of Government. An article appeared in a Hindu practice, notice of Government. An article appeared in a native newspaper, the *Dacca Prokash*, condemnatory of the Hindu practice of taking sick people to the river side to die, which was believed to hasten or even to cause many deaths (and was often termed "*ghat murder*"); inquiries were made to ascertain the prevailing feeling of the Hindu community on the subject, and the expediency or otherwise of Government interfering to put a stop to the custom. The information obtained showed that the practice was confined to the districts bordering on the river Ganges, from the confluence of the great Gandak opposite Patna to the defluence of the Bhagirathi below Rajmahal, and thence along the course of the Bhagirathi by Calcutta to the sea; that the orthodox Hindus drew a distinction between *gangajatra*, the practice of taking sick persons to the river-side to die, and *antarjali*, that of immersing the lower half of the body of the sick or dying person in the water of the river, (the latter practice being not enjoined by the Shastras as absolutely indispensable, though believed to carry with it a certain promise of salvation;) and that the educated portion of the Hindu community considered the whole ceremony repulsive, though they did not wish that the Government should interfere with it. The conclusion arrived at, on these premises, by Sir C. Beadon was that, though it was not expedient absolutely to prohibit either practice at present, the Government could no longer ignore its responsibility for taking some measures to discourage them openly, and also to regulate them by requiring that in every such case a notice should be given to the police of the intention to carry a sick person to the river-side to die, such notice being in the form of a declaration signed by the nearest

relatives of the sick man to the effect that there was no reasonable hope of his recovery. It was suggested that where practicable this should be accompanied by a certificate to the same effect from the medical attendant of the sick person. The Government of India, however, though wishing to see the practice discontinued, was not prepared to say that it was desirable to legislate specially for its repression, and particularly by recourse to the highly preventive measure of a compulsory notice to the police. The Secretary of State agreed with the Government of India.

In 1855 the Maharaja of Burdwan presented a petition to the Legislative Council setting forth the monstrous evils  
 —polygamy. arising from the practice of unrestricted polygamy, and Sir J. P. Grant promised in 1857 to introduce a Bill on the subject: but the Mutiny stopped all further action. Several petitions having in 1863 been presented to Government by nearly 21,000 Hindus in Bengal for the enactment of a law to restrain the abuses attending the practice of polygamy among certain class of Hindus, and it appearing from these and from the notices taken of them by the native Press that the greater proportion of the more advanced section of the native community were anxious to have some check placed on a social abuse which had become intolerable, an application was made to His Excellency the Governor-General, under section 43 of the Indian Councils Act, for permission to introduce into the Bengal Council a Bill for the prevention of polygamy among the Hindus in Bengal, except under certain specified circumstances. The Government of India, however, doubted whether the popular feeling in Bengal was sufficiently prepared for legislation on this subject, and also remarked that the proposed measure, while it would restrain the excesses of polygamy, would have the effect of giving legal sanction to its adoption within the prescribed limits, an objection which in the opinion of the Government of India was entitled to greater weight than the Lieutenant-Governor appeared inclined to concede to it. On these considerations the Governor-General in Council desired that no Bill should be at once introduced, but that further inquiries should be prosecuted. Acting under these directions the Lieutenant-Governor appointed a Committee consisting of some of the leading members of the native community in Calcutta, associated with Messrs. C. Hobhouse and H. T. Prinsep, with in-

structions to mature a scheme which would put a stop to the evils complained of, without, on the one hand, affecting the general liberty possessed by all Hindus of taking more than one wife, or on the other giving express sanction to that liberty by a legislative enactment. The report of the Committee was submitted in February 1867. The Kulin Brahmins being the class to whom the excesses complained of were almost exclusively confined, (and chiefly to the Bhongho Kulins,) the Committee gave a sketch of the origin of this denomination of Brahmins and of the various classes of Kulins existing at the time. They also enumerated the customs prevalent, from which the alleged abuses (which they believed to be exaggerated and on the decline) took their rise. They further proved very clearly that these customs had for the most part no warrant among the approved authorities of Hindu Theology. Thus far, in the opinion of the Committee, the path for legislation was smooth enough, as a declaratory Act might be passed setting forth the law on the subject of polygamy and making any infraction of it penal. But the report further showed that, although the chief abuses of polygamy would be condemned by a reference to the authorized Hindu law, this law at the same time warranted the suppression of one wife and the contraction of subsequent marriages on many grounds which in the eye of English law were frivolous or untenable. They therefore pointed out that, owing to the restriction imposed upon them that legal sanction to polygamy was not to be conveyed, they were unable to recommend even the passing of a declaratory Act of the kind stated above.

One member of the Committee, the Pandit Ishwar Chandra Surma (Vidyasagar) maintained his opinion that the evils were not greatly exaggerated, and that the decrease of these evils was not sufficient to do away with the necessity of legislation. His opinion also was that a Declaratory Law might be passed without interfering with that liberty which the Hindus possessed in the matter of marriage. Sir C. Beadon regarded the report of the Committee as showing the impossibility of legislating under the conditions imposed by the Government of India, while it gave a deplorable picture of the state of the Hindu marriage law, to which sooner or later a remedy must be applied. He did not share the sanguine anticipations entertained by the native members of the Committee that the Kulin Brahmins would settle into a monogamous habit only by the force of



education and social opinion. He received with satisfaction their testimony that the opinion of Hindus had undergone a remarkable change within the last few years, and that the custom of taking a plurality of wives as a means of subsistence had come to be marked with strong disapprobation, and he hoped that, with the further progress of these enlightened ideas, the necessity for legislation as the effectual means of giving them full effect would at no distant time be realized.

In the meantime a despatch was received from the Secretary of State in which he objected to any measure of a legislative character being adopted at present, as it did not appear that a large majority of the people even in Bengal were against the practice of polygamy, apart from the special abuses practised by the Kulin Brahmins.

The sudden death of Dr. G. E. L. Cotton, Bishop of Calcutta, in the autumn of 1866, was deeply and widely felt. Death of Bishop Cotton. Appointed to the see of Calcutta from the Head Mastership of Marlborough, in succession to Bishop Daniel Wilson in 1858, he had in a few years acquired universal confidence and respect, and was doing much for the Church of England and the cause of Anglo-Indian Education in India. It was said of him years afterwards that his capacity as an administrator, an organiser, an educator, had pointed him out as the very man to succeed to the see at a time of disintegration, confusion, and uneasiness, when, owing to the mutiny, the whole policy of English rule, Civil and Ecclesiastical, had to be reconsidered and the whole attitude of England to India to be reviewed. He had been travelling for some time in 1866 to Assam and elsewhere, and had nearly completed his tour. On the evening of the 6th of October he consecrated the cemetery at Kushtia, and despatched his Chaplain to telegraph to Calcutta, announcing his speedy return. It was dark when he reached the river's edge, to re-embark on his steamer, and he ascended, or attempted to ascend, a platform which was faultily constructed, having no handrail; he accidentally lost his footing and fell into the river, still swollen as it was by the rains and always dangerous. So sudden and complete was his disappearance that, although attempts were at once made to rescue him, no trace of the body, and not even his hat, could be found. The accident was regarded as a public calamity. Government published a special notice of it in

the Gazette, as follows :—" There is scarcely a member of the entire Christian community throughout India who will not feel the premature loss of this Prelate as a personal affliction. It has rarely been given to any body of Christians in any country to witness such depth of learning and variety of accomplishment, combined with piety so earnest, and energy so untiring. His Excellency in Council does not hesitate to add the expression of his belief that large numbers, even among those of Her Majesty's subjects in India who did not share in the faith of the Bishop of Calcutta, had learned to appreciate his great knowledge, his sincerity, and his charity, and will join in lamenting his death."

The Secretary of State (Lord Cranborne, afterwards Marquis of Salisbury) received the melancholy intelligence with deep concern, and added—" The loss of a Prelate who discharged the duties of his high office with such zeal, devotedness, charity, and sound judgment, cannot fail to be sensibly felt both by the Government with which he was connected, and by the Diocese over which he presided : and I have to express my entire concurrence in the sentiments recorded by your Government."

The indigo question, which had subsided in the Nadia and Jessore districts, came up again in Bihar. Some <sup>Indigo disputes in Tirhut.</sup> disputes arose during the year 1866-67 with regard to the cultivation of indigo between the *raiyats* and the managers of the Pandoul factory, in the Darbhanga estate, in Tirhut. Though the question only came seriously to a head in one concern yet the reports of the local officers, the general anxiety among planters, the number of petitions submitted, and the agitation of the native Press showed that the crisis was a dangerous one, requiring to be carefully watched. The principal points at issue were as follows. The factory maintained that in addition to the *nizabad* indigo lands, or lands undoubtedly in possession of the factory and cultivated by factory ploughs, there were in every village other lands equally in the possession of the factory which were cultivated in indigo for the factory by the *raiyats*, and in respect of which the *raiyats* were not cultivators of indigo in their own lands for the factory under contract, but merely hired labourers cultivating *ziraat* lands on behalf of the factory and receiving wages in return. The *raiyats*, on the other hand, asserted that the lands thus described were not factory

*ziraat* but formed part of their own proper holdings; that the factory people prevented them from cultivating these with cereals and other crops which paid them better than indigo, by falsely claiming these lands as *ziraat* and accusing the *raiya*s of criminal trespass when they attempted to cultivate them in the manner they liked best; that they were also very much oppressed by their ploughs and plough bullocks being taken away from them during the manufacturing season for the purposes of the factory, and that, while the factory leased villages from the Darbhanga estate on the same rent as before, the rates levied from the *raiya*s had been considerably enhanced by the introduction of a system of sub-letting the villages to the factory servants who were rapacious in their demands. The result of these differences was that the *raiya*s of a number of villages, who had been in the habit of cultivating indigo for the factory under the conditions current in all Tirhut, and who had this year, up to the occurrence of the disputes been engaged in preparing the lands for indigo, suddenly united in refusing either to finish the preparation of the lands or to allow the factory to do so, and this led to collisions with the planters' servants, which, however, were not of a serious character.

On these disputes being reported to Government Sir C. Beadon withdrew an unwise proclamation that an Assistant Magistrate had issued; the local officers were at once directed not to interfere executively in the matter further than by maintaining the actual possession of individuals and preventing any breach of the peace. They were to leave all questions of right to land and of the legal obligation of the *raiya*s to cultivate indigo for the factories to the decision of the Courts, and to impress on the planters the wisdom of viewing the subject in a broad and conciliatory spirit, especially with reference to the statement that the cultivation of cereals and other crops offered larger inducements to the cultivators than indigo at the rates paid for it. The police were strengthened in all villages where disputes had arisen. The aspect of affairs thereupon apparently changed. In most of the early cases which came up for adjudication, the decisions of the Courts were in favour of the factory, the *raiya*s being convicted of criminal trespass under the Penal Code, and this at once led to a more submissive tone being assumed by the *raiya*s

and to the compromise of many of the pending suits. The necessity of increasing the rates paid for indigo was recognised by several of the Tirhut planters, and the Pandoul *raiya*s came to terms with the factory. In connection with the system of sub-lettings, and its attendant evils, which obtained in the Pandoul concern, which held most of its lands in farm from the estate of the minor Raja of Darbhanga, (then under the management of the Court of Wards), an inquiry was made into the entire question of the relation subsisting between the farmers and *raiya*s in that estate. The policy of Sir C. Beadon throughout these indigo troubles was to encourage an amicable settlement in every way in his power: instead of forcing questions to a head and having a repetition of the Bengal troubles to deal with.

Before the Orissa Famine of 1866-67 is treated more fully, the

The Orissa and  
Bihar Famine.

following extract from the condensed report of the Famine Commission of 1878 may be quoted, as containing the main facts. "This drought (of 1865) fell with far greater intensity on Orissa in Bengal, where, as no such calamity had occurred in the whole province for nearly a century, it had to be dealt with by a body of officials necessarily ignorant of the signs of its approach, unprepared to expect it, and inexperienced in the administration of relief measures; nor were the native inhabitants of Orissa in any respect more aware of what was coming on them than the British officers. The area most affected was about 12,000 square miles, with a population of about 4,000,000. The rainfall of 1865 was scanty and ceased prematurely, so that the out-turn of the great crop of winter rice, on which the country mainly depends, was reckoned at less than a third of the average crop. Food stocks were low, both because export had been unusually brisk of late, and because the people had not been taught by precarious seasons to protect themselves by retaining sufficient stores at home. When the harvest failed, so totally new to them was the situation that no one realised its meaning and its probable results. The Local Government and officials not taking alarm and misconceiving the gravity of the occasion abstained from making special inquiries; prices long remained so moderate that they offered no temptation to importers, and forced no reduction in consumption on the inhabitants, till suddenly the province was found to be almost bare of food. It was

only in May 1866 that it was discovered that the markets were so empty that the jail prisoners and the Government establishments could not be supplied. But the southern monsoon had now begun and importation by sea or land became nearly impossible. Orissa was at that time almost isolated from the rest of India; the only road, leading to Calcutta across a country intersected by large rivers and liable to inundation, was unmetalled and unbridged, and there was very little communication by sea, for what trade there was had hitherto been a purely export trade, carried on in the months of fine weather. No relief could be obtained from the south, where lay the district of Ganjam, itself severely distressed. By great exertions and at enormous cost, the Government threw in about 10,000 tons of food grain by the end of November, and this was given away gratuitously, or sold at low rates, or distributed in wages to the starving population, saving no doubt many thousands of lives. But meanwhile the mortality among those whom this relief did not reach, or reached too late, had been very great; and it was estimated that about a third of the population, or nearly 1,000,000 persons, had died. Nor did the troubles of Orissa cease with 1866. The rainfall of the year was so heavy as to cause great floods in the river Mahanadi, and, while the harvests in all the higher lands were excellent, in all the low lands the inundations drowned the crop. In the ensuing year, 1867, after a brief respite during which hopes were entertained, which were not to be realised, that the distress had come to a close, the work of relief had to be taken up again. Then, as an apparent result of the reaction following the want of foresight and activity in affording help in the preceding year, the relief operations were marked by profusion and absence of check hitherto unexampled. Altogether about 40,000 tons of rice were imported, of which even the lavish use made of it could not dispose of half; and, while it cost 4 times the usual price, the residue had to be sold for almost nothing when the monsoon of 1867, followed by an unusually fine harvest, had altogether put an end to the famine in 1868. The total amount of money expended in Orissa was about Rs. 1,45,00,000 so that in this famine the relief seems to have been at once less efficient and more costly than that given on any previous occasion."

The above extract from the Report of the Famine Commis-

sion of 1878 contains the principal facts, but the catastrophe in Orissa was so vast and appalling that a fuller account seems to be required. The whole subject of the famine in Orissa and part of Bengal proper came under minute investigation. The Governor-General requested Sir C. Beadon to appoint Mr. H. L. Dampier, c. s., then Commissioner of the Nadia (Presidency) Division to make an inquiry, but about the same time a despatch from the Secretary of State, of 9th October 1866, ordered a similar inquiry, and under his instructions an enlarged Commission was appointed in December 1866 by the Government of India, consisting of Mr. George Campbell, c. s. (afterwards Sir G. Campbell, Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal) then a Judge of the High Court, as President, Colonel W. E. Morton, R. E. and Mr. H. L. Dampier as members, with instructions to report on the causes, circumstances, and extent of the famine, and to suggest remedial measures to guard as far as possible against the recurrence of a similar disaster. Sir C. Beadon on the 5th January 1867 recorded a Minute containing an explanation of his proceedings in connection with the famine. The Commission's Report was dated 6th April 1867, after they had visited Orissa and Midnapore and recorded the statements of 130 persons. An analysis of the Orissa Famine Report was compiled and published soon afterwards.

The Commissioners recorded that the natural causes were patent and that sufficient measures of relief were not taken at so early a period as it would have been proper that they should have been taken, if the facts had been sufficiently known and the magnitude of the calamity had been earlier understood. They divided their account of the past into 2 parts, the course of affairs till the time when Government took action on a large scale, that is to the end of May 1866, and the measures of relief then and subsequently taken. The natural cause was the premature cessation of the rains in the middle of September and the abnormal fall previously. The export trade of Orissa was considerable and averaged 20,000 tons of rice a year during the 6 years preceding 1865: but in the last of these years the quantity exported was unusually large, viz., 33,000 tons, of which Balasore alone sent away 28,000 tons. This had no doubt depleted the stocks to some extent; but in August 1865 rice was selling at the normal rate of 30 to 35 seers per rupee in Calcutta, while in Puri it

was as high as 18 seers. It was not till September 1865 that an alarm began to be felt about the rainfall. For upwards of 20 years before 1865 the province generally had not suffered from calamities of season to any very unusual extent. The crop of 1864 was below the average in Puri and instead of the average rainfall of 60 to 65 inches it was 41.8 in 1864, 36.3 in 1865, and 77.2 in 1866. It was no doubt an unfortunate circumstance that the 30 years' settlement was just expiring, and no new arrangement had been made. The tendency of such a state of things was undoubtedly to discourage agriculture: hence an inclination rather to contract than extend the assessable area and cultivation, and an uncertainty in the minds of all classes. Of the civil officers in Orissa the only one of some considerable local experience was Mr. G. N. Barlow, an officer then of 10 years standing, who had been 4 years Magistrate Collector of Puri and in this crisis did ample justice to his experience till his departure in October 1866. Mr. Muspratt, Magistrate-Collector of Balasore, had joined early in 1865. In Cuttack changes occurred in the season 1865-66, and a new Collector, Mr. Cornell, joined in February 1866. No Joint-Magistrate had been allowed for any of the districts of Orissa, and the Assistants were all of very limited experience. As Commissioner of Orissa, Mr. Shore had been succeeded in July 1865 by Mr. T. E. Ravenshaw, who had no previous knowledge of Orissa whatever. He had been chiefly remarkable for personal activity, and had more experience as a Magistrate than a Revenue officer. None of the officers had experience of famines, and the separation of the police lessened the district officers' information. There were no English settlers in Orissa, besides the missionaries and employees of the E. I. Irrigation Co., who confined their warnings chiefly to their correspondence with England. Mr. Ravenshaw's reports admitted and described the extent of the calamity in the fullest and frankest manner. His reports and those of the officers subordinate to him undoubtedly showed that no accounts of the extent and severity of the famine generally had been, or could be, exaggerated, and the private and official accounts were thus completely in accord. The extent of the mortality Mr. Ravenshaw estimated at not less than  $\frac{1}{4}$  of the population. The Famine Commissioners did not think the aspect of the country warranted the estimate of a mortality of  $\frac{1}{2}$  but it had been "without

doubt enormous." It had undoubtedly been so great among the old and the young of so many families which had escaped total destruction, and in so many parts the great mass of the labouring population seemed to have been really so much swept from the face of the earth, that the Commissioners could not say that the estimate of  $\frac{1}{4}$  was too high, even in parts which had not suffered from the floods of 1866. The Orissa Famine was the most intense India had seen. It stood almost alone in this, that there was (till a comparatively late period) almost no importation, and the people, shut up in a narrow province between pathless jungles and an impracticable sea, were in the condition of passengers in a ship without provisions. Money was spurned as worthless. Prices were constantly merely nominal: where rice was to be bought at all, it reached the rate of 5, 4, and even 3 Calcutta *seers* (of 2 lbs. each) per rupee at the chief stations where the external relief afforded was greatest, and in the interior of the districts still higher rates were reported, even to 1 *seer* per rupee. The rates were far beyond those known in any recorded famine of the century. It was quite impossible to distinguish between the mortality directly caused by starvation, and that due to disease, directly or indirectly, connected with starvation, want, and bad food. Not only was there an absence of statistics but in truth want and disease ran so much into one another that no statistics and no observations would suffice to draw an accurate line. The testimony was universal that the calamity of the famine fell with by far the greatest severity on the workers for wages, the agricultural labourers, coolies, and small artisans; especially, among the latter, on the weavers, already plying a declining trade. The advantage possessed by all the classes having any sort of rights in the land was remarkable. Not only had they better means and better credit than the labouring classes, but, being to a considerable extent in the habit of keeping grain for home consumption, those who had crops of some kind were better provided than the non-agricultural classes, when grain was not to be bought. The Commissioners found no one who shared the opinion of Sir C. Beadon that the greatest mortality in Orissa was caused by the floods in the latter part of the season. The floods were altogether a secondary cause of the mortality in 1866, although undoubtedly, in extensive tracts, it was considerably increased by that cause.



So early as 10th October 1865 there was an alarming report from the south of Puri. When the 20th passed without rain the country was in a panic; the rice trade was stopped; the country ceased to supply the towns; at both Cuttack and Puri the bazars were closed, and everywhere the alarm and inconvenience were extreme.

The police of the Puri district and a native Deputy Magistrate gave a very gloomy account of things in October, speaking of "impending famine." Mr. Barlow, who had been staying at Cuttack with Mr. Ravenshaw, returned to Puri, and on 8th November addressed the Commissioner in a tone far from sanguine. He subsequently reported extreme distress in 2 areas near the Chilka Lake and expressed the fear that it would spread. Mr. Barlow seems at this time to have recommended the importation of a ship-load of grain to the Mallood coast. The Commissioner did not support the recommendation, considering it the duty of the *zamindars* to relieve the distress; but he asked for permission to relieve distress in the neighbouring Government estates. On the 26th October, Mr. Muspratt enclosed a petition from certain *zamindars*, praying for time to pay the revenue, on the grounds that the crops were ruined; that the *raiya*s, unable to get advances, could not pay their rents; that the *raiya*s had blindly disposed of all their produce and kept no stock for the current year owing to excessive exportation of the previous year. Mr. Muspratt observed—"The rice crop of the district does not promise to reach to  $\frac{1}{3}$  of the crop of last year. The *raiya*s are forced to borrow rice and not money. The statement is but too true;" and he gave figures to prove the assertion. He intended to examine what estates had suffered, and solicited favourable consideration to the petition. The Commissioner, however, did not support it, and the Board of Revenue rejected it as "inadmissible" on the 9th November. In Cuttack, as early as the 21st October, so serious a stoppage of sales occurred that the Commissioner telegraphed and wrote to Government. The shops, however, reopened next day. The Commissioner attributed the difficulty to combinations among the dealers, and was desired not to interfere with the natural course of trade. The closing movement was shortly repeated, whereupon the Officer Commanding the Cantonment and the heads of various departments, complained of the difficulty experienced by the soldiers and public servants in obtaining food.

Mr. Ravenshaw was inclined to take a more sanguine view than the Collectors. "Don't let the people get downhearted," he said, "even with half a crop there ought not to be a famine. Get the people to help themselves, a somewhat difficult matter in Orissa, but there is nothing like trying." To Balasore he wrote—"I have no doubt there is more rice in your district than you imagine, and further that the crops of the current year will suffice for the year's supply." On the 27th October he wrote of combination among the dealers, and was "informed that large stores are in their hands", there was "nothing in the prospect of the crop to warrant apprehension of total absence of food." He reported in no less sanguine terms to the Board of Revenue and Government: and was to a great extent supported in his opinion by the majority of those about him in Cuttack. The Government of Bengal sent Mr. Ravenshaw's letters of 22nd and 27th October to the Board, and requested them "to report specially on the present state of the crops and markets and the prospects of the country throughout the Lower Provinces," and "to suggest any measures by which it may appear to them the Government can aid with advantage with a view to mitigate the effects of the present scarcity." Although the crop did not ordinarily fully ripen till December, the Board made their Report in November on information scarcely extending to the middle of that month, and that information was, as was avowed, "very imperfect." The Government of Bengal, on the 11th December, approved of what the Board had done, and concurred generally in the opinions expressed. The provision of Public Works was to be considered in that department. Permission was given to expend money in estates belonging to or in charge of Government for relief of the helpless poor and by giving employment to those willing and able to work, but otherwise unable to obtain work. Every endeavour was to be made to induce the landholders to do the same. Relief Committees were recommended in districts where distress prevailed. "It is on the exercise of private liberality, His Honour believes, that in an emergency of this kind the chief dependency must be placed."

On receipt of the orders of Government the Board circulated their Report and the Government reply to all the revenue officers, as "an easily accessible record of the principles upon which the Government considers itself at liberty to afford assistance in times of

scarcity," and this use of the Report gave it its greatest significance and importance. The means of mitigating the suffering expected, and even famine if it unexpectedly supervened, as laid down by the Board, were—the publication of official prices current; the provision of labour for the poor by public works; a liberal expenditure on Government estates, and the use of every possible means to induce the landholders to follow the example. As "the chief, if not the only, reliance" in more extreme cases, local private liberality was to be exercised through local relief committees. Whatever might be the merits or demerits of these principles they were laid before the Supreme Government in India and Government in England, and were published at the time without eliciting expressions of disapprobation. The unfortunate mistake seems to have been made of supposing the distress to be confined to a very isolated and limited space, and no general Report regarding the state of any of the districts of Orissa, or of any other of the districts, was then called for. No clear rules defining the functions of the Board and Government existed. The Board's Report and the reply of Government were, the Commissioners thought, calculated to impress the local officers as follows—that the facts regarding the crops, so far as ascertained, were not such as to justify the expectation of severe and widespread famine: that Government would not interfere directly, but must leave the ordinary laws of trade to work a remedy, and could only assist in the employment of the labouring classes and in respect of estates directly in the hands of Government; that there should, therefore, be no expectation that Government would attempt general assistance: and that, even in case of actual famine, the chief, if not only, reliance must be on local private liberality.

The reaping of the small crop in December temporarily reduced prices and allayed apprehensions. In November Messrs. Gisborne and Co., of Calcutta, had strongly urged on Government the necessity of importing and storing grain to meet the "famine which is now an acknowledged fact in several of the western districts, of extent and severity daily increasing." The proposal was to buy rice in British Burma and to ship it partly to Port Canning, and partly to Orissa. The Commissioners did not think that the information then possessed by Government would have justified the acceptance of the proposal. In the end of November and beginning of December the *zamindars*

of Orissa repeated their pressing requests for remission of revenue, and were supported by the Collectors. Mr. Barlow sent out officers to make inquiries, as he could only say that by report it was understood that the losses in some *parganas* had been very heavy. On this occasion the Commissioner sanctioned inquiry and report in special cases of extreme loss, on the understanding that no promise or expectation of remission was to be given. The Board negatived the application of the Collector of Puri in very decided terms. They regretted that the Commissioner had instructed the Collector to enter upon any investigation of claims of *zamindars* to remission, as such inquiries tended to raise expectations which, not being realised, must result in discontent and disaffection. No remissions were to be granted, and all hope of receiving any were to be positively barred. Thereupon Mr. Ravenshaw desired the Collector to observe that the Board had disapproved of the permission even to satisfy himself of actual loss in *zamindari* estates, expressed his entire concurrence in the orders, directed the Collector to consider them final and conclusive and to cancel his proceedings, and circulated the orders. The Famine Commissioners thought that the Board were not justified in passing these decided orders. Their own orders of a few months previous distinctly recognised the claim to remission on account of *general* calamities of season, and there was certainly no ground for assuming that the failure of 1865 in Orissa, and more especially in Puri, did not amount to a general calamity. The effect of the orders necessarily was to stop all inquiries in whatever form and with whatever object. It did so stop them. Mr. Barlow at once desired the officers making inquiries to discontinue operations; the result of the partial inquiries already made was never reported; and the extent to which the crops had failed and the consequent failure of the supply of food on which the population had to rely, were not made known to the higher authorities.

On 3rd December Mr. Ravenshaw suggested the formation of Relief Committees and meetings were called. He then went away on a tour for 2 months in the Tributary *Mahals*. Weekly returns of prices were called for from the districts of Bengal. On the one hand, the Board seem to have placed an almost superstitious reliance on them as a panacea for all evils, and, on the other, their accuracy was much questioned. Supposing the tables to have been reliable, the

Board hardly made consistent use of their own materials and their own principles. Prices in districts of cheap grain and low wages were too much judged by a metropolitan standard, and were on that basis supposed to be reasonable when they were really extreme in relation to the ordinary local prices; allowance was not sufficiently made for the cheapening at harvest time and the invariable enhancement as the season proceeds; and even prices rose to rates more and more distinctly famine, from February to May, both Government and the Board, deserting their own principles of political economy, acquiesced in the explanation that the rates were no true index of the supply, and that the dealers were only combining to hold back stocks with a view to artificial enhancement of prices. The price varied from an average, in the 3 districts of Orissa, of 12 *seers* per rupee at the end of October and 13 $\frac{2}{3}$  *seers* on 1st January 1866 to 4 $\frac{5}{8}$  on 13th August and 14 $\frac{1}{4}$  on 5th November. For the space of 5 months in the best supplied markets, and those most aided by Government sales, the price of food, supplied in a very intermittent way, ranged from 5 to 10 times the ordinary or average rate. In the interior of the districts food was generally not to be procured for money, and, when sold, ranged up to about 35 times the ordinary price.

Of the period from the Board's Report on 25th November 1865 to the visit of Sir C. Beadon to Orissa in February 1866, the Famine Commissioners said that there was a lull in Cuttack and Balasore, but not in Puri. Mr. Ravenshaw was far away in the hills, and, though as to writing letters he was most attentive, they came far behind time, and were of comparatively little use; while the Board, and Government in its departments, seemed all to be maintaining a sort of parallel correspondence. It was to be regretted that so many letters, so many projects, and so much zeal, should have ended in so little practical result, and that so much should have failed owing to the want of a common understanding between the different authorities engaged. Mr. Barlow's proposal to revive the salt manufacture was at once rejected as inadmissible. After much discussion on the question of ordering 500 tons of rice from Burma, it was resolved to send 18 tons by a coasting steamer. It was also determined to ship salt from the local depots, and sell it at Chittagong, partly to give employment in loading and despatching

the salt, and partly in the hope that the vessels employed would bring back rice. Finally works for the employment of the distressed were sanctioned. Eventually, however, the rice was not sent. Mr. Barlow went out to land the rice, the people even assembled to eat it, but it never came. A sum of Rs. 5,000 was sanctioned from the Government estates improvement fund to give employment to the poor. The only instance of private liberality on a larger scale was that of the *zamindar* of Parikud—a man of very limited means. On the 19th December, Government issued orders for the prosecution of the road works proposed for the relief of the distressed population.

After touring in the most affected part of the south-western portion of his district, Mr. Barlow on the 29th December submitted a full Report, containing details of an extremely distressing character. He seemed to have felt bound to be very careful not to exaggerate or too highly colour his picture; but, nevertheless, he gave his "revised opinion as to the prospective condition of the people" in the brief words of a previous telegram—"Destitution general and complete," adding, "it is that to which I most distinctly hold." Nothing could have been more active or devoted than his action. Mr. Ravenshaw forwarded his report and somewhat restrained his zeal. In January rice was not to be had in any quantities in the Puri district. Mr. Barlow, on the 15th wrote to the Executive Engineer with reference to the proposal for purchasing food for the labourers, and spoke of "a danger likely to interfere materially with, if not actually put a stop to, the works," viz., the want of food. He showed that, while as yet but 300 persons employed near the town made great complaints of the difficulty of procuring grain, and expressed great anxiety to receive their wages in kind instead of money, when the numbers increased, and the distance from the town became greater, supplies would not be procurable, since "it is one of the features observable in the famine" that "the city is the only place where a certain supply (small though it be) of grain is to be found, while in various parts of the interior none at all is procurable." He went on—"the difficulty foreseen must be met, since under no circumstances whatever must this opportunity of relief, which the liberality of Government has provided through your department, be allowed to fail or become crippled, whether it be

from want of energy or fear of responsibility ;” and he proceeded to give details of a plan for purchasing and storing grain ; the Public Works to advance money, with which he would import rice and deliver it at the works. The Executive Engineer received the proposition in the best spirit ; the Superintending Engineer, though zealous in the cause, thought the proposal that his department should advance funds for rice quite contrary to the orders which he had received. And the order was decisively conveyed on the 26th January by the Secretary, Public Works Department, under instructions of Sir C. Beadon, in the following terms :—“ Your proceedings in refusing advance approved. This department cannot have any concern with providing rice.” This led the Famine Commissioners to remark—the higher we go, the greater seemed to be the respect for the departmental rules usually called “ red tape.” On the same day, 26th January, the Board told the Commissioner that the Lieutenant-Governor did not approve of the payment *in kind* of the wages of the labourers, and that they were to be paid in cash, and only so much should be paid as would provide food sufficient to sustain the labourer and his family in health. The order was carried out to the great detriment of the local measures of relief. Sir C. Beadon did not recollect that it was brought to his personal notice, and stated that, if his attention had been attracted to the matter, he would certainly have disapproved of it. There seems, in fact, in this whole matter to have been an unfortunate misunderstanding between the Public Works and the Revenue Departments, which lasted for months, in fact till the full outburst of the famine, and produced very injurious consequences.

Mr. Ravenshaw returned to Cuttack from his tour on the 31st January. A critical time had arrived, and he despatched, that very day, the following telegram, of a very important and emergent character, to the Board :—“ Famine relief is at a standstill. Public Works Department refuse to advance money to Collectors to purchase rice. Puri must get rice from elsewhere. May I authorise advance for this purpose for Cuttack, Balasore, or Puri.” The Board’s answer of the 1st February was decisive. “ The Government decline to import rice into Puri. If the market favours importers rice will find its way to Puri without Government interference, which

can only do harm. All payments for labour employed to relieve the present distress are to be in cash." The result of that unfortunate telegram seemed to the Commissioners to have been to stifle and put an end to discussion regarding the importation of rice, from that time till a period when the state both of the weather and of the people rendered it too late to import it with successful effect. Mr. Ravenshaw, accepting to the full the principle of action imposed on him, issued a series of orders in that sense. He further disapproved of the issue of cooked food in relief. Though many would not resort to relief centres for cooked food till the last extremity, the misery among the very poorest was never properly known till the offer of food brought out from their hiding-places the most miserable objects. Balasore presented terrible famine scenes long before the district was nearly so bad as Puri, and in Midnapore the existing misery was suddenly brought to knowledge when food was offered. In Puri, while the distress was becoming deeper and the mortality greater day by day, it was not concentrated and brought to view by the distribution of food. If the Relief Committee had been left to act as originally proposed, they might possibly have imported and distributed rice, and set an example which would have led to earlier measures on a large scale. On 10th February the correspondence regarding relief by supplying food ended, till it was afterwards revived in a terrible shape. No further orders as to the payment for public works in grain were issued till June. The works were rendered to a very great degree inoperative for want of rice to feed the labourers. There was another cause of difficulty not peculiar to Orissa—the attempt to enforce task-works. The Commissioners were decidedly of opinion that in the beginning of February 1866 the time had come when Government might properly have imported rice into the Puri district, and that the telegrams of Mr. Crommelin and Mr. Ravenshaw of the 24th and 31st January marked the point when either importation should have been ordered to render effective the public works contemplated for the relief of the starving, or special inquiry should have been made which, in all probability, would have brought to light the deficiency of grain and the necessity of importation for purposes still more extended. If grain had been ordered for the works, they might have been immensely extended.

Sir C. Beadon's visit to Orissa in the middle of February



was a short one. Mr. Cockburn, c. s., and Colonel Nicolls were of the party. It seemed to have been understood on the spot that the principal objects of the visit were to see the irrigation works at Cuttack, and hold a *darbar* to receive the native chiefs, and *zamindars*; but Sir C. Beadon stated that his objects were more general, and that, as far as his visit had any specialty, it had reference to the famine. He made very little stay at Puri, having landed there one day and left for Cuttack the following evening. At Cuttack he remained from 15th to 19th (one day being a Sunday) and in that time he held a levee and a *darbar*, visited the public offices, &c. the Irrigation Company's works and anicuts one day, and the Kendrapara canal another; was entertained at a banquet by the Irrigation Company; and was throughout most accessible to all classes. On the evening of the 19th he left for Calcutta, travelling by way of False Point. There seemed to have been an unfortunate misunderstanding throughout the visit, the effects of which were very serious. He stated that neither before nor during his visit did the special difficulty regarding the procuring of rice for the labourers, the opinions on the necessity of importing entertained by some of the local officers, nor the correspondence which had passed on the subject, come in any shape to his knowledge. It was clear that the local officers did not press the facts within their knowledge on Sir C. Beadon, as they might and should have done. But, on the other hand, it was to be remembered that they had already received what they conceived to be decisive, peremptory, and final orders. Mr. Ravenshaw had accepted those orders in the fullest degree. He stated "the idea of a general famine had not at that time entered my head," and though during Sir C. Beadon's visit the prevailing scarcity and general difficulty in procuring grain were constant topics of discussion, and Sir C. Beadon spoke to him several times on the subject, he (Mr. Ravenshaw) expressed an opinion that there were probably sufficient stocks of grain in the country, and that, though it might be dear, it would be procurable for money. The subordinate officers might possibly have thought that it was not for them to volunteer information in the presence of their chiefs, and the head of the Public Works Department seemed to have thought that, the duty of providing food having been altogether put on the civil authorities, it was not for him to make representations

on the subject. The fact seemed to be that only officers of official boldness were likely to speak voluntarily under the circumstances, and the subordinate local officers did not seem to have had that boldness. Of the written petitions presented to Sir C. Beadon only one seemed distinctly to pray for provision for feeding the poor as its sole object. Most of the others, while describing the distress forcibly enough, made it a ground for asking for remissions of revenue. All were referred to the local authorities. In Cuttack Sir C. Beadon scarcely saw any other of the people than the urban population, and among them the great complaint certainly was against the grain dealers; the cry was "cheaper rice," "fix a rate." In this shape the matter was principally noticed in His Honor's *darbar* speech, which was circulated. He spoke of the calamitous effect of drought, and added—"Such visitations of Providence as these no Government can do much either to prevent or alleviate." He explained that Government could never interfere with prices. "If I were to attempt to do this, I should consider myself no better than a *dacoit* or thief." The general effect of his speech was to create a very considerable feeling of disaffection. The declarations which it contained seemed to have been taken by every one as a final exposition of the policy of Government not to interfere otherwise than by providing labour in the mode already arranged. It seemed especially surprising that Sir C. Beadon, placing the reliance which he did on public works as the means of relieving the acknowledged distress, should have left the province without discovering that there were circumstances which rendered those works quite ineffectual for the purpose. After his return from Orissa, the question of importing grain into that province was the subject of discussion between him and the Viceroy. The latter was strongly inclined to do so, but yielded to the opinion of Sir C. Beadon and others that it was not expedient or necessary.

Major-General Sir A. Cotton, K. C. S. I., K. E. in England, addressed the Secretary of State on "the immediate prospect of famine in Bengal" and urged means for preparing for and relieving it. On 12th March 1866 the Government of India asked Sir C. Beadon whether he considered it necessary for Government to take any further steps than those already authorised with a view to relieve and assist the people. The Government of Bengal reported on the 28th March that there was no prospect of famine in Bengal; that in Orissa, where the

scarcity was greatest, the wants of the people had been materially relieved by public works and those of the Irrigation Company ; that the case was not so pressing as to justify Government in advancing money to the Company, and that, as to food, there was "no reason to suppose that the stock in the country is insufficient for the consumption of the people." There was one statement in the letter of the Bengal Government of the 28th March for which the Commissioners could not in any way account. It was this—"the natural fluctuation of prices has been found sufficient to attract food to the districts in which it was scarcest." This was certainly not the case.

After Sir C. Beadon's visit to the end of May, the famine grew and spread throughout Orissa till it reached enormous proportions. The price of grain increased to more and more severe famine rates, it became scarcer and scarcer, and starvation became more and more general. In April the price of the very coarsest rice reached  $6\frac{1}{2}$  Calcutta *seers* per rupee both in Puri and Cuttack,—fully 5 times the average ordinary price of food ; yet in the whole 3 months, from the middle of February to the middle of May, public importation by Government was scarcely mentioned and never directly applied for in the local official reports. That subject seems to have been regarded as completely settled and disposed of. In Puri the District Superintendent's opinion of the probability of severe famine was reported to the Inspector-General of Police. The native Deputy Magistrate wrote an appeal for help in the native papers of the 5th March. Mr. Barlow wrote to Mr. Schalch at Calcutta, but the matter was dropped. At this time even he seemed to have resigned himself. The Commissioners said that, 'honestly accepting the policy and rules of action laid down for him, he threw himself heart and soul into the system of works, and sanguinely hoped to mitigate the distress by their means. From the 30th March, for nearly 6 weeks, there was a singular blank—in fact an entire cessation of reports from Puri ; and yet this was the period during which the famine was gradually assuming its largest dimensions. Large mortality of some kind in Puri itself was suggested in April. Trenches were being dug to receive the bodies. On the 30th April the Superintendent of Police noted in his diary—"No steps are being taken that I am aware of by Government in the matter of the famine in this district. I cannot doubt that scores of men, women, and children have died of absolute

want, and many must die, for matters are proceeding from bad to worse day by day." Early in May, an extreme pitch of misery having been reached, Mr. Barlow broke silence, in a series of long letters, giving full details. On the 9th May he addressed the papers. Mr. Ravenshaw supported his views. On the 28th May the Government of Bengal, acknowledging the reports of Messrs. Barlow and Ravenshaw, said that the latter had been already informed that funds had been placed at the disposal of the Board for the relief of the distressed districts, and that a further sum had been placed at the disposal of the Public Works Department. No rice was sent by Government to the Puri district, though a grant of money was made. There had been no direct application for the importation of rice even at this time, although it was applied for from, and sent to, other districts. In Puri 2,445 persons were employed daily up to the end of May and the sum of Rs. 43,094 had been expended in public works.

In Balasore both starvation and plunder appeared before the middle of February. It was at this time said that  $\frac{2}{3}$  of the starvelings came from the semi-independent and mismanaged Mohurbhunj estates. Later in the season, in May, the proportion was reversed, and nearly  $\frac{1}{4}$  of those relieved at Balasore came from the neighbouring hill states. When a disturbance occurred in the Mohurbhunj country, Government telegraphed on the 13th April—"You had better go yourself to Mohurbhunj." Mr. Ravenshaw thereupon left Balasore on the 20th April and the Division remained for upwards of a month without a local head. Sir C. Beadon left Calcutta for Darjeeling on the 15th April. Mr. Ravenshaw was not aware of His Honor's intended departure and it unfortunately happened that Sir C. Beadon left before the exact state of Balasore had been fully communicated to him. No arrangement was made to ensure the immediate transmission of information, at this time, although both in the Police and the Public Works Departments and from other sources much crime, misery, and starvation had been reported. Although there was direct telegraphic communication, for some weeks the authorities in Calcutta were ignorant of the state of extreme famine so visible at Balasore.

\* At the time of Sir C. Beadon's departure, no special arrangement was made with the Board. In the *Englishman* of the 24th April

appeared a somewhat modest appeal for aid from the Balasore Relief Committee, saying little of the extent of the distress. Government on the 23rd May approved generally of the measures adopted, referred to the grant of money just made (Rs. 10,000 from the North-West Famine Fund), and promised attention to the Cuttack road. On the 12th May the Balasore Relief Committee made a more urgent appeal to the public press. Just then came a telegram offering the surplus flour of the Bhutan Expedition at cost price. And on this hint Mr. Muspratt at last spoke out, recommending importation of rice. He replied—" *Atta* is not eaten in Balasore, and no one would buy it. Rice required for free distribution to about 3,000 starving of all ages, might be sent to the mouth of the Balasore river, and could be unladen by aid of sloops of this port." He also wrote to Government, to explain how sloops might be sent down in tow of a small steamer, and added—"The number of persons relieved daily now exceeds 2,500, and a more pitiable collection of skin and bone it has never been my lot to see." The Government referred Mr. Muspratt's proposal to import rice to the Board. It was yet a few days before that body consented to import; but at the end of May importations were ordered.

From February to the end of May the official correspondence from Cuttack was almost a blank. The famine came later there than in the other districts, and later in Cuttack proper than in other parts of the district. The Superintendent of Police was an officer wholly ignorant of the language, who showed little zeal, and whose great object seemed to have been to get away from the district. There was not much accord between him and the Magistrate who, new to the district, and deeming it sufficient to follow the Commissioner's views, made no inquiries. Colonel Rundall and Mr. Boothby entertained strong opinions of the severity of the distress and the scarcity of rice, and it was much to be regretted that the Commissioner and Collector did not weigh their opinions more against those of the towns-people. The agents of the French house too—persons the best qualified to judge—seemed to have been very well aware that there was not grain in the country. In the end of May the Cuttack district was suddenly discovered to be in a state of terrible famine. The popular urban confidence in stocks only ended in more sudden and complete exhaustion and ruin, and in respect of

price Cuttack suffered more than any other station. Rice was dearer for a short time at Balasore, but the extreme pressure of prices lasted for a longer period at Cuttack than at either Balasore or Puri. On the 27th May Mr. Ravenshaw returning found the troops and Government establishments on the point of starvation, and on the 28th he sent a telegram which led to importations. On the 29th the Relief Committee also telegraphed to Government urgently praying for rice. Up to this time there were no Government relief works in the Cuttack district, but the works of the Irrigation Company afforded employment to vastly greater numbers than did the Government works in Puri. The Commissioner spoke most highly of the humane endeavours of the officers of that Company to render their works beneficial to the destitute. They employed 9,290 persons on an average in each of the 6 months ending June in the Cuttack district. The native Deputy Magistrate's appeal from Puri, published in the *Hindu Patriot* early in March, did not specially attract public attention. It was not till April, when the pressure of extreme high prices was felt at Cuttack, and the height of starvation was visible at Balasore, that the attention of the European press and public was fully aroused. From the middle of April the subject began to be generally discussed in the public prints. On the 12th the *Friend of India* published a letter from a missionary at Jellasure, a place in Balasore near the border of Midnapore, and not one of the earliest reached by famine. The paper also alluded to accounts of famine received from the Collector of Ganjam. And at this time Mr. J. S. Sykes, a young merchant of Calcutta, who had business correspondence with the missionaries in Orissa, but was not in any way directly prompted by them, conceived the idea of establishing a general subscription for the relief of the sufferers by the famine there. With a boldness which the result amply justified, he advertised an Orissa Famine Fund on the 14th April, and, immediately putting himself in correspondence on the subject with those from whom he could best obtain information, wrote several letters to the newspapers, and energetically urged the fund. His own firm assumed the position of Secretaries. On the 2nd May, having received more precise information from his missionary correspondents, he circulated extracts in Calcutta. The success of Mr. Sykes' fund, as contrasted with the very scant success of the strong appeals for aid for local

purposes made by the official Committees at Puri and Balasore, was remarkable. Mr. Sykes and his partner were young and little known; it seemed unintelligible that, if things were so bad, the proposal should come from them, and many people hesitated. Yet they collected upwards of Rs. 18,000, and distributed it most impartially. On the 28th April, Mr. R. B. Chapman, c. s. Secretary to the Board, writing to the *Englishman*, in support of the official prices current which had been impugned in that paper, said,—“There can be no doubt that the suffering both in Orissa and in other parts is very great. Indeed for some months past the aged and the feeble have been dropping off for want of proper food. It is time, I think, that measures were taken to collect a general fund for the relief of this general distress.”

The Government of India, on 10th May, invited the attention of Sir C. Beadon to a letter in the *Englishman* headed “The starving poor of Orissa” and inquired whether the distress in that province was as severe as represented therein, and, if so, what steps His Honor had taken or would suggest for its relief. On 12th May, Mr. R. Scott Moncrieff of the firm of Messrs. Gisborne and Co., which had first proposed importation in November, wrote to the Private Secretary at Darjeeling, suggesting the application of the balance of the North Western Famine Fund, and strongly urging importation of rice into Orissa from Arracan. He also informed the Viceroy at Simla of his proposal. On the 14th May, Colonel Macpherson, Commissary General, made the offer of the surplus flour of the Bhutan campaign. On 16th May the Government of India, not having received information telegraphed :—“The Governor-General is anxious about the famine at Orissa, and wants to know what is being done. He will be ready to give, if needed, any portion of the North Western Famine Fund that may be still in hand. Is the distress in Nadia also as great as is represented”? Sir C. Beadon in reply stated what had been done and recommended the use of the balance of the N. W. Relief Fund in Orissa and Midnapore. That amounted to £60,500 and of this £20,000 was allotted to Bengal. On 28th May Mr. Ravenshaw telegraphed :—“Rice with utmost difficulty procurable in sufficient quantity at  $4\frac{1}{2}$  Cuttack *seers* per rupee. Bazars again partially closed. Only one day’s rations in store for troops, who are reported discontented. Com-

missariat have refused assistance; crime increasing daily. Public and relief works stopped for want of food. I recommend immediate importation of rice for use of troops, for jails, and to feed labourers on relief works, to supply food to starving through Relief Committees. Rice can be landed at Balasore River, False Point, or mouth of Dhamra River for Cuttack. I will arrange to do so. *Mahajans* would supply on their own account if Government give a tugsteamer to tow ships down the coast; no rain, and the early sown rice crop in danger." On 29th May Sir C. Beadon telegraphed an order for importation.

From this time, for a few days, the famine was half realised. The officers who were in the hills did not immediately return: but Sir C. Beadon on the 31st May showed a strong conviction of the necessity for importation and great exertions were made by the Board to get rice off from Calcutta to False Point and Balasore. On the 2nd June Mr. Ravenshaw repeated his belief in the existence of stocks, though they could not be made available. On the 4th at Puri he recommended Mr. Barlow to be cautious not to open too many centres of relief, and the Board not to import to Puri for the present. Mr. Barlow, however, succeeded in getting a small supply of sea-borne rice from Gopalpur, and the distribution of food on a small scale was commenced. On 9th June, the Government of India telegraphed to Sir C. Beadon:—"The Chamber of Commerce has sent the following message:—"Accounts of famine in Orissa most appalling. Chamber entreat that the balance of the Famine Fund may be immediately given for purchase of rice." The Governor-General begs for an immediate communication from you on this subject. Your latest advices have not led him to suppose matters at all so bad as the Chamber represents. His Excellency ready to grant the fullest aid that the Local Government reports to be required." Sir C. Beadon replied:—"The accounts which I have received do not support the statements of the Chamber, but it will satisfy the public to know that the whole of the Famine Relief Fund is available, and will be expended as required in relieving the existing distress." On the 10th June the Board were authorized to expend the whole balance of the North West Fund for importations of rice. On 16th June Sir C. Beadon returned to Calcutta. But the monsoon had burst, private steamers were not employed, False



Point roadstead was not sufficiently used, and there was no proper staff for landing the rice and conveying it into the interior. The Famine Commissioners could not but think that, if a military campaign had been in question, some attempts would have been made to send professional and other persons who might at least have tried to improve the landing arrangements, and assist generally at False Point and Puri, as did Mr. H. A. Harris, who went to buoy the Dhamra river and volunteered the greatest general assistance. The Irrigation Company also greatly assisted.

In June all Orissa was plunged in one universal famine of extreme severity. Although there never were such crowds of starving people and such mortality in the town of Cuttack as in Balasore and Bhadrak, the state of that district was already as bad as possible. No sort of order could be kept among the famishing crowd, and "for miles round you heard their yell for food." In July some centres for distribution of cooked food were established in the interior of the districts, more were established in August, and in September nearly the full number of feeding places were in operation. There were 43 centres in Cuttack, 22 in Balasore and 23 in Puri. The most frightful suffering visible at a European station was at Balasore, where great masses of people congregated in a most wretched condition. The numbers at Bhadrak were also enormous. The mortality reached its culminating point at the beginning of the second week of August, during the heavy rain and storms which preceded and caused the floods. The people were then in the lowest stage of exhaustion; the emaciated crowds collected at the feeding stations had no sufficient shelter, and the cold and wet killed them in fearful numbers. The defect of shelter was then remedied, but the people, throughout, evinced great dislike to occupy the sheds. The floods which followed these rains were unusually high, and were frequently renewed; lands were laid long under water, and the damage to the riparian tracts in the central portions of Orissa was excessive. In those parts the difficulties and isolation caused by the floods were such that the *rate* of mortality was probably, there, greater during their continuance than at any other time. There was a deficiency of food in October from a want of understanding between the local officers and the Board. The latter seemed not to have supposed that the rice would be required as

soon as the local officers found to be the case, and the local officers imagined that vessels, announced to them, were at hand when in fact they were a long way off. Mr. Chapman, who had, at first, very efficiently managed these matters, was absent on leave, and Mr. Schalch, after ordering the additional quantity through Messrs. Gisborne and Co., returned to Darjeeling to rejoin Sir C. Beadon there. Messrs. Gisborne & Co. proceeded to obtain the supply from Burma. But there was just then an extraordinary demand for cotton in China, and most of the ocean steamers of the port were taken up to go to China. No private tug steamers were employed. In November the new crop began to come into the market in considerable quantity, and then the general famine may be said to have come to an end. The people returned to their avocations, leaving only the very emaciated, the orphans and the widows. There still continued to be general distress in the unfortunate tracts which had suffered a second calamity by the floods.

With respect to the whole system of relief distribution, the difficulties of obtaining trustworthy superintendence were extreme. In the management of the feeding centres there were 3 main difficulties—*1st*, the test of admission: *2nd*, the distance of the centres from the houses of many, so that the centres became the temporary homes of crowds of houseless mendicants, and great demoralisation ensued: *3rd*, there was caste prejudice, and many were deterred thereby from seeking food till it was too late; some died without seeking it at all. The whole quantity of rice which had reached the coast up to the 31st October was about 138,000 bags; which were reckoned as 276,000 *maunds*, or about 10,000 tons: by the middle of November nearly 270,000 bags had been imported.

No details could be given of the effect of the famine in the Tributary *Mahals*. No relief measures were there undertaken by Government. The more hilly parts to the west suffered less than the low country, but the suffering in the undulating laterite tracts to the east, the Nilgiri and Mohurbhunj *Mahals*, was very great indeed. The greater part of Mohurbhunj was included in the area of the most severe suffering; but the roughest approximate estimate of the mortality could not be given. The population was sparse but in so large a territory the loss of life must have been considerable. Next to Orissa, the suffering was

greatest in the adjoining portion of the Chota Nagpur Division, that is, great part of the district of Manbhum, and the Dalbhum part of Singhbhum. The mortality from starvation was certainly very great. The number of deaths, from that cause, reported in Manbhum, was about 33,000; minute local inquiry in small sample tracts in the part of the district which most suffered made it clear that the actual mortality was there very much greater, being upwards of 18 per cent. In Singhbhum the total mortality over the whole district was roughly estimated at 12½ per cent. On the whole, the Commissioners feared that in the worst parts of Manbhum and Singhbhum, mortality occurred at a rate which might bear some comparison with that in Orissa.

Next in point of intensity of suffering came the district of Midnapore, the western part of which lay between Orissa and Chota Nagpur. The population of the district was estimated at 1,200,000. But severe famine was chiefly confined to about ⅓ the area, and most of that was the jungly and least populated part, west of the town of Midnapore, and known as the *Jungle Mahals*. On 19th May 1866 Mr. (Sir W.) Herschel, the Magistrate, noted that deaths from starvation were occurring, and on the 26th he made a full report. The distribution of food began, but the nature and degree of the distress were not known, and operations were not commenced sufficiently early. Comparatively large as was the relief at last afforded, Sir W. Herschel did not think that, at the best, it reached ½ the starving population, and he estimated the mortality at about 50,000; or ⅓ of the whole population seriously affected. But in some of the more remote parts the mortality was, it was feared, larger. In some parts the labouring population died in larger proportion, and it was said that in one jungly tract the population of stone-masons and iron-smelters almost disappeared.

In Birbhum distress did not appear till late. On 18th August a Relief Committee was formed. The distress was general, but the local officers thought that in the district generally the mortality from direct starvation was not great. In Burdwan high prices caused distress among the non-agriculturists. The weaver class in the west of the Hooghly district were severely afflicted and flocked into Calcutta. Poor struggling creatures trying to get to Calcutta from Midnapore and Balasore reached Ulubaria in large numbers. Many could go

no further, and the scenes of misery were very painful. The number of persons who died by the road-side could not be given, but 1,235 deaths were reported as having occurred at the feeding centres of the Howrah district. Early in 1866, starvelings began to resort to Calcutta from the western districts. On 11th June the Justices resolved to ask Government to prevent persons afflicted with contagious diseases from proceeding to Calcutta, "a vast number" having within the previous days arrived. The paupers soon reached a number which was estimated at from 15,000 to 18,000. Nothing could exceed the munificence of the rich native gentlemen of the town, and the food given was in quality and quantity all that could possibly be desired. Throughout the famine, of all the poor people who came to Calcutta, none remained without ample food except those poor creatures who arrived too weak to crawl to the places of distribution, and were picked up by the police dead or dying. Sheds were erected in July and extra conservancy and hospital arrangements made. On the 13th August a general Relief Committee was formed, the charity of the natives was systematized, and a camp established at Chitpur in the suburbs. The number at the camp never exceeded 5,000, and during the 3 months of its existence the average number sent to the famine hospitals was 10,769, of whom, up to November 9th, 3,761 were cured, and 4,276 died. But this last figure did not include those who died in the pauper camp and in the streets, without going to hospital. The total number despatched to their homes was 11,515. Many of those belonging to adjacent districts returned and were reckoned twice. On the 22nd November, the operations in Calcutta ceased, and there remained only the destitute orphans collected in an asylum. Of £60,186 received by the Calcutta Committee £10,000 were devoted to the support of the orphans, £28,055 were sent to other districts or paid over to the Board, and the rest was spent in Calcutta.

East of the Hooghly the district most afflicted with famine was Nadia in which the official courage of Lord Ulick Browne, the Collector, secured efficient relief. In June the distress became very severe, and money was rapidly expended both in giving employment to those who could work and feeding those who could not. On 18th June about 2,500 persons were employed in the special relief works, and 4,000 on public works of all kinds. At the worst time the number

fed exceeded 10,000. In the 24-*Parganas* severe distress appeared, somewhat late in the season, in considerable tracts, principally those in which damage had been done by the Cyclone of 1864. But this distress was efficiently met by the expenditure of Rs. 50,000.

It was not till late in September, when most of the expenditure had already been incurred, that Government appealed to the public. On the 19th September Sir C. Beadon asked the assistance of the Calcutta Committee, and about the same time addressed all the Administrations in India. An official appeal for general assistance was then everywhere made. By that time, however, there was a considerable feeling on the part of the public that the appeal was made too late for practical benefit. The amount of the subscriptions was no doubt in some degree limited by this feeling. The Famine Commissioners expressed a decided opinion that a Central Relief Committee might properly and with advantage have been formed when first suggested by the Chamber of Commerce. A public Committee would probably have delegated their executive functions to a Subcommittee constituted very much as was the Board of Revenue when Mr. Moncrieff and Babu Digambar Mitter assisted it. But the mode of arriving at such an executive body would have secured the confidence of the public, would probably have attracted information and suggestions not volunteered to an official body, would have become better acquainted with the severity of the famine than was actually the case when the public were not represented, would have been better qualified to judge of the public feeling and the monetary state of the country; and an earlier appeal would probably have been made for general public aid.

The Famine Commissioners expressed the opinion that the delays and deficiencies in regard to the adoption of effectual measures to meet the calamity must be assigned to the following causes:— (1) inevitable circumstances: (2) peculiarities of the system of administration in Lower Bengal: (3) certain errors and shortcomings on the part of different individual officers, none of which were alone sufficient to cause the greatest degree of evil, but which, coming together in an unfortunate combination, did greatly retard measures of relief.

As to the first they did not think it probable that the most watchful administration would have thrown into Orissa, in the early months

of the year 1866, a quantity of grain sufficient to meet the wants of the inhabitants during the following months, or that food and employment could in any way have been provided sufficient to reach the whole mass of the people. Much suffering and mortality must under any circumstances have occurred. The omission to import grain into Orissa, in the early months of the year, had unfortunately a double effect. If moderate quantities had been imported, the machinery for landing and distributing which must have been prepared, and the knowledge of these operations which would have been obtained, would have rendered it possible to throw vastly larger quantities of rice into the province in June, July and August, than was the case when importations were suddenly commenced in June without preparation of any kind, and just at the season when it had become nearly impossible to send boats and light river steamers from Calcutta. If these had been at False Point, almost any quantity of rice might have been landed and sent into the interior in the season of the rains. Next, in practice no 2 systems of administration could be more different than that followed in Bengal, and that which, in general terms, might be said to prevail throughout the rest of India. In all other provinces the country was actively governed with a strong hand, but, it might be said, in direct communication with the people, somewhat after the fashion of most of the Governments of Europe. The Government made itself felt everywhere, and undertook corresponding responsibilities. It was represented in every quarter by a large establishment of executive functionaries. The Bengal system was based rather on an English than on a European model. The country was administered judicially and not by the executive power. The executive reigned but did not govern. It had little executive machinery and it on principle avoided interference with the affairs of the mass of the people. The settlement of the revenue of the *zamindars* had been supposed to have transferred a large portion of the responsibilities of an oriental Government to that body, and any executive interference with their *raiya*ts, or executive attempt to ascertain rights or even facts, had been regarded as an infringement of the principles of the settlement. The officers of Government were subject, like every one else, to fixed laws and the action of the Courts; and in Bengal the personal responsibility thus thrown on them, not being

counteracted by great administrative power and influence, had become, in a rich and litigious country, a heavy burden. They were constantly subject to prosecution for every act, and the knowledge of their legal rights possessed by the people and their readiness to resort to the courts rendered executive officers little disposed to acts, the legality of which might admit of question. A weak, or at any rate abstinent executive might involve little injury and imply great advantages in a country where the indigenous institutions supplied the means of local Self-Government; but these again were more wanting in Bengal than in any other part of India, and, the *zamindars* failing to do that which the Government had ceased to do, the country was in fact governed, for the most part, only by the action of the Courts of justice, to which the people resorted in a degree not known in most countries. If the Bengalis had not yet learned much self-government, they had at least learned to make their wants known to Government. Education had progressed very greatly among them; a large proportion of them were extremely acute and intelligent; they had a large and very free use of the Press; and they had among them several influential associations. However the system might or might not be well suited to civilised Bengal, it was in many respects unsuited to remote, inaccessible, and uneducated districts such as those in which the famine in 1866 had been chiefly fatal; the more so where, as in Orissa, the tenure of the land and whole history of the country were totally different from those of Bengal. The Lieutenant-Governor, while he was assisted by no Council and by no such staff of superior Secretaries, as were the smaller Administrations of Madras and Bombay, had in Calcutta to deal with a great European Community, and with many difficult and embarrassing subjects and many conflicting interests which were hardly known to the other provinces administered by Lieutenant-Governors. Consequently, it was not possible that he should look so minutely into the local affairs of the districts under his charge, as some of the heads of Administrations otherwise situated. The system of administration caused a defect of information and an unwillingness to take direct action on the part of Government, which materially retarded measures of relief, and which could not have occurred in any other part of India.

The local officers generally did their duty quite as well as could

be expected under the circumstances—most of them with a personal devotion beyond all praise. But unfortunately neither of the officers in charge of the 2 districts in which severe famine first appeared, though most praiseworthy in all other respects, had that exceptional official persistence which might have surmounted the difficulties in their way. The Commissioners of Divisions seemed to have been, in most instances, more impressed with the necessity of resisting a too great disposition to rely on Government aid, than ready very freely to encourage applications for aid. The action of the Commissioner of Orissa was generally (up to a certain point) unfortunate. In particular Mr. Ravenshaw yielded injudiciously to a mere popular cry regarding the existence of stocks kept back by wicked grain-dealers. The greatest possible allowances were to be made for him owing to the recentness of his appointment, and to his want of knowledge of the people and want of experience of the duties thrown on him; looking also to the very decided negatives which he received when he did on certain occasions direct inquiry into the loss of crops and urged the necessity of importing grain. But his want of local knowledge, his mistake regarding the stocks of grain, and some errors and omissions on his part, produced a bad effect. If the case had been fully explained to the higher authorities, they would not have resisted the evident necessity of providing food for the labourers—a duty which Government in the Public Works Department had distinctly thrown on the civil authorities. The Famine Commissioners acknowledged Mr. Ravenshaw's unwearied exertions from the time when the crisis was recognised and large relief measures commenced. In these he was also efficiently aided by Mr. D. J. McNeile, c.s. The Commissioner of Chota Nagpur too much distrusted the representations of the Deputy Commissioner of Manbhum without himself sufficiently ascertaining the real state of the country. The Commissioner of Burdwan very fairly, even emphatically, represented the facts, so far as he could ascertain them, in the early part of the season. But he could not be said to have continued to watch and inquire so carefully as his reports of the state of the country required. The practical issue of his administration sufficiently showed that the Commissioner of Nadia did all that was proper to be done. Of the Board, the Commissioners said that, having made a report upon very imperfect



information, they adhered too tenaciously to the opinions which they had expressed when circumstances brought to their knowledge might well have caused doubt and suggested further inquiry ; and that they too long maintained general principles laid down by them, when they might have known that the circumstances were very exceptional. They wrongly applied to Orissa principles of administration which were at any rate applicable only to the permanently settled districts of Bengal. Adhering too much to their own views, they too readily seized upon everything which tended in that direction and too much overlooked circumstances tending the other way. They sometimes incautiously reported to the Government circumstances of the former character without sufficient inquiry. They resisted too long the evidences of the necessity of importing grain into Orissa. Care, thoughtfulness, and humanity were generally apparent in their proceedings : but nevertheless their too fixed adherence to their opinions, when combined with want of boldness on the part of local officers impressing views opposed to those of their superiors, tended much to an unfortunate result. Although it did not appear that it was in Bengal, as elsewhere, an ordinary duty of the Members of the Board to visit the districts of the interior, the Commissioners thought that, if it was possible to depute a Member of that body to Darjeeling in May and again in September, it would have been equally possible and more desirable to depute one to Orissa. The police scattered about each district had far the best opportunity of being early acquainted with the state of the people. By several District Superintendents their position was in this respect well utilized. But, through various channels, the information was much delayed, diluted, or lost before it reached the Government. The Inspector-General did not visit any of the districts disorganized by crime nor did any Inspector-General ever visit Orissa, or even the great district of Midnapore, within a few hours of Calcutta, and one of the districts in which crime was at all times the most heavy. In May the Inspector-General retired to Darjeeling to be near the Lieutenant-Governor. Mr. Crommelin, the Superintending Engineer of Orissa, was in the early part of the operations evidently concerned about the sufferings of the people, and anxious that his department should do all that was possible to relieve them. But instead of simply obeying the orders received he might have more

urgently represented the facts of the case to the Government. The Secretary, Public Works Department, might have informed himself of the state of things more exactly when he visited Orissa, and subsequently might have earlier discovered and brought to notice the failure of the works to give large employment to the poor. Such being the deficiencies, the Commissioners considered it very unfortunate that the Head of the Government should not have been able to give that personal attention to the subject which might have remedied these misunderstandings and brought these misapprehensions to light, and that, perhaps taking a too sanguine view His Honor was not induced by the information which did reach him to seek more urgently for that which did not reach him. Especially they thought it unfortunate that the opinions held by some of the local officers regarding the extreme deficiency of food, and the facts known to them as to the effect of that want on the system of works designed for relief, were not elicited during the Lieutenant-Governor's visit to Orissa; that on the occasion of the reference by the Government of India in March (on Sir A. Cotton's letter), and again on the occurrence of a great rise of prices in the beginning of April, and with reference to the great outbreak of crime known to be caused by want, more urgent and direct inquiry was not made: and that, before His Honor's departure from Calcutta and the Commissioner of Orissa's nearly simultaneous departure from Balasore, there was no special arrangement for the early communication of intelligence of the daily progress of events. They thought that, on the vital question of the existence of sufficient stocks of grain, His Honor placed a reliance on the reports and opinions of Mr. Ravenshaw greater than was warranted by that officer's general experience and knowledge, and too easily accepted assertions opposed to all the ordinary laws of trade and political economy, and to all the general indications from which an opinion could best be formed. On the other hand, they thought it unfortunate that Mr. Ravenshaw's letter of April 20th. announcing extreme starvation at Balasore, did not lead to urgent inquiry, and that his letter of May 2nd did not cause the most immediate action. His Honor pressed the expediency of importation on the Board before that body could accede to the propriety of the measure. But on that account the Commissioners the more thought that the circum-

stances which caused the defect of knowledge acted very prejudicially in retarding measures of relief generally. The Commissioners felt sure that every man would be judged by his conduct as a whole and not merely by certain deficiencies or errors. While many had much occasion to look back with very great satisfaction on the result of their meritorious exertions to save life on this terrible occasion, all, whose errors of judgment had in any way rendered their labours less efficacious than they might have been, must have regretted that detraction from their success in such a case with feelings more acute than could be those of any who were not actors in these events. The Commissioners' investigation was more directed to the conduct of classes than of individuals. They thought it would be invidious to particularise the individuals who most distinguished themselves by their exertions, further than by referring to the mention made in the course of their Report, and in the district narratives, of Mr. Sykes, Mr. Moncrieff, the officers of the East India Irrigation Company, and other European gentlemen, and many liberal and benevolent natives, among whom the Raja of Parikud in Puri was prominently noticed. Of officials the following were mentioned as most conspicuous among many deserving of much praise:—Mr. Barlow, Collector of Puri; Mr. Muspratt, Collector of Balasore; Mr. Shortt, Assistant Collector at Bhadrak in Balasore; Dr. Jackson, Civil Surgeon, Balasore; Mr. Harris, Assistant Surgeon employed on the Dhamra; Mr. Barton, Assistant Collector at Khurda; Mr. Kirkwood, Relief Manager in Cuttack; Lieutenant Money, Deputy Commissioner of Manbhum; and Lord H. U. Browne, Collector of Nadia.

The Famine Commissioners also discussed the measures immediately necessary for the restoration of prosperity to the afflicted districts, and other considerations of a more general character connected with famine. No further reference to these matters is required. So also, the lessons to be learnt from the Orissa famine for future guidance need not be reproduced as they have been embodied in, or superseded by, the later Famine Codes. It may be mentioned that the Famine Commission of 1878 calculated the mortality in Orissa at 1,000,000, in Manbhum 200,000, in Singhbhum 50,000, in Midnapore 50,000: total 1,300,000 deaths. Before the end of December 1866, 398,047 *maunds* of rice had been sent to

Orissa, and 413,347 *maunds* altogether, including despatches by land, to Midnapore and Manbhum: of this amount 324,072 were used. Up to the end of 1866 the total cost of the famine was under 25½ *lakhs*: 80,000 people had been gratuitously relieved for 6 months, and 4,500 for several months on works.

The hopes held out by the Orissa Famine Commissioners of the recuperative power of the province proved to be too sanguine. The Famine Commission's report may again be referred to. In December 1866, Mr. Schalch (Member of the Board of Revenue) was deputed to make special inquiries into the condition of the people. He reported that while the crop, in the tracts where there was any crop, was exceptionally good, in the parts which the inundations had visited there was absolutely nothing saved: and these parts he estimated at ½ of Cuttack (the central part lying along the Mahanadi) the southern part of Puri, and the south-eastern part of Balasore, with a population of about 850,000: he calculated that the area in which the crops were saved, aided by stocks and what small private existed, would supply food to half of this population, but that the rest must depend on Government importations, and he reckoned that, at 5 *maunds* per head, to feed them for 9 months, the necessary quantity to be imported was 1,210,000 *maunds*. This recommendation was approved by the Bengal Government, on the ground that "the holders of grain, taught by experience of the past year, will be unwilling to part with it until the safety of the next crop is assured, while the internal trade of the province is slow to adapt itself to new channels, and it is now certain that no dependence is to be placed on supplies by private merchants from abroad."

In January the number of applicants for relief began largely to increase, deaths from starvation were reported in great numbers (about 40 a day in the Cuttack district), prices showed a tendency to rise, and reports came in giving a melancholy picture of the desolation and distress of the country. On the 12th February 1867 a public meeting was held in Calcutta, at which the Viceroy made known what had been recently learnt as to the circumstances of the people, and invited the public to bear its part in the duty of relieving the famine-stricken. An influential Committee was appointed and the sum of Rs 6,14,503 was subscribed. Sir John (Lord) Lawrence, in addressing the meeting, said: "I will here remind you that in 1865

there was a general failure of the crops in the 3 districts of Orissa, followed by very indifferent harvests in 1866, while in the autumn of that year a large part of the province was also inundated. The floods of the Mahanadi and other rivers broke through their embankments and submerged extensive tracts of land in their vicinity. All the crops in these localities were spoiled, and property which had escaped the famine was carried away or destroyed. What the drought had spared was engulfed in the wide vortex of water. In this way  $\frac{1}{3}$  the district of Cuttack alone, extending over an area of 1500 miles, has been devastated. From the most reliable accounts it is estimated that from  $\frac{1}{5}$  to  $\frac{1}{4}$  of the population of the province has already perished. What famine and starvation began, diarrhoea and pestilence have completed. It is estimated that we may have to import into the province not less than 1,200,000 *maunds* of rice, equal to about 27,000 tons. We have already arranged for the introduction of  $\frac{1}{2}$  the quantity by the 1st of April, and the rest will follow as rapidly as may be found necessary." "There were already," he added, "1,500 orphan children to be provided for, which might increase to 2,000 more, and 10 *lakhs* of rupees, or £ 100,000, would be required for their maintenance."

The Viceroy had previously telegraphed to the Secretary of State. (then Lord Cranborne), begging that a subscription might be got up in England; to which the following brief refusal was transmitted in reply:-- "January 21st. Your telegram received, and sent to the Lord Mayor. He thinks no subscription could be raised here. I have made inquiries, and think he is right. Distress here from panic, frost, and strikes is terrible, and engrosses public attention." Sir John Lawrence, alluding to this refusal of assistance at the meeting, remarked that it was only the more necessary for those present to exert themselves. Eight persons on the spot subscribed 2,500 Rs. each, and the Viceroy himself gave 10,000 Rs. more towards the relief fund.

The Orissa Famine Commissioners' report was dated the 6th April 1867. On perusing it Sir C. Beadon recorded a long Minute of the 15th, and the Governor-General his Minute of the 20th idem. It will be sufficient to say of the latter that he showed that he had throughout relied on the Lieutenant-Governor "that all which appeared to be necessary had been done for the country," and that it was necessary

for the Government of India to work through the Local Governments. Thereupon the Report of the Orissa Famine Commissioners was transmitted to England under cover of the Government of India's despatch of the 22nd April 1867, containing their final conclusions. The following paragraphs of the despatch may be here quoted :—

“12. Considering the very full and exhaustive Report which the Commissioners have made, it seems undesirable that we should add more than we can avoid to the mass of papers which we have to place before you. We do not, therefore, propose to review the Report in any detail, nor, in respect of that part of the case which may be thought by the terms of Lord Cranborne's despatch of 9th October 1866 to have been in some measure specially referred to a Commission of Inquiry, to do much more than state briefly how far we concur in the conclusions of the Commissioners.

13. On the point to which our own attention is particularly directed by the same despatch, we shall, of course, think it our duty to speak more fully.

14. As regards the *first* of the proposed subjects of investigation, the causes of the famine, we see no occasion to add any thing to the observations recorded by the Commissioners. We agree in their statements upon this point.

15. As regards, *secondly*, the conduct of the officers in charge of the afflicted districts, and we would add generally of all the officers of Government concerned, including the Board of Revenue, the Police, and the Public Works officers, we find no reason to differ materially from the conclusions formed by the Commissioners, as summed up in paragraphs 416 to 420 of their Report. We would say, however, that the Commissioner, Mr. Ravenshaw, seems to us to have been in a very difficult position after the telegram from the Board of Revenue of the 1st. February. That telegram purported in its terms to convey a decisive order of the Government; and, inasmuch as the order was consistent with all that had gone before, Mr. Ravenshaw might well have supposed that it was intended as a peremptory and conclusive intimation to him upon the two vital points of the case, viz, that the Government would not import rice, and that the Government would only pay for labor in cash. No doubt Mr. Ravenshaw would occupy a far higher position had he boldly protested against such an order; and it may not be a violent inference that, not having done so, he is not to be estimated as an officer fitted for the post of a Commissioner in circumstances of exceptional strain.

16. While we are thus disposed to view Mr. Ravenshaw's mistakes

somewhat leniently, we question whether there is sufficient ground for the hesitation expressed in paragraph 418 of the Commissioners' Report as to the degree of responsibility attaching to the Board of Revenue. We cannot think that there is really any room to doubt that the Board of Revenue regarded it as a part of their duty to keep themselves informed concerning the state of the country, to give instructions within the limits of their authority to the local revenue officers respecting measures of relief when such were deemed necessary, and to report to Government if they should consider any thing to be required beyond the limits of their authority.

17. The whole course of the correspondence seems to us to support this view ; and it is, indeed, incredible that the Board should have taken on themselves to send the reply, which they did, to the Commissioner's telegram of 31st January unless they had believed that the responsibility primarily rested with them of determining whether the state of the country was, or was not, such as to call for extraordinary measures.

18. Though drawing this inference, however, as to the Board's own estimate of the character of their functions and authority, we do not the less agree with the Commissioners in considering that it was undoubtedly the duty of the Board to have communicated Mr. Ravenshaw's telegram of the 31st. January to the Lieutenant-Governor.

19. We are, indeed, at a loss to understand how the Members of the Board could have thought themselves justified in dealing with a communication of such importance without referring it for the orders of the Lieutenant-Governor, and we are constrained to say that in our judgment a heavy weight of responsibility and grievous blame attaches to the Board of Revenue in this respect.

20. As remarked by the Commissioners, the unfortunate reply made by the Board to the Commissioner's telegram seems to have stifled and put an end to all further discussion regarding the importation of rice from that time until a period when the state both of the weather and the people rendered it too late to import it with successful effect.

21. The question on which Lord Cranborne more especially asked our opinion is that of the judgment to be passed on the conduct and policy of the Local Government of Bengal in dealing with this great calamity. It is with very deep regret that, after a careful review of that conduct and policy—a review which we trust we have made with the deliberation demanded not only by the high official position, but by the long and distinguished services of Sir Cecil Beadon—we find ourselves unable to speak with satisfaction or approval of the mode in which the emergency was met by the Lieutenant-Governor. And here we are under the necessity of stating with some emphasis that we cannot accept that which is

propounded as the only true issue by His Honor in his Minute of the 15th. instant. In the 64th. paragraph His Honor observes:—"The Government of India will not fail to perceive that the real point of the inquiry, though it has not by any means been fairly brought out by the Commission, is whether the circumstances of Orissa, as known to the local authorities and reported to Government, were such as to warrant them in recommending or justifying \* the Government in resorting at an

\* Query.—"to earlier period without such recommendation to so very justify." serious and exceptional a measure as the importation on public account of rice sufficient to feed a large proportion of the entire population." We think it clearly brought out by the Commission that the circumstances of Orissa, as known to the local authorities, did warrant them in making the recommendation, which in fact most of them did make at an early period, that sufficient grain should be imported to render relief by public works effectual, and we cannot admit that the limited measure thus recommended was open to serious objection on economical grounds. It is true that the virtual unanimity of the local officers in this opinion was not apparently known to the Head of the Government; but, for the question as to the course which would have been justifiable on the part of the Local Government in the absence of Reports, we are bound to say that several other questions ought to be substituted—were not the facts as to the condition of Orissa which were in the possession of the Government of Bengal before the end of 1865 of a character to cause the deepest anxiety and alarm? Should not the anxiety and alarm have led to continued vigilance? In the exercise of that vigilance, should not the fullest advantages have been taken of every opportunity of inquiring into the state of the country and the efficiency of measures of relief? and, if that advantage had been taken, would not the true condition and prospects of the population of Orissa have been estimated with much greater accuracy at a much earlier period?

22. We are under the necessity of drawing your attention to the first half of the month of February 1866, which we consider the most critical period in the history of the famine. At that date the Commissioners are distinctly of opinion that the time had come when grain should have been imported for the purpose of paying in food the part of the population which was willing to labor at the public works, and we think it more than probable that, if such a measure had been resorted to, its direct and indirect effects would have been to bring out the whole truth as to the state of the people at a time when the exertions of Government might have been most effectual. On February 13th the Lieutenant-Governor reached Orissa in company with his Public Works



Secretary and a Member of the Board of Revenue. His Honor had, of course, before his mind the correspondence on the famine which had passed with his Government in the General and Public Works Departments, and he had before him the Report of Mr. Barlow, dated December 29th. He left the province on February 19th., and the impression which he brought away was that no calamity resembling that which has occurred was to be expected—an impression which is now acknowledged to have been entirely mistaken.

23. The Lieutenant-Governor affirms that his communications with the local officers produced this impression on his mind, and of course we entirely believe his statement. Yet it is certain that the local officers below the Commissioner were at the time most seriously alarmed, that one of them (see Mr. Lacey's diary, App. p. 119) had anticipations of the future not far removed from the truth; that few of them had any belief in the existence of large stocks of rice in the country; and that several of them, even including the Commissioner, thought the importation of grain essential to the efficacy of relief by public works, (see Mr. Ravenshaw's telegram of January 31; Mr. Barlow's letters, App. Nos. 89 and 97, pp. 99 and 103; Lieut. Nolan's letter, App. No. 91, p. 102). We do not attempt to explain their reticence, though we cannot doubt that the unfortunate action of the Board of Revenue had much to do with it, as producing a belief that non-importation was the settled policy of the Government; and we cannot but think from the tone of the Lieutenant-Governor's letter at a more serious conjuncture (see Lieutenant-Governor's demi-official letter to Mr. Chapman of June 11th, App. 288,) that the tendency in His Honor to take a sanguine view of events was unfavourable to the receipt of discouraging communications. But the inference which we now draw is, that any detailed conversation with the local officers must, under the circumstances of Orissa, have elicited very alarming facts, and that, if sanguine opinions were expressed, a very little sifting of them must have greatly diminished their value and significance. We will add that though the complaints received from natives by the Lieutenant-Governor suggested a particular remedy for scarcity which was clearly inadmissible, yet the complaints themselves, in spite of the ignorance they betrayed, were not the less evidence of severe and widespread distress, and should not have been dismissed from consideration without careful inquiry into the state of things which they implied.

24. Under any circumstances, we think the Lieutenant-Governor was bound to inquire narrowly into the sufficiency of the measures on which he placed reliance for the relief of distress. It is now certain that the relief actually afforded by public works was, from first to last,

almost nominal, and that, early in February 1866 "famine relief" was, in the Commissioner's words, "at a standstill" through the operation of the same cause which led ultimately to the general failure of the attempt to relieve through this instrumentality, *viz.*, the valuelessness of money paid for labor in the absence of procurable food. It seems to us highly probable that personal inquiry on the part of the Lieutenant-Governor, or of his Public Works Secretary, whether relief worthy of the name was in fact being administered, would have brought out information which would have proved of the most serious importance, and we are wholly unable to understand the statement of Colonel Nicolls "that the result (of discussion was that nothing more was necessary", (Statement, &c, No. 119), and that in February and March there was no reason to suppose that the employment given by the relief works in the Puri district was inadequate to the emergency for which they were designed, (*Ibid*). It appears to us that throughout the famine in Orissa no sufficient attention was paid by the Government of Bengal to the extraordinary disproportion between the distress never denied to exist in Orissa, and the relief afforded by public works whether its amount was tested by expenditure or by visible progress in construction.

25. The impressions received by the Lieutenant Governor in Orissa, no doubt, remained on his mind, and explain both the scantiness of his communications with the Government of India and the uniform colour of his representations. As His Honor has stated in his first Minute, on his return to Calcutta, he discussed the subject of the famine with the Governor-General in personal interview, and affirmed that the circumstances of Orissa were not such as to render the importation of grain expedient or necessary. No further communication was addressed to us till the 28th of March, when, in answer to our request for a Report whether any further measures of relief were necessary, the Lieutenant-Governor informed us that "there was no prospect of a famine in Bengal," that "in Orissa, where the scarcity has been greatest, the wants of the people had been materially relieved," and that "the natural fluctuation of prices had been sufficient to attract food to the districts (of Orissa) in which it was scarcest." All these assertions are substantially repeated in a series of demi-official letters to the Governor-General, extending from May 22nd to June 23rd. On the 10th of June His Honor informed us that his accounts did not support the statements of the Chamber of Commerce regarding the appalling character of the famine, and the narratives received from the Government of Bengal on June 20th, July 11th, July 18th, July 24th and August 8th, successively affirm that "the general state of the suffering districts is improving," that "the improvement continues," that "the accounts, though showing

that great distress exists in Orissa, are full of promise as to the future ;" that "prices are falling even in Orissa," that "the accounts from the distressed districts are favourable ;" and that "they are very cheering."

26. We are satisfied that a persuasion of the truth of these statements was in His Honor's mind, but we are not satisfied that they were warranted by any evidence before him, except so far as the promising state of the crops may have partially justified the later narratives. Positive assertions of this sort, in so unspeakably serious a matter, ought not to have been based on the mere absence of evidence to the contrary, but should have rested on affirmative testimony to their correctness. Such statements should not, we think, have been made without some distinct evidence that the causes supposed to be mitigating the famine were really in operation ; as, for example, that grain from the alleged stocks was really coming into the market, that prices were really falling, that private enterprise was actually coming to the aid of the starving population, that a number of persons proportionate to the area of the distress were, as a known fact, receiving effective relief through the extension of public works. We cannot see that any evidence tending to support such conclusions was before the Lieutenant-Governor ; we know, indeed, that they were altogether opposed to the facts.

27. We are convinced that, if the extent and imminence of the danger had been brought home to the Lieutenant-Governor, no officer in the service of Her Majesty would have been more forward in exertions or personal sacrifices for the sake of mitigating or averting it. But it would appear that, until comparatively late in the history of these events, the Head of the Bengal Government labored under what may be described as an incapacity to believe in disaster ; and we think that the result of this frame of mind was that he neglected warnings which were not obscure, and wasted valuable opportunities both of inquiry and of action. We, of course, admit it to be uncertain what number of the lives which have been lost could have been saved by human efforts promptly applied. The records of similar calamities would seem to show that, under any circumstances, there must have been very great loss of life. But we have the satisfaction of knowing that, on the occasion of those calamities, the foresight and diligence exhibited by the local representatives of the British Government were not unworthy of the emergencies which had arisen. We regret that we cannot make the same statement of the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, so far as relates to the later months of 1865 and the earlier months of 1866. At the same time we cordially join in the tribute paid by Lord Cranborne to the activity and zeal displayed by the Lieutenant-Governor as soon as the true condition of the people of Orissa was understood."

A copy of the Governor-General's Minute of the 20th April and of the Government of India's despatch of the 22nd idem was given to Sir C. Beadon, who wrote thereon his Minute of the 30th April, which may be quoted as containing his final words on the subject, as he then left India.

"By the courtesy of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General, I have received a copy of the despatch from the Government of India to the Secretary of State, No. 71, dated the 22nd April, and of the Minutes recorded by His Excellency and Sir H. Durand, relative to the Report of the Orissa Famine Commission. The contents of these papers impose on me the necessity for making some further observations; and I hope I may be permitted to express my regret that the necessity for forwarding the Despatch to England before the Governor-General and his Council left Calcutta for Simla should have prevented the Government of India from giving more attentive consideration to the correspondence and evidence on which the Report of the Commission professes to be based, and from testing the accuracy of the facts and opinions presented in the Report by a more careful reference to its Appendix. It is also, I think, very much to be regretted that the Government of India should have felt themselves obliged to pass judgment on the conduct of individual officers without giving them an opportunity of explaining it.

2. On the first 3 paragraphs of the Governor-General's Minute I have to remark that, in the middle of October 1865 as soon as the failure of the principal rice crop gave indications of approaching scarcity, the Board were desired to make a comprehensive Report on the state and the prospects of the country, to adopt such measures of relief as they could, and to suggest such as they thought it necessary for the Government to adopt; a few days afterwards the Commissioner of Cuttack was called upon for a special Report on his Division; action was at once taken upon it when received, and on the 25th November the Board submitted their general Report. This Report and my orders thereon were submitted to the Government of India on the 11th December, and it is to me a matter of exceeding regret that neither then nor subsequently on receipt of my official communications of the 19th December, 8th January, 5th and 20th February, and 28th March, (all showing the wide extent of the scarcity and the means taken to relieve it), nor again when I returned from Orissa in February, and related to the Governor-General what I had seen there and the impressions I had derived from my visit, did the Government of India, though having experience of famines which neither I nor any of the officers or

inhabitants of Bengal or Orissa, had, utter a single word for our guidance, or even warn me that the consequences of the impending famine might be more serious than then seemed probable, or that the measures taken to avert them might not be sufficient.

3. In paragraph 44 of his Minute the Governor-General expresses his opinion that, when I was in Orissa, in February 1866, I had quite enough before me to show that there was at least much danger of a famine. His Excellency thinks it scarcely credible that all the different individuals with whom I conversed should have been altogether silent at such a momentous period, and have given no expression to the anxious doubts and fears which they *cannot but have felt*. And His Excellency remarks that the starving multitude which beset me at Puri should have led me to make special inquiry which could not have failed to lay bare the real condition of the people.

4. If His Excellency means to say that he does not believe what I have said, and what every witness examined on this point by the Commission has said, there can be no further room for discussion. But the fact is as shown abundantly by the Commission's inquiry, that at the time no one feared that there was not food enough in the province to last till the next harvest. It was feared that there would be grievous scarcity and high prices, and many were anxious lest the poor should starve for want of means to buy food; but there is not a particle of evidence to show that any one believed in or expected an actual deficiency of food, or supposed that the coming distress however severe it might be, would not be relieved by a liberal expenditure of money. The gentlemen with whom I conversed were by no means silent. The doubts and fears which they felt were expressed to me freely enough but they were not such doubts and fears as His Excellency supposes.

5. As for the starving multitude by which the Governor-General states that I was beset at Puri, it exists only in imagination. I have told the Government of India that I saw nothing of the kind, though I walked through the town and was followed by a large crowd, and the evidence fully confirms my statement. Rice was dear, and there was difficulty in getting it, but there was no apparent starvation in the town. The first meeting of the Relief Committee, at which it was proposed (but not agreed to by Mr. Barlow) to apply to the public for aid, was not held till the 25th February, (10 days after I left Puri); and the first signs of starvation at Puri did not appear till March or April, when the poor flocked into the town. In short, the whole evidence taken by the Commission at Puri shows clearly that at the time of my visit there were no apparent signs of famine; that the Collector and everyone else believed in the existence of large stocks of grain in the district; that

rice was then being imported from Gopalpur ; and that no one supposed that it would be necessary for the Government to import rice to feed the population and prevent them from starving. I made every inquiry that it was possible for me to make, and enjoined the Collector to keep himself and Government fully and constantly informed of the state of the district, and to recommend any further measures of relief that he might think necessary. This he promised to do, assuring me then, as he did afterwards officially on the 5th March, that Government could then do no more than had actually been done.

6. As to what the Governor-General observes in paragraph 6 of his Minute, I will only ask the Secretary of State candidly to read and consider Mr. Barlow's Reports of the 21st and 30th March, and Mr. Ravenshaw's letters of the 24th March and 9th April forwarding them to the Board. The former of these reached me on the 17th April, and the latter on the 1st May ; and I confidently submit that there is nothing in either of them that could possibly lead me to suppose that the measures undertaken for the relief of the sufferers were, or would be, otherwise than sufficient. I deny that I ever thought the statements of the distress which reached me were exaggerated, but I had no reason to believe that they were too favourable ; and such as they were, believing them to be the result of careful inquiry, I could not do otherwise than accept them. The demi-official correspondence that passed between Mr. Barlow and Mr. Ravenshaw at the same time, (which I have only seen since the Report of the Commission was written,) shows clearly that their official letters represented their real opinion and belief, and that there was no hesitation in expressing them.

7. Mr. Ravenshaw was desired to go to Mohurbhunj before his letters of March and April reached me. It is all very well now to say that he ought not to have gone, but at the time the necessity for his presence there was extremely urgent, and I could not possibly suppose that his temporary absence from the sea-board would in any way impede relief measures, or prevent Government from receiving such further information as would lead it, if necessary, to extend them or adopt others. I expressly desired him to communicate with me by telegraph ; and it is evident that, if he had been all the time on the sea-board, he could not have reported anything further during the interval, for it was not till the 28th May, (17 days after he had returned to the sea-board and 6 days after he had telegraphed to say that importation of rice was only required as a measure of economy,) that he telegraphed its urgent necessity as a means of supplying food. Long before that, we had allotted large funds for relief to each of the Orissa districts, and I had urged the Board to import rice.

8. The Governor-General observes, in paragraph 8, that Mr. Schalch ought not to have been allowed to go to Darjeeling but the executive action of the Board was in no way impeded by the temporary absence of one Member, and I was anxious to have the advantage of personally consulting him both on that and on other questions of revenue administration. Mr. Schalch's personal knowledge of Orissa was confined to Balasore and it did not in the least appear that he could have done any good by going to Orissa, or that the Commissioner and the other local officers required the personal advice or direction of a Member of the Board.

9. I refrain from remarking on paragraphs 9 to 19 of the Governor-General's Minute, further than again to urge that none of the officers whose proceedings have been impugned by the Commission may be condemned before they have been heard in defence. There is not one among them whose explanation would not materially affect the conclusions which have been formed by the Commission and adopted by the Government of India from the Commission's Report. These gentlemen are, in fact, in the position of accused persons, who, having been examined in such a way as to elicit answers in support of an obviously foregone conclusion unfavorable to themselves, are judged without having been given an opportunity for defence.

10. With regard to what the Governor-General says in paragraphs 20 and 23, I can only say that I reported faithfully to His Excellency the impression made on my mind by my visit to Orissa, and by the various accounts, official and demi-official, which had reached me; and that the decision not to import grain was arrived at after frequent conversations on the subject. His Excellency does me the justice to say that I appeared as earnest and anxious about the state of things in Orissa as possible, and he is perfectly right in saying that I did not then anticipate the possibility of the Government having to undertake to supply food for the people.

11. As to what the Government of India say in paragraph 21 and the following paragraphs of their despatch, it is evident that it is written under a totally erroneous apprehension of the facts, as shown in the correspondence and evidence. I beg to draw special attention to the fact that the proposal to import grain for the payment of labourers had reference in the first instance not to the whole province of Orissa, not even to the whole district of Puri, but to the comparatively small portion of it comprising the *parganas* of Parikud, Malud, and Sathpara. Though the Commission have endeavoured to show that the proposal had a wider scope, the whole correspondence conclusively proves the contrary, and Mr. Barlow's official letter of the 27th November expressly defines

the tract in which severe distress prevailed, and into which he desired to import rice, as "the sandy strip of land which divides the Chilka lake from the sea." This, too, was at a time when there "was no bother about food in the town of Puri," and when it had been reported that there was a steady influx of carts from the *mufassal*, that grain of all sorts was exposed for sale in the shops; and that, though prices were so high as to be prohibitory to the poorer classes, the regular supply was above the demand, and food was forthcoming where funds to buy it existed. Even the Deputy Collector (Babu Ramakhoy Chatterji) who, in December 1866, told the Commission that he had not believed in the existence of large stores of grain, actually reported officially on the 25th October 1865 that there was a large quantity of rice in the Puri bazars, that a supply was coming in daily, and that many *zamindars* and others had "an immense quantity of rice in their stores enough to supply the whole district with rice for 2 years." This is not the language of men who thought that Government would have to import rice for the support of the population of the town and district.

12. At a somewhat later period again, when Mr. Barlow sent in his amended proposal to employ the people of Malud, Parikud, and Sathpara on the Puri and Ganjam roads, instead of reviving the salt manufacture, all he suggested was that grain should be *stored* at different points along the line. In his letter of the 29th November making this suggestion he said not a word about *importation* of rice; and the Commissioner, in forwarding Mr. Barlow's letter to the Board on the 6th December, evidently supposed that the rice would be purchased on the spot. On the 9th December Mr. Barlow telegraphed from Puri that "destitution was general and complete" in Sathpara, Malud, and Parikud, which he had just visited; but all he asked for was permission to expend Rs. 5,000 in digging a tank at Sathpara, and this was given at once,—the Board directing him to pay wages in grain in order to keep the people from starving. Here again neither Mr. Barlow nor Mr. Ravenshaw, who wrote on the same subject on the 18th December, alluded to the necessity for importing rice; and Mr. Crommelin, writing on the same day to the Chief Engineer regarding the prosecution of work on the Puri and Ganjam roads, observed that the Commissioner's suggestion for part payment in rice should be adopted, and that *there would be no difficulty with the Collector's aid in carrying it out.*

13. Again on the 22nd and 25th December Mr. Barlow wrote saying that rice in the district, *so far as depending on the local supply*, would not be cheaper than 12 Cuttack seers, equal to 15<sup>3</sup>/<sub>4</sub> Bengal seers, the rupee; and that, therefore, if it could be imported at 16 seers or more for the rupee, large quantities would be sold, and that he was ready



to take 10,000 or 15,000 maunds for the jail and Public Works at that rate; but that, as he found that rice could not be landed at Puri cheaper than 10 or 12 Bengal seers for the rupee, it would be useless "under present conditions of the local market" to import rice. This is not the language of one who thought that the local supply of rice was insufficient, or that its importation from abroad by Government was necessary to feed the labourers, much less to support the population.

14. Mr. Barlow's subsequent correspondence with Mr. Nolan and Mr. Ravenshaw was unfortunately not communicated to me in any shape, but it amounts really to no more than this, that in Mr. Barlow's opinion, though there would be great difficulty in obtaining a sufficient supply of rice in the district of Puri *at the rates then prevailing*, it could be obtained in the neighbourhood, and that it would be useless to apply to Chittagong or Moulmein for cheap rice, as it could not be landed at less than from 10 to 12 seers for the rupee, and (as he said) "we ought to be able to obtain more favorable rates here." This, be it observed, was written on the 1st February, the very day on which the Board, in reply to Mr. Ravenshaw's telegram of the 31st January, telegraphed back that the Government declined to import rice into Puri. I need not again remark on the Board's omission to report this to me, or their declaration that the Government declined to import rice into Puri; but I desire to point out that Mr. Barlow, before receiving the Board's message, and therefore quite independent of its supposed influence, proposed the importation of rice only on the supposition that it could be landed at a cheaper rate than 10 or 12 Bengal seers for the rupee, and that such a condition was at that time impossible.

15. From that time there was no further proposal from the local authorities to import rice into Orissa until I pressed the measure on the the Board in May, and a few days afterwards directed its adoption. At no time till the very end of May did the local authorities propose it except as a measure of economy, and up to that time there is nothing to show that any single person in the province thought that there was not enough rice there to feed the people, or that anything was wanting but money to enable them to buy it.

16. The Government of India are pleased to consider that I laboured under an incapacity to believe disaster. I fully believed in the disaster that was likely to be caused by the failure of the crops of 1865, and did all that a Government could do to avert it; but I did not believe, nor did any one else believe, that there would not be food enough in the province to feed the people, or that the stocks of old rice (which the Commission admit to have been considerable, and which were far from exhausted when

their inquiry was held), supplemented by private importation, would not suffice for all.

17. The Government of India have referred to my private correspondence with the Governor-General in proof of this alleged "incapacity of belief;" but yet His Excellency writing to me on the 11th June, long after I had realized the necessity for importing rice into Orissa, and had actually imported it, wrote to me thus—

"I think that, *if the local officers at all recommend this measure*, we should import grain even at this late date, and at the risk of prices falling."

And the Hon'ble Mr. Grey, writing to His Excellency on the 18th June, observed as follows:—

"Beadon is no doubt right in saying that we must now go on with our supplies of rice to Orissa, but the facts mentioned by Chapman seem to me to *throw grave doubts on the wisdom of the course we have embarked upon.*"

18. If I had waited for the recommendation of the local authorities, or if Mr. Grey's doubts had prevailed, rice would not have been imported into Orissa until a still later date. The narratives alluded to in paragraph 25 of the despatch were all written after the most active measures had been taken to relieve the distress, and when they were in full operation. The tone of them is fully borne out by the official Reports received at that time from the local officers.

19. Undoubtedly the facts known as to the condition of Orissa before the end of 1865 were such as to cause the deepest anxiety and alarm, and to demand continued vigilance. To this I was fully alive from the first, and I did not cease to exercise (as I thought) the vigilance which the occasion demanded. The correspondence with Messrs. Gisborne & Co., in November, and with the Board in November and December 1865, was immediately reported to the Government of India,—but the former only elicited a bare approval of my proceedings, and of the latter no notice was taken. On the first indication of scarcity, and repeatedly afterwards, the Commissioner of Cuttack was called upon to report on the condition of the province, and to suggest measures of relief; weekly reports were required from the Collectors; every practicable measure recommended by the local authorities was adopted; Relief Committees were appointed, and unlimited expenditure was sanctioned for public works. Not content with this, I myself visited the province in February, and endeavoured by personal communication with all classes, official and unofficial, European and Native, to elicit the truth, and I reported the result of my inquiries verbally to the Governor-General.

20. As Mr. Barlow himself had never advocated the importation of

rice even on a small scale, unless it could be landed cheaper than it could be obtained in the district, and had never even thought of importation on a large scale, it is easy enough to understand why he did not press the matter on me when I was on the spot, without having recourse to the monstrous supposition broached by the Commission that he lacked official boldness to speak out his mind, or the utterly gratuitous insinuation \* that he was in any way discouraged from doing so. I venture to affirm that there is not an officer under the Government of Bengal who would not indignantly deny the existence of any such feeling, and that Mr. Barlow himself would be among the first to repudiate it.

21. The Government of India say that I came away from Cuttack with the impression that no calamity resembling that which has occurred was to be expected, and that this impression is now acknowledged to be a mistaken one. There is enough truth in this to make it a plausible ground of charge, and to give apparent support to the conclusion that my inquiry was superficial. But yet the statement is substantially erroneous and misleading. The impression I derived from my visit was, not that the pending calamity was not a very serious one, not that the people would not suffer severe distress in consequence of the utter failure of the crops and the consequent extreme dearness of food, but that the stocks of grain in the country would last beyond the next harvest, that present distress was already met by the employment of the people on the roads, embankments, and canals, and by the relief afforded both by private individuals and by the Relief Committees; and that, though money would be afterwards wanted to supplement local charity, the importation of food by the Government would not be required. In this opinion I was supported by all facts I could gather by patient personal inquiry, and by the universal opinion of all with whom I came in contact.

22. The Government of India say that the relief afforded by public works was almost nominal, but this statement is wholly opposed to the recorded facts. During the first 6 months of 1866, the amount actually expended on public works in Orissa (exclusive of the cost of establishments) was upwards of Rs. 3,00,000, and Mr. Barlow's letters of March, April, and May show that a vast amount of relief was being then

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\* NOTE.—The Commission, and I am sorry to add the Government of India, have most unfairly referred to a letter I wrote to Mr. Chapman on the 11th June, as indicative of a tendency in my mind "unfavourable to the receipt of discouraging communications;" my letter had reference simply to the publication of papers. A few days before, on the 29th May, I wrote to Mr. Grote thus:—"When you get the official reports from the District Committees, they should be promptly published, either at length or in a digested form, under the Board's authority." The whole tenor of my official and private correspondence with the Board, and with the Commissioner, is directly opposed to the tendency imputed to me,—a tendency which I utterly deny.

afforded in that way, while the Irrigation Company had, when I was in Cuttack, some 17,000 or 18,000 labourers employed on their canals, and would have employed more if they could have got them. Unfortunate as were the orders of the Commissioner regarding the payment of labourers in money instead of grain, their effect has been greatly exaggerated by the Commission.

23. I have nothing to remark on Sir Henry Durand's Minute, except that the *carte blanche* to which he refers was not given until after effectual measures had been taken to relieve the distress, both by grants of public money and by the importation of food.

24. I feel much indebted to the Government of India for their cordial acknowledgment of "the activity and zeal displayed by the Lieutenant-Governor" as soon as the true condition of the people of Orissa was understood; but in truth there was no want of activity or zeal on the part of the Government, or of any of its officers, from the commencement. I certainly did not think until the middle of May (though, as the Governor-General observes, the subject had occupied my anxious thought from a much earlier period) that it would be necessary or expedient for the Government to resort to the extreme and hazardous step of supplementing the local stocks of grain by importation of rice on public account from abroad; but this view was held by all the local officers, and by at least one Member of the Government of India long after I had abandoned it, and after I had directed importation on my own responsibility in spite of the remonstrances of the Board, and of the warnings of the Press against such interference with private trade.

25. I beg the Secretary of State to consider the parallel case of Ganjam. There the same indications of scarcity appeared precisely at the same time as in Orissa, and exhibited themselves almost precisely in the same manner. There the same reliance was placed by the Government on the efforts of the local officers and on private charity, until on the 15th June (nearly a month after large sums of money had been allotted for gratuitous aid in Orissa) application was made for a grant from the old Famine Fund. And there also there was the same, or even greater, hesitation in adopting the decisive measure of importing grain into the country on account of the Government. I have not got a copy of Mr. Forbes' Report on the Ganjam Famine, but I append a brief abstract of it taken from a newspaper, which I presume to be in the main correct. So far from presuming to question the action of the Government of Madras in the matter, I have no doubt it was dictated by the same careful regard for the interests of the people by which we were actuated; but I may refer to it as showing how unreasonable it is to condemn the Government of Bengal for a course of action exactly

similar to that which in another Presidency has commanded unqualified approval."

Mr. Bosworth Smith in his *Life\** of Lord Lawrence has shown some of the difficulties which surrounded the Viceroy. The letters from the latter to Lord Cranborne and Sir Stafford Northcote as successive Secretaries of State prove that the Viceroy relied on the Lieutenant-Governor's information and blamed himself for not having overruled Sir C. Beadon's decision not to import grain earlier. The Victory wrote: "The weak point, as regards the Government of India, is no doubt, the circumstance that we did not interfere early in the day, and insist on the Lieutenant-Governor importing food. I myself wished to do so simply as a measure of security. But my Council was against me, and I had no data which would have warranted my overruling them. No doubt, I ought to have done this irrespective of all considerations. But it is difficult to act decisively when there is no certainty what may be the view which the authorities will take of an act of the kind." And again, of the Lieutenant-Governor he wrote as follows:—Sir C. Beadon is a man of decided ability and kindly nature. But all the best years of his life have been passed in the Secretary's office and hence he has learnt to depend on others for information, and not to seek it out himself. These circumstances, and his general bad health of late years, account to me for the mistakes he made. In any other way, I cannot understand how he could have gone to Orissa and not have discovered the miserable condition of the people and the calamity which was impending over them." Sir Charles Aitchison recorded† that "nothing could be more unjust" than to blame the Governor-General for want of vigour in not pressing the Bengal Government to more active measures. Sir Richard Temple may be here quoted‡: "Though he was not to blame in all the circumstances, still this disaster cut him to the quick, and he fretted at the thought of what might have been done to save life had he himself been wielding the executive powers locally as in former days, instead of exercising only general control as Governor-General." Sir R. Temple had already written:§ "John Lawrence's next trouble was the famine in Orissa which probably caused him more grief than any other event during his rule."

The Secretary of State's despatch of the 25th July 1867 to the Government of India brought the official correspondence regarding the Orissa famine of 1866 to a close, and distributed praise and blame. Sir Stafford Northcote wrote as follows:

\* Vol. II. Chap. XII.

† *Lord Lawrence.*

‡ *English Men of Action, Lord Lawrence.*

§ *Men and Events of my time in India,* p. 327.

"I have read and considered in Council with great interest, and not without great pain, the Report of the Commissioners appointed to inquire into the Famine in Bengal and Orissa in 1866 transmitted in your letter of the 22nd April (No. 71), 1867, together with the other papers connected with the subject.

2. It is hardly necessary for me to say how deeply Her Majesty's Government, and indeed all classes of people in this country, have been affected by the heavy calamity with which it has pleased Providence to visit that portion of the British Empire. Such a visitation, even if we could console ourselves with the reflection that every available means had been used to avert and to mitigate it, must necessarily be felt as a severe misfortune; and I deeply regret that on the present occasion this consolation is denied to me. I am reluctantly brought to the conclusion that, though the melancholy loss of life which the Commissioners report may be due mainly to natural and inevitable causes, there has been a most unfortunate want of foresight and of energy on the part of those who were charged with the administration of the province where it occurred; and that some grave errors of judgment have been committed.

3. I do not forget that in a tropical country, depending on the annual rains for its main supply of water, imperfectly supplied with the means of communication, and inhabited by a dense, and in many parts an ignorant, population, dearths and even famines must occasionally occur; or that it is but little that the most powerful Government can effect, when the land is visited by these evils, to avert the most appalling forms of death. Neither do I forget that it must be difficult for the most far-seeing persons to discriminate in the early part of a deficient season between mere threatenings of distress and the actual imminence of disaster, such as would justify a Government in having recourse to exceptional measures of relief. It is clear that Government interference with the supply of food would, in ordinary years, be not only unnecessary but mischievous; and I think the authorities in Bengal were, in the first instance, quite right in regarding proposals for such interference with distrust. I think, however that a sufficient amount of attention to the facts, as they were gradually brought to light, would have shown them at a comparatively early period that this was a case in which it was their duty to take such measures as were in their power for the mitigation of suffering which had become inevitable. They saw the necessity for providing the people with the means of obtaining food. I regret that they failed to discover that what was needed was not money to purchase with, but the food itself.

4. It appears to me, after an examination of the Report and of the evidence on which it is founded, that it would not be just to throw the

blame of the failure, which is but too clearly brought to light, exclusively upon any particular individual. The prominent position of the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, and his immediate and direct responsibility for the proper administration of his Presidency, cannot fail to attract the closest attention to his conduct, and to expose him to the strictest criticism, and, I am bound to add, to some animadversions the justice of which cannot be disputed. But it would be wrong to judge Sir C. Beadon by the light of subsequent events, without taking into consideration the circumstances, in which he found himself placed, and the amount of assistance which he received from those on whom he had a right to rely for information and advice. His conduct, when he at last became fully alive to the magnitude of the calamity, affords sufficient proof that his previous inactivity was due not to indifference, but to an imperfect apprehension of the facts of the cases; and it is fair to inquire how far that imperfection is attributable to his own failure in energy or in sagacity, and how far to the nature of the reports which he received from others.

5. The position of the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal is, in many respects, a very difficult one. He is charged with the administration of an extensive and highly important Presidency, and has to attend to a vast amount and a great variety of business, without being allowed the assistance of a Council, such as is attached to the Governments of the other Presidencies, or of a Secretariat equal to those of Madras and Bombay. He is, therefore, necessarily overburdened with the details of daily work, and must have less time and less energy to devote to questions which are not absolutely forced upon his attention than the Governors of the other Presidencies are able to command. At the same time, he possesses, in the Board of Revenue, an important administrative organ, upon the assistance of which he has at all times a right to reckon. It is not to be wondered at that, in the early period of the famine at all events, Sir C. Beadon should have placed implicit reliance upon the watchfulness and the sagacity of the Board of Revenue.

6. I cannot but regret, however, that he should have continued that confidence so long. The course of events in the winter of 1865-66 must have led him to perceive the necessity for a more active personal investigation of the true state of the case. Indeed, the fact that he found it necessary to visit Orissa proves that it had done so. But even then, as far as I can judge, he seems to have been under the influence of the views which he had imbibed from the Board, and he did not take the opportunity of making a thorough investigation, such as would, I think, quickly have convinced him of the urgent need for more efficient measures of relief.

7. While expressing my regret at this error on the part of the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, I cannot but say, that I think it unfortunate that the Government of India, although their attention appears to have been especially called to the subject, did not exercise their influence in favour of a more vigorous course of action. The close relations between the Government of India and that of Bengal and the opportunities which exist for personal communication with the Lieutenant-Governor, would naturally bring a question of this importance continually under your notice, and you were, no doubt, cognizant of most of the proceedings with respect to it. I learn from your Minute of the 20th April last that Your Excellency was personally of opinion, at an early period of the distress, that it might become desirable to import food. That opinion was not shared by the Members of your Council, and was not acted upon. The amount of information actually in possession of the Government at that time was perhaps, hardly sufficient to justify so exceptional a measure, but it was, I think, enough to have awakened the most serious apprehensions, and to have induced your Government to urge the Lieutenant-Governor to undertake an immediate and searching inquiry.

8. I am not insensible to the force of the economical arguments which were used against the interference of the Government with the operations of private trade. But the conclusions of political economy are true only when sound reasoning is correctly applied to well-ascertained facts; and the event has shown that, in the present case, the facts had not been ascertained. It was taken for granted that there was a sufficient quantity of food either in the province, or within reach of the people, which would be brought out in due time when prices had risen to a certain point; and it was argued that the interference of the Government with the regular action of the laws of supply and demand would be not only useless, but mischievous. The argument would have been just, if the assumption on which it rested had been true. But, unhappily, the assumption was not true, and the reasoning founded on it was consequently fallacious. Nor did the mischief stop there. It cannot be doubted that the avowed belief of the Government in the existence of adequate stores of rice must have encouraged a like belief on the part of the people of Orissa themselves, and on that of the merchants who might otherwise have been expected to undertake the importation which was needed. It escaped the notice of the authorities that Orissa, having long been an exporting country, and not having suffered from famines for a very great number of years, lay somewhat out of the ordinary course of the import trade, and that its necessities were not likely to be so quickly recognised as those of other districts to



which supplies have more frequently to be sent. It was not till great distress began to be felt that the general trade were aware of the reality of the demand ; and, when that time arrived, the season for importing had unhappily almost passed away. Had the Government, as soon as their attention was called to the subject, instituted a strict inquiry into the actual condition of the district, and made public the result, there can be little doubt that supplies would speedily have been sent there, or that, if private enterprise had failed to provide them, the Government would have seen their way to supplementing it by their own action. But this was not done ; and it must be asked why it was not done.

9. The responsibility for the omission appears to me to rest chiefly upon the Board of Revenue.

10. I am aware that it may be urged on behalf of the Board that the information which they received from the local officers was less indicative of the approaching distress than it ought to have been ; and that they may also point out that their proceedings were from time to time submitted both to the Government of Bengal and to the Government of India, and were approved, or not disapproved, by them. But while admitting to some extent the validity of these considerations, I am still of opinion that the action of the Board upon one or two critical occasions was most unfortunate.

11. The Report of the 25th November 1865 was written in reply to a reference made to the Board of Revenue by the Lieutenant-Governor, in consequence of the intelligence which had reached him, and more especially in consequence of the alarming accounts which he had received from Mr. Ravenshaw, the Officiating Commissioner of Cuttack. The Lieutenant-Governor called upon the Board to "report specially on the present state of the crops and markets, and the prospects of the country throughout the Lower Provinces," and to suggest any measures by which Government could "mitigate the effects of the present scarcity." Mr. Ravenshaw, as the Board were aware, had had comparatively little experience as a revenue officer, and had hardly any experience at all in Orissa. It was known that his views were more sanguine than those of his Collectors, who had had far more experience than himself ; and the Board were themselves of opinion that he was "too hopeful." Yet Mr. Ravenshaw's letters had been sufficient to alarm the Lieutenant-Governor, and to induce him to call upon the Board for a special report upon the state of the country. It is surprising that the Board, under these circumstances, and after all that had passed, did not call upon Mr. Ravenshaw, at least, to institute a minute inquiry and to submit a special report upon the actual condition of his division. The measures recommended by them for mitigating the effects of the scarcity may or

may not have been well conceived. But the failure to institute inquiries, and to obtain accurate information as to facts, [cannot be] excused. Without the solid basis of a correct knowledge of the facts there was no reasonable prospect of their being able to deal properly with the exigency of the case.

12. I cannot but regret that neither the Government of Bengal nor that of India should have taken notice of the inadequacy of the information contained in the Report to which I have referred. The Board themselves draw attention to the "hypothetical" character of the estimates which had been formed, and to the difference of opinion between one officer and another; and add that they regard them as "merely the opinions of intelligent gentlemen, framed upon such information as they could collect upon a subject with which they are more or less familiar." The Government of Bengal were, I think, hardly justified in describing information of this character as a "very complete Report on the present state and prospects of the crops in the Lower Provinces of Bengal."

13. A similar want of perception of the importance of accurate information is observable in other matters. The suggestion that prices current should be regularly published would have been an excellent one, if it had been ascertained that their correctness could be secured. As steps were not taken to ensure this, their publication was not merely useless, but had a tendency to become mischievous.

14. I do not think it necessary to follow in detail the narrative contained in the Report of the Commissioners, or to express my opinion upon every point which they have raised. It would be easy to comment upon many incidents to which they have drawn attention, such as the reprimand conveyed by the Board of Revenue to Mr. Ravenshaw (January 10th) for having given instructions to Mr. Barlow to investigate some of the claims of the *zamindars* to remission of revenue,—the refusal to allow the wages of the labourers on the public works to be paid in grain,—the confusion of responsibility between the officers of the Public Works Department and the Civil authorities,—the unfortunate answer given to Mr. Ravenshaw's telegram of the 31st January, requesting permission to import rice, and the extraordinary hesitation of the Board to import rice, even at so late a date as the 22nd May, when specially invited to do so by the Government of Bengal (Appendix, page 241); but these are, in fact, only illustrations of the tenacity with which the Board of Revenue clung to the view which they had originally adopted. Having, in the first instance, accepted, upon very inadequate evidence, the belief that there was a sufficiency of food, they were not to be induced to part from it by evidence which should have carried

conviction to any unprejudiced mind. That their convictions were sincere, I have no doubt. I deeply regret that they were so erroneous.

15. I must now advert to the visit of the Lieutenant-Governor to Orissa in February 1866. That visit, which should have inaugurated the commencement of a more vigorous and effective system of action, only served to check the hopes that such a system would be adopted. When once the Lieutenant-Governor had personally visited the suffering district, and had come away satisfied that no famine was to be apprehended, and that no other measures of relief were required than such as had been already set on foot, it was not to be expected that the representations of the subordinate local officers would have much weight against his authority; and it was not to be wondered at if the vigilance of the Government of India was relaxed.

16. It becomes necessary, therefore, to inquire whether the imperfections of Sir C. Beadon's personal investigation are to be attributed to his own fault or to the faults of others. It appears to me, after careful consideration, that they are to be attributed partly to the one and partly to the other. Undoubtedly, he had been misled by the representations which had reached him through the Board of Revenue, and had come with preconceived views, which he could not readily lay aside. Undoubtedly, too, those who accompanied him, and who ought to have been peculiarly well qualified to form a judgment,—I refer to Mr. Cockburn and Colonel Nicolls,—shared his belief that matters were in a much better state than, unfortunately, they really were. Still, after making allowance for all these considerations, I am obliged to say that Sir C. Beadon did not, upon this occasion, show the energy or the sagacity which might have been expected from an officer of such high distinction and such well-deserved reputation. It was to be expected that, having undertaken this visit, he would have made a minute personal inquiry into the real state of the district, and would not have been satisfied with the general statements of the local officers, but would have questioned them closely, demanded explanations of their alarming telegrams and other representations, and would have tested their evidence both by cross-examination and by comparing it with that of others. Such an examination would probably have startled them from their security, and brought them to a proper appreciation of the facts of the case. It is, therefore, the more lamentable that this, the last chance of amelioration, should have been lost.

17. I have referred to the 2 officers who accompanied the Lieutenant-Governor in this visit. One of them, Mr. Cockburn, was attacked in the course of it by an illness which proved fatal; it is, therefore impossible to say how far the state of his health may have affected his

power of work. But I am surprised to find that Colonel Nicolls did so little to enlighten the Lieutenant-Governor. Being at once the Secretary and Executive Head of the Public Works Department, to which the administration of the relief works was entrusted, he must have had peculiar facilities for ascertaining the actual condition of the people, and in the absence of explanations his failure to do so is to me quite unaccountable.

18. I do not think it necessary to discuss at length the conduct of

Mr. Barlow.  
Mr. Muspratt.  
Mr. Shortt.  
Dr. Jackson.  
Mr. Harris.

Mr. Barton.  
Mr. Kirkwood.  
Lieutenant Money.  
Lord H. U. Browne.

the several local officers who were brought more or less directly into contact with the famine. I notice with pleasure, and readily concur

in the commendation bestowed by the Commissioners on the 9 officers named in the margin.

19. The conduct of Mr. Barlow has been made the subject of some discussion. This gentleman was not examined by the Commissioners in consequence of his absence from India, and they are consequently unable to explain the cause of his reticence on the occasion of the Lieutenant-Governor's visit to Orissa. They suggest that, in all probability, after the replies he had received from the Board of Revenue and from the Government of Bengal to his proposals for the importation of rice, he did not venture to recur to the subject. I cannot see any evidence to support this conjecture, which moreover appears to me to be directly at variance with the evidence of the Lieutenant-Governor. Mr. Barlow's conduct is, upon the whole, very praiseworthy, and it would have been well if more attention had been paid to many of his recommendations; but I cannot think that, upon the occasion of the Lieutenant-Governor's visit, he was as fully alive to the real state of affairs as the Commissioners apparently considered him to have been. If I could believe that he was so, and that he withheld his information deliberately through fear of an official rebuff, I should regard his conduct as highly censurable. But I am rather disposed to think that he was himself deceived as to the extent of the distress, and was probably under the influence of the more sanguine views of those around him, who considered that the prosecution of public works on a liberal scale would be sufficient to meet all the exigencies of the people. I am confirmed in this opinion by the enclosed reply from Mr. Barlow to a letter which I had caused to be addressed to him, and which I also forward.

20. The conduct of the officers of police generally was creditable to them: but I regret that Colonel Pugh should not have made more use of the information which must have reached him, and should not have even gone a little beyond what he thought the strict duties of his

duty, in order to call the attention of the Government to the real state of the district.

21. I shall reserve for a separate letter the consideration of many questions which arise out of this important Report. The suggestions which the Commissioners make for the development of the resources of the country and for the prevention of similar calamities in future, will have my most serious attention. I shall also take into consideration the question whether any alterations are desirable in the organization of the Government of Bengal, or in the constitution of the Board of Revenue, with a view to a better concentration of responsibility and to greater vigour of action. These are points upon which I shall request the advice and co-operation of your Government.

22. At present, I will only say, that I feel deeply indebted to the Commissioners for the valuable Report which they have presented; and that, painful as it is in many respects, I feel confident that it will be productive of very useful results".

A debate took place in the House of Commons on the 2nd August 1867, on the Orissa famine; technically on an amendment moving for more papers on the subject, but substantially on the Report of the Famine Commission and on the Secretary of State's Despatch of 25th July. The Debate is reported in *Hansard*.\* Its general tendency was to hold Sir C. Beadon responsible, and to exculpate the Governor-General and Government of India. It devolved upon Sir Stafford Northcote as Secretary of State to wind up the debate, and defend the line he had taken in his despatch of the 25th July. His last words were: "This catastrophe must always remain a monument of our failure, a humiliation to the people of this country, to the Government of this country, and to those of our Indian officials of whom we had been perhaps a little too proud. At the same time, we must hope that we might derive from it lessons which might be of real value to ourselves, and that out of this deplorable evil good of no insignificant kind might ultimately arise". There was no division, as the amendment, on which the debate was formally held, was by leave withdrawn.

While the events of 1866 were thus being discussed in high quarters, famine relief was in active progress in Orissa itself in 1867.

The officers appointed to carry on "relief transactions" were a special Commissioner (Mr. Molony) and 3 young civilians, one in each district, and under them Deputy Collectors, a Civil Surgeon, and 4

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\* Vol. 189, pages 770—818.

subordinate medical men. The nature of the system carried out by these officers in 1867 leaned, as was natural, to the opposite extreme from the parsimony of 1866 ; for the calamity had been so great, and the horror provoked by it so profound, that it was not unnatural that the moving principle should be a compassionate desire to relieve distress at all costs, rather than a careful regard for economy in the administration of the public finances.

The operations for the importation of rice were placed entirely in the hands of the Board. At first, it was intended to import 4 00 000 maunds ; this quantity was then raised to 6,00,000, and afterwards to 8,00,000, and ultimately by the end of the year 10,55,825 maunds were imported, which, added to the stock in hand, on 1st January 60,985 maunds, made a total for consumption of 11,16,810 maunds. At the close of the year 1867, the stock in hand was 6,17,642 maunds, so that the quantity actually sold or distributed (including waste and shrinkage) amounted to 4,99,168 maunds. The *biali* or autumn crop was unusually large and good, and in October 1867 the Board reported that the condition of the people and prospects of the country had so much improved that the importation of grain should cease and the embargo on export should be taken off from the beginning of 1868. The local paddy was then selling at about 50 seers per rupee, and it was so much preferred by the people that they could not be induced to buy the imported rice and the Government sales had almost entirely stopped. The cost of the purchase and importation of this 10,55,825 maunds seems to have been Rs. 47,86,201, or Rs. 4-9 per maund.

No proclamation appears to have been issued by Government forbidding export, but the Government of Bengal (4th February 1867) instructed the Commissioner to "let it be generally known that the Government will not allow rice to be exported by sea from those parts of Orissa which are now being supplied with food at the cost of the State : a prohibition to this effect should be issued by the Commissioner."

The Board of Revenue, in reply to the censure passed on them by the Orissa Famine Commission and Government, submitted a long defence dated the 15th August 1869, of 211 paragraphs, with Minutes by both Members attached. The paragraphs which the Famine Commission of 1878 quoted, may be reproduced here :

(Para 21) - The Board have already admitted unreservedly that,

in their opinion, the measures adopted for the relief of the sufferers from the famine in Orissa and some other places have been shown, by the event, to have been insufficient, and that nothing but the importation of food by the Government, and that at a very early date, would have enabled the local officers to grapple, in any degree, successfully with the famine."

(Para 196.)—"The Board account for the delay which occurred in regard to the adoption of effectual measures to meet the famine thus—

(a) From the want of experience of famine by the people themselves, their presentiments of famine were far less distinct, and the indications of its approach were far less definite and less early, than they would have been in countries habituated to famine.

(b) At the same time, the same want of experience on the part of the administration, local and central, prevented them from realizing the full significance of the phenomena that did present themselves, as officers accustomed to famine might have done.

(c) Neither of these causes would have produced very serious results, but for this that all the remedies, heretofore found sufficient for the mitigation of famine in India, were very largely ineffectual in this case. Money was of little use, for it could not be exchanged for food.

(d) Neither would even this circumstance have materially paralyzed the power of the Government but for this, that, to be at all largely effectual, it was necessary that the discovery of the full truth should be made, and very extensive measures adopted, many months before the actual outburst of unmistakeable famine occurred.

(Para 197.)—"In the Board's opinion, no fair comparison can be made between the action of the administration last year and that of other administrations on former occasions, unless these 2 vital distinctions of the conditions precedent be fully and honestly recognised and disposed of. They, in fact, constituted the essential distinction, and, as it has proved, the insurmountable difficulty to the authorities in Bengal in the famine of 1865-66.

(Para 198.)—"The Board are well aware that, even apart from the light of the event, it is not possible to look back upon proceedings taken in any important conjuncture without being aware of many things that might have been done better. As regards themselves, for instance, they frankly admit and regret that they did not, even without the orders of the Government, institute in December a closer inquiry into the out-turn generally of the harvest. They believe now that such an inquiry might possibly have led to a timely discovery of the full extent of the coming evil, and of the approximate remedy. They regret that they did not grant remissions of revenue in December 1865. They regret further that,

owing to its isolated and therefore unintelligible character they did not comprehend the importance of Mr. Ravenshaw's telegram of the 31st January, which, if followed up, might again possibly have proved the means of discovering what was hidden from the authorities."

The Government of India disposed of the Board of Revenue's defence in a letter dated the 4th September 1867 to the Bengal Government, from which the following extract may be given :—

"13. Still the whole correspondence published shows that even from official sources ample evidence did reach the Board that a terrible calamity was rapidly drawing near, and the Governor-General in Council is constrained to say that, in dealing with this information, the Board were alike wrong in judgment and dilatory in action. Imperfect as the information which the Board had before them in November 1865 now proves to have been, His Excellency thinks that they were premature and over-confident in their conclusion that even then no danger of famine existed. It is probable that if the evidence then in the possession of the Board had been fairly weighed and tested by information available from other sources, they would have hesitated to form so positive an opinion,—an opinion indeed which, not only unquestionably misled the Local Government, but which appears largely to have influenced the proceedings of the Board, until the Famine had already reached its crisis.

"14. Moreover, the information which subsequently reached the Board, even through official channels, was, in the opinion of the Governor-General in Council, quite sufficient to have suggested to the Board, at a comparatively early period, anxious doubts as to the soundness of their original conclusions ; and the Board had then within their reach much besides official information.

"15. But at no period till the close of May 1866 do the Board seem to have been awakened to the necessity of closer inquiry, or to the probability of any measures of relief being required, beyond those afforded by a moderate extension of public works, and by the exertions of purely local charity.

"18. His Excellency in Council is indeed unwilling to believe that considerations of expense really hampered the action of the Board. He is glad rather to attribute their inaction to an ungrounded fear of interfering with the natural course of trade—a trade, however, which never existed in fact, and which, even if it had existed at all, was manifestly insufficient to meet the exigencies of the crisis, and which, therefore, might have been unobjectionably supplemented by the aid of Government importation.

"22. Taking, therefore, the most restricted definition of their duties



which the Board themselves now give, the Governor-General in Council feels that they failed to perform them,—that they neither took proper measures to obtain official information, nor rightly estimated the gravity of that which reached them. But it cannot be admitted that the responsibility of the Board was confined to supplying the Local Government with information and advice ; they unquestionably had authority to take active measures, and in some cases did not hesitate to use it, but they not only held back when prompt action would have been invaluable, but the action which they did take was in some cases fatally mischievous.

“23. I am particularly to instance their telegram of the 1st February 1866 to Mr. Ravenshaw, the effect of which, in the opinion of the Governor-General in Council, the Board have not succeeded in explaining away.

“24. By their own admission, they not only failed to apprehend the full significance of Mr. Ravenshaw's telegram to which they replied, but, in answering it, they assumed the authority of Government, which they allow that they were not entitled to use ; and whatever they may have meant to say, there can be no doubt that the terms which they employed in their message were so broad as to embrace not only the individual application of Mr. Ravenshaw to which they replied, but all others of the same nature. Mr. Ravenshaw was certainly justified in considering that the telegram conveyed a final and conclusive refusal on the subject of importing grain. Nor was he alone in his impression ; it is now known that Mr. Barlow believed that the question was definitively settled, and on that account abstained from personally urging measures of this nature on the late Lieutenant-Governor during his visit to Cuttack. Reviewing these circumstances, therefore, the Governor-General in Council is compelled to say that the Board not only failed to see the necessity of importing grain at a sufficiently early period, but that they took upon themselves effectually and decisively to prevent it when urged by others, or, to use the words of the Commission, “that they stifled and put an end to the discussion regarding it till it was too late.”

“25. As regards the action of the Board on the Lieutenant-Governor's telegrams of the 29th May and 9th June 1866, it is true, no doubt, that they did not altogether omit to take measures, as ordered, for the importation of rice. Still, it nevertheless is clear, and it is indeed admitted by the Board, that even at that late period they still clung, against all evidence, to the fallacious hope of private importation, and, in consequence, held back from the full measure of vigorous action urged upon them by the Lieutenant-Governor.

“26. It is with sincere pain that the Governor-General in Council places on record these remarks. The Board have now, at their leisure,

submitted their full explanation of all that occurred, and His Excellency in Council is unable to see that on any important point it justifies or extenuates the course which they pursued ; and His Excellency in Council therefore regrets that he is unable to withdraw or modify any portion of the censure which he has already reluctantly passed upon them."

On the occasion of the occurrence of drought in Bengal in 1868-69, Sir William Grey, by a Resolution of the 22nd. January 1869, relieved the Board of Revenue of all connection with relief measures. Much doubt had been found to exist as to the exact limit of their duties and responsibilities with regard to the distress occasioned by scarcity, and the adoption and supervision of measures for the relief of the suffering districts. He thought such matters not to be within their functions in a province like Bengal, and the existing practice had given rise to practical inconvenience and delays. He therefore relieved the Board of the duty of collecting and submitting to Government information as to the state of the crops and the condition of the people with special reference to the necessity of adopting measures of relief, either in the shape of works or of charity: and regarding all such matters Commissioners of Divisions were placed in direct communication with the Local Government.

The Famine Commission of 1878 recorded the following conclusions as to the famine management of 1867.

"It is a melancholy reflection that while a larger sum of money was spent on this famine than had ever been spent before, it should be associated in history only with the memory of a greater mortality than had ever been recorded. But the cause of this is not hard to find. The measures taken in 1867 were a violent reaction from the policy of 1866: and no expenditure was thought too large to incur in shutting the stable-door, although the steed was irrecoverably lost. The officers who administered the charitable funds were mainly impressed with the necessity of forcing relief upon the people and making it so attractive to them that no one could refuse it: and hence the cost of this relief was abnormally large. Whether in the relief-houses, on light labour, or in the employment given to spinners and weavers, the wages and the food amounted to far more than a bare subsistence allowance, and there can be little doubt that many were tempted by these high rates to accept relief who were not in absolute need. So again no experienced person can read the account of the

village relief system without seeing that the officials were too few and too new to the work, and the time was too short for them to acquire any real knowledge as to the condition of the people who clamoured for relief; they were obliged either to accept all comers, or to be guided by the rudest of all tests, that of outward appearance, in their admissions and rejections. Still, the destruction of property and comfort, and the moral shock to the whole population in the preceding year, had been so terrible that there can seldom have been a country in which the employment of tests to keep off the undeserving was less necessary; and, though many who were relieved cannot have been in severe want, they can hardly have been altogether free from want. The main evil of the lavish and somewhat indiscriminate relief became evident in the tone both of the public and the official mind in 1873, when with a far less serious calamity to the crops, the same determination was shown to make relief pleasant and acceptable, and the same ruinous system was adopted of paying the pauper at a higher rate of wage or food than could be earned by the independent labourer.

As to the policy of importing grain, it seems to have been mainly a mistake. Mr. Schalch's investigations were of the most summary and superficial character: his estimates of the area and population of the inundated tracts, and of the extent of the injury done to the crops, were but rough approximations, and his calculation that the crop saved would supply food for only half the population of these tracts was a guess which was proved erroneous by the event. No information seems to have existed as to the extent to which private trade was active, or could have been stimulated to activity. The resolution to import grain seems to have been come to as if that had been the universal practice of all time, a proceeding which required neither defence nor argument; and it is so accepted by the local officers, who assume that it is the only way in which the necessities of their relief measures can be supplied. It is very probable that some measures were inevitable to place supplies ready for the carrying on of charitable and labour relief; but it never seems to have occurred to any one to inquire whether the required quantity could not have been supplied by the process of giving advances to trading firms on the spot rather than by the expensive agency of Government officers. In any case it is clear that the quantity imported was enormously in excess of what was required. The Relief Committee used less than a third of the million maunds imported at so great a cost; of the rest a small quantity only was sold to a necessitous public, and the balance had to be parted with for next to nothing. Of the total sum spent in 1867 on this object, at least  $\frac{2}{3}$ , or 28 lakhs of rupees, were absolutely thrown away."

The drought of 1865 was not confined to Orissa, but extended also to Bihar and Northern Bengal, where, for a time in 1866, there was great suffering; relief works were opened, and the gratuitous distribution of food, mostly in raw grain, was undertaken. But the system of relief was defective and devoid of uniform organization; the wages given on the work, and the amount of food at relief centres, differed in every district, and the food was seldom given in sufficient quantities for subsistence. About 12,000 persons were employed on relief works, and about 25,000 received gratuitous food daily, for the 4 bad months, June to September. By that time the early autumn crop, which was unusually abundant, was harvested, and famine was at an end. The total expenditure on both the forms of relief was Rs. 2,30,000. There are no records of the mortality among the general population; but the police reported that about 135,000 persons died of starvation and of diseases arising from it.

The above was the brief summary of this portion of the Bihar famine of 1866 recorded by the Famine Commission of 1878. Mr. F. R. Cockerell, c. s., Legal Remembrancer in Bengal, was deputed to inquire into the circumstances and submitted his Report on the famine in Bihar and North Bengal in March 1867. Happily the anticipations of evil were not altogether realised in Bihar, but there were great distress, severe scarcity, and in some parts the undoubted pressure of famine. The tracts that suffered most were the northern portions (adjoining the Nepal *Tarai*) of Champaran, Tirhut and Bhagulpur. Scarcity and high prices pressed somewhat less heavily on the other districts *viz.*, Saran, parts of Shahabad and Gaya, parts of Monghyr and the Sonthal country. The area of severe famine was 11,480 square miles with a population of 16½ millions. The rainfall was deficient in quantity and none fell in October: not only the main rice crop suffered but the *rabi* area was small. At the same time exports were brisk. The earliest indications of the approaching calamity were given by the rapid rise of prices that occurred when the deficiency of the monsoon was established. The Collectors, for the most part, took alarm in October and November 1865, and reported their fears of impending famine and organised local Relief Committees. In all cases, however, the ripening of the winter

rice in December relieved the tightness of the markets and gave employment to the poor: the funds raised locally were small, and were soon exhausted. The winter rains were unusually abundant, and the *rabi* crop (so important in Bihar) was quite a good one except in limited tracts destroyed by hail. From this time there was a period of apparent lethargy on the part of Government officers. The police reported numerous cases of deaths from starvation, and crime of a kind peculiarly connected with hunger became very common: but no notice was taken of these indications. In April prices again rose considerably; in May the Commissioner called on his Collectors to take measures to relieve distress. On this, Relief Committees were again appointed in each district in June; subscriptions were collected, and grants made in addition by Government; a large number of relief-centres were opened: food was distributed to the helpless and infirm gratuitously, and work offered to those who could do any labour, however small. In July, these measures began to be in working order, and in August as many as 37,000 were relieved daily. The rains, however, were timely and abundant and the early *bhadoi* harvest almost put an end to the distress: a small number of paupers however remained on the hands of Government till the rice crop was cut, in December.

It is not worthwhile to dilate on the system of relief then adopted, as more modern methods of famine administration now obtain.

As an immediate consequence of the famine and the Commission of Inquiry, special measures were taken for preventing, or minimising the effects of the recurrence of such a calamity. Communications with Orissa were improved, by the provision of access by sea at False Point and the Dhamra river. Roads, both those leading to, and those within, the province were ordered to be completed as rapidly as possible. The development of the canal system was pushed on steadily.

It would be impossible and unprofitable to attempt to collect and analyse all that was written at the time on the Orissa famine. The official papers which have been quoted cannot be surpassed in importance or in accuracy of information. Sir C. Beadon completed his 5 years of office while the correspondence set out above was proceeding, and before the famine itself had terminated.

Two articles in the *Calcutta Review* (Nos. 90 and 91 of 1867) on  
 The *Calcutta* Sir C. Beadon's administration of Bengal contain a  
*Review.* valuable appreciation of his character as it appeared to

a contemporary observer, and comments on his career. They are too long to quote, but an analysis of them will be interesting. The writer's object was apparently to urge whatever could be said for the late Lieutenant-Governor (he had just retired) who was being generally blamed. "In his manner he was excessively urbane and courteous, always ready to hear what people had to say and to receive and listen to suggestions from whatever quarter they came—he started with great expectations and a general cry of approval—he showed an anxiety to develop and assist the rising Tea interest—to open up Assam—to interpret the Waste Lands rules liberally—generally to identify himself with the interests of the European settlers—so fair was the start, how different the end—"one might say that our late Lieutenant-Governor left these shores amidst one harmonious strain of unbroken universal ululation"—the Tirhut Indigo system tottering, the Assam Tea Industry collapsed,—for which he was abused by the English Press and held responsible—unpopular with the natives and part of his own service—how did this all happen?—he possessed very great ability, a large capacity for hard work, untiring industry, and considerable skill in dealing with a knotty subject—an almost excessive facility in writing—his cast of mind was readier than his predecessor's, more pliant, quicker to seize the signs of the times, more open to new impressions—'the unvarying grace and courtesy of his manners',—he was a remarkably courageous man, sheer pluck carried him through—in the mutiny he never lost his firmness—his universally sanguine temperament, and tendency to take a sanguine view, influenced his actions in many matters in which his judgment has been questioned—of this temperament his treatment of the Orissa famine was the most conspicuous instance—he did not hunt after popularity—he would not sacrifice principle to popularity—he might have aimed at popularity by treating the famine differently—nor did he sacrifice principle to expediency—he was not in the foremost rank of administrators—magnificently loyal towards subordinates and gaining warm attachment, he lacked the personal force and energy of character to subordinate other minds and wills to his own—public opinion distri-

buted the blame for the Orissa famine, but the main censure rested upon him—as the most prominent, certainly the most convenient victim, he being directly responsible for the Government of the province—no official in Orissa (with perhaps one exception) really understood up to the middle of May 1866 the true nature of the calamity, i. e., the want of rice—Sir C. Beadon did not discourage free expression of opinions when visiting Orissa—his 2 fundamental errors were, his belief that there was enough rice in the province to support the population, if they had money, and his belief that rice would find its way by the natural course of demand and supply, and that Government interference with trade was of all things to be deprecated—these errors were shared by others but both expectations proved to be wrong—did the facts justify his belief?—the belief was general that there was sufficient rice—the Bengal Government accepted too readily the sanguine views of the local officers—most men would have acted as Sir C. Beadon did—the system of administration was to blame, which provided no means of acquiring information—he shifted none of the blame on others—his errors were shared by the Government of India not by the Viceroy personally—some attached the main responsibility to the Board of Revenue—Sir C. Beadon had lost popularity by advising the mission to Bhutan, but he was not responsible for the conduct of the war—he came into antagonism with the Press and to despise their advice—it was not fair to blame him with regard to the Labour Transport Laws, or the Indigo troubles in Tirhut—or the Waste Lands rules—the collapse of the Tea interest was due to over speculation, bad management and insufficient capital—he identified himself with the extension of education—especially primary—he did far more in education for Bengal than either of his predecessors—he introduced improvements in the subordinate judicial service—and instituted a system of municipalities—‘though fully aware how much more might have been done in vindicating Sir Cecil from many of the reproaches cast on him, enough has in our opinion been said to show that Sir Cecil’s administration has on the whole not been unworthy of the respect and gratitude, both of his countrymen and of the people over whom he ruled, and we feel that for one most grievous and fatal error of judgment, a career of 30 years’ industry, usefulness, and ability, guided, and guided successfully, by a noble and philanthropic desire to

promote the best interests of the country, should not be lost sight of and forgotten. We are told that there will never again be a civilian Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal. However this may be, we feel assured that Bengal will be administered by many Governors or Lieutenant-Governors before it is ruled over by one worthier than Sir Cecil Beadon.' "



## CHAPTER IV.

SIR WILLIAM GREY, K. C. S. I.

1867—71.

IN each of the first 3 Lieutenant-Governorships there was an occurrence of the greatest importance—the mutiny, the indigo troubles, the famine—to test the statesmanship of the ruler of the province. There was no event of such magnitude in Sir William Grey's time, which was one of comparative peace and quiet. His official training had been on the same lines as that of his predecessors, so that he was well able to deal with the matters and controversies that fell to his lot. He was born, in 1818, the fourth son of the Hon'ble and Right Reverend Edward Grey, Bishop of Hereford, a son of Charles, first Earl Grey. His mother was a daughter of James Croft, Esqre., of Greenham Lodge, near Newbury, Berkshire. He matriculated at Christ Church, Oxford, 19th May 1836, but left the University without a degree on being appointed by his cousin, Lord Howick, (the third Earl Grey), to a clerkship in the War Office. While serving there he was nominated to a writership in the Bengal Civil Service, the nomination having been placed at the disposal of his uncle, the second Earl Grey, the Premier of the first Reform era, by Sir Robert Campbell, Director of the East India Company. Entering Haileybury College in January 1839, he passed out in July 1840. The following account of his life is taken, almost *verbatim*, from the Dictionary of National Biography. He was not remarkable for studious habits in early youth. At Christ Church he incurred the displeasure of the Dean, Dr. Gaisford, in April 1837 by his indolence and inattention. In his first term at Haileybury he was rusticated on account of a late and disorderly wine party in his room. He made up for these delinquencies, however, in his later terms, and passed out of College after a shorter residence than was usual. He reached India on 27th December 1840, and soon devoted himself unremittingly to his duties, speedily establishing a character for industry and practical ability, combined with high principle and singular independence of judgment. His first appointment, August

Previous appointments and brief sketch of career.



Photogravure

Survey of India Offices Calcutta, December 1900

SIR WILLIAM GREY, K C S I

From a photograph by Mess<sup>rs</sup> Bourne & Shepherd



1842, was as Assistant Magistrate-Collector of Rajshahi. After holding various subordinate offices in the *mufassal*, he was from September 1845 to 1847 Private Secretary to the Deputy Governor, Sir Herbert Maddock, and subsequently served for some years, December 1847-1851, in the Bengal Secretariat and in the Home and Foreign Secretariats of the Government of India. In April 1851, at the special request of the Directors, he was appointed Secretary to the Bank of Bengal, and discharged the duties until 1st May 1854, when he became Secretary to the Government of Bengal, on that province being constituted a Lieutenant-Governorship. In January 1857 he left India on Furlough, but in consequence of the mutiny returned in November of the same year, and after officiating for some 18 months in temporary appointments, one of which was that of Director-General of the Post Office, he was appointed by Lord Canning in April 1859 Secretary to the Government of India in the Home Department. In offering him this appointment in cordial terms Lord Canning wrote: "Judging from some experience I should think it possible to quit the duties of Post Master General without many pangs!" In 1862 he became a Member of the Council of the Governor-General, and had opportunities for displaying his administrative capacity to great advantage. During the greater part of this time Lord Lawrence was Governor-General. Between him and Sir W. Grey there was considerable difference of opinion on questions of the greatest moment. It was natural that their views on public affairs should be largely influenced by their very different antecedents. Their opinions notably differed with reference to the treatment of the *talukdars* and the subordinate proprietors and tenants in Oudh,—a question on which the Chief Commissioner in Oudh, Sir Charles Wingfield, held views directly opposed to those of the Governor-General. It was mainly due to Sir W. Grey's intervention that this question was solved by a compromise which furnished probably as equitable a settlement as was possible in the circumstances of the case. In other matters, and especially in resisting certain retrograde proposals made by Sir Charles Trevelyan when Financial Member of Council, Sir W. Grey exercised a salutary influence on the Government. While strongly opposed to the policy of excessive centralisation, which had cramped the energies of the Provincial Governments, he successfully opposed a proposal

for decentralising the Postal Department. He was also a staunch opponent of the income-tax, holding that it was totally unsuited to the circumstances of India. As a Member of Council he took an active part in discussions regarding the settlement of the land revenue in Orissa and other cognate questions which the famine brought into prominence. When he succeeded Sir C. Beadon as Lieutenant-Governor, Lord Halifax, in congratulating him on the appointment, wrote: "There is no one I think so well qualified to fill it with advantage to the country." Very shortly after his assumption of the Government he had to consider and report upon various suggestions affecting the entire constitution of the Government of Bengal, made partly in Sir George Campbell's report on the famine, and partly at the India Office. One proposal was to the effect that the Bengal Legislative Council should be abolished, that the Lieutenant-Governorship should cease to be a separate and distinct office, and that the duty should be discharged by one of the Members of the Governor-General's Council, who, subject to the control of the Governor-General in Council, should be empowered to make laws for the "non-regulation" districts, and that for the districts of Bengal proper and of Bihar all legislation should be entrusted to the Governor-General in Council. From these suggestions Sir W. Grey emphatically dissented, designating the last as "a very startling example" of a vacillating policy, "if 6 years after introducing the experiment of a local, and in some sense a representative, legislature in Bengal, we suddenly abolish it and relegate all local legislation to the general legislature of the empire." "If there was one part of India," he added, "in which the native public were entitled to have a real share in legislation, it was the lower provinces of Bengal." Indeed it was "possible," he wrote, "to look forward to the time when a local legislature," or some local consultative body, should take part in regulating the expenditure of local taxation. So far from acquiescing in any reduction in the functions of the Bengal Government, he recommended that its constitution should be assimilated to that of the Governments of Madras and Bombay, where the administration was and is conducted by a Governor and an Executive Council. This discussion ended in the maintenance of the *status quo* in Bengal, (Assam being shortly afterwards constituted a separate Chief Commissionership). Although Sir W. Grey's particular

recommendation for strengthening the Bengal Government was not adopted, his Minute probably disposed for ever of the proposal to re-establish the system under which Bengal had been administered previously to 1854.

As Lieutenant-Governor, Sir W. Grey opposed the proposal to impose local taxation in the form of a land cess, as a means of providing primary education. But he did not object to the imposition of local taxation for roads and other works of material utility. His objections to the educational tax were based partly upon the terms of the permanent settlement of Bengal, and partly upon the impolicy and injustice, in his opinion, of requiring the landholders to defray the cost of elementary schools for all classes of the rural population. His views did not commend themselves to the Government of Lord Mayo or to the Secretary of State, but were supported by several members of the Council of India. Shortly before his retirement he was nominated a Knight Commander of the Order of the Star of India, and installed on the 27th February 1871. When he resigned the Government of Bengal on 1st March 1871, a year before he had completed the usual term of office, the expressions of regret were keen and general throughout Bengal, and efforts were made to induce him to withdraw his resignation. In other parts of India, too, it was felt that when he left the country India had lost her best public servant.

His nomination to the Supreme Council in 1867 was described by the native Press as unexceptionable. "A thoroughly conscientious man, possessed of considerable general ability, well-skilled in finance, and with just views on Indian policy, Mr. Grey will prove an acquisition to Government. He is a steady friend of improvement, and the natives will find in him a warm advocate of liberal measures".

It is mentioned\* by Mr. Bosworth Smith that, when the vacancy was about to occur in the Lieutenant-Governorship on Sir C. Beadon's retirement, the Governor-General recommended his Member of Council, Sir W. Grey, "as a very able and zealous officer," adding, "there is no one available for the post who has greater claims, or who is better fitted for it. He has plenty of moral pluck, and is very conscientious, & very

Nomination to  
Council—

—and the Lieuten-  
ant-Governorship.

\* Life of Lord Lawrence, Vol. II. Chap. XIII.

useful qualities in dealing with people down here". His Private Secretaries were, at different times, Captn. H. H. Stansfield; his son, Lieut. L. J. H. Grey; and Captn. R. G. Loch.

There had for some time past been doubts and difficulties attending the selection of the site for the Darjeeling Cantonment. The Sinchal site had proved unsatisfactory, owing to its excessive rainfall and depressing climate. The Commander-in-Chief in April 1867, after visiting Darjeeling, gave his opinion in favour of placing the barracks upon the Jalapahar hill only, the elevation of the latter being 1000 feet less than that of Sinchal, the rainfall not so great, and the officers and men of the garrison not so averse to it as to Sinchal. Sir W. Grey concurred in the view taken by Sir William Mansfield, and recommended the adoption of the proposal. A road was opened from the saddle to the new sites cleared on the Jalapahar hill, and the barracks were taken in hand in due course.

A considerable portion of the Lower provinces was inundated in 1867 after the rains by the overflow of the Darjeeling Cantonment. foundations. Gandak, the Gogra, the Sone, and the Ganges in the North-West, and of the Ganges and its affluents in Lower Bengal. In the Patna Division, the tract of country inundated included a large portion of the district of Shahabad which was invaded on one side by the Sone and on the other by the Ganges, a portion of the district of Saran which was inundated by both the Ganges and the Gogra, and a portion of the district of Tirhut which was flooded by the Gandak. The Ganges also inundated portions of the districts of Monghyr, Bhagalpur and Purnea; all the districts of the Rajshahi Division were likewise laid under water along the banks of the Ganges and the smaller rivers running through them; and, lower down, the overflow of the Nadia rivers submerged that district and Jessore to an extent unknown for many years. The districts of the Dacca Division were also inundated by the overflow of the innumerable channels which intersect them, and a portion of the Chittagong district by the overflow of the Matamori river. The Sone, Gogra, and Gandak fell as suddenly and quickly as they had risen, and the duration of the flood in the tracts overflowed by them was necessarily brief and nowhere exceeded 2 or 3 days. In Lower Bengal, the water did not subside as quickly; but the injury

done was nevertheless not so great as had been expected. No loss of life was reported in any district, but considerable damage was done to property, especially to houses. Some injury was also done to the crops on the ground, but not to any great extent. the principal crops having been housed before the inundations occurred.

Most of the inundated tracts were visited by the district officers in person, and measures were at once organised by them, in connection with the influential residents in the neighbourhood, to afford immediate aid where required. Little relief was asked for by the people. Where employment was sought, it was at once provided, special grants for the purpose having been sanctioned for expenditure on public works. Fears had also been entertained that the subsidence of the floods would be followed by a severe outbreak of disease, and preparations were made to meet the emergency. But these anticipations were fortunately not realised.

Inundations during the rains occur in Bengal in so many years that it is hardly worth while to mention them constantly, unless for some special reason. For the time they do much damage and cause infinite inconvenience, not to speak of the loss of human and animal life, but they have a very fertilising effect on the soil and are generally succeeded by splendid crops.

Sir C. Beadon had proposed the appointment of a special Commission for the purpose of inquiring into the causes Tea Commission. which had affected the condition of the tea cultivation, and of ascertaining what measures might be adopted to preserve the interest from the serious ruin which seemed to threaten it, but the Government of India and the Secretary of State postponed its appointment until November 1867 when it would have greater facilities for reaching the tea districts. In that month accordingly Mr. W. Ainslie, c.s., Mr. H. S. Reid, c.s., and Dr. J. M. Cunningham were deputed to Assam as a Commission of Inquiry. Besides these members, the Government of India also proposed to have 2 others to represent the tea and labouring interests respectively; but the 'Lanholders' and Commercial Association, on being asked to nominate a member to represent the tea planters' interest, declined to do so on the plea that the time had gone by when such an inquiry as that proposed could be of any practical benefit to the teaplanters, and, in consequence of this decision, the special representation of



the labouring interest was also considered unnecessary. The Government of India, however, did not agree with the Landholders' Association that it would be inexpedient to proceed with the proposed inquiry, and orders were therefore given to prosecute it. The Landholders' Association had particularly objected to the appointment of the Commission as tending to retard the improvement of the laws bearing on labour transport. But the Bill proposed by the Bengal Legislative Council to amend Acts III (B.C.) of 1863 and VI (B. C.) of 1865 not having been assented to by the Governor-General, it was deemed by His Excellency particularly desirable to have further information on the working of the laws which remained in force, and it was considered that such information would in reality expedite, instead of retarding, satisfactory legislation. Besides the question of suitable legislation, it was also highly desirable to ascertain the circumstances, under which the cultivation of tea had hitherto been carried on, with a view to ascertain the difficulties which the planters had to encounter and the means whereby the Government could give relief to them; the position and condition of the labourers moreover notably demanded early and serious attention. The Commission was therefore despatched at once to the tea districts, to make the necessary inquiries; the main points of inquiry on which detailed instructions were given being, (1) the financial prospects and present position of tea cultivation; (2) the rules regarding the lease and sale of lands as affecting that cultivation; (3) the state of the labour market; (4) the system of importing labourers, treatment and condition of the imported labourers, and working of the existing laws on the subject; and (5) the state of works and communications in the tea districts.

The Commission returned to the Presidency after making their investigations, and submitted their Report in due course. Their recommendations covered every point of the tea question—such as Sir the land, labour emigration, and the law. The suggestions made by W. Grey in 1868 in connection with the Report met generally with the approval of the Government of India, and were considered in amending the labour-emigration law in the Bengal Legislative Council.

The improvement of the Port of Calcutta engaged the serious attention of Government during the latter part of 1867-68. It happened, from various causes, that

the Committee of the Justices of the Peace for Calcutta who had been appointed under Act X (B. C.) of 1866 Trustees for the improvement of the Port, resigned in October 1867. The Committee had done little in the way of actual improvement, but they had collected some valuable information, and their Engineer, Mr. Leonard, had matured several well considered plans and estimates, all of which were made over to Government on the resignation of the Committee. While the best arrangements for the charge of the interests of the Port were still unsettled, and legislation was still pending, the improvements required on the river bank were not suffered to be delayed, the works being kept in progress through the direct agency of Government, the administration of the Port being vested in the Lieutenant-Governor by a temporary Act.

When the best method of providing for improvements in the Port of Calcutta had long been under consideration, Act V (B.C.) of 1870 was passed, to give the Lieutenant-Governor power to appoint 9 Commissioners for making those improvements, to hold office for 2 years, one of them being appointed by the same authority Chairman and another Vice-Chairman. They were created a Corporation with a common seal. They were to prepare and submit to the Lieutenant-Governor, from time to time, a schedule of necessary officers and servants, with the salaries and allowances which they proposed to assign them. They might make rules for the appointment of these officers and servants. They might acquire and hold property, and all property which under the previous Act became vested in the Secretary of State was vested in the Commissioners. They could neither contract for nor commence any work, the estimated cost of which exceeded Rs. 2,000, until the plan and estimate thereof had been sanctioned by the Lieutenant-Governor. If the estimate exceeded 2 *lakhs* of rupees, it was to be submitted for the approval of the Governor-General in Council. The general nature of the works to be constructed by the Commissioners was described. They included wharves, quays, jetties, and piers, landing-places, tramways, warehouses, reclamations of the river-bank or river-bed. The Commissioners might from time to time raise money in such a way as the Lieutenant-Governor might direct with the sanction of the Governor-General. When sufficient accommodation had been provided for the purpose, all vessels were to be obliged to load and unload at the

Commissioners' wharves, the Commissioners having power to frame a scale of tolls, dues, rates and charges for the landing and shipment of goods.

After the Commissioners had completed their arrangements and got affairs into working order, the Government of Bengal, in February 1871, expressed an opinion that the time had come when the transfer of the charge of the Port proper to the Trustees might be advantageously carried out under the Act and on certain terms. The sanction of the Government of India was accordingly obtained to confer on the Commissioners the powers of the Conservator of the Port from the 1st April 1871. This consent having been communicated to the Commissioners, they accepted the charge of the Port on certain terms; and it was afterwards determined that  $3\frac{1}{2}$  lakhs of rupees should be the amount of the reserve fund required to meet the charges arising from such events as a cyclone, &c.

The severe hurricane during the night of the 1st and morning of the 2nd November 1867 caused great loss of life and property, especially in Calcutta and the neighbouring districts.

*Cyclone of 1st-  
2nd November 1867.*

The storm had its origin apparently at some point in the North East portion of the Bay of Bengal, and the centre of it was ascertained to have passed E. of Saugor Point, from the mouth of the Matla over Port Canning and Basirhat, and thence in a N. N. E. direction to the east of Kumarkhali and the west of Sirajganj. Indications of the approaching disturbance were observed early on the 1st November: shortly after dark the weather became threatening: the gusts gained gradually in strength until they reached their maximum force in Calcutta between the hours of 1-30 to 3-30 A.M. of the 2nd idem. Rain fell in torrents, completely flooding the town, and the wind tore away doors, windows, &c, the injury sustained by the town being even greater than that inflicted by the Cyclone of the 5th October 1864, owing mainly to the more recent disaster having occurred at night: and the darkness made the conflict of the elements more appalling. The returns showed a loss of 1016 lives in Calcutta and the suburbs, and of about 160 houses and 29,000 huts of various kinds. The number of deaths on the river was fearfully large, but, as the direction of the wind took the ships in the moorings on the bow, instead of coming up the river as in 1864, the damage done to the shipping was

much less than in October 1864 ; also there was no storm-wave, as on the earlier occasion. On this account the ships in Port were generally able to ride out the storm, and most of them escaped without serious injury. Some vessels, however, broke adrift from their anchors, and others from the anchor moorings, and these ships fouled others, doing much mutual damage. But no ship was lost in the Port, although the destruction of small craft and boats of every description, containing property, was immense, the banks of the river being encumbered with floating casks, bales and goods of every kind. The number of cargo boats lost was so great as for a time to put a stop in a very great degree to the business of the Port. Much labour was expended in picking up and recovering sunken craft laden with grain and other produce. A large number of boats (295) were also lost in the canals to the east of Calcutta ; some of them were subsequently recovered. Among the larger vessels lost were the Inland Steamer *Delhi* and a flat in Garden Reach belonging to the India General Steam Navigation Company. A considerable number of Government vessels in the Port suffered more or less. The *Hope* Light Ship at the entrance of the eastern channel at the Sandheads was never heard of after the gale.

Beyond the city of Calcutta and its suburbs, the effects of the hurricane were most disastrous in Port Canning, where the gale was accompanied by a storm-wave 5 feet high, the water of which passed over the town with fearful violence. The station-house, goods' sheds, and railway hotel were all blown down ; the Port Canning Company's store hulk *Hashemy* carried away a great portion of the railway jetty ; and the fresh water tanks were salted by the storm-wave. The total number of casualties reported was 90. About 500 head of cattle were destroyed.

The calamity in some other portions of the 24-Parganas was equally severe, the centre of the storm having traversed the country stretching nearly due east from Calcutta to Basirhat on the Ichamati river. In this line many villages were blown down wholesale, and their destruction was accompanied by much loss of human life, the more populous places which suffered severely being Baruipur, Diamond Harbour, Atharabanka, Basirhat, Gobardanga and Satkhira. The storm-wave beginning from Saugor Island extended a very great distance to the extreme east of the district, and in the Kulpotton and

Kobadak rivers the water rose to 6 feet above the flood level. The storm was severely felt in Jessore and Nadia and as far as Dacca and Backergunge. Prompt measures had to be adopted for affording relief, and a subscription was at once opened by the Chamber of Commerce in aid of the sufferers, and a Relief Committee appointed. This movement was supported by Government, with a promise of doubling the funds collected by subscriptions. Instructions to the same effect were issued to the officers in the interior wherever local subscriptions might be raised, and a margin of Rs. 20,000 was left in the treasuries of all districts affected by the cyclone to meet any demands made upon them on this account. Relief was most urgently demanded to the south of Calcutta. A local Relief Committee was therefore formed there at once with efficient agents, and the balance of the Famine Fund, amounting to Rs. 18,750, was placed at the disposal of the Commissioner of the Division, to be augmented by grants from the Cyclone Relief Fund. In Port Canning, great distress was felt for want of fresh water, which was obviated by the South-Eastern Railway Company taking down 1,500 gallons of water by every train till the distress was removed. A steamer, the *Pioneer*, was also sent with supplies of good water and clothing to be distributed to the indigent in the places to the east of Canning which had suffered most severely. There was no general complaint of want of food, the grantees or owners of the Sundarbans lots having assisted their tenantry with alacrity.

The subscriptions realised for the Relief Fund amounted to Rs. 90,976, and, an equal amount having been contributed by Government, the total sum available for distribution was Rs. 1,81,952. The total amount expended by the Relief Committee was estimated at Rs. 1,54,514.

The proposals of Mr. Schiller in regard to Port Canning and the Sundarbans generally have been previously noticed. Port Canning and the Sundarbans. He revived the subject, submitting the following proposals to the Secretary of State :—1st. that the Sundarbans be formed into a separate district with Canning as its centre ; that the Magistrate of Baruipur be removed to Canning ; and that the Commissioner in the Sundarbans with the office be likewise made to reside at Canning : 2nd. that the office of Port Master at Port Canning be removed from the control of the Master Attendant of Calcutta, and

that powers be given to the officer in charge to decide all marine cases, to save ship-masters the trouble of travelling down to Alipore : *3rd.* that a certain moderate sum, not exceeding £5,000, be granted annually for 10 years for the benefit of the Municipality of Port Canning : *4th.* that the Telegraph from Canning to Halliday Island which had been sanctioned, be laid down without further delay, and that the restrictions be rescinded by which emigrant and troop ships were prevented from availing themselves of the new Port : *5th.* that prominent notice be given by Government to the shipping community generally of the fact that Port Canning was open as a Port : *6th.* that a certain number of the Government vessels and a certain quantity of the Government stores annually received in Calcutta be directed *via* Port Canning : *7th.* that, in lieu of existing arrangements, the Port Canning Company be empowered, as holders of most of the forest rights in the Sundarbans, to levy a cess or royalty on all the fire-wood, building material, forest produce, &c., as it passed into consumption in the large marts of Bengal.

Mr. Schiller added that the Canning Company would undertake to procure the transfer to themselves of all intermediate proprietary rights, and to give up to Government  $\frac{1}{3}$  of the gross revenue from these forest rights, on condition that such revenue be formed into a separate fund, (1) for giving the necessary support to the Canning Municipality, (2) for relieving the interest account between Government and the Calcutta and South-Eastern Railway and (3) for applying any surplus to general improvements in the Sundarbans. These proposals met with little favour from Government.

During 1867-68 the lease of the forest products, on the terms previously stated, was granted to the Port Canning Company, but was withdrawn within a year, as the monopoly was found to exercise a very mischievous influence, and to be incompatible with the interests of the public.

The scheme for the formation of a Port at Canning came again before Government in 1868-69. All efforts in this direction having proved futile, it seemed to the Local Government that the time had come for arriving at a definite conclusion in regard to the future connection of Government with the project, and it was proposed to the Government of India that Port Canning should, after the expiration of 12 months' notice, be abandoned as a Port. The deterioration

of the Hooghly had not occurred as had been feared, and trade had shown no inclination to go to Port Canning. This recommendation was based on the conclusion that Government would not be justified in imposing on the public revenues further expenditure on account of the Port, in the face of the fact that all the endeavours made since 1853 (the year in which experiments to improve the Hooghly were first made) to develop it had failed, notwithstanding that, irrespective of the outlay by the Port Canning Company and private individuals, as well as by Government, the State had disbursed directly, or through the Municipality, on shore and afloat, nearly 20 *lakhs* of rupees, besides having made a railroad solely for the benefit of the Port, at a cost of upwards of 60 *lakhs* of rupees, which had failed to cover its working expenses. To allow the public an opportunity of expressing their opinion on the subject, the papers were published in the *Gazette of India*.

While the questions were yet under consideration, the Port Canning Company, in October 1868, proposed that the Municipality should be abolished, and the lands held by them be made over to the Company on a rent-free tenure, together with the Bidyadhari foreshore, the Government reserving sites for public buildings; and further, that the Company be bound to keep up and repair the roads, protect the foreshore, and undertake the conservancy of the place, until Government should consider it to be sufficiently advanced for the reformation of a Municipality, when the Company would make over the public roads and conservancy to the Municipality, retaining their property in the lands and foreshore under liability to Municipal taxation. In consideration of these arrangements, the Company were prepared to surrender, by way of purchase money, their right to the repayment of the sum of 2½ *lakhs* of rupees subscribed by them as a loan to the Municipality and also all claim to compensation for alleged injuries done to them on the part of the Municipality. The Company further proposed that the whole of the unappropriated lands in the Sundarbans of the 24 *Parganas* and Jessore should be granted to them on rent-paying clearance leases for 99 years under the conditions of Lord Dalhousie's rules of 1853 with certain modifications, the Company having the option of redeeming the rent payable on the lands which they might clear, and of so converting the tenure of such lands into fee simple: also that the Company

should purchase the South-Eastern Railway at a valuation, or take it on lease from Government. The second proposition was made dependent on the grant of the first, but the first independent of the grant of the second.

Subsequently, an entirely different scheme was submitted by Mr. Schiller, its chief propositions being as follows:—(1) that the Port Canning Municipality be empowered to purchase from the Port Canning Company their large agricultural property for a sum of 30 *lakhs* of rupees, by the issue of debenture bonds bearing 3 per cent interest, and redeemable with a premium over a period of 50 years; (2) that this landed property be administered in trust by Government for the benefit of the Municipality, until the debentures were entirely liquidated; and (3) that the money realized from the forest leases during the time that they remained in the hands of the Port Canning Company be formed into a special fund, bearing 5 per cent interest for the purpose of subsidising the Municipality and enabling it to fulfil the proposed engagements connected with the purchase of the Canning estates. Mr. Schiller's proposals were communicated to the Government of India, with the remark that they could only be properly entertained if they were submitted by the holders of considerable interests in the Company, and that the local Government would not take steps in the matter unless it received some communication on the subject from authorized representatives of the shareholders.

The Port Canning Company also proposed that that Port might be made free by suspending for a period of 5 years the Port charges on shipping, and by giving ships resorting to it the use of the Government moorings free of charge; that the rates for fare and freight on the railway be maintained for a period of 5 years; and that the foreshore of the Bidyadhari be made over to the Company. On these requests Sir W. Grey decided that no sufficient ground existed for conceding to Port Canning the privileges embraced by the first request of the Company. The drawing away of traffic from the Hooghly to the Matla was no longer considered to be advantageous to the public generally, nor was the attempt supported by the mercantile community. Events had also led to the belief that Port Canning was exposed to greater dangers from cyclones than Calcutta; and there was altogether nothing to warrant the Gov-



ernment in using special means either to force or to bribe trade to resort to the Matla in preference to the Hooghly. The Local Government saw no objection to guaranteeing the public against any increase in the railway rates for 5 years. The question of making over the Bidyadhari foreshore to the Port Canning Company was reserved for further consideration. The Government of India decided that moderate concessions not involving further permanent increase of the burden already imposed on Government might be made with a view to attract commerce to the Port, and the following concessions were suggested :—viz. (1) the suspension of the levy of Port dues for 5 years ; (2) the reduction to the narrowest limits of the cost of maintaining the Port during those 5 years ; (3) the conditional transfer of the foreshore of the Bidyadhari river to the Company for a term of 5 years, the company being made responsible during the period for the protection of the banks, and being bound to abstain from levying tolls on passing navigation, boats discharging cargo, and goods and passengers passing on to the railway stations, and to allow the public the use of its jetties and tramways free of charge ; and (4) the non-alteration of the existing railway rates during the 5 years. The Government of India also ordered an inquiry as to the possibility of making Port Canning the end of a line of navigation leading across the delta towards Dacca, with a view to assist in the development of its trade.

Thereupon Sir W. Grey declared the suspension of all charges for moorings in the river Matla and the levy of Port dues in Port Canning from 1st April 1870. The subject of reducing to the narrowest limits the cost of maintaining the Port had to be further considered. The Company were asked whether they would accept the transfer of the Bidyadhari foreshore on the terms proposed, including the concession to the public of the use of their jetties and tramways free of charge. The possibility of opening out a line of navigation from Port Canning across the delta towards Dacca and the subject of fixing the traffic rates on the railway for 5 years were duly examined.

A reference was made about this time by the Port Canning Municipality on the subject of the debentures due by them, some of which had already matured, but to meet which no Municipal funds were available. The total liability of the Municipality upon debentures was shown to amount to Rs. 9,48,500, of which Rs. 87,600

had been commuted for land ; Rs. 2,50,200 were held by the Port Canning Company ; Rs. 4,50,000 were held by Government, and Rs. 1,60,700 by other parties ; these last mentioned debentures being those which had become due. The Government of India decided that there was no obligation whatever on the part of Government to provide funds for the redemption of any of the debentures issued by the Municipality, or for the payment of any other debts contracted by them.

The finances of the Canning Municipality having been well-nigh exhausted, loans to the extent of Rs. 22,200 were granted to them on the condition of their executing a mortgage of their landed property to Government subject to the prior claim of the debenture-holders. The money was urgently wanted to meet the interest due on the uncontested debentures, and, as the Municipality were not able to raise funds to meet the claims on that account, except by the sale of either the town lots or other municipal lands, it was necessary for Government to come forward and provide the funds.

Subsequently, proceedings of the Port Canning Company published in the newspapers went to show that, notwithstanding the large expenditure incurred and the concessions made by Government, the attempt to attract ships to the Port and to people the town of Canning had signally failed ; that it was proposed to sell the rice-mills on the successful working of which large expectations were founded, and that it was intended to reorganise the Company, their attention being directed in future solely to the management of their *zamindari* property situated in the Sundarbans. Thereupon the Local Government drew the attention of the Government of India to the proposals made in 1868 for the abandonment of the Port ; suggesting that after a sufficient notice this measure should be carried out. The Government of India, after calling for further information, decided that the Port should be closed, though the outer lightvessel might be maintained for the benefit of the Sundarbans trade. During the previous 2 years only one vessel *per annum* had visited Port Canning, and one of these vessels was driven in, against her will, by stress of weather. The closure of the Port therefore caused loss to no one while it saved a *lakh* of rupees a year of public money.

During 1866 and 1867 the epidemic fever again attacked portions of the districts formerly affected by it, though not with the extreme violence of the outbreak of 1862

and 1863. The Government of India, being apprehensive that the suffering and mortality might recur sooner or later with increased violence, desired that measures should be taken for obtaining full and early information on the drainage of that part of the country, and how far it had been injuriously affected by railways and roads and the shutting up of outlets into rivers: also that the sanitary measures suggested by the Commission appointed in 1864 to inquire into the causes of the fever should be carried out in every village, the suggestions of the Commission being epitomized and translated into Bengali for village circulation. Further inquiry was then made from the Commissioners of the Burdwan and Presidency Divisions, as the previous investigations had not included the preparation of a comprehensive scheme of drainage for the affected districts. To remedy this defect, Sir W. Grey proposed that a special officer should be deputed to inquire into and settle the question whether the drainage of the country was or was not seriously defective, and to suggest measures for removing such defects as might be found to exist. The Government of India, however, did not think any such inquiry to be called for and were besides of opinion that the subject was too large to be satisfactorily disposed of by the deputation of a single officer. The point which the Government of India required to be cleared up was, whether the system of roads and railways had injuriously affected the drainage of the country, and an investigation on this point by a competent Engineer officer was authorized.

As regards the inauguration of a general system of sanitation throughout the affected districts, the Bengal Government explained that many of the recommendations made on the subject had been already carried out, and that the suggestions for the adoption of sanitary measures by the people were translated and extensively circulated by the British Indian Association, but without much success, the majority of the villagers being unable to understand what legitimate connection there could be between their mode of living and the epidemic, inasmuch as they had all along been used to the mode of living objected to without detriment to their health. With reference to this feeling, Sir W. Grey observed that any hasty and indiscriminate efforts on the part of the public officials to enforce sanitary measures against the inclination of the people

could only have the effect of calling forth a passive opposition to all sanitary improvements. This view was accepted by the Government of India, who left it to the Local Government to decide, in communication with the Sanitary Commissioner, to what extent the work of clearance ought to be insisted on, and what steps were necessary to carry it out.

Epidemic fever again broke out in 1868, in several districts, accompanied with unusual mortality in Jhenidah (Jessore) and Jangipur (Murshidabad), and Burdwan. Government aid was afforded as before. It was again recorded that this fever owed its origin to the endemic malarious and highly insanitary conditions of the soil and of the surface of the country from defective drainage, want of tillage, crowded habitations and foul drinking-water; the effect of all being heightened by the poverty of the inhabitants and its attendant depressing influences. An inquiry by a competent Engineer had been instituted to ascertain whether the system of roads and railways had injuriously affected the drainage of the country so as to tend in any way to increase the suffering and mortality caused by epidemic fevers. The conclusion arrived at was that the roads and railways in Lower Bengal did not obstruct the drainage of the country so far as to cause or aggravate sickness; but some obstruction was thought to be inevitable and to require remedy as far as possible by the provision of side drains or otherwise. It was held that a certain amount of unhealthiness appeared due to a want of drainage and that improvement could only be effected by Government under proper regulations and special legislation, after the examination of particular tracts and the preparation of drainage schemes.

Reports having been received early in 1869 that epidemic fever was prevailing in the districts of Hooghly and Burdwan, Government deputed Dr. D. B. Smith, the Sanitary Commissioner, to those localities to investigate and report. This officer strongly advised the establishment of dispensaries for the relief of the sick-poor. Under a scheme proposed by the Commissioner a system of dispensaries and hospitals was established for the Hooghly district, under the Civil Surgeon, to afford relief to certain circles of villages where the fever was most severe. This scheme provided for the strengthening of 5 existing establishments, and for the establishment of 9

new dispensaries. Similarly in the district of Burdwan the dispensaries were increased.

Fever of a severe and fatal type also broke out simultaneously in the town of Burdwan. The Sanitary Commissioner reported that it was of a persistent type, and on the increase. Great difficulty was experienced in dealing with it, owing to numbers being prostrated by it, and the inability of the poorer classes, from debility and utter loss of strength, to earn their livelihood. A European medical officer and medical stores were sent up from Calcutta. Kitchens and depots for the supply of cooked and uncooked food to the destitute sick were also established. These measures, it was believed, were the means of improving the health of the people, and saving hundreds of lives who otherwise would have perished from extreme want. The general health of these places much improved from the measures employed. In meeting the crisis, all the officers concerned displayed commendable energy, and the thanks of the Government of India were conveyed to them for their services.

The cost of all that was done in both districts was (with the exception of the salary of the special European medical officer deputed, and the value of the medicines supplied from Government stores) met, without aid from the State, partly from donations, subscriptions, and local sources, but principally from the munificent liberality of the Maharaja of Burdwan, who placed funds for the purpose at the disposal of the Lieutenant-Governor from time to time, as required. The munificence of the Maharaja left besides a considerable fund available to meet any return of the fever. Government brought the conduct of the Maharaja to the special notice of the Secretary of State.

Again in 1870 fever reappeared in Burdwan and its neighbourhood, and in Jahanabad and other parts of Hooghly. But the disease which prevailed in these districts this year was considered to be the ordinary miasmatic fever which appears at certain seasons and not the peculiarly dangerous fever of the past year. Dispensaries and depots to supply cooked food and clothes were opened as before. As the Sanitary Commissioner had attributed the prevalence of this epidemic fever mainly to insufficient drainage, the partial or complete obliteration of rivers and the pernicious state of soil, air, and water which are produced thereby, a scheme for draining certain

swamps in the Hooghly district was prepared and an Act, V (B. C.) of 1871 to facilitate drainage in certain districts of Bengal was passed (by Sir G. Campbell) to give the authorities the compulsory powers required. The Act was intended to be experimental, so that if it succeeded the principle might be applied to other parts of the country and other marshes. In this case the proprietors had consented to accept the scheme, which involved local rating and apportionment of the costs by the drainage Commissioners.

By a Resolution dated 19th. August 1867, the Government of India invited the attention of the Bengal Government to the orders of the Secretary of State directing a careful review of the question of the prospects which should be offered to native officers of ability in the public service, and of the expediency of modifying the existing state of things which practically set a bar to their aspirations by the limited promotion which was accessible to them. The Government of India admitted the urgent political necessity created by the progress of education for opening to the natives a more important, dignified, lucrative sphere of employment than had hitherto been open to them in the administration of British India. In regard to the Regulation Provinces, the law reserved all higher appointments for the Civil Service, admission to which however was open to natives (and had actually been obtained by one Bengali gentleman) by their proceeding to England and passing the competitive examination held there. Moreover, the salaries of the judicial offices open to the Uncovenanted Service had been recently considerably increased. The Government of India were therefore of opinion that what remained to be done was to open a field for the legitimate ambition of deserving natives in the Non-Regulation Provinces. The Governor-General in Council accordingly proposed formally to recognize the eligibility of natives to the rank and emoluments of Assistant Commissioners and Small Cause Court Judges in the Non-Regulation Provinces, and to fix a definite proportion which they should bear to Civilians, Military men, and Uncovenanted Englishmen. In carrying this into effect, due regard was to be paid to the difficulty which natives entrusted with administrative duties experience in dealing with independent Europeans.

After correspondence, the Governor-General in-Council declared

that he did not at present contemplate anything more than the promotion of deserving and carefully selected natives from inferior posts to Assistant Commissionerships, the highest grade of the latter rank being made the limit of such promotion; and in this view the proportion which native officers in Assam might bear to the full complement of Assistant Commissioners was fixed at one-fourth. The Government of India also suggested that a definite proportion should be similarly fixed for general adoption of the strength which native officers might bear to European officers in the grade of Extra Assistant Commissioners; and it was proposed to fix this at one-half, it being understood that it should not be considered imperative at all times to maintain this or any precise proportion, the local Government being left free, as in the case of appointments in the subordinate Executive Service in the Regulation Provinces, to employ the largest number of natives that could be so employed with advantage to the public service, otherwise it might appear that the fixing a minimum proportion of natives would be equivalent to a restriction of the privilege hitherto enjoyed by them of being eligible to any number of appointments for which qualified candidates might be found.

The Secretary of State in noticing the Resolution of the 19th. August 1867, observed that the principle of opening up to natives of ability and character a more dignified and lucrative sphere of employment in the administration of the country might, it appeared to him, be carried out not only in the Non-Regulation, but also in the Regulation Provinces, as, besides the more important and responsible appointments in the latter which were reserved by law to the Covenanted Civil Service, there was a large class of appointments scarcely less honourable and lucrative than the others, to which the natives of India had a preferential claim. The Government of India accordingly asked the Local Government to bear the wishes of Her Majesty's Government in mind, and bring to notice the steps that might be taken to fulfil them.

Early in 1868 Sir W. Grey instituted a system of making appointments to the Subordinate Executive Service on a combined plan of nomination and competitive examination: i. e. 3 candidates to be nominated to compete for each vacancy, the nominees to be of the class to which

Subordinate  
Executive  
Service.

the appointment was meant to be given. The right was reserved to admit independently gentlemen who had served Government in other capacities for some years. In 1868-69 the strength of the Subordinate Executive Service which had been fixed at 200 in 1856 was increased by 16 additional appointments. The grades were reorganized after the transfer of rent suits to the Civil Courts in 1869. In 1869-70 this service memorialized Government to obtain higher salaries but, though Sir W. Grey supported the application, the Government of India declined to entertain it in the state of the finances.

The Secretary of State having sanctioned the introduction of a general system of sanitation throughout India, a special officer (Dr. D. B. Smith) was appointed to carry out the sanitary improvements required in Bengal. The Government of India sketched out a scheme of the duties to be assigned to the Sanitary Commissioner, which came under consideration in 1867-68. This scheme—it was urged by the Sanitary Commissioner—was so comprehensive that no single officer could do justice to it within such an extensive area as that of Bengal. It was therefore modified by the Local Government, and the new Department was started on a more limited basis.

A Committee, which had been appointed by Sir C. Beadon for the revision of the salaries of all the ministerial establishments attached to the Divisional and district Courts in Bengal, submitted a complete scheme for providing a general increase of the salaries of all ministerial officers attached to the Courts of the Commissioners, Judges, Collectors, Magistrates, and Uncovenanted Judicial officers in the Lower Provinces and the permission of the Government of India was obtained to give effect to this scheme. The total increase recommended

To offices or Courts of Judges, Collectors, Magistrates, and subordinate Judicial officers in the Regulation districts...

Rs. 1,55,276

To Courts in the Regulation districts not included in the above...

Rs. 1,42,044

To Courts in the Non-Regulation districts.....

Rs. 80,868

To English offices

Rs. 25,716

Rs. 8,03,904

by the Committee amounted to Rs. 8,03,904. The increase proposed for the English offices was, however, disallowed by the Government of India, because the establishments attached to such offices in other provinces had not

received any increase of pay, and also because these establishments



were specially exempted from the revision previously carried out in the vernacular establishments attached to the Judicial and Revenue Courts. The rest of the scheme was sanctioned. No officer was to be admitted to the benefit of the new scales of salaries without full consideration of fitness to obtain such admission, and it was to be carefully ascertained whether reductions in the number borne on the existing establishments might not be made. The scheme was carried into effect from the 1st. May 1868.

The amount of Civil business devolving on the Government of Bengal having become too large to be transacted with promptitude and efficiency by a Lieutenant-Governor, supported by only one Secretary and Under-Secretary, and a continuance of this state of things being alike injurious to the public interests and unjust to the officers concerned, an increase was made to the Secretariat staff, with the permission of the Government of India, by the appointment of an additional Secretary on a salary of Rupees 30,000 a year. It was also proposed to increase the salary of the Secretary from Rs. 36,000 to Rupees 50,000 *per annum*, with a view to place it on the same footing as the Chief Secretaryships in Madras and Bombay. This proposal was not sanctioned. Eventually it was settled that the 2 Secretaries should receive annual salaries of Rs. 40,000 each.

The affairs of Keonjhur, one of the Tributary *Mahals* under the Commissioner of Orissa (as Superintendent) at one time gave cause for considerable anxiety. There was a disputed succession to the Raj. Dhununjoy Bhunj, son of the late Raja, (who died in 1860), had been recognized by Government as Raja, and, as he came of age in September 1867, it was determined to make over to him the management of his estates. His right to succeed was disputed by the childless Rani of the late Raja, and she supported the claims of Brindaban Chandra Bhunj, a scion of the Mohurbhunj family, whom it was pretended the late Raja, her husband, had adopted. That no such adoption had ever taken place was amply proved and affirmed by all the Courts in India before whom the matter came, and it did not appear to Government necessary to suspend making over charge of the estates until the result of Brindaban Bhunj's appeal to the Privy Council was known.

The announcement of Dhununjoy's succession was the signal for

a strong outbreak of opposition on the part of the Rani and the hill tribes subordinate to Keonjhur who were devotedly attached to her. Deputations were sent to Calcutta to represent their case to the Lieutenant-Governor ; and to the Chiefs so deputed it was carefully explained why Government would not recognize a fictitious adoption such as that of Brindaban Chandra Bhunj. They were assured on the other hand that no oppression would be permitted to be practised on them by the young Raja or his advisers. Matters continued in a very unsettled state during December and January 1867-8. The Superintendent of the Tributary *Mahals* of Cuttack had personally to remain in Keonjhur, and it was only when aided by the presence of the Commissioner of Chota Nagpur, who brought with him the Seraikela Chief, brother of the ex-Rani of Keonjhur, that the negotiations assumed a favourable turn and the large gatherings of hill-men in the forests began to listen to reason.

Ultimately, however, the Rani consented to withdraw her factious opposition : a proper settlement was made for her support and the hill tribes, the Bhuias or Bhunyas, united with the rest of the Keonjhur people in formally recognising Dhununjoy as their Raja.

The peaceable conclusion of the Keonjhur disturbances proved not to be lasting. Suddenly on the 28th. of April 1868, scarcely 3 months after the cessation of the disturbances, a fresh outbreak occurred, of which the immediate cause was obscure. The Commissioner of Chota Nagpur attributed it to some treacherous and impolitic action of the Bewartha, or chief minister of the State, while the Superintendent of the Cuttack Tributary *Mahals* suspected the Rani, and the Raja of Mohurbhunj, a brother of Brindaban Chandra Bhunj, of secretly fomenting the disaffection. Ratna Naik, the leader of the Bhuias of the hill tracts of Keonjhur, who had all along been one of the most refractory chiefs in the late insurrection, organised a combination among his own and the other hill tribes in opposition to the Raja's authority. Large assemblages took place and persons sent out to treat with them were arrested, detained, and plundered. They sacked the Keonjhur bazar, carried off the chief minister, intimidated the well-disposed *raiya*ts and burnt villages. The Raja became alarmed for his own safety and applied to Government for the aid of police, declaring his own *paiks* to be untrustworthy. Dr. Hayes, Deputy Commissioner of Singbhum,

who was acquainted with the people and possessed some influence over them, was ordered to the spot with a force of police and reinforcements were held in readiness at Balasore. More police were sent up to Keonjhur, to keep open communications and to create confidence among the people and prevent their joining the Bhuias. The Superintendent addressed a *parwana* to the Bhuias, and another to the dowager Rani and the Raja of Mohurbhunj, calling upon the former to disperse and reminding them of their promises to the Raja, and warning the latter against encouraging or assisting the disaffected.

On arriving at Jaintghar on the border of Keonjhur on the 1st. May, Dr. Hayes found an extensive opposition against the Raja, but believed it to be directed mainly against the Bewartha. Soon, however, he learnt that the Bewartha and about 50 adherents of the Raja had been carried off to the hills, with the object of detaining them as hostages until the installation of Brindaban. The insurgents, numbering about 20,000, had disarmed the police at the Garh and dismounted the guns. The entire country was disorganized, and plundering was rife. The wild clans, Juangas and Kols, united with the Bhuias and were countenanced by the other races. Both Raja Dhununjoy and the Rani were at the Garh, but the Raja's authority was at an end and the Rani's authority alone prevailed. The combination appeared most serious, and a considerable force was deemed necessary to suppress it. The season was against successful operations in the hills.

A force of police and regular troops was at once ordered up to restore order. It was in contemplation to remove the Rani to Puri or Ranchi, unless she gave in a willing adherence to the Raja, and Brindaban Chandra was ordered to proceed to Balasore and reside there.

Dr. Hayes, with a small guard of Singbhum Kols, reached Keonjhur on the 7th May unopposed. He found the Raja regularly besieged by the wild tribes, armed with bows and arrows, axes and swords, disarmed them and easily turned them out of the Garh, and the people were reassured by his arrival. The Raja and the Rani were said to be on good terms but the authority of both was extinct. Dr. Hayes sent a written demand for the release of the Bewartha and other prisoners and summoned the heads of villages, and was hopeful that force would not be necessary.

He was joined by Mr. Ritchie with a body of police from Chaibassa. On the 9th May, finding that the Bhuias had not released the captives, Dr. Hayes made an expedition into the Bhuia country, to gain information. The people fled at his approach. On reaching Tarpur, the residence of the chief instigator, Ratna Naik, he found the place deserted and obtained no news of the captives. He had an interview at Betheapada with some of the leading men, who asked for 6 days' time to consult the headmen of the other *dandpats* with regard to the delivery of the captives, and engaged to meet him at Keonjhur if he would return there. While suspecting this to be a mere subterfuge to gain time, Dr. Hayes, wishing to succeed by conciliation, if possible, acceded to their request. On reaching Keonjhur, he found the malcontents collected in large numbers around the Garh in an important position at Jonardhanpur, about 3 miles distant, commanding the road to Chaibassa; after some resistance, but without recourse to firing, they were dislodged and a great number disarmed. The chiefs failed to appear on the appointed day but reports of a large assemblage and a meditated attack on the party at the Garh were received. Dr. Hayes now considered hostilities inevitable and applied for 300 troops. The rains had set in heavily, causing sickness, and supplies were getting scarce. On the arrival of supplies and reinforcements, police and native infantry, Dr. Hayes directed his efforts towards breaking up the combination between the hill Bhuias and the people of the plains, and inducing the latter to return to their homes and cultivate their lands. With this object several posts in the country at the foot of the hills were occupied, partly by strong guards of police and partly by armed *paiks*. Events in the neighbourhood of Keonjhur however showed that the opposition had assumed a serious character. Some of the police engaged to keep open postal communications with Keonjhur had been surprised and taken prisoners at Tara. In an attempt made to establish an outpost 6 or 7 miles from the Garh, on the 21st. Mr. Ritchie with a party of 50 police was attacked and surrounded by about 2,000 Bhuias, but opened fire and dispersed the assailants. Communications with Cuttack and Chaibassa were closed, the *daks* plundered, and 3 attacks upon the camp were made by the Bhuias, without success. A detachment of troops from Chaibassa under Major Gahagan

reached Keonjhur, and, thus reinforced. Dr. Hayes was enabled to strengthen the outposts and to repel attacks : but the weather and sickness prevented measures of retaliation.

The Mohurbhunj Raja, besides supplying men, did good service and gave proofs of his loyalty by arresting and making over to the Superintendent messengers sent to him by the Bhuías with overtures. From their establishments and otherwise the complicity of the Rani with Ratna Naik and others in originating the disturbances seemed to be clear. With the reinforcements, the strength at Keonjhur amounted to 1,134 officers and men, all told.

Colonel Dalton, Commissioner of Chota Nagpur, sent an expedition into the north-eastern division of Keonjhur, to compel the submission of the chiefs, and bring in all the principal men who surrendered. Rumours of the murder of the Bewartha were confirmed. A detachment under Lieutenant Hunter succeeded in finding and rescuing a party of constables from confinement at a village which had for some time been the head-quarters of Ratna Naik, who fled with the inhabitants when the force entered. The mails plundered at different times were found in his house. Another message was sent to the Bhuías, inviting them to submit and promising clemency to those who surrendered. Some seizures of insurgents were effected, and some portions of the country were subdued. On the 7th. July, the Superintendent, Mr. Ravenshaw, arrived and assumed charge of affairs with Colonel Dalton. Expeditions were sent out in various directions. The insurgents betook themselves to hiding places in the hills, and no opposition was anywhere encountered. Herds of cattle and stores of grain were brought away, and villages which had sided with the insurrection were burnt. The Bhuías petitioned for 15 days' time to arrange for submission ; they were encouraged to come in, but were informed that no suspension of hostilities would in the mean time be granted. Rewards were offered for the capture of the principal leaders Ratna Naik and others. On this occasion active loyalty was exhibited by Raja Bindessuri Persad Sing Deo Bahadur, c. s. l., of Oodeypore and by Parganait Jagdar Sing of Petoria, a *jagirdar* of Chota Nagpur, and other Chiefs and *zamindars*. They came unsolicited, with large retinues of sepoy and *sawars* to assist in the operations, and it was with their aid that the hill country was penetrated and

several *sardars* captured. In remarkable contrast to our own un-acclimatized troops the followers of the Rajas were comparatively free from sickness and easily provided themselves with food from the stores of the rebels. The latter had now lost all heart: many Bhuia headmen tendered their submission, and more leaders were captured, including Ratna Naik, the principal instigator. The brief struggle drew to a close and the country was entirely subjugated.

By the end of August the work of pacification had so far advanced that the gradual withdrawal of the troops, amongst whom considerable sickness prevailed, could be ordered. The Rani was conveyed to Cuttack pending a decision with regard to her part in the late disturbances. Colonel Dalton returned to Ranchi, the management of affairs being left in the hands of Mr. Ravenshaw, who had to hold a judicial inquiry into the offences with which the prisoners reserved for trial were charged.

In addition to the general charges of waging war against the Queen, plunder, *dacoity*, and kidnapping, there was distinct evidence of the deliberate murder of the Bewartha and 3 other persons. The trials resulted in the conviction of 183 prisoners, of whom Ratna Naik and 4 others were sentenced to death, 27 to transportation for life, and the rest to periods of imprisonment. The capital sentences against 3 of the prisoners who acted as subordinate agents, were commuted to transportation for life, the other sentences were all confirmed. A severe but necessary example was thus made, as a warning against similar outbreaks in future. The prisoners were conducted under proper escort to Cuttack, where the capital sentences on Ratna Naik and his 3 prominent associates were carried out.

Affairs were in a sufficiently settled state to admit of Mr. Ravenshaw's return on the 1st. November. It was judged expedient to leave a force of 200 police to afford substantial support and protection to the Raja until disaffection should have disappeared and complete order and confidence should be restored. Lieutenant Johnstone was placed in charge as Civil Officer, to advise the Raja and effect a reconciliation with the late disaffected tribes. The country soon quieted down peaceably. In 2 years it was reported that the people had quite settled down to their ordinary pursuits, and the disturbances were almost forgotten. All differences had ceased and the Raja was acknowledged by all parties: the Bhuias had paid

their accustomed homage to the Raja, visited him, and consulted him about their affairs. The State had been mainly administered by Lieutenant Johnstone who displayed marked capacity for governing rude and uncivilized tribes. (He was subsequently Sir James Johnstone, K. C. S. I. for services in Manipur).

Early in 1868 Her Majesty's Government, through the Secretary of State, directed their attention to the "working of the machinery of administration in the Presidency of Bengal" in connection with the report of the Orissa Famine Commission and the discussion which had arisen therefrom as to the changes, if any, required in the form of the Government of Bengal. Sir Stafford Northcote, in a despatch of the 16th January of that year, formulated the following definite questions to the Government of India, and asked for their advice and opinion :—

"Assuming that no change is made, for the present, as to the site of the Capital of India, would you recommend that Bengal should be placed under a Government similar to that of the Presidencies of Madras and Bombay ?

If you are not of that opinion, would you recommend that the present form of Government for Bengal, and present relations between it and the general Government, should be maintained ?

Or would you consider it preferable that the local administration of Bengal should be placed in the same hands as the general administration of India ; and, if so, what arrangements would you propose in order to give effect to that system ?

Or would you deem it expedient to restore the relations which formerly subsisted between the Governor-General and the Presidency of Bengal, by making the Lieutenant-Governor a Member of the Council of the former, with (perhaps) the title of Deputy Governor of Bengal ?

In that event, would you further think it desirable that his present Legislative Council should be abolished, and that he should possess legislative power for limited purposes, all other legislation for Bengal being entrusted to the general legislature ?

If you should be of opinion that any change, authorizing or compelling the Governor-General to take a more direct share than at present in the administration of Bengal is desirable, would you recommend the adoption of a similar change in his relations to the subordinate Governments of other parts of India ?

I further desire to be informed in what manner you would recommend

Sir W. Grey's  
views on changes  
in the form of  
the Government of  
Bengal.

that provision should be made for the case of the Governor-General's being called away from Bengal to any other part of India, when not accompanied by his Council in a body."

The Secretary of State also raised other points—viz, as to the establishment of summary powers of legislation—the site of the Capital of India—the best mode of strengthening the Secretariat and other executive details of the Bengal administration,—such as whether the Board of Revenue should cease to exist on its present footing. Sir W. Grey had already considered the proposals of the Orissa Famine Commission for changes in the executive machinery of Bengal, and soon afterwards wrote his views on the questions put by the Secretary of State. His opinions on the whole subject were given at length, and may be summarized as follows. He was entirely opposed to the idea of making the Head of the Local Government an *ex-officio* Member of the Executive Council of the Government of India: he preferred to strengthen the Local Government by giving it greater authority and loosening its relations with the Supreme Government: he thought the best form of Government for Bengal was that which had long obtained in Madras and Bombay, i. e. a Governor with a Council, with each Member undertaking the executive work of certain departments: he regarded the abolition of the Board of Revenue as resolved upon, and proposed the transfer of all Land Revenue work direct to Government, and the creation of a Chief Commissioner of Miscellaneous Revenue: he advocated an establishment of 3 Secretaries and 11 Divisional Commissioners with increased powers and with control over the police: he strongly opposed the idea of abolishing the local legislatures after only 6 years' experience—he deprecated the separation of Assam from Bengal by the Government of India taking it under its immediate authority, but proposed that it should be placed on the same footing to Bengal as Sind to Bombay—he thought it undesirable that the Government of India should at all times be present in Bengal, or that the Governor-General should himself visit other parts of India, leaving his Council behind in Bengal. He dealt fully with other minor points which need not be mentioned.

The Viceroy (Lord Lawrence) was generally in favour of maintaining the *status in quo* in Bengal, but *inter alia* advocated the abolition of the Board of Revenue, and the substitution of a



Financial Commissioner. A series of elaborate Minutes was written by the Viceroy and every Member of the Council, amounting, with Sir W. Grey's, to 94 pages of printed foolscap, to which justice could not be done without fuller analysis than space permits. The discussion proved to be altogether academical and infructuous. The opinions of the Members of the Government of India differed from one another on each point. Accordingly, the Government of India adopted the unusual course of sending home to the Secretary of State, in March 1868, all the Minutes *in extenso*, without attempting to give any collective expression of their opinions; and the question has not since come within the range of practical politics.

The "Shoe-question" was the subject of an official pronouncement in March 1868 by the Government of India. <sup>The Shoe-question.</sup> who had for some time past had under its consideration the manner in which natives of India, who had adopted the European style, in respect of boots and shoes, should be permitted to appear on official or semi-official occasions, in the presence of the servants of the British Government. The matter was regarded as not devoid of importance, as affecting the treatment of the upper classes of natives by British officers, and after consulting all the principal officers in the country, civil and political, the Governor-General was of opinion that a definite and special rule on the subject had become necessary. The Government Resolution proceeded:—

"At some of the Presidency towns and other large stations a practice has grown up whereby natives wearing boots and shoes of European fashion are permitted to appear on all official and semi-official occasions before the highest functionaries of Government. The practice has for many years been allowed at Government House in Calcutta, and was definitively settled by Notification, No. 5356 of the 19th December 1854, in the Foreign Department. It is now deemed requisite that the same privilege should be allowed throughout the Bengal Presidency; otherwise there would arise grave inconvenience if natives of position and consequence who had enjoyed this concession at the Capital and before the Viceroy were to be denied it before any British Officers at the stations in the interior of the country. And unless the social practice at the Presidency be prescribed for observance everywhere *quoad* the servants of Government, and for official or semi-official occasions, individual officers at a distance might have doubt as to what course to

pursue ; or individual native gentlemen might feel uncertain as to what they are or are not entitled to do, and thus embarrassing personal questions might from time to time arise.

His Excellency in Council is therefore pleased to rule that all natives of India wearing boots and shoes of European fashion may appear thus habited before all the servants of Government, in all places within the Bengal Presidency and its dependencies, on all official or semi-official occasions, including *darbars* of all descriptions. In the case of natives wearing shoes of Indian fashion, the old social practice, whereby such shoes must be taken off within the customary limits, will be maintained by the servants of Government in their official or semi-official capacities.

In the High Courts established by Royal Charter, it will of course be for the Judges to decide whether any rule on the point is required for those Courts."

In 1868 another Municipal Act, VI (B. C.) the District Town *Municipal* Act,\* was intended to apply to small towns, and gave *Municipalities.* in theory at least a larger measure of self-government than the Act of 1864. The Municipal Committee was to consist of not less than 5 persons, of whom not more than  $\frac{1}{3}$  might be officials. They were to be ordinarily nominated by the Magistrate, unless Government should otherwise direct. They were to elect their own Chairman, and Vice-Chairman, unless Government should appoint the Magistrate to be Chairman *ex-officio*. The only taxation allowed by the Act was levied from the occupiers, instead of owners, and assessed upon an estimate of the circumstances and property of the persons liable to it. The town fund thereby raised was applicable first to the payment of police, and then to the repair of roads or streets, to the conservancy or general improvement of the town, and to the maintenance of dispensaries and vaccination. In fact the Committees were not executive but only consultative bodies, to assist the Magistrate by their advice, to check expenditure and to frame assessments.

In 1867-8 there was a strong demonstration against the cultivation *Indigo difficulties in Bihar.* of indigo in the district of Champaran, accompanied by instances of illegal violence. The real causes of dissatisfaction on the part of the *raiyats* were believed to be (1) the unusual trouble, hard labour, and constant call on their energy required to carry on the high system of cultivation necessary for the successful production of the indigo plant ; (2) the constant

harassment caused to the *raiyats* by the factory servants who, besides committing other acts of oppression, were alleged to be in the habit of taking a very large percentage of the payments made to the *raiyats* as their own perquisites under the general name of *dasturi*; (3) the fact that the rates which were then being paid for indigo cultivation (apart from all contingent and indirect advantages which the planters were able to give the cultivators) did not give adequate remuneration for the labour expended on the task; (4) the widespread knowledge existing among cultivators that enormous profits were derived from indigo, and the natural desire on their part to obtain a larger share of this profit; (5) the existing high prices of food which had raised the profits of the production of food-grains, and therefore made indigo still more unpopular than before; and (6) the absence on the part of the present race of managers of factories of that sympathy with the *raiyats* which used formerly to be felt by the old proprietor planters, who paid much more attention to the well-being of their tenantry. These causes had for some time prepared the minds of the *raiyats* for the movement, to which, it was believed, they were immediately instigated by certain persons who had their own interests to serve; and this belief appeared to be borne out by the fact that the open opposition to the planters was mainly confined to the estates of the Maharaja of Bettia, with which the persons referred to were connected as farmers. The management of the Bettia estate by an English gentleman was said to have given rise to much dissatisfaction among the influential natives of the Raja's household, whose opportunities of enriching themselves at the expense of the Raja had been restricted thereby; and the combination among the *raiyats* was said to have been got up by them mainly with the object of involving the manager of the estate in difficulties, so that the Raja, disgusted with the management, might allow his affairs to revert to their former neglected condition.

The opposition of the *raiyats* showed itself by the exhibition of a general determination not to sow indigo, and in some cases by the forcible appropriation of the lands already prepared for the cultivation of indigo to other crops. The first instance of such proceedings occurred in a village called Jokitiya, the *raiyats* of which, in defiance of the contract into which they had entered with the Lal Seraya factory, sowed their lands with cold weather crops; and this

example was rapidly followed by other villagers. The aim of the officials under these circumstances was confined (1) to preserving the peace between the contending parties, in which they were so far successful that the factory people were not aggressors in a single instance; and (2) to inducing the planters to raise the rates of remuneration, which resulted in their agreeing to pay Rs. 12 per *bigha* where they had hitherto paid from Rs. 7-8 to Rs. 9. The planters were urged to put a stop to the practice of the factory servants deducting a percentage as *dasturi* from the advances given to the cultivators. As the interests of the planters at stake were very considerable, and it was necessary that they should receive prompt and final decisions on their complaints, the Government at their request established a Small Cause Court at Motihari, with jurisdiction over the entire district of Champaran, for the trial of all cases of breach of contract between them and the *raiya*s; and, having regard to the strong feeling of excitement between the two parties, the Court was composed of two Judges, the one a convenanted Civil Servant and the other a native gentleman selected for his ability, independence, and judicial experience, and these 2 officers were directed to sit together for the trial of all suits connected with the indigo question. The result of this measure was entirely satisfactory. Mr. Bell, the officer who was deputed to preside in the Court, exercised his influence judiciously and successfully out of Court, by explaining to the *raiya*s their exact position as to rights and liabilities. But few suits were instituted, the mere knowledge that such a Court was at hand to enforce promptly the payment of damages for breach of contracts being apparently sufficient to deter the *raiya*s from wantonly breaking them. At the same time the demands of the *raiya*s were met by concessions from the planters, whose bearing was most moderate and temperate throughout this trying period. Within 9 weeks of the establishment of the Court, the Lieutenant-Governor was able to put an end to its special constitution, leaving the native Judge only to preside over it. Before it was too late to retrieve the prospects of the indigo season, all open opposition to the cultivation had ceased.

The disputes between the *raiya*s and planters had at one time threatened to become very serious. The *raiya*s were apparently determined not to carry out their contracts to sow indigo; the result

of such conduct would have been not only heavy loss to the factories, but eventual ruin to the *raiyats* themselves. The local officers almost unanimously reported that the cultivation of indigo had become very unpopular, and that there was not a *raiyat* who would not abandon the cultivation if he could; and this state of things was ascribed as much to the insufficiency of the remuneration which the *raiyats* received, as to the exactions, oppression, and annoyance to which they were exposed at the hands of the factory servants. Government was satisfied that the time had passed when planters could hope to carry on an indigo concern profitably by forcing on the *raiyats* a cultivation and labour which was to them unprofitable; and it was clear that in the altered circumstances of the time they must be prepared either to close their factories or to give to the *raiyats* in some shape or other a remuneration which should make it worth their while to grow indigo. This necessity was recognised by the general body of Tirhut and Champaran planters, and they yielded to the pressure, raising the rate of remuneration from Rs. 7-8 to Rs. 12 per *bigha*. Action on the part of Government was confined to throwing the weight of the influence of its officers on the side of this party or that, to induce it to abstain from what was obviously indefensible, and to concede what was obviously right. Beyond this, Government merely provided the promptest and most efficacious means of obtaining judicial redress against intentional wrong-doers. Managers of indigo concerns saw clearly the danger they had so narrowly escaped and a belief was expressed that they would be careful to guard against falling into such an error again. On the other hand, if, after what had occurred, any of the proprietors or managers still obstinately refused to adapt their terms to the changed circumstances of the time, the result would no doubt be their speedy ruin, for which they only would be responsible. But in any case, it was laid down, Government could do no more than it had done, and any more direct interference on its part would lead to serious mischief.

During the year 1868-9 Government were apprised that an active movement of some kind was taking place among the Muhannadans of the Wahabi sect in several districts of Bengal. Mr. J. H. Reily, the head of the detective department, was accordingly deputed to make an inquiry. Up to

The Wahabi  
movement.

November 1868, his movements were limited to the districts of Malda and Rajmahal, but it appeared certain that a *jihad*, or religious war, against the British power had for some time been preached, and collections in aid of the Hindustani fanatics on the frontier made on a regularly organised system. From 12 to 15 agents were arrested and kept under detention and it was thought probable, though by no means certain, that charges of abetting the offences described in sections 121 and 122 of the Penal Code could be established against most of them. With 1 or 2 exceptions however, they were men of inferior position and to proceed against them formally, and at once, would have rendered further inquiry difficult, if not impossible, while failure to secure conviction would have placed Government in a false and unfavourable position. It was moreover very desirable to ascertain the full extent of this movement, and the course which seemed best was, that the leading preachers of sedition, as well as all foreign emissaries from the north-west frontier against whom any proof of complicity might be obtained, should be detained under Regulation III of 1818, the inferior and subordinate agents being liberated but carefully watched: and that the detective department should then quietly, but persistently, prosecute their inquiries, until, all the leaders of the movement had been ascertained, and, if necessary, secured, and their power for evil neutralised and checked: Government would then be in a position to judge whether formal prosecution of any of those concerned was advisable and could be undertaken with reasonable hope of success. Mr. Reilly was instructed to trace out the chain of agents through whom reinforcements of men and supplies of money were sent to the north-west frontier, and in the inquiries subsequently made this object was kept in view.

It was found that this movement was extensively ramified and that there were agents stationed in different and distant parts of the country. Several of the leading agents, against whom strong presumptive evidence was discovered, were held under detention, pending the final decision of Government. A number of arrests were made of persons suspected of complicity in the efforts of the Wahabi fanatics to excite a *jihad*, and they were detained under Regulation III of 1818. Officers to whose custody they were committed were at the same time reminded that the prisoners were not to be treated

as criminals; and where there was no separate place of confinement for them they were detained in the civil jail. Subsequently Mr. Reily was deputed to Peshawar to collect further evidence as to the extent of the movement and the manner in which the individuals, either in imprisonment or under surveillance, were implicated. His mission was satisfactory in respect of the information on these points which he was enabled to obtain in the Panjab. He then had to complete the cases against the men in detention with a view to bringing them as soon as possible to trial.

In connection with the measures undertaken for the suppression of these intrigues, it was considered whether it was not necessary to amend the law with the object of enabling Government to deal more satisfactorily with seditious proceedings not amounting to waging, or attempting to wage, or abetting the waging of, war against the Queen. In the opinion of the Government of Bengal, such an amendment was required to meet cases of seditious preaching, such as had been alleged against certain of the Wahabis, and for which there seemed to be no satisfactory provision in the existing Code.

The total number of persons arrested in connection with the Wahabi movement and detained as State prisoners under the Regulation was 26. The evidence collected in several of the cases having been considered by the law officers of Government sufficient to establish their guilt, Sir W. Grey authorized their prosecution

1. Waging war against the Queen.
2. Attempting to wage war against the Queen.
3. Abetting the waging of war against the Queen.
4. Attempting to abet the waging of war against the Queen.
5. Abetting an attempt to wage war against the Queen.
6. Abetting an attempt to abet the waging of war against the Queen.
7. Preparing to wage war against the Queen, with the intention of either waging or being prepared to wage war against the Queen.

on the charges specified in the margin: and Mr. J. O'Kinealy, c.s. was appointed to conduct the prosecution on behalf of Government.

The trials were held at Malda, Rajmahal and Patna. One of the prisoners, Haji Moniruddin, was also committed to the Sessions Court of Rajshahi; he was acquitted. The prisoners tried at Malda and Rajmahal were Amiruddin of Malda and Ibrahim Mandal of Islampur, both of whom were convicted and sentenced to transportation

- \*1. Hashmadad Khan.
2. Pir Mahomed
3. Amir Khan.
4. Haji Din Mahomed.
5. Mubarak Ali.
6. Toharak Ali.
7. Amiruddin.

for life with forfeiture of property. At Patna, 7 prisoners\* including Amir Khan of Colootolla, the most influential of the Wahabi conspirators, were committed to the Sessions

Court. They were tried by the Judge, Mr. H. T. Prinsep, with the aid of 4 assessors, 2 of whom were Muhammadans. At the close of the prosecution the Judge discharged Hashmadad Khan, for want of sufficient proof against him, remarking, however, that great suspicion attached to him. The remaining 6 were put on their defence. Pir Mahomed was acquitted; the rest were convicted and sentenced to transportation for life, with forfeiture of property. All the other Wahabi prisoners were men of very small consequence, and were discharged by Government (most of them previous to the trial at Patna, and the remainder on its conclusion) with a warning that their conduct would be watched and reported on by the police. The police were instructed to exercise a general surveillance over their doings, without however in any way directly interfering with them.

All the prisoners sentenced at Patna appealed to the High Court. The case was argued before a Bench consisting of the Chief Justice and 2 Puisne Judges, who in an unanimous judgment confirmed the conviction of Amir Khan and Tobarak Ali, but reversed the finding of the Judge as regards the 3 other prisoners, who were accordingly released. Amir Khan was a wealthy banker and money lender. He was released on the Proclamation of the Queen as Empress of India, 1st January 1877.

In consequence of a despatch from the Secretary of State, the Government of India on the 9th April 1868, called for an expression of opinion on the following points:—

Proposed formation of a distinct judicial branch of the Civil Service.

(1) Whether it is expedient that a distinct judicial branch of the Civil Service should be formed, the members of which should be trained specially for the duties of the Bench, and should not look for advancement beyond the sphere of those duties; and

(2) whether there were any difficulties in accepting the principle of such a change absolutely with regard to the Indian Civil Service.

A select number of officers of experience and distinction serving the Bengal Government were consulted and in due course Sir W. Grey recorded his views and recommendations on the subject. He drew attention to the fact that, since the union of the officers of Magistrate and Collector in one person, the Magistrate-Collectors of districts had so little time to take up judicial work, that instead of acquiring in that post judicial experience and qualifying for



judgeships, to which they were ordinarily promoted, they were absolutely losing the good effect of the judicial training which as Assistant and Joint-Magistrates they had enjoyed. These executive duties so fully engrossed their attention that they had not even the opportunity of qualifying themselves by a course of reading, such as, before the union, a Collector had ample time to undertake. And while the opportunities of acquiring judicial knowledge and experience had thus diminished to the judge himself, all around him had been moving onwards; the judicial administration had become more and more scientific and exact; the Subordinate Judges whom he had to control, and the Bar with which he had to deal, had advanced much, not only in general education, but particularly in the special education of their profession.

Sir W. Grey was satisfied that the general progress of events was such, that, if our administration of justice was to command respect and secure confidence, the special qualifications of those who presided over the highest local Courts must be materially improved, and that the proper means of doing this was to place them at a comparatively early period of life in a position which would concentrate their attention on the requirements of the judicial line as a profession, would hold out inducements to them to perfect themselves in that profession by study, and would afford them a practical training for it. This could only be done by disconnecting the future judge from the distraction of executive duties, by securing him against the chance of being called on in after life to discharge duties requiring executive qualifications, and by giving him distinctly to understand that he must look for advancement in the judicial line, and in that alone.

Nor was it only for the improvement of the judicial service that this separation was called for. The administration on the executive side had also become more scientific and exact, and the work of the executive officers was multiplying and extending upon every side. In some of the larger districts the labour imposed by the union in one officer of executive and judicial administration was so great as to diminish the efficiency of the former as well as of the latter, and in those smaller districts in which there was no second officer the want of one had long been most urgently felt.

Sir W. Grey was of opinion that the simple and most effective

plan of fulfilling the required conditions was to carry to completion the tendency which had displayed itself of late years to confine the Joint-Magistrate to judicial duties, leaving the executive to another officer, the Magistrate-Collector. The former officer, who might be called the Assistant Judge, would under this arrangement be unavailable for executive work, and to him would fall the chief share of the criminal judicial work of the district. The Assistant Judges and the judges would form a distinct judicial branch, promotions being made direct from the former to the latter post.

It was no part of the proposed scheme, nor was it considered advisable in itself, that the separation of executive and judicial functions should be carried out in the grades below the Joint-Magistrates. While filling these lower appointments, the Covenanted Civil Servant was learning his work and gaining a knowledge of the people, of the law, and of the system of administration. It was clearly to his advantage that this education should be a general one, and at the same time it would not be possible in these appointments to make a division into executive and judicial without incurring considerable expenditure and without making violent changes in the existing arrangements, and probably also in the law. But when an Assistant Magistrate had reached that period of service where, under present arrangements, he was appointed to fill a Joint Magistracy, he might reasonably be called on to decide between the judicial and executive lines and the Government would also have the means of determining for which he was best suited.

It appeared to Sir W. Grey that by establishing 5 grades of pay (Rs. 10,800, 18,000, 23,000, 30,000 and 35,000) in each of the 2 branches of the service, these expectations could be rigidly respected, and the Civilian would attain at each period of service the same pay which he would enjoy under existing arrangements. This plan would also fulfil another important condition, viz., that the inducements, in respect of salary, to enter each branch would be equal, and that contemporaries on either side would find themselves in nearly equal positions as regards salary. The scheme proposed was to arrange the 66 judicial appointments and the 44 executive appointments, in the districts, on the grades of pay above-mentioned, so that the average pay of each judicial appointment came to Rs. 21,894

and of each executive one Rs. 22,260 a year. It involved an increased expenditure of Rs. 1,29,200 a year.

It was part of the proposition that Assistant Judges should also exercise civil powers, though it was doubtful whether this could enable Government to reduce its subordinate judicial establishment. It was Sir W. Grey's object in his proposals to avoid, as far as possible, all necessity for legislation. It did not appear to be necessary, nor was it deemed expedient, to deprive the district officer of all judicial power. Sir W. Grey believed that there was no form of judicial proceeding more satisfactory to the people of this country than a local investigation held by an officer of experience and standing, in which he inquired into the matter on the spot and decided it on its merits without the intervention of *amla* or *mukhtars*, and one great advantage of the proposed scheme was that it would leave the Magistrate-Collector free to travel leisurely about the district to a much greater extent than he could before, and place him in a position to dispose of a great many disputes arising out of questions connected with the occupation of land and cultivation, without forcing the people into the Courts at the chief station of the district. It was proposed to leave to the Magistrate-Collector the powers he then had, only strengthening his position as regards the police, and having it avowed that he was not expected or desired to exercise his judicial powers, except when he believed that his doing so would be for the public good. The Assistant Judge (Joint-Magistrate) was also to be left in the position he already occupied as regards criminal jurisdiction.

The practice of hook-swinging has been previously mentioned as having attracted the notice of Government. Cases were again stated in the newspapers to have taken place in the Midnapore and Dacca districts. The reports of the local officers showed that in the cases alleged to have occurred in Midnapore the swingers had not used hooks. As the interference of Government with native customs extends only so far as is necessary in the interests of humanity, the practice of swinging during the *Charak puja* without the infliction of bodily torture had never been prohibited. In the cases, however, in the Dacca district, hook-piercing had been practised. The Commissioner reported that the parties immediately concerned had been punished, but that

no steps had been taken against the *zamindars* in whose estates the cases were discovered. The Magistrate of Dacca was instructed regularly to republish, a month before the commencement of the *Charak* festival, a notification warning the people against the practice of hook-swinging. The revival of the custom in Dacca was attributed to the omission on the part of the executive authorities to publish such a notification for some time past.

The Secretary of State had in 1859, when reviewing the results of the Education despatch of 1854, drawn the Education and Road-cess. attention of Government to the continued neglect of the education of the mass of the people in their own vernaculars. Acknowledging the failure of grants-in-aid to encourage such education, he directed the levy of cesses on the land for village schools. Such cesses had been first raised by Mr. Thomason in the N. W. Provinces (Lieutenant-Governor, 1843-1853). Gradually the cesses were levied in other Provinces, except Bengal, and with notable success in Bombay. Something had been done in the direction of extending the education of the people both by Sir J. P. Grant and Sir C. Beadon. From 1865, correspondence took place between the Government of India and the Government of Bengal on the subject of providing the funds required for the maintenance and extension of lower class vernacular education in Bengal. The Government of India believed that Sir J. P. Grant's scheme had worked successfully, regarding it as an adaptation of the grant-in-aid system to the circumstances and requirements of elementary vernacular schools in Bengal, but laid it down in October 1867 that the State had never undertaken to provide funds for the education of the mass of the people, and that in Bengal the main burden of vernacular education should fall, not on the Imperial revenues, but as elsewhere on the proprietors of the land; and that steps should therefore be taken to raise the necessary funds from the owners of land, either in the shape of voluntary contributions (as in the Benares Division) or, as a separate tax for special local purposes, the Government aiding the funds to such extent as the state of the finances of the Empire might permit. In a subsequent letter of April 1868 the Government of India, while observing with regret the almost total absence of proper means of provision for the elementary education of the agricultural classes forming the great mass of the

population, declared further that it would in future decline to listen to any proposition the effect of which would be to throw upon the State the main burden of the cost of educating the people of Bengal; and, after referring to the educational cesses levied from proprietors in Bombay, the N. W. Provinces, Oudh, the Central Provinces and the Panjab, it again urged the necessity of raising funds in Bengal in the same manner and for similar purposes, adding that the rate to be thus levied should be calculated for the purpose of roads also, for which the proprietors of land in Bengal were paying nothing: an opinion was expressed that the amount levied ought not to be less than 2 per cent. on the net assets, or gross rental, of the land.

The question thus raised by the Government of India was carefully considered by the Local Government in consultation with the principal officers and the leading non-official Associations: and the information obtained was such as to force Sir W. Grey to the conclusion that, as the position of the proprietors of land in Bengal was so dissimilar to that of the proprietors of land in other parts of India, the proposed cess could not be levied in Bengal without considerable modification in the nature of the imposition. The argument that a cess upon landholders only was warranted by the increase in their gross assets owing to extended cultivation and high prices could only be valid if it were shown that (1) the increased profits arising from these causes actually reached the *zamindars* and others who were under direct engagement with the Government for the payment of revenue and (2) that the landholders enjoying such increased profits had derived their estates by inheritance from the original settlement-holders, and had not purchased them at market rates as an investment for capital. But, as a fact, in Bengal most of the *zamindars* had, by the creation of permanent subordinate tenures, placed themselves in the position of mere annuitants on their estates, and did not share in any increase of profits; while, on the other hand, the effect of the sale laws had been to transfer very many estates at full values to recent purchasers. An examination of the nature of the land revenue in India generally, and of the limitation placed upon it in Bengal, led Sir W. Grey to the conclusion that any cess for educational or other general purposes ought to be imposed by way of general direct taxation and

not left to fall on the landholders only. But again it was capable of demonstration that, both as regards the rates and proceeds of taxation, Bengal was already more drawn upon than other provinces ; while there could be no doubt that to impose a general tax for educational purposes would tend to check private bequests and make the system of education extremely unpopular. It was questionable, moreover, whether the hypothesis on which the Government of India based its opinion as to the deficiency of vernacular education in Bengal had itself any substantial ground of truth. For all these reasons, the Government of India was requested to take the question into reconsideration. At the same time, it was admitted that a scheme by which a cess could be laid upon land for the purpose of providing local roads by which the estates in the neighbourhood would directly benefit was not open to the same objections. The Local Government having admitted the necessity of imposing a local tax for the purpose of providing local roads, the Government of India requested that the necessary steps might be taken to carry out the measure, referring especially to the state of the finances, which would preclude the Government from contributing as much as heretofore for the construction of roads in Bengal. The question came fully under consideration on the receipt of the despatch of the 12th May 1870 on the subject of local cesses, from the Secretary of State, to whom the question was referred. The Duke of Argyll communicated the orders of Her Majesty's Government, approving of the policy of the Government of India, which was that of Lord Derby's despatch of 1859, and directing the levy in Bengal, from property of all kinds accessible to such rates, of cesses for roads and village schools. In a subsequent despatch the Secretary of State sanctioned certain arrangements by which less would be spent from the general funds on English Education and more on the instruction of the mass of the people in their own languages. As the despatch (Educational) of the 12th May 1870 from the Duke of Argyll to the Government of India finally settled a much-vexed question, it is here quoted at length :—

“ I have had under my consideration in Council Your Excellency's despatch No. 17 of the 31st December 1869, with a copy of further correspondence with the Government of Bengal “on the subject of providing from local sources the means of extending elementary education

among the masses of Bengal, and of constructing and maintaining roads and other works of public utility." In the concluding paragraph of your despatch under consideration, you declare that the "imperial resources of the Empire are unable to provide the large sums necessary for such purposes as these," and you add "if we are to make roads, to educate the people of Bengal and keep them clean and healthy, it can only be done by imposing on local resources such a burden as they can conveniently bear. We are therefore decidedly of opinion that it is the duty of the Government of India to insist on their gradual imposition, and, if we have refrained from taking immediate steps for this latter object, it mainly is because we wish to be informed, in the first instance, whether our conclusions are accepted by Her Majesty's Government, it being of much importance that we should be fully assured of their support in any measures that we may take to give effect to our intentions."

2. I do not understand the question, now referred for my decision, to be the question whether a local cess, if levied at all, can justly be levied from the *samindars* alone or whether all other classes which have acquired beneficial interests in the soil must equally contribute to the rate. The Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal understood the letter of Sir J. Lawrence of 28th October 1867, No. 5876, as a proposal to levy rates from the *samindars* alone. This impression does not seem to have been removed by the farther letter from Sir J. Lawrence's Government, dated 25th April 1868, No. 237. This last letter modifies, on several points, the opinions which had been indicated in the previous letter of 1867. These modifications the Lieutenant-Governor, in his letter of 30th April 1869, No. 1768 A, refers to as important, but he does not accept them as sufficient. In particular, he points out (paragraph 10) that, whilst the method of rating the cess originally suggested (namely, in proportion to the land revenue) is abandoned, "it does not appear that the Governor-General in Council has altered his opinion as to the persons who should be called upon to pay it." Accordingly, the Lieutenant-Governor proceeds to state some most important facts, which had not, probably, received adequate attention when the levying of rates was first suggested,—that, since the permanent settlement was made, the condition of landed tenures has entirely changed, and a great variety of derivative interests has arisen between the original *samindars* and the actual cultivators of the soil. So complete is this change that the Lieutenant-Governor represents (para 27) the permanent settlement as having been "only a gift to certain individuals, and neither can these persons for the most part now be identified, nor can the share of the increased rental appropriated by them and their successors or assigns be ascertained." In the despatch under reply the bearing

of these facts on the incidence of rates is fully acknowledged, and, in view of them, it would clearly be unjust, irrespective even of the promises given under the permanent settlement, to levy cesses or rates solely upon the *zamindars*. Looking, however, to this correspondence as a whole, I gather, even from the letter of the 28th October 1867, more clearly from the letter of 25th April 1868, and most clearly of all from Your Excellency's despatch now under reply, that neither the method of levying the rate, nor the distribution of its incidence among different classes, were questions to which chief importance was attached by the Government of India. The one point on which Sir. J. Lawrence insisted, and on which Your Excellency now insists, is that the expense of roads, education, &c., in Lower Bengal, cannot be borne by the imperial exchequer out of its existing revenue, and that it must be met by special rates levied locally for the purpose. The method of levying the rate and the distribution of it, were matters to be carefully considered in communication with the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal. His Honor, in his letter of 30th April 1869, finally accepts a rate for roads to be levied upon land, but only in consideration of the urgency of your Government and the obvious utility of the purpose in view. His Honor also seems prepared to admit that it might be legitimate, though not expedient, to levy a rate for education, provided it were converted into a general tax affecting all incomes from whatever source. But in principle I understand His Honor to contend, and a general part of his letter to be directed to establish, that, whether for roads or for education, it is not just to levy in Bengal any merely provincial tax whatever, and especially any rate or cess, the main burden of which must be laid on land held under the terms of the permanent settlement of 1793.

3. The question thus raised for the decision of Her Majesty's Government has immediate reference to Lower Bengal; but the arguments used on both sides in the correspondence involve, both directly and by implication, the whole subject of the conditions and the circumstances under which the Government of India can be justified in imposing on the people special rates or taxes in order to effect improvements which the existing revenue is insufficient to provide for.

4. The importance of this subject in a financial point of view can hardly be exaggerated. It may be stated broadly that the general or imperial revenues of India are barely sufficient to meet the demands which are at present made upon them by the civil, political, and military administration of the Empire, together with the interest on debt and the interest on great public works which have not yet become remunerative. But whilst these exhaust the means at the disposal of the Government, they do not exhaust the obligations which are thrown upon it by the



condition of the people. The Government does, and it ought to do in India, much which in Europe is undertaken by private enterprise, or by municipal and other local bodies. In India it may be said with substantial truth that private enterprise does not exist, and that the machinery for local taxation and expenditure is yet but imperfectly developed. In the Department of Public Works, both "Ordinary" and "Extraordinary," there is a large expenditure by the Government, which, in Europe, would be met either by individuals or by Companies, or would be defrayed by assessment. But there is still much absolutely requiring to be done, if the condition of the people is to be improved, which the Government cannot overtake out of imperial funds. It cannot, out of the means now remaining at its disposal, make and maintain the roads and bye-roads required for developing the resources of a country so vast as India. If, therefore, this work is to be done at all, it must be done by the help of rates established for the purpose. In like manner, it has been assumed in all the discussions which have arisen during recent years upon this subject that the expenditure which may be required for the vernacular education of the people and for sanitary improvements cannot be afforded by the imperial revenue, and must be met, in the main, out of the same additional resources. There appears, indeed, to be no alternative unless it be the alternative of allowing the country to remain without drainage, and without roads, and without education.

5. Accordingly, this conviction has been now for many years forced upon the Administrations of some of the most important provinces in India, upon the Supreme Government, and upon several successive Secretaries of State. Local rates for meeting the necessities of local improvement have been levied, over and above the land revenue in the Panjab, in the N. W. P., in Central India, in Oudh, in Sind, and throughout the Presidency of Bombay. I shall presently advert to the distinction which has been drawn between the circumstances and conditions under which these rates have been imposed, and the circumstances which affect the question of imposing them in Bengal. I am now only recording the fact that such rates have been raised in the provinces above-named. In the 53rd. paragraph of the educational despatch of the 7th April 1859, Lord Stanley called special attention to the question of the expediency of imposing a special rate to repay the expense of schools for the rural population. Sir Charles Wood, in his despatch of the 25th May 1861 to the Government of Bombay, whilst recounting all the difficulties and objections which had been felt upon the subject of cesses in addition to the land revenue, spoke of the obligation to keep up roads of internal communication as a liability everywhere attaching, both by reason and by custom, to the owners and occupiers of land,

In respect to education, he referred to the probable necessity of dealing with the question by a specific legislative enactment. Accordingly, such an enactment, under conditions to which I shall afterwards refer, has actually been adopted in Bombay. Lastly, my predecessor, Sir Stafford Northcote, in Council, in his despatch of the 28th. of October 1868, No. 22, approved of these proceedings of your Government, in which the proposal was made to levy a rate for this purpose in Bengal.

6. I come, then, to the specific objection to this proposal that the Government of India is precluded from imposing special rates in Lower Bengal, because of the binding promises made to the landowners of that province under the terms of the permanent settlement. In considering this question, I put aside for the moment every argument which turns upon the purposes to which the proposed rates or taxes are to be applied. On this point, there seems to be some doubtful reasoning used on both sides in the correspondence before me. Your Government repeatedly asserts the right of imposing local cesses for local purposes, implying that the purpose to which such a tax is devoted affects the question of the right of the Government to impose it. Assuming the right to impose any given tax, the purpose to which it is applied may make all the difference in these two most important things: *first*, the reasonableness, or even the justice, of imposing the tax; and *secondly*, the possibility of making that reasonableness and justice plain to the people who are to pay it. But if the right to impose the tax be absolutely denied, on the ground of a binding promise that no such tax should be imposed, then the purposes to which we may intend to devote the money can have no bearing on the question of our right to raise it.

7. But the question whether the Government of India has, or has not, the right to impose taxes upon land in Bengal, even for the general purposes of the Empire, has been ruled and decided in the case of the income tax. And yet that ruling was not, and could not, be arrived at by any mere construing of the words in which the promises of the permanent settlement were made. Those words did not contemplate such a case; and, to reach the general principles on which that case was ruled, it was necessary to go outside altogether of the four corners of the document in which the permanent settlement is recorded.

8. Your Excellency has, indeed, referred to Article VII. of that Regulation as indicating the reservation of a power large enough to include that which is now disputed. I am bound to say, however, that this argument does not appear to me to be satisfactory. It is true, indeed, that under that Article the Government of India retained a right of enacting such Regulations as it might think necessary for the "protection and welfare" of the various agricultural classes. It is

true also that we may argue, in all good conscience, that the support of roads and of vernacular education are necessary for the "welfare" of those classes. But the whole context of the passage indicates, in my opinion, that the power intended to be reserved under that Article was the power of regulating and limiting the power of the *zamindars* over their tenantry. It is indeed, obvious that in the exercise of such a right the revenues of those *zamindars* might have been affected to a far greater extent than they can be affected by rates for the making and maintenance of roads or of schools. But if the question be whether the right to levy such rates, in addition to the "*jama*" was contemplated or thought of at the time, I am compelled to believe that no such idea was in the mind of the Government of Lord Cornwallis in 1793.

9. But, if the words of the permanent settlement do not rule the case in favor of the power now claimed by your Government, neither do they rule it in a sense adverse to that claim. The great object and purpose of that settlement, as clearly defined and described in Article VI., should govern our interpretation of its terms. That object was—as this Article explains at length—to put an end for ever to the practice of all former Governments of altering and raising the land tax "from time to time," so that the landholder was never sure, for any definite period, what proportion of the total produce of the soil might be exacted by the State. This uncertainty was to be set at rest for ever. The "public demand" was to be fixed and permanent. Such was the promise: and its scope and object were clearly explained in the concluding exhortation addressed to the landowners, that "they would exert themselves in the cultivation of their lands, under the certainty that they would enjoy exclusively the fruits of their own good management, and that no demand would ever be made upon them or their heirs and successors by the present or any future Government *for an augmentation of the public assessment in consequence of the improvement of their respective estates.*"

10. These last words illustrate the whole force of the argument, which had been admitted to be just in the case of the income tax. It must be remembered that none of the pleas which, in the correspondence before me, are urged in favor of the right of the Government to levy rates for roads or for education, could have been put forward in favor of the right to impose an income tax on the landholders of Bengal. The income tax was not "local" in any sense. It was not applied to special purposes intended for the immediate benefit of the agricultural classes. It was, in the fullest sense of the words, a "public demand," levied over and above the public demand which, under the permanent settlement, had been fixed "for ever". It went directly into the imperial exchequer, and was applied precisely as the land revenue and all the imperial taxes

were applied. But there is one thing which that tax was not: it was not an increase of the public demand levied upon the *samindars* "in consequence of the improvement of their estates." It was levied upon a wholly different principle, and in respect of a wholly different kind of liability. One index and proof of this difference lay in the fact that, although this "public demand" was made upon those to whom the promises of the permanent settlement had been given, it was made upon them only in company with other classes of the community, and with no exclusive reference to the source from which their income was derived.

11. But when the principle of this distinction is clearly apprehended, it becomes obvious that an income tax is not the only form of "public demand" to which that principle applies. The same essential distinction may be established between the original assessment which was fixed "for ever", and every kind of tax, or cess, or rate, which is levied irrespective of the increased value or produce of land, and with no view to a re-adjustment of the proportions in which the produce of the soil is divided between the State and the owners of land holding under it. The best method of marking this distinction, and of making it clear is to provide that such cesses should be laid upon the owners of land only in common with other owners of property which is of a kind to be accessible to the rate.

12. It has been contended that the rates levied in other provinces of India are essentially distinct in principle from the rates which it is proposed to levy in Bengal. The argument appears to be, that in other provinces of India the local rates are simply so much addition to the ordinary land revenue—an addition which is there legitimate, because the Government had not in those provinces debarred itself by positive engagements from increasing the land assessment. This appears to be only another form of stating the argument already dealt with, which is founded on the terms of the permanent settlement. But the distinction thus drawn between the character of such rates when levied in Bengal, and the character of similar rates when levied elsewhere, is a distinction which I concur with Your Excellency in considering to be unsound. Whatever character may be assigned to these rates as a matter of mere verbal definition, they were unquestionably intended by the Government in all the provinces in which they have been raised, to be in addition to the land revenue, and not a part of it. This separation was expressly defined and marked in the proceedings of the Government of Bombay before any special legislation had been passed upon the matter. In the Resolution of that Government, dated March 9th, 1860, the Superintendents of Survey were directed, "after fixing the assessment of a district," to add the rate "over and above the amount which on other consider-

ations they may deem appropriate." Although incorporated with the land revenue in respect to the mode of levy, as being the most convenient, it is again in the same sentence explained to be calculated over and above the ordinary assessment ;" and Sir Charles Wood, in his despatch of May 25th, 1861, in which he dealt with the proposal, speaks of it as a proposal "for the imposition of a school rate and road cess in addition to the revised rates of land assessment which have been, and still are, in course of introduction."

13. Her Majesty's Government are therefore of opinion that it cannot be said with justice that to impose rates in Bengal would be to impose a special tax on that province which is not imposed on other parts of India.

14. It is true that, in making some of the recent land settlements in various provinces of India, the Government has given notice that in fixing the assessment of land revenue for 20 or 30 years it retained the power of imposing some additional rates for local expenditure. In the Bombay Act of 1865\*, a notice to this effect has been made permanent by law. But this notice, so far from indicating that such rates are to be considered as part of the land revenue, is, on the contrary, a distinct indication that they are to be considered separate. The notice was issued because the Government was warned by the misunderstanding which had arisen in Bengal, and because it knew that precisely the same misunderstanding might arise under any settlement—the misunderstanding, namely, that during the term for which such settlement might be made the Government absolutely surrendered all power of additional taxation upon the land. But, although, under these circumstances, it was expedient to prevent such misunderstanding in future by a warning explanation to all with whom new settlements might be made, Her Majesty's Government do not admit that, where no such notice has been given, no rates can be levied in addition to the assessment. This, indeed, would involve a result in direct antagonism with the principle laid down in this despatch, and sanctioned in the case of the income tax. That principle is that any extra taxation or rating levied from the agricultural classes, over and above the land revenue, must be imposed as equally as possible upon all holders of property accessible to the impost. But if those holders of the landed property are to be free from the tax, to whom notice was not given at the time of settlement, the rates cannot be imposed equally, but, on the contrary, there must be an extensive system of exemptions. And those exemptions must especially include the holders of *inams*, of alienated villages, and all permanent tenures either rent-free or at small fixed quit-rents. The guarantee under which

\* Act I of 1865,  
Section 21,  
clause I.

these persons hold their lands, free from any increase of the land assessment, is a guarantee quite as binding as the promise given to any holder in Bengal. But the practical injustice of exempting *inamdars*, or the owners of alienated villages, is as apparent as the departure it involves from the principle of making rates equal and general in their incidence. It must always be remembered, in matters of taxation, and when a given work is to be done, and a given amount of expenditure is required to do it, that the exemption of any class is simply an aggravation of the burden on all other classes who are not exempt. And in this case those would be the exempted classes who have been otherwise most favoured by the State, and those would be the classes bearing an aggravated burden who already contribute most to the public expenditure. Moreover, the holders of property thus exempted would derive equal, or indeed greater, benefit from the rate than the holders of property who alone would be called upon to pay them. On these grounds Her Majesty's Government feel that, in rejecting any claim to exemption from rates on the part of those who did not expect to pay them at the time of the land settlements, or on the part of those who hold under permanent tenures whether of one kind or another, they are not adopting any mere verbal plea in order to justify a foregone conclusion which otherwise might be difficult of defence. They are satisfied, on the contrary, that they are rejecting a claim founded solely on a mistaken interpretation of the mere wording of a particular document, and which, if admitted, would lead to results at once anomalous and unjust.

15. It is the more important that a final decision on this matter should be arrived at, because it must be admitted that the misunderstanding on which such claims to exemption are founded is a misunderstanding which has been long prevalent, and has imparted a character of doubt and hesitation to the language and to the acts of the Government both in India and at home. There has been, on the one hand, a feeling and a conviction of the essential distinction—between the ordinary land revenue and the rates which it was desired to levy, whilst, on the other hand, there has been a difficulty in defining that distinction, and a fear lest it should be found to be incapable of explanation to the people. Hence there has been a variety of suggestions for evading the difficulty, by raising the required amount of money through a house tax, or a license tax, or some other tax which could not be confounded with the land revenue, and respecting which, therefore, there could be no doubt of the right of the Government to impose it. But all these suggestions have, for various sufficient reasons, been rejected. The despatch of Sir J. Lawrence of 22nd. February 1867 (No. 9, Revenue Department), exhibits the embarrassment felt by the Government of

India in this condition of affairs, and its anxiety lest rates on landed property should appear to the people to be a breach of faith. It is injurious alike to the Government and to the people that this condition of things should continue. The Government has nothing to conceal, and the people have nothing to fear or lose in the re-affirmation of the same principle as regards rating which has already been affirmed as regards the income tax.

16. An important step in the practical decision of this question has been taken in the passing of the Bombay Act No. III of 1869. The special object of that Act is to raise "funds for expenditure on objects of local public utility and improvement," and for this purpose it imposes rates upon all holders of land, without making any distinction between those who received and those who did not receive a notice at the time of settlement. No exemption of any class of landholder is admitted. On the contrary, the holders of rentfree, of alienated villages, and of other permanent tenures are expressly subjected to the rates.

17. In view, therefore, of these various facts and considerations, Her Majesty's Government have now to intimate to Your Excellency the conclusion to which they have come, after a careful consideration of a controversy which has now been going on for a long course of years. This conclusion is that rating for local expenditure is to be regarded, as it has hitherto been regarded in all the provinces of the Empire, as taxation separate and distinct from the ordinary land revenue ; that the levying of such rates upon the holders of land, irrespective of the amount of their land assessment, involves no breach of faith on the part of the Government, whether as regards holders of permanent or of temporary tenures ; and that, where such rates are levied at all, they ought as far as may be possible, to be levied equally, without distinction and without exemption, upon all the holders of property accessible to the rate.

18. So far I have been dealing only with the right of the Government to levy rates, and with the argument that this right had been parted with for ever under the terms of the permanent settlement in Bengal. I now proceed to consider the further question, which ought to be kept entirely separate, namely, the expediency and policy of exercising the legitimate power of the Government in imposing such rates in Bengal. Many arguments, which are entirely irrelevant in the discussion of right, become arguments of first importance on the question of policy. (1) The proportion which the existing land tax bears to the whole resources of the people on whom we propose to place new taxes ; (2) the mode of levying them so as to reach fairly the different interests in the property to be assessed ; (3) the machinery through which the levy is to be made ;

(4) the persons to whom the expenditure is to be entrusted ; and (5) the special purposes to which rates are to be applied—all these are most important elements in the question of policy, perhaps even of justice ; they cannot therefore be too carefully considered.

19. Adverting, then, to these matters in the order in which I have now enumerated them, (1) it cannot be maintained that the people of Bengal are less able to afford such rates than the people of other provinces of India. In so far as the permanent settlement makes any difference in this case, it is a difference in their favor with respect to the other demands made upon them by the State. A large portion of the produce of the soil which, even at the most moderate assessment made elsewhere in India, would have been appropriated by the State, has been left in the hands of the various classes connected with agriculture, and has contributed to increase the general wealth and resources of the province. The case, on this point, for the Government cannot be better stated than in paragraph 36 of the Lieutenant-Governor's letter to your Government, dated April 30th. 1869 :—"Owing to the operation of the permanent settlement, Bengal contains, scattered throughout the different classes of its population, many persons who have acquired more or less of an independence from the profits of land surrendered by the Government in that measure." It is true that in the greater fruitfulness of indirect taxation and of some direct taxes in Bengal, as compared with other provinces, the Government recovers some portion of the revenue which it has sacrificed in the form of land assessment. But this very fact testifies to the greater wealth of the people, and is a conclusive proof that they can bear, at least as well as the people of other provinces, such special taxes as may be required for drainage, roads, and schools.

20. On the next point, (2) the mode of levying rates so as to reach fairly the different interests in the property to be assessed, I understand you to be fully impressed with the justice of providing that they should be levied as equally as possible, not only on all kinds of rateable property, but as equally as possible also upon the various classes who have various interests in that property. I observe that you contemplate the extension of the cess to towns and villages (paragraph 24). There is indeed no reason why the burden, either of roads or of education, should be thrown exclusively upon the agricultural classes, where other classes are equally interested in the expenditure, and have property of a kind which can be made accessible to rates. How all this can best be done is a question which must be locally decided. The knowledge and ability possessed by the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, which are eminently displayed in this correspondence, give me confidence that, when the decision of Her



Majesty's Government is announced, the measures consequent upon that decision will be directed with a careful regard to all the peculiar circumstances of the province which is under his administration.

21. As regards (3) the machinery through which the levy of rates is to be made, and (4) the persons to whom the expenditure of them is to be entrusted,—it would indeed be most desirable if the local character of these rates could be emphatically marked by committing both the assessing of them and the application of them to local bodies. If the people were farther advanced in the knowledge and appreciation of those advantages which we desire to confer upon them, there would be no need of interposing the authority of the Imperial Government in regard to such matters as the making and maintenance of roads, of schools, and of sanitary improvements. In this case we must entrust the initiative in all such things to the people themselves. But, speaking generally, it may be said that the people have as yet neither the knowledge, nor the desire, nor the organization which could alone render it possible to rely exclusively upon their voluntary action. Nevertheless, when the authority of the Supreme Government has been exerted to prescribe, as an obligation, the performance of certain duties, it may be possible, and if possible it will certainly be desirable, to carry the people along with us through their natural native leaders, both in the assessment and in the expenditure of local rates. The importance of doing so has been acknowledged in the measures adopted for regulating the management of similar rates in other provinces of India, and it would be, in the belief and hope of Her Majesty's Government an undeserved reproach to the many wealthy and intelligent native gentlemen of Bengal, to suppose that a similar course may not be successfully pursued as regards the people of that province.

22. Closely connected with the local character which may belong to rates arising out of the mode of assessment and of administration, comes (5) the local character which depends on the purposes to which they are to be exclusively applied. I have already pointed out that the purposes to which a tax may be applied cannot be considered as affecting the abstract right of the Government to extract it. But assuming this right, everything, as regards the policy, and even the justice of the rates now in question, turns upon the manner in which they are to be expended. It is, of course, essential that the Government of India should be itself satisfied that it is breaking no faith in any measure it may take; but next to the necessity of this assurance is the necessity or at least the great importance, of making the same conclusion plain to the apprehension of the people. For this purpose it is, above all

things, requisite that the benefits to be derived from the rates should be brought home to their doors,—that these benefits should be palpable, direct, immediate.

23. The making and improving of wells, tanks, and other works of irrigation affecting comparatively small areas of land, are the operations which probably best comply with these conditions. But roads are a first requisite in the improvement of every country, and, although as yet they may not be equally valued by the people, it is the duty of the Government to think for them in this matter, and the benefits they must derive will yearly become more apparent to themselves. It is due, probably, to these considerations that the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal has waived his objection to local rating in Bengal for making and maintaining roads (admitting indeed that for this purpose a cess upon landed property is necessary), although, as regards the argument founded on the permanent settlement, no clear distinction has been drawn between the right of the Government to levy rates for roads, and its right to levy rates for education. Her Majesty's Government can have no doubt that, as elsewhere, so in Bengal, the expenditure required for the education of the people ought to be mainly defrayed out of local resources. This, however, is precisely the application of rates which the present condition of the people may render them least able to appreciate. I approve, therefore of Your Excellency proceeding with great caution in this matter. The circumstances which have just compelled you, for the general purposes of the Empire, to increase the tax upon incomes, would appear to render such caution more necessary at the present moment. I do not construe the concluding words of the 6th paragraph of your despatch as suggesting that rates nominally levied for one purpose should afterwards be applied to another, because I am sure that Your Excellency must be as fully alive as Her Majesty's Government to the necessity of maintaining perfect openness in our dealings with the people of India, especially as regards imposts which are comparatively new, and which seem to be so much contested. I do not doubt, therefore, that, in the paragraph referred to, you intended only to suggest that, until the system, machinery, and incidence of local rating in Bengal has been satisfactorily established, so much only should, in the first instance, be raised as is required for roads. Her Majesty's Government approve of this precaution, and they are of opinion that any addition to the cess should be duly and separately notified to the people with a full explanation of the special purposes to which it is to be applied.

24. I have now communicated to Your Excellency the views of Her Majesty's Government on the matter which you have referred for their

decision. On the great importance of the subject in a financial point of view I have already spoken. If it were indeed true that, in the land revenue raised from the agricultural classes, the Government of India took so much from the resources of the people as to leave them unable to bear any additional burdens, then, indeed, it would be as impolitic to impose "local rates" as to impose any new imperial tax.

In this point of view, it matters nothing whether the land revenue be in the nature of a "rent" or in the nature of a "tax." So far as regards the ability of a people to bear fresh burdens, it is the same thing whether they be over-rented or over-taxed. But Her Majesty's Government are satisfied that this is not the condition of things with which we have to deal. It is notorious that the direction in which the Government of India has been proceeding in its land assessments has been the direction of making those assessments more moderate, and of eliminating altogether the element of uncertainty, of arbitrary variation, which, more than anything else, impeded the progress of agricultural improvement. The whole discussion, which is now before me, has arisen out of the fact that in Bengal the Government went so far in giving effect to this policy as to declare the land assessment to be "fixed for ever." The same principle is involved and the same policy is expressed in the long and definite periods of time for which, in other parts of India, the assessments are now equally fixed, and during which they cannot be readjusted in favor of the State. This policy is a wise one, even though the treasury should appear in the first instance to be a loser by it. The true wealth of a wise and just Government lies in the growing wealth of its people; and the fiscal system which most encourages the accumulation and enjoyment of capital in private hands must in the long run be the most profitable to the State. But there is one condition attaching to this argument, without which it ceases to be applicable to a people situated as the people of India now are. The growing wealth of the country must be made accessible to such demands as arise from time to time out of the duty and necessity of our applying to its condition the knowledge which belongs to a more advanced civilization than its own. We are spending the imperial revenues of India conscientiously for the good of its people. If there are some great improvements in their condition which we cannot afford to undertake, we must not be precluded from throwing the cost of such improvements upon those growing resources of which we heartily desire to see that people in the enjoyment, but which are due in a great measure to the Government we provide.

25. There is yet one other aspect in which the question of local rating for special purposes must be regarded,—an aspect in which it

assumes an interest and importance distinct altogether from its bearing on finance. Local rating, although it may be imposed in the first instance by imperial authority, must become a powerful means of further educating the people in an intelligent management of their own affairs. I approve entirely of the anxiety shown by the Government of Bombay in its first action in this matter, and expressed also by the Supreme Government under Sir J. Lawrence, that, as far as possible, the assent and concurrence of the rate-payer should be secured, both in the levy and in the management of the rates. I commend this wise policy to your careful consideration in communication with the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal and the subordinate branches of his administration."

On receipt of this despatch a Committee was appointed to report on the best mode of giving effect to its views. The main features of the scheme proposed were the levy of a road cess from the landed classes: the extension of the scheme as far down as the cultivating *raiyat*, the cess levied from him being in proportion to the rent of his holding, while the *zamindar* and the intermediate under-tenure holder should contribute in proportion to the profit derived by each from the land in his possession; and the collection of the cess-rate, in case of default, as an arrear of revenue. The general equitableness of these principles having been accepted, a Bill was, after Sir W. Grey had retired, introduced into Council for legalizing the levy of a cess on all immovable property, as far as possible without exemption, except in favour of such property already liable to local rating by municipal laws.

In January 1869, the Secretary of State having authorized the immediate prosecution of the Sone Canal project, which had for some time been under consideration, the chief Irrigation officers determined on the works to be undertaken and the establishment required, and with the sanction of the Government of India they were put in hand. In the same year the negotiations with the East India Irrigation and Canal Company for the transfer of their Bihar and Orissa projects were concluded, and their extensive works and establishment were taken over by Government. Act VI (B.C.) of 1869 was passed to bring the system of recovery of rates for water supplied from the canals into accordance with the altered state of circumstances.

The necessity for amending Act XI of 1859 having from time to

time been brought to the notice of Government, and the alterations and additions proposed having proved to be very numerous and extensive, it was considered desirable to enact an additional law on the subject, and to this end a Bill was introduced to make further provision for the recovery of land revenue and public demands recoverable as arrears of land revenue. It was proposed by this bill to define accurately the terms proprietor, revenue, estate, tenure, and demand, to make substantive provision for the sale of estates and tenures for arrears of revenue and other demands therein specifically enumerated and described; to place arrears of rent due to Government on the same footing as arrears of revenue; to provide further for the service of notice of sale on the defaulting proprietor; and to empower the Collector to adjudicate on claims to any lands which it was proposed to sell. The Bill was passed into law as Act VII (B. C.) of 1868.

A despatch from the Secretary of State dated the 23rd August 1867 directed the compilation of a Gazetteer of the territories under the administration of the Lieutenant-Governor. After ascertaining that all the information required for such a purpose was already available in the records of various offices, it was proposed to employ a special officer for the compilation of the work, and generally for supervising the collection and arrangement of statistical information of every description. The Government of India were not prepared to sanction such a measure, and requested that attention should be confined to the much smaller question of collecting existing materials for the preparation of a Gazetteer, in a year or 18 months. It was accordingly proposed that Mr. (the late Sir) W. W. Hunter should be appointed to do this work, in addition to the duties of an appointment in Calcutta which would give him leisure to attend to it. The proposal was sanctioned. But after further consideration Sir W. Grey thought that the work could not be carried out successfully under the plan proposed, and again asked for the appointment of a special officer on an adequate salary and with a proper establishment. Eventually the appointment of Sir W. W. Hunter with the requisite establishment to compile the Gazetteer for Bengal was sanctioned.

An earthquake, which was felt more or less in every district of

Bengal, occurred on the 10th. January 1869. The various accounts of it showed (though the scientific value of the conclusions was vitiated by the inexact nature of the data, and their insufficiency) that the earthquake was one of more than usual violence. Its effects were most severe in Cachar and Manipur: numerous large fissures were formed, from which issued water, a dark blue mixture of sand and clay, and ferrugineous matter. An earthwave was propagated from this region, or its immediate neighbourhood at least, as far as Patna and Darjeeling. From the data at command, it was calculated that the earthwave travelled at the rate of 11,256 feet a second. This rate seemed improbably high; the more so, as for upwards of 100 miles of the distance at least the wave traversed an unconsolidated alluvial formation, and one, therefore, in which its speed would be comparatively low. There did not appear to have been any peculiarity in the meteorology of the day on which the earthquake occurred.

A party of Nagas committed a series of daring raids in November and December 1867 in the Sibsagar district. Frontier raids :  
Chittagong hill  
tribes, Lushais. The motives which actuated them not being known, Sir W. Grey at first called for information as to the tribes concerned, and ordered that when this had been obtained an expedition should be despatched, with military assistance if necessary, and the passes into British territory blockaded. The Chittagong Hill Tracts were not molested in 1867-8: some misunderstanding occurred with the Kuki chief Rutton Pooea, who had hitherto been faithful to the British Government, but it blew over, and the annual meeting with the chiefs of his clan took place on Christmas Day as usual. The chiefs of the Howlong and Syloo tribes entered into engagements to commit no more raids on British subjects. The police in the Hill Tracts was strengthened and the Sungoo subdivision established. The border tribes raided again in 1869 and the Howlongs were believed to be implicated, in spite of their solemn oaths to abstain from all hostilities. The requirements of the case not justifying an organised expedition, their punishment was postponed. The district head-quarters were transferred from Chundergonna to Rangamatia.

The Eastern frontier, bordering on the Sylhet and Cachar districts, had for some years since 1862 been singularly free from the attacks

of the savage Lushai and Kuki tribes inhabiting the hills and jungles to the South of the Hylakandi valley, a wild and difficult tract of country, lying principally between the Dalesari and Sonai rivers. Suddenly in December 1868 the Lushais under Sukpoilal raided into the Tippera Raja's territory and Sylhet. The local police force being inadequate, native infantry and police reinforcements were sent from Cachar to aid them. Cachar tea-gardens were then attacked by Lushais under Vompilal. An expedition was organised to follow up the marauders to their villages. Two columns of troops, native infantry and Eurasian artillery, under General Nuttall and Mr. Baker, Deputy Inspector General of Police, were moved up along the course of the rivers Dalesari and Sonai to attack the villages of the chiefs above-mentioned. One column and a detachment were compelled by the incessant rain and want of supplies to return: the other column obtained the submission of Vompilal's villages, the chief himself having recently died.

The military expeditions undertaken against the Lushais late in the cold weather of 1868-69 having failed in their principal objects, viz. the punishment of the tribes concerned in the outrages on British and Manipuri subjects, and the rescue of the captives taken, Sir W. Grey proposed the despatch of a fresh expedition, carefully organized, into the Lushai country early in the cold weather of 1869-70. The Government of India, however, objected to any renewal of active military operations against the Lushais, having regard to the jungly and wild nature of the country, to the unfavorable climate which rendered active operations impossible, except for a short period of the year: to the difficulty of inflicting a retribution sufficient to produce a lasting effect on savages possessed of little or no property, and to the time that had elapsed since their outrages. They were, moreover, averse on principle to moving bodies of troops and armed police with a view to punish such frontier outrages by reprisals, or to admit that it was imperative to chastise the offenders by following them up into their own fastnesses and hills. Their policy with regard to the wild tribes was to place them under a carefully selected and well qualified officer, in charge of any difficult tract of country which the ordinary authorities were unable to superintend, who should have the entire control of our relations with the tribes, in subordination to the Commis-

sioner. While the measures to be adopted for giving effect to their policy were under consideration, messengers from some of the Lushai chiefs arrived in Cachar to confer with\* Mr. J. W. Edgar, c. s. Deputy Commissioner, with the object of bringing about a better understanding. It was arranged that Sir J. Edgar should return with the messengers to the Lushai country, attended by a small guard, and seek a personal interview with the principal chiefs, and that he should be accompanied by Major Macdonald, Superintendent of Surveys, with a view to defining the southern boundary of the Cachar District and to obtaining such topographical knowledge of the country beyond as opportunity offered. Sir J. Edgar started on this expedition on 20th December 1869 and returned after nearly 3 months. The most southern part reached by him was Bepari Bazar, a place not far from the home of Sookpoilal, who was concerned in the raids committed in December 1868 and was one of the most powerful of the Lushai Chiefs. At this place Sir J. Edgar was met by Sookpoilal. The instructions to Sir J. Edgar strictly enjoined him to do nothing likely to entail risk of a collision with the tribes. No demand, therefore, was made for reparation or satisfaction for past offences, but that chief was induced to listen to reasonable proposals in respect of our future relations and seemed satisfied with the interview and really anxious to cultivate a better understanding. Sir J. Edgar had interviews with other chiefs, of the good effect of which he was sanguine, and it seemed probable that some progress had been made towards the improvement of our relations with the Lushais. At any rate, a great deal of very useful information was acquired regarding the chiefs and the country. Parts of the country previously supposed to be almost impassable were found to contain wide, well-beaten tracts, for the most part traversable on horseback, and extending almost to the boundary of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, as shewn in the maps.

In concurrence with Sir J. Edgar's recommendations, the following measures were sanctioned for the improvement of our relations with the Lushais. As he was of opinion that the proposed location of a British officer among the Lushais would be most distasteful to the tribes, excite their jealousy and destroy their confidence in our

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\*Afterwards Sir John Ware Edgar, K. C. I. E., C. S.



good intentions, he proposed that the Deputy Commissioner of Cachar or one of his subordinates should annually visit the Lushai country, and that his duty should be to see as many of the chiefs separately as possible, hear grievances, use his influence for the adjustment of quarrels, and give small presents to the chiefs, specially rewarding those who had behaved particularly well. To give effect to this policy, it was decided that Sir J. Edgar himself should revisit the Lushais during the cold weather of 1870-71. One of the principal objects of his visit would be to settle with Sookpoilal, or some of his people, a boundary from the borders of Manipur to Hill Tippera, where ordinary British Civil jurisdiction should cease; the tribes thus making themselves responsible for the peace of the districts beyond it. It was believed that there would be no difficulty in arranging this, as a line had already been roughly indicated which Sookpoilal was willing to accept. Other measures were sanctioned in detail for the same purpose of improving relations with the chiefs. In the cold weather of 1870-71 several raids were committed by the Kukis, or Lushais, on a more extensively organized scale, and of a far more determined character, than any of their previous incursions: the audacity of the raiders in many cases was quite new to our experience, showing that they possessed fighting qualities not altogether to be despised, and that they had other tactics to depend on than those of night surprises and rapid flights, which had been supposed to be their only mode of aggression. Some 200 of either the Howlong or the Shindu tribe raided on the 31st. December on the Chittagong Hill Tracts frontier, but failed to do much injury. Several raids occurred in quick succession late in January in the Hylakandi subdivision of Cachar. A tea garden was destroyed, the resident planter, Mr. Winchester, was killed and his little girl carried off. Several other tea gardens and coolie lines were attacked and more or less injured, though gallantly defended by the planters. Even the troops and police sent to the relief of the tea gardens were attacked. On the Sylhet frontier and in Hill Tippera villages were similarly fired on, and some of them burnt; skirmishes ensued between the police guards and the raiders, with uncertain results. At this time Sir J. Edgar was in the heart of Sookpoilal's country on the Dalesari and was apparently treated with great friendliness by Sookpoilal: he luckily escaped encountering the raiders. The first

object of Government was to obtain accurate evidence of the identity of the tribes implicated in these outrages; the evidence led to the conclusion that the sons of Vonolel, and certain Howlong and Syloo Chiefs acting in concert committed the raids in Cachar. Sookpoilal's people were suspected of the attacks on the Sylhet side, but the suspicion was not pressed against him. Government then seriously took up the question of its future policy towards these frontier tribes, not only with a view to punish them and recover British subjects from captivity, but to prevent effectually a repetition of the incursions. Sir W. Grey had previously recommended a fresh military expedition, but had been overruled, and it was in accordance with the Government of India's policy that Sir J. Edgar was visiting Sookpoilal's country, as above mentioned, when the disturbances broke out which obliged him to return his steps, and which Sookpoilal, though professing friendship and bestowing every attention on Sir J. Edgar, was powerless to prevent, if he did not actually participate in them.

On the Chittagong side the Commissioner, Lord Ulick Browne, pointed out that the circumstances of Cachar and the Chittagong Hill Tracts were entirely different, and that for 10 years there had been a European officer in the heart of the hill district, in constant intercourse with Rutton Pooea, the Syloos and Howlongs. He recommended the establishment of a strong advanced post to keep the Howlongs under check, and that the Arracan authorities should deal with the Shindus and Kumis who had committed half the raids. Sir W. Grey supported this policy.

The conclusion arrived at was that the occurrence of the raids, which took place in spite of the efforts made by the frontier officers, proved that the policy of conciliation alone was utterly powerless and insufficient to protect our frontier from the tribes beyond, whose cupidity was excited, even if those nearest to us might thereby become well affected.

The policy unanimously recommended by the local officers was that raids should be met by condign punishment, in the shape of a military occupation of the raiders' villages during as long a period as possible, the seizure of their crops and stored grain, and the forced submission of their chiefs; after that, by the steady endeavour of the frontier officers to influence them and promote trade; and

finally, by a system of frontier posts, combined with a line of road running north and south from the Cachar frontier to that of Chittagong.

The Commander-in-Chief, Lord Napier of Magdala, who inspected the Cachar frontier, was in accord with those of the local officers who urged the necessity of an expedition, and was of opinion that it should consist of 2 columns, which should start as early as possible in the ensuing cold weather, one from Cachar on the North, the other from Chittagong on the South; and then, effecting a junction, occupy the villages of the chiefs known to be implicated and open out a road of communication between the 2 frontiers. Sir George Campbell, in May 1871, was in favor of military exploration of the country rather than a measure of pure retaliation. Certain points, he thought, should be advanced to in order to find and secure a convenient location for troops to be posted in the centre of the Lushai country, and to establish the means of maintaining communication with them. If the people submitted, he thought we should treat with them and demand surrender of our native subjects, and, if a fair amount of success were attained in that way, we should enter into friendly relations with them; but if they resisted, we should use force and compel respect. Eventually it was resolved to send an expedition to invade the Lushai country by columns both from Chittagong and Cachar.

The Government of India invited Sir W. Grey's opinion on a Minute written by Sir W. Muir in February 1868, in which he suggested the appointment of a Commission for the purpose of inquiry into the best mode of raising an opium revenue in India. The questions which Sir W. Muir desired to refer to a Commission embraced 2 distinct subjects, viz: (1) the principle to be followed in fixing the rate of pass duty on opium in Western India, and (2) the abolition of the manufacture of opium in Bengal by Government, and the substitution of a system of export duties on opium freely grown.

The opinion expressed by Sir W. Grey was to the effect that all the information which a Commission could obtain was already available to Government, which rendered the appointment of a Commission unnecessary, the subject not being one on which special information was possessed by any person whose opinion could be obtained only

through the medium of a Commission. It was urged that all that remained to be done on the point was for Government to lay down the principle on which the pass duty on Malwa opium was to be fixed; and it appeared to Sir W. Grey that the only guide was the price which that opium commanded in the China market. A careful estimate having been made of the average price obtaining in China, a deduction would have to be made of the cost of production, transit, and shipment, and a fair trading profit, the balance left after such deduction forming the basis for the calculation of the duty, a wide margin being reserved for the fluctuations of trade. Calculated on this basis, the existing duty of Rs. 600 per chest appeared to be the highest that could be levied.

As to the substitution in Bengal of a system of so-called free cultivation, with a very heavy export duty, for the existing system of monopoly and direct manufacture by Government, Sir W. Grey remarked that this question had been before fully considered and that the arguments then advanced in favor of the existing system had never been refuted, or considered to be mistaken, unsound, or inconclusive. On the other hand, the system proposed to be substituted for it appeared to Sir W. Grey, under the most favourable circumstances, likely to result in great financial loss, the extreme risk of which at least was admitted even by those who advocated its introduction, and this without altering the moral aspect of the question, or even affecting to withdraw any amount of the drug sent to China from that market. Under these circumstances, he was unable to advocate any change of system or the necessity of instituting any inquiry of the nature proposed.

In consequence of financial difficulties, it was necessary, under orders received from the Government of India in

Reductions in the  
police.

October 1869 to make considerable reductions in the police of Bengal. Sir W. Grey, in a Minute dated the 13th November, remonstrated strongly but temperately against the proposed reductions as necessitating the alteration of the whole system of police administration matured under the experience of the past 8 years. The Government of India had asked for a saving of Rs. 3,59,560, and Sir W. Grey expressed his willingness to reduce the annual charge for police in Bengal to 45 lakhs, if allowed to arrange for the reduction in the whole force, i. e. in the lower ranks as well

as in the gazetted appointments. This was sanctioned, in the expectation that the saving would amount to Rs. 5,46,091. The appointments of 3 out of the 5 Deputy Inspectors-General, and 27 out of the 67 Assistant Superintendents, were abolished, and large reductions were made in the lower grades of the force. The grade of head constable was reduced by 327, and that of constables by 4,505 men. The reductions in the lower grades were effected chiefly by withdrawing outposts where their retention was not an absolute necessity, and by diminishing the strength of the reserve in each district.

In November 1868 Government came to the conclusion that the best means of finally accomplishing the Census operations would be to make partial and tentative enumerations where the best opportunity afforded. Preliminary measures for the Census of 1871. The Commissioners of Divisions were accordingly directed to set on foot such partial enumerations where facilities existed for carrying them out. The object of the tentative measures was to bring to light the difficulties to be met, and suggest the methods best adapted to the varying circumstances of the country. The Registrar General of Assurances was appointed to be the officer for supervising the Census operations.

He submitted a careful and elaborate report on the partial enumerations which had been made throughout every Division. Sir W. Grey came to the conclusion that no further tentative enumeration was desirable. There were grounds for an opposite conclusion from the consideration that in some districts the objects of the Census were still misunderstood, and that in many instances, especially in distant districts, the people not only abstained from co-operation, but wilfully obstructed the work. Notwithstanding this, Sir W. Grey was of opinion that it was advisable to abstain from any further experimental measures in anticipation of the general Census, and that much more would be gained by using the time before January 1871 to organise the arrangements for the regular Census. It was held that no trustworthy Census of the population of Bengal could possibly be effected without a very large outlay. In the tentative proceedings, every form of agency was employed: *zamindars*, police, *patwaris*, *mandals*, municipal officers and volunteers; and the almost unanimous opinion of the authorities was, that whatever assistance

might be obtained from any particular local machinery in any district, it could only be as a supplement to an organized *paid* establishment for the final Census.

The Registrar-General also recommended the employment entirely of a trained agency paid by the Government. The scheme was to entail the employment of 4,000 supervisors and 80,000 enumerators at a cost of between 8 and 10 *lakhs* of rupees. It was, however, feared that any proposition for the work, which was framed upon a basis so costly, could not be favourably entertained, especially if the outlay were to be incurred altogether in one season and was not spread over 2 or more years. On the other hand, the difficulties of the case, in the absence of an adequate provision for the proper completion of the work, were so great that alternative schemes were put forward.

According to the first, it was suggested that it was not an essential condition of success that the Census should be taken on one and the same day throughout the country, but that it would be better to avoid the great outlay which a simultaneous enumeration of Bengal must entail, and, by making the Census of different Divisions at different times, to spread the expenditure over a larger period.

The second plan also proceeded upon the supposition that the Census of the whole country should not be taken on one and the same day but contemplated merely an approximately accurate record of the people, to be obtained by a regular and careful survey of the population of the country. For this it was proposed that a Deputy Collector specially selected for his qualifications should be appointed to each Commissioner's Division, with a staff of 20 enumerators on Rs. 30 each, or thrice that number if he could work them. It was proposed that each district should be divided into circuits, and the circuits into sub-circuits, and, after these preliminary distributions of the work had been carefully laid down, each Deputy Collector should send his establishment through each district, making a careful record of the people,—males, females, children,—&c. It was circulated that in this manner the whole work would be done in 18 months, at a cost roughly estimated not to exceed Rs. 1,32,000 *per annum*.

In the meanwhile, the Commissioners of Divisions were instructed to secure accurate information as to the number of villages in each *thana* of every sub-division, the unpaid agency available for enumera-

tion in each, and the salaried agency required for supervision in every sub-division, with as careful an estimate as possible of the cost of the whole arrangements.

The Census was to be completed in the cold weather of 1870-71, and expected to cost about 3 *lakhs*. It was subsequently postponed for a year on financial considerations.

By Act VII (B.C.) of 1869 the trial of rent suits between landlord and tenant was transferred from the Collector's revenue court to the ordinary civil tribunals, and the distinctions between the procedure in such suits and that in other cases were for the most part abolished: at the same time, to render it as far as possible a complete code of the law of landlord and tenant, the substantive provisions of Act X of 1859 were re-enacted. The Act was introduced into 33 districts by notification: the number of munsifs was to be increased by 28, and the cost to be met by corresponding reductions in the number of Deputy Collectors. This change was one of much importance, in this respect, that it withdrew from the cognizance of revenue officers a class of work with which it was very desirable that they should be acquainted.

His Royal Highness the Duke of Edinburgh, K. G. K. T., visited Calcutta in H. M. S. *Galatea* from the 22nd December 1869 to the 7th January 1870. He landed at Prinsep's *ghat* and drove to Government House, where he was the guest of the Viceroy, the Earl of Mayo. Among the principal events of His Royal Highness's visit were—a State performance at the Italian opera, addresses from the Municipality and residents of Calcutta, the University, and the Bengal Chamber of Commerce, a Levee and a Drawing-Room, Public illuminations and fireworks, interchange of visits with the Native Chiefs, a review and field day of the troops, a Ball at Belvedere, a Native entertainment at the Seven Tanks, a State concert, the Investiture of His Royal Highness as Extra Knight Grand Commander of the Star of India, a Fancy Ball at Government House, a Ball given by Sir Richard Temple, a Reception at Belvedere, a Garden party at Government House, a Ball on the *Galatea*, visits to Institutions &c., &c.

His Royal Highness left Calcutta by special train from Howrah on the 7th January for a tour in the Upper Provinces. His suite consisted of Major-General Sir N. B. Chamberlain, K. C. B., Lord

Transfer of rent  
suits to the Civil  
Courts.

Visit of H. R. H.  
the Duke of Edin-  
burgh.

Charles Beresford, R. N., Dr. (Sir Joseph) Fayrer, c.s.i., Colonel (Sir Dighton) Probyn, c. B., v. c. and others.

Further legislation had for some time been in contemplation to consolidate and amend the law in regard to the emigration of labourers to the tea districts of Assam, Cachar, and Sylhet. The Local Legislature had passed a Bill in 1867 which the Governor-General vetoed. A new Act, II (B. C.) of 1870, repealed the existing Acts of 1863 and 1865 and re-enacted their material provisions in an amended form. It authorized special agents, deputed by planters, to engage coolies to go to the tea districts in groups not exceeding 20, without being subject to all the stringent provisions respecting the transport of labourers forwarded by contractors under the former Acts. It permitted the disembarkation of labourers at such places as might be most convenient. It empowered the Lieutenant-Governor to make rules for the care of labourers during their river transit, and made the person in charge of them responsible for the due observance of such rules. It enabled the Lieutenant-Governor to prohibit the emigration of labourers to the eastern districts. It considerably modified the former provisions respecting the care and treatment of labourers when employed. It provided for the discharge of a labourer after repeated imprisonment for desertion, and in other respects much altered the former Acts which it superseded. The maximum contract term remained 3 years.

The principal change in the law was the bringing under the sanitary provisions of the Act all time-expired labourers who might enter into fresh local contracts. The Protectors of labourers in the districts of Assam were appointed to be Inspectors of labourers under this Act; and the officers in charge of certain sub-divisions in Assam to be Assistant Inspectors of labourers within their respective sub-divisions. The fees to be levied under the Act on account of licenses granted to contractors, and recruiters' licenses, remained as under the old law. The annual fee to be paid by employers for each labourer was fixed at Re. 1 per labourer, but this fee was not to be levied on account of time-expired labourers. Revised rules and returns embodying all the amendments proposed in the Act were passed: and a form of contract was settled, so worded that labourers might clearly understand the agreements they



entered into with employers. The cost of all protective establishments was to be met from the general revenues.

Apart from legislation, communication with Assam was facilitated by the opening of the extension of the Eastern Bengal Railway over the Gorai bridge to Goalundo by Lord Mayo on the 1st January 1871, which increased the length of the line to 156 miles from Calcutta.

In 1869-70, Sir W. Grey made certain proposals for the gradation of appointments in the Education Department, on which the Government of India in a Resolution dated the 9th September 1869 recorded their views on the subject of expenditure on higher education in Bengal. They commented on the heavy charge so long borne "by the State for the instruction of the natives of the Lower Provinces in the English language, and through the medium of that language in the higher branches of a liberal education," and expressed an opinion that the time had fully come when the State should be relieved of some portion of that charge. The budget figures, shewing the gross expenditure for 8 years as varying from £111,957 in 1861-62 to £229,935 in 1868-69, were set out with the remark that these figures showed the entire expenditure in Bengal on education, science and art, yet the "bulk of it is for high English education." The Government of Bengal was accordingly requested to consider "whether the fees levied at all Government Schools and Colleges in Bengal should not be so increased as substantially to reduce the heavy charge which burdens the State on account of high English education in Bengal,"—this charge to be accompanied by a modification of the grant-in-aid rules, enforcing "the levy of such a rate of fees in all aided schools which give a high English education as shall secure the Government schools against an unfair competition from such institutions." The Government of India considered that there was no reason to doubt that eventually English education in Bengal would be prosecuted with increased vigour, so as not only to cause no charge to the imperial revenue, "but even so as to provide some means for helping forward vernacular education."

The conviction expressed by the Government of India that the bulk of the expenditure set out in figures was for "high English education" appeared to Sir W. Grey to be so devoid of foundation,

and so calculated to produce impressions injurious to the people of Bengal, especially contrasted as the expenditure had been with the alleged small receipts for education, that he thought it his duty to beg the further attention of the Government of India to the subject. The statement, as it concerned the year 1868-69, for example, was that while the bulk of £229,935 had been spent on "high English education," only £36,583 had been contributed from private sources for education of all kinds; whereas it was shown by the Director of Public Instruction that the sum spent by the State on high English education was £54,000 only, and that the same amount was contributed from private sources towards the same class of education. This was fully explained to the Government of India, and the following remarks were added:—

"The Lieutenant-Governor has long seen with concern that an erroneous impression is entertained by the Governor-General in Council as to the expenditure on education under the Bengal Government, but, until he read the Resolution of September, he was not at all aware how very far wrong that impression is, and how injurious to the people of Bengal. The Lieutenant-Governor is sure that the Governor-General in Council would not have permitted it to be said that the "burden" on account of the "high English education of the natives of Bengal" had "for some time past weighed heavily on the finances" if he had been informed of the true state of the case, and His Honor earnestly begs, if the present communication is not accepted as showing correctly how the case really stands, that the Governor-General in Council will cause a special inquiry to be made by an officer selected by himself before any measures are adopted which will tend directly or indirectly to take away from the people of these provinces the opportunities of obtaining a good education, of which they have been so keen to avail themselves, and which have produced results at once elevating to the people and most advantageous to the general administration.

"The Lieutenant-Governor has before pointed out, but it seems necessary to repeat it, that in no other part of India are school and college fees so high as they are in Bengal. He agrees with the Director of Public Instruction in admitting that they may be still further increased, but it should be done gradually, and with a reasonable consideration to the means, not of the very few wealthy men, but of the large middle class which is not wealthy; and he feels that, whether in the interests of the people or for the credit of the Government, he cannot too strongly urge the inexpediency of a sudden change of policy, which will everywhere

have the effect of closing the schools and colleges of these provinces against a large number of those who now take advantage of them and must in many places result in the entire destruction of the institutions themselves."

The Government of India admitted so far a correction of its figures as to concede that £92,492 were spent on English education in 1868-69, and £59,234 on vernacular education; and suggested that the difference between these figures and those of the Government of Bengal arose probably from the fact that the Local Government had made a distinction between *high* and *other* English education. Such a distinction, however, the Government of India remarked, could not be made "upon any satisfactory basis," adding that, "for the purpose with which the Government of India recorded the Resolution of September 1869, English education must be classed as high."

The Government of India further explained the object of the Resolution as follows:—

"The principle which the Government of India had in mind in the Resolution of September applies alike to all English education, viz, this, that the motives which induce the people to seek it are *prima facie* sufficient for its rapid development, without any contribution from the imperial finances. It is notorious that the same assertion can by no means be made in regard to vernacular education. It may, it is believed, truly be said, in respect even to the most intellectually advanced provinces of India, such as Bengal, that the desire for vernacular education, or, as might distinctively be said, for education in order to develop the intellectual powers, apart from the immediate purpose of securing material advantages, is so low as perhaps hardly to exist. It is undeniable that in this form education needs, and ought to receive, much artificial stimulus and encouragement".

A further communication was then addressed to the Government of India, respectfully urging the ill effect certain to be produced by the last Resolution on the people of Bengal in strengthening the belief, which had for some time past been gaining ground, that the Government of India was opposed to the further spread of English education among them. And in stating his views on this point, Sir W. Grey expressed a hope that, if the general belief regarding the intentions of the Government of India upon this important question was wrong, and without foundation, some step would be taken to dispel the apprehension and the irritation which prevailed among the native community throughout Bengal.

In 1869-70 cattle-disease raged with great virulence in many districts in Bengal. In the Diamond Harbour Sub-division, in the 24-*Parganas*, and in Jessore, this epizootic form of disease was particularly severe. A Veterinary Surgeon was deputed to these districts and subsequently to Assam, where the ravages of the disease were most fatal, (177,659 animals perished). Chota Nagpur, the Sonthal *Parganas* and other districts also suffered. Simple instructions for the treatment of the disease were drawn up and widely circulated, but almost insuperable difficulty was experienced in getting the people to allow the remedies to be used and to understand the importance of segregation. Sir W. Grey urged upon the Government of India the necessity of creating a skilled agency for dealing with these epizootic forms of disease, and of special legislation. The Government of India appointed a special Commission of Inquiry into Cattle Plague, with instructions to visit the places where the disease prevailed, and report fully the nature of the diseases and the preventive and curative measures required, the contagious character of these murrains and their relations to rinderpest.

The filtered water-supply works of Calcutta, from water taken in from the Hooghly at Palta 16 miles above Calcutta, were actually commenced in January 1867 and completed and taken over from the contractors in 1870: and bye laws were issued in March to regulate the use of the water. The works were so efficient that there has been no interruption to the regular daily supply of water throughout the whole town of Calcutta. The aggregate cost amounted to above 65 *lakhs* of rupees. A 5 per cent water-rate was imposed on the assessed rental of all property,  $\frac{2}{4}$  of it to be paid by the tenants and  $\frac{1}{4}$  by the owners of property. Though at one time some difficulty was anticipated from the reluctance of the Hindus to drink water, this was entirely overcome by a decision (in favour of drinking the water) by the religious authorities; powerfully aided, no doubt, by the visible and tangible advantages of pure and wholesome water conducted all over the city, in place of the very foul and unwholesome water which alone was obtainable in many quarters. The improvement effected in the health and comfort of the town was at once remarked, and could be traced in the mortuary statistics and hospital returns all over the city. In 1872

Calcutta water-supply and drainage works.

measures were taken for increasing the daily water-supply of the town by 3,000,000 gallons. The Calcutta drainage works, consisting of a system of underground sewers, over 26 miles in length, had been in progress for some years and at about this time were in full operation in the southern portion of the town, and it was contemplated to extend them gradually as funds were available, to the northern portion. A permanent pumping station was located at Palmer's Bridge to discharge the contents of the sewers through the outfall works to the Salt-water Lakes. The works had cost upwards of half a million sterling. Arrangements were also completed for putting a stop to the long-existing nuisance of discharging the sewage of the town into the river Hooghly. During 1872 the main drainage scheme was extended to the northern division of Calcutta, and eventually completed.

In 1868 the question of bridging the Hooghly was revived and a number of opinions were elicited from different persons and firms interested. Sir W. Grey was in favour of a road-bridge at Armenian *ghat*, if by engineering appliances efficient protection could be given to the structure, as also of a temporary floating bridge as a tentative measure. He objected to the idea of moving the East Indian Railway terminus from Howrah to Calcutta. The Government of India shared the objection and apparently preferred a bridge higher up the river, with a goods station at Chitpur and a connecting line to Sealdah, which should be considered as the terminus for passengers. They recommended these proposals to the Secretary of State, suggesting as an alternative the construction of a railway bridge at or near Chakdaha on the Hooghly, to join the E. B. S. Railway with the East Indian near Pandua. They promised to give their best attention to the proposal for a floating road-bridge. A design for the latter, to be placed at Armenian *ghat*, was soon submitted by a syndicate of promoters. Sir W. Grey and the Government of India agreed that Government should itself construct the bridge and that its management would best be handed over to a Trust. Mr. (Sir) Bradford Leslie, Engineer of the Eastern Bengal Railway, was selected to carry out the project.

Though the regular police had been organised for some years, no steps had hitherto been taken successfully to put the "village watch" on a modern legal footing. . A

Proposed bridge of the Hooghly.

The village-watch.

Bill for its reorganisation had in 1859 not advanced beyond a second reading. In 1869 a Committee was appointed to frame a Bill to reform the village police on the principle of affirming their municipal character and providing for the proper payment of their wages. In due course the Chaukidari Act VI (B.C.) of 1870 was passed with the object of effecting this reform. It was intended for purely rural villages. It vested the management of a village (of more than 60 houses) or group of villages in a Committee, or *panchayat*, to be selected by the Magistrate. These *panchayats* had the power of appointing watchmen and assessing all owners and occupiers of houses in order to provide for the payment of their salaries, over whom they were to exercise a general control. The assessment was to be made according to the circumstances and the property to be protected, of the persons liable to the tax, the maximum rate being fixed at one rupee *per mensem*. The law further provided that, wherever the Act was extended, the lands hitherto appropriated to the maintenance of the village *chaukidars* should be made over to the landholders on payment in perpetuity of  $\frac{1}{2}$  the present annual value. The Act was introduced experimentally in a few places only, and difficulties were experienced in working it in some districts. Sir G. Campbell did not extend it in the western districts where service lands prevailed, because he objected to the expropriation of these lands. Sir R. Temple largely extended the operation of the Act.

The "decentralisation of the finances" effected by Lord Mayo's Government in the Resolution of 14th December 1870 had been for some time suggested, but was then first adopted as a policy. Its object was to enlarge the powers and responsibility of the Local Governments in respect to the public expenditure in some of the civil departments. Briefly, the principle of the measure was that the Government of India made over to the Local Governments certain grants of money and certain receipts on certain conditions, so that at the outset the income and expenditure thus transferred should nearly balance, and allowed the Local Governments to administer those departments without further financial control. The policy was developed largely under Lord Lytton, and the reasons on which it was based and the shape it first took may be best seen in the following extracts from the Resolution above mentioned :—

Decentralisation  
of the finances.

"Under the present system, these Governments have little liberty and but few motives for economy in their expenditure ; it lies with the Government of India to control the growth of charges to meet which it has to raise the revenue. The Local Governments are deeply interested in the welfare of the people confided to their care ; and, not knowing the requirements of other parts of the country or of the Empire as a whole, they are liable, in their anxiety for administrative progress, to allow too little weight to fiscal considerations. On the other hand, the Supreme Government, as responsible for the general financial safety, is obliged to reject many demands in themselves deserving of all encouragement, and is not always able to distribute satisfactorily the resources actually available.

"Thus it happens that the Supreme and Local Governments regard from different points of view measures involving expenditure ; and, the division of responsibility being ill-defined, there occur conflicts of opinion injurious to the public service. In order to avoid these conflicts, it is expedient that, as far as possible, the obligation to find the funds necessary for administrative improvements should rest upon the authority whose immediate duty it is to devise such measures. This is the more important, because existing Imperial resources will not suffice for the growing wants of the country.

... ..  
 "The Supreme Government is not in a position to understand fully local requirements, nor has it the knowledge necessary for the successful development of local resources.

... ..  
 "These principles are now generally recognised, and important steps have been taken to develop provincial resources.

... ..  
 "It would have been satisfactory had His Excellency in Council been able to propose the enlargement of the power and responsibility of the Local Governments without charging upon local resources any part of the existing Imperial expenditure. This cannot be done ; but it has been determined to make as small a demand upon these resources as possible. At the same time it should be remembered that the relief of the Imperial finances has been a principal object in the discussion of such measures on former occasions.

"The Government of India is accordingly pleased to make over to the Governments, under certain conditions to be presently set forth, the following departments of the administration in which they may be supposed to take special interest ; and to grant permanently from the Imperial revenue for these services the sum of £4,688,711, being less by

£330,801 only than the assignments made for the same services in 1870-71 :—Jails, Registration, Police, Education, Medical Services (except Medical Establishments), Printing, Roads, Miscellaneous, Public Improvements, Civil Buildings.

... ..  
 “The actual permanent Imperial assignments for “Provincial Service” will be then as follows : all receipts heretofore credited in connection with these Services being given up to the Provinces in which they accrue :—

...	...	...	...	...	...
Bengal	...	...	...	...	£1,168,592
...	...	...	...	...	...

“These assignments will not be classified in the Financial statement and in the Imperial estimates and accounts, but will appear under a single new head, “Provincial Services.”

... ..  
 “Unless some fiscal misfortune, such as a heavy loss in the Opium revenue, or national disaster such as war or severe famine, occurs, the Governor-General in Council will maintain for the future the assignments for “Provincial Services” at the amounts now fixed. They will not in any case be reduced without previous consultation with the Governments.

“For the coming year the Provincial Service estimates should be immediately prepared upon the basis of these assignments, which may be distributed at the discretion of the Government among the several departments for which they will now be responsible. Any portion of the assignment made to any Province that may be unspent at the end of the year will not lapse to the Imperial revenue but will remain at the disposal of the Local Government. The estimates and accounts of these Governments should therefore open and close with balances brought and carried forward.

... ..  
 “Each Local Government will publish its own yearly estimates and accounts in the local Gazette, together with a financial exposition (which should where possible be made before the Local Legislative Council) analogous to that annually made in the Legislative Council of the Governor-General.

... ..  
 “The financial control which is thus entrusted to the Local Governments is to be exercised subject to certain conditions (as to creation of appointments and changes involving expenditure).

“The Governor-General in Council is fully aware that this Resolution will effect a wide change in Indian administration. It has been adopted



after long and careful consideration, in the hope that it will be received by the Governments in the spirit in which it is promulgated. The Governor-General in Council believes that it will produce greater care and economy, that it will impart an element of certainty into the fiscal system which has hitherto been absent, and that it will lead to more harmony in action and feeling between the Supreme and the Provincial Governments than has hitherto prevailed. But beyond all this, there is a greater and wider object in view. Local interest, supervision and care are necessary to success in the management of funds devoted to Education, Sanitation, Medical charity and Local Public Works. The operation of this Resolution in its full meaning and integrity will afford opportunities for the development of Self-Government, for strengthening municipal institutions and for the association of natives and Europeans to a greater extent than heretofore, in the administration of affairs. ...

"Subject to these general restrictions, the Governments will henceforth enjoy full liberty in the expenditure of the funds appropriated to "Provincial Services." It must, however, be understood that in thus divesting himself of control the Governor-General in Council divests himself also to a large extent of his former responsibility. If responsibility for expenditure is retained, control cannot be renounced."

The Secretary of State in a despatch of the 23rd February 1871 approved of the principles laid down by the Government of India with the view of enlarging the powers of the several Governments. Sir Henry S. Maine has declared this to be "much the most successful administrative reform which has taken place in India in his time": and Sir John Strachey agreed\* with him "that no more important and successful reforms have been made in Indian administration since the transfer of the Government to the Crown." Sir W. W. Hunter stated that the word "decentralisation" was hateful to Lord Mayo, who objected to it being uttered either in the Council or even in casual conversation by those about him. He appears to have regarded the measure as, financially, the transfer of certain services to the Local Governments, with corresponding grants for the expenditure. The word in question has however the sanction of very high authority and of common usage. "The permanent merit" of Lord Mayo's reform, wrote Sir W. W. Hunter, "consists in the fact that he enlarged the responsibilities of the local administrations and gave them a new incentive to economy, without diminishing the

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\* India, Edition 1894, p. 94.

authority of the Central Government, or loosening the unity of the British Power in India."

In the early part of 1871 a curious theft case occurred at Belvedere, and may be reproduced here from the work *Curious theft case at Belvedere.* *Life in the Mofussil*, by G. Graham (B. C. S. 1860-72) who was Magistrate of the 24-Parganas at the time. Mr. Graham wrote as follows :—

"At Belvedere, the residence of the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, were staying a Mr. and Mrs. Phillips (wrong names are purposely given throughout) connections of his. One evening, Mrs. Phillips missed a diamond ring, and information in due course was given to the police. As the loss had occurred in the house of the Lieutenant-Governor, a great stir was made, and it was suggested that a detective constable should enter Phillips' service as a *khidmatgar*, and see what could be discovered. Suspicion had fallen upon the *ayah*; and the constable in disguise made love to her, in order to get her confidence.

At length he made a statement to his chief, the Commissioner of police, who had the *ayah* arrested, and the following was the case for the prosecution. The constable alleged that he had succeeded in gaining the *ayah*'s confidence, and she had admitted to him that she had stolen the ring. She wished to sell it; but was afraid. However, she had picked out one of the diamonds, and, if he could dispose of this for her successfully, she would give him another for the same purpose. She had told him this, and given him the diamond under a tree on the *maidan* of Calcutta, where she had appointed a rendezvous.

There were witnesses to prove that the constable and the *ayah* had been seen together under this tree at the time stated. The diamond was produced, and Mr. and Mrs. Phillips both testified that to the best of their belief it was one of those from the missing ring. The defence was merely a denial, and the evidence for the prosecution remained unimpeached. The case was tried before the Deputy Magistrate of Alipore, who convicted the *ayah* and sentenced her to 18 months' imprisonment. She appealed to Bramstone, who upheld the conviction and sentence. The diamond was made over to the plaintiffs.

Shortly after this, Phillips and his wife were moved to Serampore of which subdivision he was to have charge, and, on unpacking their

goods, the missing ring was found jammed in an inkstand, with all the diamonds *intact*. They sent the ring down to me; and I recommended that the *ayah* should be pardoned. Bramstone held out stoutly that the conviction was legal, and that the woman's relatives might have had another diamond put into the ring, and the latter placed where it was sure to be found.

Mrs. Phillips now recollected that, on the evening of the loss, the Lieutenant-Governor's little daughter had been playing about her room, and might have put her ring into the inkstand. But she could not recollect whether the inkstand had been unpacked there or not, so this was not much use. I carried my point, and the *ayah* was released.

But what was to be done with the surplus diamond, which had also been returned to me? The constable had been arrested with a view to prosecution for perjury. It appeared to me that it was more than probable that the police had fabricated this evidence, and gone to the expense of purchasing the diamond,—which, after all, was only valued at £2-10s,—to get the credit of convicting somebody of the theft. The constable, however, stuck to his story.

Shortly afterwards Mrs. Phillips showed me a diamond locket with one diamond missing, into the place of which I found the surplus diamond appeared to fit. This gave rise to the theory that the *ayah* had picked the diamond out of the locket, with which to try the fidelity and business qualities of the constable, keeping the ring intact for future disposal, and that, in consequence of what followed, her friends, to whom she had entrusted the ring, had managed to get it restored as above described.

I took the locket and ring to a jeweller, who said that the surplus diamond was of the same character as those in the locket, but that it was not possible to swear to its being the missing diamond, as he could buy 1000 others exactly similar in the Burra Bazar in half-an-hour. Under all these circumstances, it was thought advisable to do nothing further, and the real facts remain a mystery to this day."

On Sir W. Grey's retirement the *Friend of India*, of Serampore, wrote of him as follows:—"What there is to tell of Sir William Grey's life in India will never occupy a large space in history. An effective worker, in many matters of

The *Friend of India* on Sir W. Grey's retirement.

the first importance, it can scarcely be said that he has been in any respect a real leader of men. He has not been, in the Indian sense, a creative man, a bold initiator of policy, so much as a careful and a judicious critic with a keen eye for every fault—for every crevice in the armour of his opponents, and indeed of all who have taken part, during the 30 years of his Indian life in Indian affairs. The good characteristics of Sir W. Grey's administration have been patience, tact, thorough conscientiousness, real office—that is desk—Government, and an utter disregard of consequences when duty pointed in one direction and interest seemed to point in another. The weak points of his administration have been a narrowness—Whiggery—in approaching great questions and a slowness to believe that men of views different from his might nevertheless be as honest as himself. ... Half of the rumours about Minutes, against this, that and the other, have arisen from the public belief that Sir W. Grey was all but certain to be minuting on something...a Minute, pitiless in its logic, and yet, singularly enough, coming from a man who could be exceedingly merciful and forgiving even when he condemned. Popular we should say, in the commonly understood meaning of the word, no one will term Sir W. Grey: and few persons, we should think are likely to class him among the foremost of Indian Administrators still less Statesmen. Perhaps no assembly that could possibly be convoked in India would cheer heartily when his great services to India and England were told, though every one would admit the services to be great and real, and the motive of the highest. The story would merely be one of quiet work, in all manner of Secretariats and Directorates, in Bengal, to which he altogether belongs. But without being popular, as popularity is usually understood, he has high respect wherever he is known...When his portrait is put up in Calcutta, as it is to be, it should be marked—"The last and one of the best Bengal Civilians." Yes, we mean the last of an old school, excellent in its day, but never again to be resuscitated for high office in Bengal. We know not what course Mr. Campbell may take, but it is utterly impossible for him to take the same course, or feel in the same way as Sir W. Grey. There is not perhaps an intelligent man in India who will not agree that the Star of India which Sir W. Grey will receive on Monday next (February 27, 1871) will be most worthily bestow'd...We have no

pleasure in the drawbacks in our picture. We prefer the full, broad outline,—the record of the truth and honor and righteous dealing that will long be associated in India with the name of the retiring Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal.”

At a public meeting held in Calcutta on the 11th February 1871 a Resolution was carried for a portrait of Sir W. Grey to be taken and kept in the city : it is now in the Town Hall. The Chamber of Commerce passed a similar vote for a picture.

In 1873 Sir A. Eden, who had been his Secretary in Bengal, wrote of Sir W. Grey : “He was a man of such modesty and retirement that probably only those who worked with and under him and were behind the scenes fully realised the enormous value of his services to India. I am quite certain that there are few men of later days who have done so much by their unswerving integrity and conscientiousness to raise the standard of our administration, and I do not know any one who is more universally respected and admired by all who were under his rule, both Europeans and natives.”

Another journalist wrote,—“When Sir W. Grey left Calcutta, the whole educated native population deplored the loss. Not perhaps with enthusiasm, for he was not a man to evoke enthusiasm, but, I believe, with sincerity. His gentleness and forbearance, his consideration, his justice, and his conscientiousness, seemed to have found a way to the heart of the people. He was not a broad man, people said, not broader than an English Whig, but in his own groove he was reliable where only justice, or mercy in need, was sought for. I gathered that he had not been a strong, though he had been a careful administrator : that he was a dangerous disputant, with a keen eye for crevices in the armour of his opponents, and that his minutes were often tempered by an after-thought which smoothed much of the sternness away. That is, he was a Bengal Whig of the better kind, with a view of administration resting on a tolerance of opinions, and even prejudices, and a great kindness to native India ; and native India has preserved his portrait, as that of a friend.”

Sir W. Grey remained in England without employment until March 1874, when he somewhat reluctantly accepted, on the second offer, the Government of Jamaica.

He spent 3 comparatively uneventful years in that post. During the latter part of the time his health was much broken ; the climate did

Subsequent  
career.

not suit him : and he carried with him to England in March 1877 the seeds of the malady of which he died at his residence, Parkfield, Torquay, Devon, on 15th May 1878. He was buried at Torquay.

He was twice married, firstly, in 1845, to Margaret, daughter of Welby Jackson, Esqre., of the Bengal Civil Service ; she died in 1862 ; and secondly, in 1865, to Georgina, daughter of Trevor Chichele Plowden, Esqre., of the same service, who survived him. He left five sons and four daughters.

## CHAPTER V.

SIR GEORGE CAMPBELL, M.P., K.C.S.I., D.C.L.

1871—74.

UNDER the Roman Republic the high office of Consul was attained ordinarily as the climax of a regular succession of public services. The *decursus honorum*, i. e. the *certus ordo magistratuum*, as it was termed—the “ladder of promotion”—lay usually through the inferior offices of Quæstor, Ædile and Prætor to the Consulship. Similarly, as may have been observed, the first 4 Lieutenant-Governors had passed regularly through the appointments of Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Secretary to the Government of India, and Member of Council, to the charge of the province of Bengal. The *via processûs* appeared to be laid down on fixed lines. Sir George Campbell's own observations (in 1872) on the dissolution of the system of succession which his nomination effected contain much that had been often said, and may be here quoted :—

“It may, perhaps, also be permitted to the present Lieutenant-Governor to observe, as some excuse for seeking to do some things not done by the distinguished men who preceded him, notwithstanding his extreme inferiority in natural and acquired gifts, and his entire want of that broad experience in the Secretariat and in the Government of India which they possessed, that some of them had had very little practice as executive officers, and were, perhaps, on that account less prepared to deal with executive details during the short term of Indian office than they otherwise might have been. It is only repeating too what is generally believed to observe that their action was said to be much hampered and retarded by an unfortunate difference of opinion on minor matters which seems to have very frequently occurred between the Governments of India and Bengal, and which does not seem to have been allayed by the presence in the Council of the Governor-General of a Bengal Civil Servant, who not unfrequently differed from the Lieutenant-Governor in office, to be differed from when he succeeded to the Lieutenant-Governor's post.” The selection of Sir George Campbell to be Lieutenant-Governor was therefore contrary to all precedent. Not only was he a Civi-

His appointment  
contrary to preced-  
ent.



Photogravure

Survey of India Offices, Calcutta, December 1900

SIR GEORGE CAMPBELL, M.P., K.C.S.I., D.C.L.

From a photograph by Messrs Bourne & Shepherd





lian of the North-Western Provinces, but he had done no service in Bengal, except as a Judge of the High Court at Calcutta for 4 years. His previous executive career had been entirely in other parts of India. He was born in 1824, eldest son of the late Sir George Campbell, (elder brother of the first Lord Campbell, Lord Chancellor 1859-61), educated at the New Academy, Edinburgh, and at St. Andrews, appointed to the Bengal Civil Service from Haileybury in 1842, and, making the voyage round the Cape in a P. and O. Steamer, arrived in India on the 25th December

Previous career.

1842: he served in Rohilkund in the usual subordinate revenue and judicial appointments from 1843 to 1846; was in charge of several districts and political Divisions of the Cis-Sutlej States 1846-51, and was mentioned with special praise by Lord Dalhousie. While on furlough from 1851 to 1854 he was called to the Bar at the Inner Temple in 1854, and became an Associate of the Court of Queen's Bench, and published "Modern India" (dedicated to his uncle, then Lord Chief Justice of England) and "India as it may be." He married in 1854 while at home. He was Magistrate-Collector of Azimghur, 1854; Commissioner of Customs, North-Western Provinces, 1855; Commissioner of the Cis-Sutlej States, 1855-7: took an active part as Civil Commissioner in some events of the Mutiny and was present at several engagements: was Personal Assistant to Lord Canning, 1857-8: and judicial and financial Commissioner of Oudh, 1858. It was unusual promotion, such as would nowadays be impossible, that brought him from Oudh to be a Judge of the High Court, Calcutta, 1863-66. He was President of the Orissa Famine Commission, 1866-67, and Chief Commissioner of the Central Provinces, 1867-8. While on furlough in 1868-70 he became a candidate for Dumbartonshire in the Liberal interest, but retired from his candidature before the general election: he then published his work on Irish Land Tenure, and was made a D. C. L. of the University of Oxford. His appointment to the Government of Bengal was, as he has himself recorded, a surprise. He was on furlough and, "failing anything that he cared for," on the eve of retirement. Late in the autumn of 1870, he received the offer of the Lieutenant-Governorship from the Secretary of State, the Duke of Argyll, between whom and the Governor-General, Lord Mayo, the selection

was arranged. If Sir G. Campbell had not accepted the offer there is reason to believe that the choice would have fallen upon Sir A. J. Arbuthnot, K. C. S. I. of the Madras Civil Service. The selection of a non-Bengal officer was made for a particular purpose. Bengal had for sometime been considered a "sleepy hollow" which required arousing, and there had been considerable friction between a Conservative Lieutenant-Governor and a Supreme Government bent on reforms. "Put shortly"—the words are Sir George Campbell's—"what was contemplated was a more active system of Government in Bengal instead of the old *laissez-faire*, and a more direct contact with the people." There was work to be done in carrying out the policy of decentralisation of the finances, which would involve the imposition of local rates and taxes, resisted for some time by the local authorities: and the whole system of Bengal administration had come prominently and unfavourably into notice in connection with the Orissa famine of 1866. The appointment of an avowed reformer as their ruler was not likely to be popular in the conservative circles of Bengal, and the new Lieutenant-Governor's energy, ability and masterfulness were soon felt throughout the province. There has not been before, and there has not been since, such a period of active reform as the 37 months during which he administered the Local Government. And for no period is its history available in a more readable form. In the Introductory Chapters prefixed to the provincial Administration Reports for 1871-72 and 1872-3 Sir G. Campbell recorded, almost entirely with his own hand, the administrative history of Bengal to the end of December 1873, that is, during 34 months of his tenure of office. It was the summary of 1871-2 to which the Bishop of Calcutta (Dr. Milman) added fame by his epigram at a University dinner at the Town Hall (Lord Northbrook presiding) when he spoke of it as being "as clear as crystal, as complete as a circle, and as amusing as a novel." (On the same occasion Sir G. Campbell called himself a University man "born out of due time," in allusion to the Honorary D. C. L. which connected him with Oxford). But Sir G. Campbell himself supplemented the official accounts of his work in Bengal by Chapters XII—XIV of his "Memoirs of my Indian Career," edited by Sir Charles E. Bernard, 1893, which contain a full account of his policy and action as Lieutenant-Governor "in many respects the

most active and interesting period of my life." Both the summaries and the portion of the autobiography emanated evidently from the heart of the writer, and are so genuine and original that they must ever rank among the most interesting and entertaining specimens of literature dealing with official subjects. No acquaintance with the history of Bengal of the triennium 1871-74 can be complete without a knowledge of these publications. It is impossible to reproduce them at full length, and it has not been easy to make selections from a mass of materials all possessed of such a high degree of interest. Fortunately Sir G. Campbell himself picked out the "notable events" which, with some additions, it will be sufficient to recount and describe as the main incidents of his Lieutenant-Governorship. It may be here mentioned that Lady Campbell did not accompany her husband to India on this occasion. There was hospitality at Belvedere as usual, but everything was subordinated to work. "I did not come out to India again to give big dinners," said Sir G. Campbell, but he did give them. Mr. H. S. Beadon, I. C. S. was his Private Secretary for his first year: then Mr. H. Luttmann-Johnson, I. C. S., and for his last few weeks Mr. L. C. Abbott, I. C. S. and I held the office.

About the middle of the year 1871 intelligence was received that the Sonthals of the several *Parganas* were contemplating a visit to Dumka in great numbers. This movement, it was said, was not confined to Dumka. They intended going to all the district head-quarters, and perhaps even to Bhagalpur, with the avowed object of obtaining redress of grievances. Their main complaints were that many of the *manjis*, or headmen, had been deprived of their villages because they had not agreed, on the expiry of their leases, to renew them at exorbitant rents, and that the villages had been leased at enhanced rents to strangers, who had rack-rented them, or that their *manjis*, being threatened with being deprived of their villages, had agreed to exorbitant terms and had in consequence been obliged to levy excessive rents from them. A report spread that some 500 to 600 Bengalis of the Moheshpur district had left their houses and passed through to Jangipur from dread of the Sonthals who (they had heard) had risen and were following with the intention of looting the country. The Railway Volunteers turned out to meet the danger. The Raja of Moheshpur took active measures to allay this panic by reassuring his remaining

Sonthal agitation.

*raiya*s and bringing them back to their villages. The Deputy Commissioner, Mr. Wood, who proceeded to Moraroi to ascertain the cause of the panic and tranquillize the people, had an interview with some *parganai*s, or headmen, and gave assurance to them that the Dumka Sonthals' complaints were undergoing inquiry, and that just grievances would be redressed. He at the same time told them that large gatherings, got up for the purpose of intimidating Government officers, would not be tolerated, and only tended to weaken their case; and that the Dumka gathering had without doubt been the primary cause of the present panic, disturbing the minds of the timid and entailing on them serious distress, privation and loss. The *parganai*s admitted the justness of his remarks, and promised to allay the present panic, so far as lay in their power, by convincing the Bengalis that they had no reason whatever to expect any outbreak on the part of the Sonthals. For some months, however, considerable excitement prevailed, and repeated gatherings of Sonthals gave rise to considerable uneasiness.

After the Sonthal insurrection of 1855, it had been intended to exclude the Sonthal *Parganas* from the operation of the General Acts, but that district had gradually drifted more or less under the ordinary law and procedure. Sir G. Campbell was of opinion that the new difficulties were owing to the change of system in the Sontha *Parganas*: it appeared to him that the Sonthals had good ground for complaint and he earnestly urged a reversion to the non-regulation system of administration. The Government of India agreed that the indiscriminate extension of some Acts to the Sonthal *Parganas* had worked much mischief and that a peculiar and simpler form of administration was required. On the Lieutenant-Governor's recommendation, a Regulation was passed under the Statute 33 Vic. c. 3 for the peace and good government of the Sonthal *Parganas*. This Regulation gave the Lieutenant-Governor full power to appoint officers to make a settlement of landed rights, to restore dispossessed *manjis* and others, to settle rents and to record the customs and usages of the people. It also introduced a usury law limiting the accumulation of interest on debts, and it laid down what laws were to be in force in the *Parganas*, and what were left to the discretion of Government to introduce or withdraw as found desirable from time to time. The country gave no further cause for anxiety.

The group of subjects of provincial finance, local taxation, and the self-government to accompany such taxation were matters in which Sir G. Campbell felt that it was his duty to carry out the policy laid down by superior power after much discussion and consideration. He has left on record a description of the system which had until lately been in force. "While the Local Governments had very great powers in many respects and, as regards some of the principal sources of income, especially the land revenue, exercised practically almost complete discretion, the power of the purse in respect of expenditure was completely centralized in the Government of India, by whom grants to the various Local Governments were made on detailed estimates of the needs of each department. It was impossible that the central power could efficiently scrutinize these demands over so vast an Empire, and the result was sometimes that the Local Government asked as much as possible and the Central Government gave as little as possible; and so grants were adjusted by a species of compromise, under which, however, the general result seemed to have to some extent been that those who asked most and asked it most boldly and pertinaciously got most. On this system many of the civil departments were constantly progressing in their expenditure when the Government of the late Earl Mayo determined to apply a remedy which had long been talked of but never carried into practical effect, *viz.*, the assignment of certain funds and resources to the Local Government for certain purposes to be by them made the most of. The arrangement adopted was as follows. No sources of revenue were made over, other than the *per-contra* receipts of the executive departments, transferred. But the previous net assignments to certain departments, *viz.*, Police, Jails, Education, Registration, Medical, Printing and Civil Public Works, were taken: a proportion (about 7 per cent.) was deducted as a relief to the imperial finances, and as representing a share of the burden to be charged upon the local resources; the remainder was made over as a fixed annual income. It was intended that any deficiency thus caused, and any additional expenditure resulting from progress and improvement, should be met either by economy or by provincial or local taxation."

This was the scheme for the "decentralisation of the finances" previously described (page 473), an experiment which Sir G. Campbell

considered a complete and unalloyed success. He recorded his opinion that there was inequality in the fixed assignment, Bengal having received proportionately to its population less than other provinces : while at the same time, in other provinces, large revenues were already raised for local purposes by heavy cesses on the land for local roads, local police and popular education, whereas in Bengal there were scarcely any such resources, merely petty cesses partially levied in some districts by tolls on roads, ferries and canals, and the proceeds of pounds. He felt that *provincial* taxation must sooner or later be imposed, but that, as it was desirable to avoid if possible the imposition of too many burdens at once, he should at first devote himself to *local* taxation properly so called, trusting for provincial expenditure to economy and thrift. By these means he effected a saving of 14 lakhs,—chiefly by avoiding “indulgence in the æsthetics of bricks and mortar,”—increased the grants for education and medical relief, and proposed no new taxation for *provincial* purposes. He calculated that the whole local taxation of the Bengal province was only about a quarter of a million sterling, showing Bengal to be in this shape far more lightly taxed than any other part of India. Under all the circumstances, he thought it would be best and most consonant with the instructions of Her Majesty’s Government to begin with a cess on immovable property of all kinds for roads, canals and other means of communication, deferring the question of an educational cess of any kind : he had doubts on the propriety of putting such a tax upon immovable property only, or the land in particular.

He therefore lost no time in setting to work to carry out the policy with which he considered himself to be charged. The first important measure with which he had to deal was the introduction of the District Road Cess. A Committee had met and proposed a plan of assessment before Sir G. Campbell assumed office. A Bill was brought into the Legislative Council on the 23rd June 1871, by Mr. V. H. Schalch, Member of the Board of Revenue, and received the Lieutenant-Governor’s assent on the 19th July 1871. The Act X (B. C.) of 1871 was passed, to provide for local rating for the construction and maintenance of roads and other means of communication in Bengal. Calcutta and district municipalities and towns were excluded

from its operations : it was not to come into force at once all over the country, but to be introduced gradually into such districts as Government might see fit. Its principles and main provisions can best be described in Sir G. Campbell's own words :

“The Bengal Road Cess Act of 1871 is a measure which first provides for the valuation of the land and for the record of the holders of these various rights ; it also imposes rates on houses, mines, and other immovable property. It then establishes local bodies, either nominated or elected from among the rate-payers, which are to ascertain the needs of districts and localities in regard to roads, canals and other means of communication ; to bring on their books all roads &c., which it is thought desirable to maintain as local public communications ; to determine the work to be undertaken in the current year ; and to strike a rate for the year to meet the necessary expenditure on the whole immovable property of the district. This rate may in no case exceed  $\frac{1}{2}$  anna in each rupee of the net profits of the landholders and other owners, that is about 3 per cent. The valuation is to last for 5 years, and to be subject to revision at the end of that period.

“When the Act is introduced, the process of valuation commences and necessarily occupies a considerable period. The *zamindars* are bound to render an account of all rents receivable by them from their under-tenants, it being provided throughout, in addition to penalties for false returns, that no rent not returned shall be recoverable by law. When the *zamindars'* returns are received, if, as generally happens, their immediate tenants are sub-holders superior to the cultivating *raiyat*, the same process is gone through with the sub-holders ; they are required to file a statement of holdings under them, and so on, it may be through several gradations, till the actual *raiyat* is reached.

“In regard to cultivating *raiya*ts paying less than Rs. 100 *per annum*, no attempt is made to distinguish between the different classes of *raiya*ts possessed of more or less beneficial interest in the soil. It is not sought to make an actual rack-rent valuation of the soil, but only an account of the rental actually paid.

“To lessen the great labour involved in valuing the small holdings, so much more numerous than the large ones, and yet producing after all little in comparison, it is provided that small holdings paying less than Rs. 100 annual revenue or rent may be summarily assessed in a rough way, either in proportion to their payments to the superior holder, or with reference to the gross quantity of land comprised in the tenure, if that has been or can be ascertained. If the summary valuation is favourable to the proprietor, he will accept it ; if not, he is entitled to file



returns of the actual rental received from his *raiya*s, so that he cannot pay on more, and may pay on less than his real rental.

"Separate provision is made for the mode of rating houses and other immovable property, houses below a certain value being exempt, so as entirely to exclude the huts of the labouring classes. The houses of those who pay as landholders or *raiya*s are also exempt if they have no other calling or profession.

"The Road Cess Act proceeds on the principle that  $\frac{1}{2}$  the rate is to be paid by the occupiers, that is by the *raiya*s, and  $\frac{1}{2}$  by the rent-receivers, each according to his own share of the profit. On the superior holders is also imposed the duty of collecting the money due from those under them, and paying the whole in a lump for each estate. A valuation roll of each estate, and of the district, being completed, and the rate for the year being declared,  $\frac{1}{2}$  of that rate will be published as the rate payable by the *raiya*s. The holder immediately above the *raiya*s will collect from them the half-rate and pay to his superiors the full rate for his holding, less half-rate on the rent or revenue receivable by the superior: and each superior holder will pay to his own superior in like manner, till the *zamindar* holding direct of Government pays the whole rate on the whole estate, less half-rate on the share of profits which goes to Government as land revenue. The effect is that each holder passes on the *raiya*'s half-rate with a half-rate paid by himself of his own share of the profits."

The measures taken to give effect to the Road Cess Act were as follows. The Act was in the first instance introduced in 16 districts in different parts of the country, those being chiefly selected in which, other things being suitable, the demand for money for roads, &c., had hitherto most largely exceeded the local collections; such were specially some of the metropolitan districts. Three districts were added in which there was shown to be a similar necessity, making 19 in all. In all these districts, the valuation proceedings were actively undertaken and concluded. A special Deputy Collector with suitable establishment was told off to carry out the details in each district.

At the same time that the Act was introduced into the districts above mentioned. Sir G. Campbell made a declaration in a Resolution, dated 22nd August 1871, of the policy and intentions of the Government in regard to the funds hitherto distributed for local works. It was determined that all taxes and tolls raised locally in each district should be retained in that district for its own local expenditure, instead of being brought into a central fund at the dis-

posal of Government as before. The main lines of arterial communication, both roads and canals, were distinguished as provincial communications, to be maintained from general provincial funds; while it followed that any tolls levied on those lines of communication would go to the treasury which was to maintain them. All other roads and communications were left to the district Committees, which were to settle those to be kept up. The effect of the assignment to the districts of all ferry and road tolls, together with any other local receipts of the same description, was that some districts, especially those of the Patna Division, were, without additional taxation, considerably better off than ever they were before.

When the [rate] was fixed in each district a Proclamation was issued, and circulated broadcast, with a view to make the amount of the cess payable by the *raiylats* generally known and understood. The Proclamation also contained certain promises of the principles to be followed. Some of its paragraphs were as follows :—

“This Proclamation is chiefly to inform the *raiylats* of their liabilities and rights.

“From and after 1st October next every *raiylat* in the district of \_\_\_\_\_ is bound to pay to the person to whom his rent is payable, and along with his rent,  $\frac{1}{2}$  the rate of road cess imposed by the Committee; that is, the *raiylat* is to pay \_\_\_\_\_ for every rupee of rent. This tax then is of the nature of a cess at \_\_\_\_\_ per rupee of rent payable by each *raiylat*. By the provisions of the regulations no other cess is legal or recoverable by law; this one cess only has been imposed by law, and the *samindars* and other holders are authorized to levy it at the rate named above.

“All persons assessed to the road cess are informed and assured by the Government that every pice levied under the Act will be spent in the district in which it is raised, to improve the local roads, canals, and rivers in the district for the benefit of the inhabitants; nothing will be diverted to any other purpose than that which the law directs.

“Sub-divisions of the district will be arranged, and a fair proportion of the proceeds of the tax will be apportioned for the petty roads of that subdivision. That money will be distributed and spent by local men trusted by the inhabitants, who will be selected for the purpose. Every tax-payer is encouraged and invited to claim that the tax shall be fairly applied to the village roads and local paths or water channels in which he is interested. The Government will use every effort to see that such

local claims are fairly met, and that every tax-payer derives a fair benefit from the tax which he pays."

The land valuation commenced on the 15th of August 1871, and was completed by the 1st October 1873, throughout the 16 districts first taken up. The valuations obtained by returns were considered fairly accurate. The results showed that sub-infeudation was very general: out of the aggregate valuation of nearly  $4\frac{3}{4}$  crores for the 16 districts fully 66 per cent were due to undertenures.

Towards the end of his time Sir G. Campbell recorded that the working of the Road Cess Act had been a complete success—there had been no great difficulty in the valuations, which had been effected with ease and absence of friction. Collections had been commenced without hindrance, and good progress had been made towards obtaining a fair record and valuation of landed property and tenures in Bengal, a sound basis for the local taxation of immovable property, and a good income for the construction and maintenance of roads and water channels. In 1874 Sir Richard Temple, having regard to the successful results obtained, extended the Act to all the districts except the Sonthal *Parganas*, Singbhum, the Chittagong Hill Tracts and Darjeeling. It was anticipated that, at  $\frac{2}{3}$  of a full rate, the total yield from the road cess in the province would amount to about a quarter of a million sterling a year. In his *Memoirs of his Career*, Sir G. Campbell has recorded that he felt some anxieties in passing the Road Cess Act, and hardly expected such a success. The Bengal *zamindars* were, as it were, taken by surprise by the new system imposed with all the authority not only of their own Government, but with the weight of the Government of India and the Home Government behind. They obeyed the requirements of the law, and in doing so they found themselves in a kind of dilemma. If they failed to disclose their rentroll, they were at the mercy of the *raiyats* and could not recover their rents; if they put down more than the truth, they must themselves pay an exaggerated tax, which they would probably fail to recover.

In a speech in Council in March 1880 on the Bill which became the Cess Act of that year, Sir A. Mackenzie said:—

"With all his burning longings for universal reform Sir G. Campbell was as cautious and thrifty an administrator financially as India ever saw. I do not myself think that justice to his great financial capacity has ever

been properly done. He had an amazing grasp of both details and principles when dealing with such subjects. When he thought his position secure for the time he postponed further taxation, which he had always avowedly kept in reserve, and proceeded to allot the funds in hand in order to give Bengal the improvements, moral and material, for which it had so long been crying. But before the money could be utilized, famine swooped down upon the country and every farthing of his accumulations had to be surrendered to feed the people of the tracts distressed.'

The Calcutta Port was again the subject of legislation in 1871, in Act VII (B. C.) of that year. The Port Trust  
 The Port Trust. Commissioners had taken charge of the "Port proper" of Calcutta, leaving the river Hooghly outside to be managed directly by the Marine Department of Government. The governing body of the Port Trust consisted of 12 Commissioners, appointed by Government, most of them connected with the trade of the Port. The Port Trust began its existence with a debt of £230,000, being the value of the plant already supplied by the Government. On this they were to pay interest, a reserve of £30,000 being also accumulated and kept up to make good losses. For new works they had borrowed from Government another £100,000, which was to be repaid within 30 years, and they were about to receive further loans for the same purpose. Since the Commissioners assumed charge of the Port, the receipts of the Port had greatly exceeded its expenditure. They had constructed along the river front additional jetties and warehouses and landing places at a cost of from £60,000 to £70,000 and paid for these works and appliances partly from loans and partly from current revenue. One result of their work was that a large vessel could unload in half the time that it required in 1869, and in another year there would be the same facilities for loading also. Meanwhile, there was a prospect of the Port dues being soon reduced, and all Port affairs working more smoothly and more satisfactorily to the public and to Government than before. There could be no doubt that the Port Trust was a great success. The plan was due to the late Lieutenant-Governor, Sir W. Grey, who originated it and its fruition was in fact a triumph of his administration.

In 1871 an Act was passed to empower the Lieutenant-Governor

to cause a bridge to be constructed with Government capital across the river between Calcutta and Howrah at such place at or near Armenian Ghat as he might select, to make and maintain ways and approaches, to authorize the levy of tolls according to a fixed scale &c., and to appoint the Port Commissioners to carry out the purposes of the Act. The project of a floating bridge had been referred by the Government of India to the Chief Engineer, who reported on the proposal, approving of the engineering arrangements and details generally, but expressed grave doubts as to the wisdom of adopting a bridge of this class for such a river as the Hooghly. The Government of India having accepted the modification of some details proposed by the Chief Engineer, and alterations in mooring gear recommended by the Harbour Master, informed the Bengal Government that they considered a floating bridge all that was required for the present. In moving for leave to bring in the Bill for the construction of the Bridge, the Hon'ble Sir A. Eden mentioned that a contract had been entered into with Sir Bradford Leslie, the eminent engineer, for the construction of such a bridge, at a cost not exceeding £150,000, to be completed by the beginning of 1873. The work was forthwith commenced in England and the portions of the bridge sent out and put together in Calcutta.

The excessive rainfall of 1871 caused great floods in Central Bengal, in some of the districts most under the domain of the great rivers; but the only great flood of very widely disastrous consequences was that which affected the districts of Murshidabad, Nadia and Jessore, and more especially Nadia. The embankments on the left bank of the Bhagirathi, in the Murshidabad district, gave way, and the waters from that and other directions swept into the Nadia district, carried away portions of the Eastern Bengal Railway and poured into parts of Jessore. Even in this case, however, the result almost justified the converse of the English proverb, and a statement that rain never breeds dearth in India. The losses in Nadia and parts of other districts were certainly excessive. Sir G. Campbell himself saw a state of things from which he could hardly have believed that the population could have emerged, still less that they could have emerged self-supporting. Yet they showed wonderful self-reliance and self-help, and eventually

made very little demand for the assistance which the Government was prepared to give in case of need. There was little loss of life, but a terrible loss and mortality among cattle. The means of the flooded districts, had, no doubt, been decreased, to such a degree that it took them some time to recover; but perhaps the Indian proverb, "The corner of a field saved from flood is worth 10 fields saved from drought," explained in some degree their recovery. Whatever crop did not perish produced abundantly and the after effects of flood were very good.

Universal horror was excited by the murder on the 20th September 1871 of the Officiating Chief Justice of the High Court, the Hon'ble John Paxton Norman, as he was ascending the steps of the Town hall, on his way to his Court there (the new building for the High Court being still under construction). The following account is based on the report, in one of the newspapers of the time. Probably there was not a man in India more generally beloved and esteemed than was Mr. Norman of whom, above all men, it might have been asserted that he had not an enemy. His large-hearted kindness of nature, the geniality of his disposition, his open-handed hospitality and charity, and consideration for others, had endeared him to all with whom he was brought in contact. To the natives of India Mr. Norman was a true friend, taking an active part in all measures for their advancement, and heartily associating with them in private and public. As a judge he was known as a sound lawyer and a man of large common sense and sagacity, enabling him readily to arrive at a correct conclusion on intricate questions of fact. A robust healthy man, fond of nature and outdoor exercise, he was the very ideal of an honest English gentleman. In the full vigour of life, when soon about to return to his native land after a long career in India of usefulness and well-doing, he was cruelly murdered.

The facts of the crime, so far as they were ascertained, were as follows. At 11 o'clock on Wednesday morning, the 20th September, the Officiating Chief Justice having alighted from his carriage under the portico of the Town Hall, where he was about to sit to hear appeals, turned round on the uppermost of a flight of 8 stone steps leading into the Hall, to give some order to his coachman. On the instant a man who was standing concealed behind the doorway

Murder of the  
Officiating Chief  
Justice Norman.

rushed out and stabbed the Chief Justice in the back under the left shoulder with a long broad-bladed dagger, the knife dividing the eighth rib and passing through the diaphragm. On receiving the blow the Chief Justice turned round and the assassin plunged the dagger into his abdomen with such force as to touch the spine, and cause severe internal injury. Mr. Norman thereupon ran down the steps, pursued by the murderer, who was about to strike him a third time when the Chief Justice dashed a brick, which he had picked up, into the man's face and caused him to stagger backwards. At this moment Mr. Norman had got about 10 yards from the building, and the large number of persons, chiefly natives, who had witnessed the occurrence, surrounded the murderer, but did not venture to close with him as he was brandishing his knife. A native workman, however, felled him with a stroke of a bamboo, and a native policeman wrested the dagger from him, getting his own hands cut in so doing. A European constable having run up with a rope, the murderer was bound hand and foot and removed amid the execrations of the Hindu officers of the Court and others, who were standing by. The Chief Justice still stood, leaning against a post, but he was quickly placed in a *palki* and carried off to the nearest dispensary. Before he was taken away in the *palki* he said 'I don't think I shall live.' On the way Dr. W. Palmer came up, and, at his suggestion, Mr. Norman was carried into the shop of Messrs Thacker, Spink & Co., where he was laid on a couch in a back room and his wounds were examined. Dr. Fayrer, also, was soon in attendance, and did all that surgical skill could devise to give the sufferer relief, though it was evident from the first that either wound was mortal. The pain endured by the Chief Justice was great, but throughout he exhibited a manly fortitude which was the surest answer to the prayer he himself uttered as he lay in his agony. "God have mercy upon me and give me courage and patience to bear through to the end." Later on he asked the friend who was sitting by his couch to say the Lord's Prayer, which the Chief Justice followed sentence by sentence, pausing at and slowly repeating the words, "As we forgive them that trespass against us." The house in which he lay was thronged all day by his colleagues and friends, but save his wife, the medical men and one or two of those whom he knew most intimately, no one stayed in the room with him. The

Archdeacon of Calcutta, Dr. Pratt, saw him for a few minutes in the afternoon; but he was then too much exhausted to bear conversation. Drs. Norman Chevers, Ewart, and Walker, were also in attendance and the two first remained with him until he died. He retained consciousness for some hours, but towards midnight he began to sink rapidly and breathed his last at 1-20, on the morning of the 21st.

The news was immediately telegraphed to the Government, and in the course of the day 2 Gazettes Extraordinary were published, one by order of the Governor-General in Council, stating that the funeral was to be conducted and a monument erected in the Cathedral at the public charge, ordering the public offices to be closed, and 17 minute guns to be fired at the time of the funeral, and inviting all officers of Government and the community of Calcutta, "to testify, by their presence, their respect for the high character of the deceased, and their abhorrence of the foul crime which had been committed." A similar request was expressed in the Gazette issued by the Government of Bengal. In accordance with these notices all the public offices in the city were closed, every shop was shut, and business entirely suspended. The flags of the ships lying in the river, and the standard in Fort William, were hung half-mast-high throughout the day. The whole city was in mourning, in genuine unaffected sorrow at the loss of one who had been loved as a friend, not merely esteemed as a public man. At 5 in the evening the funeral procession left the house of the deceased, in Russell Street, where the public had been admitted to see the body before the coffin was closed. The crowd was so great that it was found impossible to allow carriages generally to follow the hearse, so that the majority of those who attended the funeral proceeded on foot. I remember that I only reached the top of Park Street in time to meet the chief mourners returning after the ceremony at the Circular Road cemetery. The Commissioner of Police was completely taken by surprise by the magnitude of the attendance. Deputations had been sent from all the leading Associations, European and native, in the town, but the mass of persons of all ranks and nationalities who had assembled to take part in the ceremony caused all distinction of societies to be lost. The same confusion prevailed at the cemetery, which was crowded with a multitude of persons long before the funeral



procession arrived. The service was performed by the Archdeacon, amid the deep silence of the great assemblage of persons, Christians, Hindus, Muhammadans, Jews, Greeks, Parsis, and Americans, who had gathered together to do homage to the memory of him who had so long presided over their Courts.

The murderer, when brought before the Magistrate, had no defence to offer. When asked whether he had any question to put to the witnesses against him he said.—“The earth is much below the water, and the men have gone to the skies; the dog is eating the wall.” He was committed to take his trial at the Criminal Sessions of the High Court, on the capital charge. He was tried by the officiating Judge Mr. (afterwards Sir) G. C. Paul, convicted, sentenced and hanged. Little more was definitely ascertained concerning him than that he was a native of the Panjab, and had been for 2 years living in a mosque in Calcutta. His name was Abdulla, and he was said by some of the witnesses to have gone by the appellation of “Maulvi Shaib.” He was a short thickset man, of about 45 years of age, with a savage determined expression, and very low forehead. It was almost certain that the motive of the crime was not personal, but beyond that opinion rested almost entirely on conjecture. A petition was picked up near the scene of the crime, but it was a mere blind, and was never presented to the Chief Justice. The inclination of belief was that the murderer was connected with the seditious Muhammadan sect of Wahabis, but he admitted nothing, and after making a feint of insanity, which he quickly abandoned, he contented himself with denying all connection with the murder. Sir G. Campbell wrote as follows of the deceased Judge, formerly his colleague on the Bench :—

“The late Chief Justice Norman was a man who never had, and could not have had, an enemy. Not only was he beloved by all his fellow countrymen, but probably in all India there was no man whose feeling towards the natives was more kindly, who more actively interested himself in their welfare and who was more accessible to them and more ready to listen to all they had to say and to sympathise with them. He was in every way the most popular of men, and so simple in his habits that any one might approach him at any time. He was murdered in the most public place possible, where he was surrounded by crowds, by an assassin who made and could make no attempt to escape. The man died on the scaffold without giving any

intelligible account of his motives. He neither showed any feeling for his own situation nor attempted any bravado; he would only say that he was enraged or excited and felt impelled to the act. The crime was of course the subject of much investigation and anxious inquiry. Rumours and suspicions of political conspiracy were rife, but the closest inquiry failed to show any grounds for such suspicion. The man's history was to some extent traced. He was a foreigner, but for some years had led a wandering unsettled life in India; a morose, a peculiar, solitary man of limited intellect, yet with a desire to acquire clerkly qualifications, in which he had constantly failed; religious in his own gloomy sort of way. One part of his history seemed to be clearly made out, *viz.*, that while attending the Government school at Mirzapur, where he kept aloof from his fellows and refused to make obeisance to the Bishop with the others when that dignitary visited the school, he had shown symptoms of a homicidal mania, and had even there talked of killing the Judge; but, being told by his religious adviser that it was unlawful to do so, he went off in disgust."

After a full discussion in the summer of 1871, the Government of India sanctioned the despatch of an expedition <sup>The Lushai expedition.</sup> into the Lushai country in the cold weather of 1871-72, to prevent the recurrence of the outrages lately committed on British territory. It was settled that the force should be of a regular military character, divided into 2 portions, one column starting from the Chittagong Hill Tracts on the south and proceeding northwards, and the other setting out from Cachar on the north and marching southwards. Two columns were accordingly organized; the Chittagong column under the command of Brigadier General, C. H. Brownlow, c.b., with Captain Lewin as his Political officer; and the Cachar Column under Brigadier General G. Bouchier, c.b., with Sir J. W. Edgar, c.s., in a civil capacity. By the orders of the Governor-General the entire political and military conduct of the expedition was placed in the hands of the military commanders; they were specially instructed that the object of the expedition was not one of pure retaliation, but that the surrender of the British subjects held in captivity should be insisted upon; that they were to establish permanent friendly relations with the savage tribes, and convince them that they had nothing to gain and everything to

lose by placing themselves in a hostile position towards the British Government. From the very commencement of the preparations for the expedition, success depended more upon the efficiency of carriage than any other contingency.

The Government of India ordered that the strength of the 2 coolie corps should be raised to 4,000 men, including the Commissariat coolies, and advantage was taken of the existing Commissariat agency in the Upper Provinces to recruit coolies for the expedition. The Nepalese corps, enlisted by Captain Hidayat Ali, was intended to accompany the Cachar column, and on or about the 14th November some 800 of them, with their mates and *sardars*, were embarked at Dhubri. Unfortunately, between Dacca and Chattack, cholera broke out with all its fury, and on reaching the latter place it was found that from deaths and desertions the corps had been reduced from upwards of 800 to 601 men with 6 *sardars* and 24 mates. A body of 316 Nepalese was also got together for service with the Chittagong column. Among these also cholera appeared when *en route* for Chittagong, and they lost 40 of their number. Of other coolies 4,618 were collected throughout the country, a number which from rejections and desertions was reduced before embarkation to 4,403 men. Of these 1,924 were sent to Cachar and 2,479 to Chittagong; including therefore the Nepalese coolies, the strength of the corps assigned to the left column was 2,764 men, and of that attached to the right column was 2,791 men.

The Cachar force consisted of half a battery of Artillery, a company of Sappers, and 500 men each of the 22nd Panjab N. I., 42nd Assam Light Infantry, and 44th Assam Light Infantry: a coolie corps, together with 178 elephants, and 1,200 coolies for Commissariat purposes, were also attached to the column. Tipai Mukh, the junction of the Tipai and Barak rivers, had been fixed upon as the starting place and advanced base of operations, and by the 15th December the greater portion of the force was collected there.

They then marched through a very difficult country, constantly exposed to attacks from enemies who rarely showed themselves, until on the 2nd February they reached Sellam, the chief Poiboy's stronghold. Before arriving at this village a somewhat spirited encounter took place between our troops and the enemy on the Moorthlang range. Our route lay above and parallel to the bed of a *nala* about a

mile and a half from the camp. The advanced guard was fired into, and presently on all sides a sharp fire was opened. The enemy were found in considerable force, but were attacked by the 44th Assam L. I., and severe punishment inflicted on them; finally they were pursued up a precipitous mountain side and 2 of their stockades stormed. One satisfactory result was that the English ammunition found on the slain proved that they had been the raiders last year at Monierkhal and Nandigram. On the 12th February a small portion of the column, carrying only necessary supplies started from Sellam for Lalbura's locality, the distance or whereabouts of which no one knew. They met with no opposition, and on the 17th February entered Chumfai, Lalbura's chief village, which they found deserted. In the centre of the village was the tomb of Vonolel, an elevated platform, on every point of which were hung skulls of different wild animals, while in the centre, on a pole, was the fresh-slain head of a Sukti, with his hand and foot. The village, consisting of 500 houses, was burnt. Then the tribes of Vonpilel, Poiboy and Vonolel had been subdued, and the capital of the latter destroyed. The General therefore set out for Chumsin, the village of Vonolel's widow, where he dictated the terms on which alone it and the other villages of Lalbura would be spared. These terms were (1) that agents from the Government should have free access to Lalbura's villages and transit through his country; (2) that 3 hostages should accompany the column to Tipai Mukh; (3) that the arms taken at Monierkhal and Nandigram, or an equal number of their own, should be surrendered; (4) that a fine of 2 elephants' tusks, 1 set of war gongs, 1 necklace, 10 goats, 10 pigs, 50 fowls, and 20 maunds of husked rice, should be delivered within 24 hours. There was difficulty about the arms, but eventually everything was delivered before morning, except a small portion of rice. The possibility was then considered of forming a junction with General Brownlow, and signal rockets were fired, hoping that they might attract his attention, but without success. The column then set out on its march home, and the General Commanding reached Cachar on the 10th March, having advanced 193 miles from Cachar and 110 from his first base in the enemy's country at Tipai Mukh, until he reached the stronghold of Lalbura, the most powerful of the Lushai chiefs.

Nor were the operations of the right or Chittagong column less

successful. This force, of about the same strength as that starting from Cachar, was, however, chiefly composed of Gurkha Regiments. Its advanced base was at Demagiri on the Karnafuli, where the force assembled at the end of November. The tribes which General Brownlow had to reduce to submission were the Syloos and the Howlongs, the latter being the most distant; Mary Winchester, who had been carried off from Alexandrapur in 1871, being a captive in their hands. At Barkhal the chief Rutton Pooea came in; it had been doubtful whether he would give in his adhesion to us or not, but the prospect of a large force assembling at Demagiri in the neighbourhood of his own village no doubt influenced him greatly and induced him to cast in his lot with us. From Barkhal he acted as guide to a force that marched from that place to Demagiri by land, and subsequently throughout the whole expedition he was of the greatest possible assistance in carrying on negotiations.

A move was first made on the 9th December against the Syloos; the troops marched in a north-easterly direction, occupied the hill marked Syloo Savunga on the map, and thence penetrated to Laljika, the village of one of Savunga's sons. In reaching this point, the force had to march through a most intricate country, being obliged in places literally to hew their way through the jungle. They succeeded, however in striking severe and rapid blows as they passed; Vanhnoya's, Vanshuma's, Vanuna's, and Vanhooien's strongholds were all captured, and the stores of grain in them burnt. From Laljika the General returned to Savunga, intending thence to make an expedition into the northern Howlong country. As however Rutton Pooea and Mahomed Azim, the police *subadar*, had been sent on a mission to the Howlongs, it was deemed expedient to await their return before any hostile occupation of the latter tribe's country was attempted. In the meantime Captain Lewin had despatched 2 messengers to Benkœa, the principal northern Howlong chief, in whose hands Mary Winchester was, and he at once gave up the girl, reserving, however, all questions as to submission and his other captives. On their journey back these messengers met Rutton Pooea and the *subadar*, and the latter having taken charge of Mary Winchester brought her to Rutton Pooea's village near Demagiri, whence she was sent to Chittagong. Rutton Pooea continued on his way to Vandula, the chief of the Southern Howlongs.

As soon as possible General Brownlow started with a portion of his force against the northern Howlongs, having first left a sufficient garrison at Syloo Savunga. The force crossed the Daleswar and on the next day some of the enemy were seen; they were communicated with through some of Rutton Pooea's men, and evinced a desire to submit. The march was however, continued until definite information was received that Benkœa and Sangbunga were advancing to tender their submission. They arrived in a few days and without hesitation accepted the terms imposed on them. These were the surrender of all captives, an engagement on their part to live amicably with all subjects from Manipur to Arracan, with free right of access to our people through their whole country. A day or two afterwards, Lalbura, Jatoma, and Lienrikoom, who were the remaining chiefs of the northern Howlongs, came in and agreed to similar terms. There upon the force commenced its march back to Syloo Sangbunga; and there Lal Gnoora and Laljika, sons of Savunga (or Sangbunga), Vanoya, Vanloola, and three other chiefs, representing the whole of the Syloo tribe, made their submission on the same terms as the Howlongs. There only remained now the southern Howlongs and to commence proceedings against them it was necessary to return to Demagiri, and starting from that place a show of force was made in the direction of Sypooea and Vandula, whose villages were said to be from 3 to 5 days' march east of Rutton Pooea. An advance was made to Sypooea's village, a distance of 40 miles, and he immediately submitted. Subsequently Vantonga came in with a number of captives and next morning Sangliena, Vandula's eldest son, followed, and his submission was accepted on behalf of his father; he agreeing that his captives should be given up. The submission of the tribes being now complete, the force marched back to Chittagong, the last of the troops reaching that place on the 24th February.

After the expedition, a police force of 100 men was located at Rutton Pooea's village to protect him against the Syloos and Howlongs, and sanction was given to the occupation of another site considerably in advance. On the Cachar side a number of posts were strengthened, the question of future defence and of opening a line of communication with Chittagong along the eastern boundary of Hill Tippera being reserved.

It may be mentioned that Colonel F. S. Roberts, v. c. (afterwards Lord Roberts, Commander-in-Chief) was Assistant Quarter-Master-General to the Cachar column. Sir G. Campbell wrote of Sir J. Edgar having conducted all his duties in an admirable manner: and he was shortly afterwards made a Companion of the Order of the Star of India.

In June 1872 the Secretary of State congratulated the Viceroy on the results of the Lushai expedition, as being 'not less creditable to the wisdom and moderation of the Government which sanctioned the expedition than to the military authorities who conducted the enterprise to a successful issue.' He specially attributed much of the success to the thoughtful and unremitting interest which H. E. the Commander-in-Chief had throughout taken both in the plan and in the conduct of the operations. The services of the Military and Political officers were also suitably acknowledged.

When the future policy of Government towards the Lushai tribes came to be considered, and the measures necessary for the permanent defence of Cachar and Chittagong, the Government of India adhered to the system of exercising political influence only without direct interference of control, coupled with the definition of a precise boundary line beyond which ordinary jurisdiction should on no account extend. The line was to be guarded by a chain of posts, and beyond it only political relations with the tribes were to be cultivated. Careful surveys were made of the frontier lines. A large portion of the Lushai country was brought within the familiar knowledge and political control of our officers, and most of the remainder was explored and mapped by parties who had friendly relations with the tribes. The Lieutenant-Governor favoured the policy of maintaining an advanced post to bring political influence to bear upon the Syloos, Howlongs, and other tribes, whose country was more accessible from the Chittagong Hill Tracts than on the Cachar side. The Shindus in the direction of Arracan were more difficult to approach. The Lushai raids ceased entirely. Government passed a Regulation under the Statute 33 and 34 Vic. c. 3, with a view to bringing under more stringent control the commercial relations of our own subjects with the frontier tribes living on the borders of our jurisdiction.

The epidemic fever broke out again in July 1871 with extreme

The Burdwan  
fever.

virulence, first in the town of Burdwan, then in the greater part of the district, and in Hooghly, causing the same mortality and reduction of the general health of the people as before. Government did all that it was possible to do. Dispensaries were established wherever required and medicines and medical men supplied; food relief depots were also opened. Towards the close of the year the fever greatly abated in both districts. The causes of the disease and its ultimate prevention were still in doubt. A systematic survey of the levels and drainage of this part of the country was undertaken by the Irrigation Department with a view to verify the exact physical facts. Sir G. Campbell considered it possible that the fever might be aggravated, if not caused, by the gradual silting up of the country, as the Gangetic streams have moved further east since the beginning of the present century. "The observations of the disease seem, however, to show that it creeps over the country, taking hold in many cases of high lands and low lands alike, and after a period relaxing its hold in a way which seems to indicate, if not contagion, or infection at least some kind of local progression which we do not understand. And however we may mitigate the disease by drainage or other engineering expedients, there is still much for medical science to discover before we can understand it so as to cope with it effectually."

In 1872-3 this fever appeared extensively in all districts of the Burdwan Division except Bankura. Its previous history was thus summarized:—"It began to rage about 10 years ago in Jessore and Nadia and caused much consternation and havoc in several parts of these districts. It gradually spread to the northern parts of the 24-Parganas, and in 1864-65 crossed the Hooghly and appeared in the northern portion of the Hooghly district. In 1866 it appeared in the eastern and southern parts of the Burdwan district. During 1867-68 it continued to prevail and spread in these districts along the course of the Damodar river, and in 1869 the town of Burdwan was attacked, and many places in both districts suffered severely. In 1870 the type and mortality were not so severe; but in 1871 fever broke out with renewed violence, and was more wide-spread and fatal than ever. It also extended to the parts of Birbhum and Midnapore bordering on the Burdwan and Hooghly districts. The disease commenced in July and continued to cause most serious sickness and mortality



throughout the whole of the cold season of 1871-72. The year 1871 closed with the epidemic in full sway throughout large portions of Birbhum and Midnapore." In the year 1872-73 all that was in the power of Government was done by providing dispensaries and medical relief. In some parts of the country most affected the fever, it was hoped, was wearing itself out and subsiding, but it was also, it was feared, marching southwards into Midnapore as well as into the northern parts of Birbhum. In 1873 the disease abated during the spring and summer, but increased in the autumn. The causes of the fever remained mysterious, but renewed efforts were made to investigate them. An idea that its special virulence, as an aggravated form of malarious fever, was attributable to insanitary conditions, filth, over-grown jungle &c, was exploded, because it did not vary according to the degree of filth &c. : Raja Digambar Mitra had strenuously ascribed it to obstructed drainage, but his facts and deductions were called in question : some assigned natural deltaic changes and others over-population and destitution as the cause : others again thought that typhus or typhoid fever constituted the real epidemic : a 'fungus' theory was also started but not verified. Sir G. Campbell expressed the opinion that, whatever the origin or character of the fever, it marched from place to place by some kind of communication and progression. Places which it had invaded and held for years had been gradually abandoned by it and become healthy again, while it advanced over other tracts previously healthy, marching onwards by a gradual progress. So much at least seemed to him certain.

The very peculiar fever or disease known as dengue commenced to attract notice in Calcutta towards the end of 1871 and was rife in 1872. It prevailed during the cold weather and increased rapidly as the hot weather advanced. It continued to rage epidemically during the hot weather and rains, and few escaped its attack. Very few deaths were caused by it, though the symptoms, violent fever and racking pains, were exceedingly severe during the few days of acute suffering ; and the attack was apt to be followed by prolonged debility and rheumatic or neuralgic affections. Cases of relapse were also not unfrequent. The epidemic subsided towards the close of the rains. Cases began to occur in Howrah and Hooghly in December 1871, but the disease did

Dengue fever.

not spread to the suburbs or surrounding districts till March and April. All the suburbs of Calcutta were visited, and the epidemic extended all over the 24-*Parganas*. It reached different localities at different times, and could always be traced to importation. The outbreak generally lasted for about 3 months from the date of the first to that of the last case. The epidemic was carried to different parts of the province, and followed the great routes of human intercourse.

The assassination of the Viceroy, the Earl of Mayo, at the Andamans on the 8th. February 1872 profoundly affected Bengal and Calcutta, so that an account of it may properly find a place here. A Narrative of the facts was published by the Government of India on the 13th. February.

Assassination of  
the Viceroy the  
Earl of Mayo.

" This Narrative contains a statement of all that is known to Government up to the present time. His Excellency The Viceroy arrived in Her Majesty's Steam Frigate *Glasgow* at the convict settlement of Port Blair, Andamans, at 9-30 A. M., on Thursday, the 8th. February. Shortly after 11 A. M. His Excellency and the Countess of Mayo, with the staff and other gentlemen and ladies, landed at Ross, the chief station of the Settlement, and were received at the pier by the troops lining the approaches. The Countess of Mayo and the ladies proceeded to the house of the Superintendent, Major General Stewart, C. B., while the Viceroy and suite, accompanied by General Stewart, visited the convict establishments at this station. His Excellency inspected the *sadar* bazar, the convict barracks, the Native Infantry Lines, the hospitals, the new Church, and other public buildings, and was accompanied throughout by a strong guard of both Native Infantry and police, who closely attended His Excellency on either side of and behind the Staff immediately surrounding him. After a short rest at the house of the Superintendent, the Viceroy inspected the barracks of the European troops, and assisted by Colonel Jervois, R. E., C. B., and Colonel Rundall, R. E., made a minute examination of the foundations and walls of the buildings, to ascertain the cause of their having given way shortly after they were built. His Excellency then, attended as before, visited the European convict barracks and library, and returned with the Countess of Mayo and party to H. M.'s Ship *Glasgow* by 2 P. M.

At 3 P.M. the Viceroy, accompanied by Major General Stewart, C.B., the Hon'ble Mr. Ellis, Colonel Jervois, C.B., Mr. (Sir) G. W. Allen, and the Personal Staff—Major Burne, Private Secretary, Captains Lockwood and Gregory, Aides-de-Camp, and Mr. Hawkins, R.N., Flag Lieutenant—left the *Glasgow*, in a steam launch, and, passing the stations of Aberdeen and Haddo, landed at Viper Island. This station is in the inner harbour, about 5 miles from Ross, and here are detained about 1,300 convicts, including all those who are received from India with the character of being desperate men, and all who, by their bad conduct during their residence in the Settlement, have been proved deserving of specially rigorous treatment. His Excellency was received at the landing place by the officials in charge, and was here, as in Ross, closely attended by a guard of Native Infantry and police. After an inspection of the jail and other arrangements, the Viceroy and party returned to the steam launch and visited Chatham, a station on a small island dividing the inner from the outer harbour. His Excellency, under the escort of a guard of police and the petty officers of the station (there being no Native Infantry on this island), inspected the saw-mills and the coaling depot and then re-embarked in the steam-launch, leaving on board the steamer *Vemesis*, then lying at the coaling station, Captain Gregory, Aide-de-Camp, who had to give orders in anticipation of the proposed departure of the *Vemesis* early on the following morning.

It was then nearly 5 P.M., and the Viceroy decided that he would visit Mount Harriet. It had been proposed earlier in the day that His Excellency should do this if time allowed, but no decision had been come to, nor had any notice been given that this place would be visited by His Excellency that evening. Mount Harriet is a lofty hill on the main island, nearly opposite Chatham. There is no regular convict station on the hill, but below it is Hopetown, where there are convicts, chiefly invalids and ticket-of-leave men, with a few others required for work at the station.

The Viceroy landed from the steam-launch at the pier at Hopetown, where Mr. Ellis left the party and returned to the steamer *Dacca*. There being ordinarily no free police or sepoy guard in this station, the Superintendent ordered the guard from Chatham island to cross to Hopetown to escort the Viceroy; and accordingly 8 policemen from Chatham arrived just after His Excellency landed.

accompanied him to the top of the hill, and were with him throughout. There was one pony here, and His Excellency rode up part of the way. The road is narrow, but the ground on either side has been cleared, and in places plantain and cocoanut trees have been planted. On reaching the top, His Excellency sat down for about a quarter of an hour. The sun had set, but there was light enough for a view of the whole Settlement, with its numerous islands and inlets. Two ticket-of-leave men addressed the Viceroy on his way down, and were informed by General Stewart that on their making formal petitions their cases would be inquired into. No other convicts were met on Mount Harriet: they were all at their huts at Hopetown below.

While the Viceroy was still on the hill, Captain Lockwood, Aide-de-Camp, and Count Waldstein (who had joined the party before they commenced the ascent) went on in front and arrived at the pier, the latter about a quarter of an hour, and the former some 10 minutes, before the rest of the party. It was then dusk, but not quite dark, and when Captain Lockwood and Count Waldstein met on the pier and sat down on some stones, about 20 yards from the pier-head, waiting for His Excellency, there was apparently no one loitering on the pier, though they saw men passing to and fro carrying water for the steam-launch.

By the time His Excellency reached the foot of the hill it was a quarter past 7 and quite dark, and lighted torches were by order of an officer of the Settlement sent to meet the party. The huts where the convicts, some 40 or 50 in number, were drawn up had been past, General Stewart had stopped to give orders to an overseer, and the Viceroy had walked about  $\frac{1}{2}$  the length of the pier preceded by 2 torch-bearers, and a few paces in advance of the rest of the party, when a man jumped on him from behind and stabbed His Excellency over the left shoulder, and a second time under the right shoulder-blade, before any one could interpose. The assassin was at once knocked down by the guard and people in attendance, and, but for the interference of the officers, would probably have been killed. There is no consistent account to show how the man made his way to the Viceroy, and it is not clear whether he was lying concealed on the side of the pier, or whether he rushed in from behind. Major Burne and the Viceroy's *jamadar* were a few paces from

the Viceroy, Colonel Jervois, Mr. Hawkins, and Mr. Allen somewhat behind, and the police and petty officers of the station in flank and rear.

The Viceroy on being struck moved forward and staggered over the side of the jetty; it is not certain whether he fell into the water or jumped into it, but he either quickly raised himself or alighted on his feet, and stood for a few seconds, till he was assisted up and placed on a truck close by. The only words he uttered after the blow were "I'm hit", or words of similar sound, and the only movement he made after being placed on the truck was a convulsive motion forwards. It is probable that His Excellency expired then, but the precise moment of his death is not ascertained. He was at once carried on board the launch; every effort was made to staunch the flow of blood from the wound on the top of the shoulder, and to keep up the circulation by rubbing the extremities, but to no purpose, as the Viceroy was dead before the steam launch reached the *Glasgow*.

The Surgeons of the vessel were promptly in attendance, and Dr. Barnett was summoned at once. A *post-mortem* examination was forthwith made by Dr. Loney, Staff Surgeon, R.N., Dr. Barnett, Personal Surgeon to the Viceroy, and Dr. More, Assistant Surgeon, R.N., in the presence of the Hon'ble B. H. Ellis, Member of Council, the Hon'ble Ashley Eden, Chief Commissioner, British Burma, Mr. Aitchison, Foreign Secretary, and Major Burne, Private Secretary. It then for the first time became known that there were 2 wounds, and it was the opinion of the medical officers that either wound was sufficient to cause death.

The assassin was at once secured and taken on board the *Glasgow*. He was shortly afterwards interrogated by the Hon'ble Mr. Eden and by Mr. Aitchison, and stated that his name was Shere Ali, the son of Wulli; that he came from a village near Jamrud, at the foot of the Khyber; that he had no accomplices; that it was his fate: and that he had committed the act "by the order of God." He was then removed ashore, and kept during the night in custody of a guard of European Infantry.

Early on the morning of the 9th, the prisoner was again brought on board the *Glasgow*, where the Magistrate, Major Playfair, held a preliminary inquiry, and, after hearing the evidence of the European

gentlemen and others who were present, committed the assassin for trial before General Stewart. The knife was a common one, such as is used for cooking or other domestic purposes; it was taken from the assassin on the spot by Urjoon, a convict petty officer, who was slightly scratched by the knife, and had his coat torn in securing it. The prisoner did not freely confess before the Magistrate as he had confessed the night before, nor did he deny his guilt. He said that if any of the European gentlemen present would state that they had seen him commit the deed he would admit it, but not otherwise. The final trial before General Stewart was being proceeded with, but had not been concluded at the time of the latest advices.

The assassin is 30 years of age, strong and well made. He is a Khyberi of the Kuki-Kheyl clan, and a resident of Pakhri in the Cabul territory. He was convicted on the 2nd April 1867 of murder by Colonel Pollock, Commissioner of Peshawar, and, being sentenced to transportation for life, was forwarded, via Karachi and Bombay, to the Andamans Penal Settlement. He arrived there in May 1869, and, except on one occasion, on which he had in his possession some flour for which he could not account, nothing whatever has been recorded against him. The prisoner was removed to Hopetown on the 15th May 1871, in order to perform duty as barber at that station, and he has since been employed there.

Major General Stewart was called on by Mr. Ellis to furnish a report to Government, detailing the special precautions taken by him to secure the personal safety of His Excellency the Viceroy.

The body of His Excellency the Viceroy is being conveyed to Calcutta by Her Majesty's ship *Glasgow*. The steamer *Scotia* was despatched direct from Port Blair with Mr. Aitchison, Foreign Secretary, and Major Taylor, Aide-de-Camp, to convey intelligence of the mournful event to Lord Napier the Governor of Madras. The steamer *Nemesis* was sent to False Point to inform His Honor the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, and the *Dacca* returned to telegraph from Saugor Island news of this great public calamity to the Supreme Government in Calcutta, and to the Governors of Madras and Bombay."

The Foreign Secretary went off to Madras to bring up Lord Napier and Ettrick, as the senior Governor in India, to officiate as Viceroy, and pending his arrival Sir John Strachey, the senior

Member of Council, carried on the Government, as acting Viceroy, for a few days. The Lieutenant-Governor was at the time at the mouth of the Hooghly on his way to Orissa, to meet Lord Mayo there : on hearing the news he at once returned to the Presidency. No one who was in Calcutta at the time (as I was) can forget how, as Sir G. Campbell wrote, "here, as everywhere else in India, the social grief and feeling of public loss were overwhelming; the intensity of that feeling and the greatness of the loss to India can hardly be depicted." The funeral arrangements were all carried out with impressive ceremonial. The late Viceroy's remains were brought up the river in H. M. S. *Daphne* and landed on the 17th February at Garden Reach, whence the procession started and advanced over the Hastings Bridge to the Strand Road. The route up to Government House was lined with troops on both sides. At the grass-plot, where Lord Napier of Magdala's statue now is, opposite Prinsep's *ghat*, the European residents in Calcutta were assembled, (divided into representative bodies, associations, services, groups), and joined in with the procession in regular order. Minute guns were fired in the compound of Government House as the procession filed through from west to east. The coffin was taken up into the Throne-Room and for two days, the 19th and 20th February, the body lay in state, guarded night and day, and crowds of visitors passed by it to pay their last respects. At 7 A.M., on the 21st February a funeral service was performed, by the Lord Bishop of Calcutta, on the north Grand staircase of Government House, over the coffin, which was then taken on board H. M. S., *Daphne* and *Glasgow* and despatched to Ireland, according to Lord Mayo's special directions in his will. The official records testify to the 'inexpressible grief' caused by this 'irreparable loss,' this 'calamitous event,' 'this most melancholy catastrophe,' and Her Majesty the Queen sent the following message :

"The Queen has been deeply affected by the intelligence of the deplorable calamity which has so suddenly deprived all classes of her subjects in India of the able, vigilant, and impartial rule of one who so faithfully represented her as Viceroy of her Eastern Empire. Her Majesty feels that she has indeed lost a devoted servant and a loyal subject in whom she reposed the fullest confidence. To Lady Mayo the loss must be irreparable, and the Queen heartily sympathises with her under the terrible blow."

The murderer was tried at the Andamans by the Superintendent of the Settlement, General Stewart (afterwards Sir Donald Stewart, Commander-in-Chief in India and Field Marshal): and the judicial proceedings were, according to law, forwarded to the High Court at Calcutta for confirmation of the sentence. It was said at the time that there was some petty irregularity in the proceedings, which the Judges desired to have revised, but there were in authority Statesmen who were not disposed to discuss niceties of procedure in such a case of proved and confessed guilt, and the death sentence was duly carried out at the Andamans on the 11th March. Searching inquiry was made into the antecedents of the murderer. He was ascertained to be an Afghan or Pathan of the Khyber country, a man probably devoid of religious feeling, a mountaineer of a race habituated to deeds of violence. He had fled from his own country as the result of bloodfeuds, was transported for assassinating in British territory a man of the opposite faction, and was then put to menial work with sharp instruments, in a climate and condition most abhorrent to one of his race and temperament. His antecedents and position were such that it was not necessary to seek very far for the motives and the means of the murder. Still, careful and full inquiry was instituted in order to ascertain whether he might possibly have received any communications from India, or might in any degree have been a political tool. It was found that there was no trace whatever of anything of the kind, and the murderer's latest communications were with his relatives on the frontier, and referred only to his fields and to his wife, and the last news of murders committed by one faction or another.

Sir G. Campbell's personal relations to the Viceroys and experiences are thus related in his *Memoirs*:—"Whatever <sup>Some personal experiences.</sup> his (the murderer's) motives, his knife removed a most excellent Viceroy, a true friend of the people, and an able, conscientious, hardworking man. That act very materially changed the course of our policy in India. And to me in particular, Lord Mayo's death was a turning point in the administration which I was carrying out in Bengal. Afterwards I worked under very different circumstances. For a time, however, while Lord Napier ruled, he was entirely sympathetic. He and Lady Napier were socially charming, and, in public matters, Lord Napier was all I could desire, and supported me as thoroughly as Lord Mayo. There was in those



days in Calcutta a feeling of personal shock. It was remarked as a curious feature in my position that within a very short time both the one man above me in rank, and the next below me, the Chief Justice, had been struck down by assassins; and some people seemed to think that I might well take some precautions. I thought it better, however, not to let any appearance of disturbance be observed, and took my morning walks as usual without protection. I was convinced that the 2 assassinations were only an unhappy coincidence. Once only, a little later, I was a good deal startled. I was awoke by a wild man cutting capers and shrieking in my very bed-room, and hastily calling to mind the lessons of my first master, Williams of Badaon, I caught up a pillow, and as soon as possible substituted a chair, used as a shield, legs to the enemy. Assistance soon arrived, and then it turned out that it was only a madman who had walked quietly past the sentries, as if he were a servant of the house, and had somehow found his way to my bed-room. So I said nothing about the affair."

The Census of all India had been postponed owing to financial exigencies, but it was eventually taken in Bengal during the cold weather of 1871-72, i. e. January and February 1872, not on one and the same day, but in each district and Division as nearly simultaneously as possible, to a great extent on the night of 25th January. It was very successfully carried out, beyond all expectation. The result was to revolutionize the ideas previously held as to the number of the population in Bengal, and as to its distribution in different districts, races and religions. This result altered also all previous calculations as to incidence of taxation, consumption of salt, &c. The information required in the returns was carefully limited by Sir G. Campbell to what was considered really necessary for practical purposes and attainable. The names, castes, and professions of all heads of houses and adult males were recorded; while the women and children in each house were numbered—not named, the caste and profession of the head of the family being sufficient to distinguish the family. Religion also was stated, and adults or grown persons were distinguished from children under 12. These were the main points shown, while it was also endeavoured to elicit the numbers of schools, of blind persons, deaf persons, insane persons, idiots, lepers, and the like.

Mr. H. Beverley, *i. c. s.* the Inspector General of Assurances, was selected as the most proper officer to supervise the Census arrangements from their commencement to their close.

To facilitate operations, and to prevent any complications which might possibly attend the employment of an unpaid agency a brief Act XI (B. C.) of 1871 was passed, authorizing the local officers to appoint enumerators, and providing certain penalties for their misconduct or neglect. The Act invested the enumerators so selected with the power to collect the required information, making refusal to answer their questions on such points a penal offence. It also empowered Magistrates, under certain restrictions, to call for assistance in the matter from landholders or their agents.

The agency employed in the enumeration of the people was chosen as far as possible from among the people. The Census was thus virtually effected by the people. In Assam and Bihar indeed the enumeration was carried out through the indigenous fiscal establishments of the country, but in Bengal it was for the most part taken by indigenous agencies or private individuals owning no official allegiance to Government.

Very much was elicited by the Census and was confirmed by later inquiries regarding the various indigenous agencies still found existing in the country, which were utilized as far as possible. Old institutions, officially supposed to be long ago dead and gone, were still found to survive in many places, and rural agencies, condemned long since, were proved to exist in several parts of the country and afforded much assistance. Many private individuals also accepted office as unpaid enumerators and rendered very useful service. The Government servants of the police and registration departments, school-masters and the like, largely contributed to the result as a supervising agency.

It was hardly to be expected that the first attempt to carry out a Census in Bengal would be accomplished without exciting alarm in the minds of the people. The most absurd rumours got abroad. But, as the people were brought into contact with the Census officials, they gathered more and more of the true object in view, and many of them finally learned to laugh at their own fears. As a rule, there was no real opposition whatever: in one place only was there any serious outbreak. The most prevalent ideas, and those which

took deepest root in the minds of the people, were the anticipation of increased taxation and compulsory emigration. No general dissatisfaction, however, existed and any passive resistance that may have been made was purely local and easily overcome.

The details were, Sir G. Campbell considered, sufficiently ample and sufficiently accurate. His own feelings were, he confessed, very much those expressed by more than one district officer and entertained, he believed, by many more, viz., that they began by doubting whether the returns would be worth the paper on which they were written, and ended by thinking them wonderfully good and trustworthy.

The total area of Bengal and Assam, including the Tributary States, was found to be 248,231 square miles, with an aggregate population of 66,856,859 souls : thus—

Province.	Area in square miles.	Total population.	Average number of persons to the square mile.
Bengal ...	85,483	36,769,735	430
Bihar ...	42,417	19,736,101	465
Orissa ...	23,901	4,317,999	181
Chota Nagpur ...	43,901	3,825,571	87
Assam ...	35,130	2,207,453	63
Waste and country not censused ...	17,399		
The entire territory under the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal. ...	248,231	66,856,859	269

Of the 17,399 square miles of wild and sparsely inhabited country, of which no Census was taken, 8,343 represented the wild portion of Lakhimpur, 5,341 the Sundarbans, and 3,715 the Cachar hills. The areas of large rivers were excluded.

In all the central and western districts, including the tributary states of Orissa and Chota Nagpur, the Census was fully carried out; but it was not completely effected in some of the eastern

border districts, where there were political difficulties. The Chittagong Hill Tracts and Garo hills (so far as they owed British allegiance) being the scene of war or uneasiness, a full Census could not be taken. Some of the Assam tribes beyond the ordinary land revenue settlement were not counted; and especially in the farthest district of Upper Assam (Lakhimpur) considerable tracts of country marked as British territory and inhabited by tribes owning a theoretical allegiance, but in practice not very directly ruled, were omitted. Owing to administrative accidents the *Tarai* under the Darjeeling hills and the adjoining Bhutan Duars (ceded by Bhutan after the late war) were not properly counted. Sikhim, Hill Tippera, and the Nagas and quasi-independent tribes of Assam were neither counted nor estimated, because, though within our political system, they were not administered by us, and for the most part had not been explored. Bhutan and the Himalayan tribes to the east were wholly and entirely independent.

Altogether, under direct and indirect British administration, the population of Bengal amounted in round numbers to 67 millions; of this total, 2 millions were taken as the population of the Tributary States, in which the Rajas and Chiefs exercised jurisdiction, subject in great matters to British Courts and officers. Nearly 1,300,000 were in the Orissa Tributary *Mahals*, 400,000 in those of Chota Nagpur, and the remaining 300,000 represented the tribes on the eastern frontier imperfectly counted. This left 65 millions under direct British administration.

The Bengal provinces comprised 200,938 villages, townships or communes. The people resided in 11,383,498 houses. The average area of the lands of each commune was 1.00 square mile and the average number of souls to each commune was 325.55. The average number of souls to each house was 5.74, or rather more than 5½. The total number of Hindus in Bengal and Assam was returned as 42,674,361, and that of Muhammadans at 20,664,775. The vast majority of the latter, namely, 17½ millions, were in Lower Bengal.

There were altogether in Bengal 19,857 Europeans of all nations, of whom 11,324 were English, 3,631 Irish, and 2,356 Scotch. There were 360 Frenchmen, and 354 Germans. The American population was 2,649, the African 83, and the Australasian 19. Altogether the non-Asiatics in Bengal numbered 22,608.

Excluding Hill Tippera and the Naga and Garo Hills, in which the mere numbers of the inhabitants were estimated without distinction of sex, the population of Bengal was divided into 33,398,605 males and 33,274,740 females.

The Census of Calcutta was effected under the superintendence of the City Municipality. The returns of the population were believed not to be trustworthy. However, the population of Calcutta was taken to be at least as follows :—

Calcutta	...	...	...	447,601
The suburban municipality	...	...	...	257,149
The further suburbs, known as the north and south suburban towns	...	...	...	89,895
Howrah, on the opposite side of the river...				97,784
				<hr/> 892,429 <hr/>

From a financial point of view, the Census was extraordinarily successful. The total charges connected with it aggregated £21,600. For a population of 67 millions this was equivalent to a charge of about one farthing per head.

Port Canning was finally closed in 1871-72 and the establishments withdrawn. During the 2 previous years only 2 vessels had visited it,—and they had been driven there unwillingly by stress of weather,—while the maintenance of the Port and preventive establishment cost Government some thousands of pounds a year. The town of Port Canning was almost entirely deserted as a place of trade. After the closure of the Port, there were no complaints from the people or traders of Calcutta or foreign merchants, nor was there any reason to fear that the closing of the Matla or Port Canning harbour would cause any loss or inconvenience. The new Port Canning Company, who owned considerable properties in the almost deserted town of Canning and had lands in the neighbourhood, having succeeded to some of the property of the insolvent Company, protested : but Government did not feel warranted in taking any action on the protest.

The great feature of Sir G. Campbell's policy was his intention to "govern more actively:" and he explained fully the sense in which he used the phrase. "To govern more actively" meant to use the power and influence of the executive

more actively and decidedly in promoting and, if need be, compelling the honest performance by each class of the obligations which undoubtedly attach to it by law or otherwise, but which are too often evaded in practice ; and to apply remedies by legislation or executive action for those defects and wants which a thorough knowledge of facts may bring to light. " With this view he set out to seek information in regard to the country and the people of all degrees, and thus obtain the means of elaborating any measures which might seem to be required with greater confidence than when we are ignorant of very much that we ought to know. By the system of non-interference he means the practice of not seeking to obtain detailed information, and of deeming it enough to set up Courts of Justice, to keep the peace, and to dispose of matters which forced themselves on the attention of Government. The Lieutenant-Governor has often felt and he apprehends that others must have often felt how difficult it is to do justice to the country or to particular tracts—how impossible it must be to lay Bengal administrative questions fully before the Government of India—when the statistics of Bengal districts were and are so incomplete. As an illustration of what the Lieutenant-Governor means, it may be mentioned that we had no reliable information—even approximate—regarding the area of land under cultivation, the prevailing rent-rates, or the breadth sown with the different crops. We do not know what districts produce more food than they consume ; what districts hoard food, and what districts export food. At present, if a famine were to occur, in one part of Bengal, the Government could not tell from whence the deficiency of the famine tract could best be supplied. Less than 2 years ago, when the Government of India had before it the Sone Canal scheme, the revenue officers of Bihar were reluctantly obliged to confess that they could give no statistics of the area under the plough, of the irrigated lands, of the different crops. over the tract which was to be watered by the proposed canal. The Supreme Government had therefore to decide upon undertaking the Sone Canal without any of the information which is available in such detail from other parts of India. In regard to the population of the country and of the several districts, the Government of Bengal was very much in the dark. Houses had been counted, or were supposed to be counted, in some sort of way in most districts, at

different times during the last 30 years. But it was only during the present year that a Census of Bengal was undertaken under the orders of the Indian and the Home Governments.

“At the same time Mr. Campbell would specially wish to guard himself against the supposition that he means to claim for the present Government the ability to obtain complete information, or to suggest that previous Governments have failed to seek information. It is merely a question of degree. He believes that his predecessors had not sufficient machinery to obtain all the information they would have desired, and that a somewhat excessive reliance on the efficacy of a permanent settlement and a judicial machinery had, at one time, led some high authorities to think detailed information less necessary in Bengal than in other parts of India. He believes that one great misfortune, and some other difficulties attributable in some degree to a lack of knowledge, had convinced both the Government of India and Her Majesty's Government—he may say successive Governments—that Bengal could not be safely governed, with due regard to the lives and the happiness of the people, without a more intimate knowledge of them and their affairs; and he has considered it to be his duty and his function to seek to obtain more information than we have hitherto possessed. In that view he thinks he may assert that he had the fullest concurrence and support of the late Lord Mayo and the members of the Government of India. He believes that he only sought to follow the course marked out for him by superior authority. In doing so, he neither claims any special credit for himself nor would throw the smallest imputation of remissness on the very able men to whom he feels himself but an unworthy successor. The present Lieutenant-Governor only humbly undertakes to the best of his power that particular phase in the administration which the course of events has made, as it seems to him, imperative on any Government of Bengal at the present time.

“So far then as it is proposed to make any change in the policy which has been pursued in Bengal, the change may be described as being, in its present stage, mainly a change from a less seeking of information to a greater seeking of information, and not a change in the positive principles of Government.”

In connection then with his policy of “governing more actively,”

Sir G. Campbell set himself to "obtain information on matters on which it is of the first importance that Government should be well-informed": in one word "statistics." The Census had been admittedly a statistical work, but, without additional establishments, he refrained from aiming at statistics on a very large scale. He expressed himself as being "very anxious to get some of the agricultural statistics in which we were so sadly deficient, and which were notably wanted with reference to the great irrigation works which we had undertaken. But he felt that he must be moderate in the demands which he made from *all* districts, and for the present he purposed to confine his arrangements for more detailed agricultural statistics to 4 specimen districts in different parts of the country in which separate establishments were being organised for the purpose. Similarly, in regard to vital statistics, despairing of soon getting reliable figures for the whole country, he arranged to select in connection with the Census arrangements certain limited specimen areas of town and country in each district in which the Census had been taken with more than ordinary care, and to obtain from these vital returns for which special arrangements were in progress."

At the same time arrangements were commenced for the collection and preparation of statistics of a more general character, which, it was hoped, would fructify when sufficient establishments were available.

In accordance with the same policy, he ordered the submission of a weekly return of the agricultural prospects, the rainfall, and the state of the weather and the crops from each district, so that proper attention should be paid to the subject.

The registration of births and deaths was confined to certain selected areas, rural and urban, and Sir G. Campbell was satisfied with the results obtained. In respect of agricultural statistics 4 Deputy Collectors were appointed to acquire them from the 4 specimen districts of Birbhum, Jessore, Shahabad and Rangpur: some valuable reports were received, and some district statistical accounts were specially supplied by the district and subdivisional officers. A special Commission was also appointed to enquire into the trade and production of jute, the greatest commercial staple of Bengal: in some areas an educational Census was taken: the returns filed under



the Road Cess Act supplied information of the registration of tenures and landed property : reports of much interest on particular agricultural products such as cotton, safflower, tobacco and tea were called for : and, to supervise the whole organisation, a separate Statistical branch of the Secretariat was established, in charge of an Assistant Secretary. The condition of the *raiyats* was a subject which Sir G. Campbell considered himself specially charged to watch over and care for : and the main end and object of all his measures and inquiries was, he stated, to approach the solution of this one great question. In the same connection, he was profoundly convinced of the great importance of obtaining an adequate knowledge of the products of the country, and was much inclined to favour the idea of an economic survey. As a first step he thought it well to provide a place in which specimens of the economic, vegetable and other products of the country might be placed and made accessible to the public : and, with this view he had adapted and fixed up a building in the heart of the business portion of Calcutta, near the N. W. corner of Dalhousie Square, and the necessary arrangements undertaken for establishing an Economic Museum under a Central Committee in Calcutta, in correspondence with District Committees. It was duly opened, and for some years had but a languishing existence. The economic section now forms an annexe to the Indian Museum and has taken the place which Sir G. Campbell desired for it.

Economic  
Museum.

It was in furtherance of the policy of developing Self-Government, to accompany local taxation, that Sir G. Campbell embarked on a scheme of legislation for Municipalities. He had "always believed that while on the one hand the task of really governing India down to the villages and the people is too great for the British Government, and on the other anything like national political freedom is inconsistent with a foreign rule, we may best supplement our own deficiencies and give the people that measure of self-government and local freedom to which both their old traditions and their modern education alike point, by giving to towns and restoring to villages some sort of Municipal or communal form of self-government." As the Municipal law of the province was contained in 12 Acts, he thought it very desirable to consolidate and systematise the whole

The *Municipal*  
Municipal Bill of  
1872 : vetoed.

law on the subject, ranging Municipalities in different classes, and prescribing a suitable constitution for each, in all of which the element of Self-Government might be largely infused.

In his speech to the Council at the opening of the Legislative Session in December 1871 Sir George Campbell announced his intention to amend and consolidate the law relating to *Mufassal* Municipalities, a subject which he considered to be of the most extreme importance. He was, he said, "a great believer in Local Self-Government. Under free constitutions nothing tended so much to keep the people free, and under constitutions which were not politically free nothing did so much to help the people to some of the benefits of freedom, as decentralized local municipalities in all parts of the country. In such a country nothing so much tended to prepare the people for a measure of gradual freedom—nothing so much emancipated them from the burden of despotic rule, as the constitution of free municipalities. His Honor was most anxious that the Council should do all in their power to create municipalities not only legally, but in fact and in truth to make them, *bond fide*, as far as possible, self-governing. It is one of the main objects—he might say *the* main object—of the Bill which the Hon'ble Member would shortly explain to the Council, to foster those self-governing institutions. It might be doubtful whether these wonderful indigenous institutions, so well known in other parts of India, these little republics, these village communities, which remained intact when Empire after Empire fell to pieces, whether they ever existed to any very large extent in Bengal: it might be doubtful whether there were any such institutions so perfect here as there were elsewhere; but, though the people of Bengal have not the same experience of these institutions as the people of some other parts of the country, he believed that they are the most advanced in point of modern education and therefore his sanguine hope was that they are more prepared to accept municipal institutions as they are now constituted on western models. The efforts of Government should therefore be to create self-acting municipalities where they do not now exist. The education which had been given to the upper and middle classes of this country might or might not be the best in system, but His Honor thought that it had really created a very intelligent class of men—a class in many respects capable of

self-government; and he hoped and trusted they would find in various parts of the country many enlightened and public-spirited men who would devote themselves to the good of the country in making the most of these self-governing institutions to which he had alluded."

A Bill was accordingly introduced into Council on the 9th December 1871 which after much manipulation passed the Bengal Council on the 29th July 1872. It established various classes of Municipalities, cities, towns and rural villages, and revised the taxes which might be levied in each class, with a view to regulate more exactly their weight and incidence, and considerably to extend the scope and objects of taxation. It was made compulsory on Municipalities to provide for police, roads and education, under certain limitations, and voluntary objects of expenditure were made legal within moderate maxima, a strict maximum limit of taxation being laid down for each class of Municipality. The system of election was not included in the law, but was to be admissible under rules framed under it. Sir G. Campbell's desire was to make the Municipal Bill meet and fit into the Road Cess Act, so that they, supplemented by separate enactments for embankments and drainage, should form together a complete and as far as might be final scheme of local Government and self-taxation: by dealing with the questions of cesses for roads and education he hoped to leave scope for voluntary expansions in such a way as to avoid if possible the imposition of any further local cesses.

The Bill was vetoed by the Governor-General on the 30th January 1873. The principal reasons recorded by His Excellency were that the measure was calculated to increase municipal taxation in Bengal, and such increase was unnecessary and inexpedient at the time: that His Excellency was unable to assent to those portions of the Bill which allowed the provision of elementary education to be made obligatory upon first and second class Municipalities (i. e. on cities and towns, as distinguished from villages): that he also objected to a provision enabling Town Municipalities to give relief to the poor in time of exceptional scarcity and distress: that he thought the time had not come when it was desirable to create the machinery for the government of villages proposed in the Bill.

Seeing how broad was the principal ground on which the Viceroy

had vetoed the Municipal Bill, and how difficult it would be to devise any new municipal system which might not give rise to apprehensions of increased taxation, resulting from increased activity and extension of the system, if not from increased incidence of taxation: seeing also that he had other reforms in hand which would give his Government much occupation, Sir G. Campbell came to the conclusion that it was not expedient that he should then make another attempt to consolidate and reform the Municipal law of Bengal, and he therefore announced to his Council that he abandoned that task for the present, and would probably leave it to his successors.

The Bill had not been a contentious one, and he and his Government were much astonished when it was thus vetoed. In after years he wrote: "Lord Northbrook's dread of taxation wrecked our Municipal Bill, and the progress of local Government in Bengal, I may almost say in India, was thrown back many years. There was nothing for it but to abandon the hope of doing much in that direction. And I must say that with that hope went also the hope of doing much more in the way of reform in any direction under Lord Northbrook's *regime*."

The Viceroy had, when vetoing the Municipal Bill, suggested that in some minor points improvements might be introduced in the Bengal municipal law. He stated his belief that under Act VI (B.C.) of 1868 and the District Road Cess Act of 1871, sufficient powers then existed for the introduction into Bengal of a system under which municipal and local affairs might gradually come to be administered by bodies in which the people were represented, and said that he would favourably consider any proposal which the Legislative Council of Bengal might make to amend Act III (B. C.) of 1864 in the same direction. It was also, in His Excellency's opinion, desirable to amend the present law so as to enable Municipalities, under Acts III (B. C.) of 1864 and VI (B. C.) of 1868, voluntarily to contribute in aid of education within their districts.

A short Bill was accordingly brought into the Council and passed on the 5th April 1873 as Act II (B. C.). This Act enabled Government to provide for the election by the rate payers, and rotation, of Municipal Commissioners in the larger towns: as well as to establish and maintain schools, after providing for the police, conservancy, and

ordinary town purposes, medical relief and vaccination. The Serampore Municipality was the first to try the elective system, and a year later it was granted to Krishnagar.

It may be mentioned here that on the 11th October 1872 the Viceroy was 'pleased, on the representation of the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, to permit the title of Honorable to be borne by the Members of His Honor's Legislative Council.'

Primary Education received a great impetus from Sir G. Campbell.

Primary Education.

The Government of Bengal had first directed its attention to this subject some 10 or 12 years previously, and begun a system of instituting or aiding village *pathshalas* at a cost of Rs. 5 a month for each school. A second system of "circle" schools had also been tried, whereby 4 *pathshalas* were formed into one circle, under a trained teacher, whose business was to teach at each *pathsala* in turn and to direct the teaching of the indigenous schoolmasters. The Government *pathsala* system had been partially worked in 5 or 6 districts, and the circle school system in 1 or 2 more, when further funds were not available and the spread of Government primary schools was stopped. The Government of India was unable to grant further funds, but directed that money saved from higher education should be devoted to primary schools, and suggested that funds for village schools might be raised by local taxation as in other parts of India. Then came all the discussion previously mentioned which resulted in no educational cess being imposed on the land, and the *pathsala* system not being extended. In August 1871 the Secretary of State left the question of providing primary education for the general body of the population to the unfettered discretion of the Lieutenant-Governor. Thus on the 31st March 1872 there were in Bengal only 2451 primary schools assisted by Government with only 64,779 boys. Until the beginning of 1872-3 the budget grant stood at about Rs. 1,30,000 a year. Up to July 1872 the Lieutenant-Governor had been engaged in the Municipal Bill, one object of which was to provide for primary education in the several classes of Municipalities to be formed under the Bill. In September and October of that year Sir G. Campbell issued from Hazaribagh several Resolutions for the purpose of largely reorganizing the work of the Education Department, (by rearranging the circles of inspection &c.) and in one of these he wrote :

"The great object of the Government now is to extend primary education among the masses of the people. The Lieutenant-Governor hopes that, under arrangements now in progress, if the Municipal Bill becomes law, many villages will establish primary schools aided by Government funds; and he is prepared to take advantage of the favourable state of the Bengal finances to make a considerable additional allotment for that purpose in addition to the new grant provided for in the budget of the present year. It seems to His Honor that this scheme can only be carried out by the influence and aid of the district authorities, and that this, the most important branch of education, must of necessity be placed under their superintendence."

With a view then to making a real and substantial attempt to establish a good system of primary education of the simplest character, Sir G. Campbell put the grants for education, and especially for primary education, under the local officers, and specially allotted 4 *lakhs* from the provincial savings, to be used in developing primary education, in addition to the other grants already made for the same purpose, 1 *lakh* to be spent in 1872-3 and the other 3 *lakhs* in 1873-4. The total allotment for primary education was to stand at Rs. 5,30,000 a year. It was calculated that, at an average of Rs. 40 to Rs. 50 per school, the 3 *lakhs* would suffice to establish 6000 to 7000 schools. The scope and intention of the measure will appear from the following extracts from a Resolution of the 30th September 1872:—

"The Lieutenant-Governor hopes that by the end of 1873-74 the new municipal system will be so far established that a considerable portion of the burden now assumed by Government may be taken over by the Municipalities of considerable and prosperous villages, and that Town Municipalities will be able to support or render self-supporting some of the schools of a higher class which now absorb a large share of the educational grant. In this way Government money, in addition to that already saved, will be made available for poorer and more backward places.

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"The Lieutenant-Governor's wish is that the money now granted should be used to encourage and develop in rural villages proper indigenous education, that is, reading, writing, arithmetic in the real indigenous language and character of each province. He would not, as a rule, think it necessary to employ highly trained masters on considerable salaries. He would rather give money as a grant-in-aid to men of the purely indigenous schoolmaster class, provided each keeps up in a place where it is required, and among a population of cultivators

and labourers, a school efficient according to native standards, and submits it to inspection and examination. Perhaps for such purposes an allowance of Rs. 2 or 3 *per mensem* will in many cases suffice, more especially in places where the village or landlord or other party interested is willing to make up the remainder of the ordinary Rs. 5 *pathsala* grant. Recently the Lieutenant-Governor has sanctioned four 2½ Rs. *pathsala* grants in Tippera on the application of a *samindar*, who has agreed to give the other 2½ Rs. for each school himself. It is hoped that in all wards' estates the Court of Wards will be able to double any share of the present grant that may be allotted for schools in these estates. Where no such aid is available, and where the people are poor and backward, a larger Government grant may be given; but no grant to a village school is to exceed Rs. 5 *per mensem*. With such a basis, and some receipts from fees or gratuities, a village school will be established. Those places should be selected where the need is greatest, and where the people are ready to help themselves to some extent; places already provided for being left to themselves for the present, or only assisted in a moderate degree on condition of inspection and improved methods. In places where, though immediate assistance is not available, a municipal organization may be shortly expected, the maximum of Rs. 5 *per mensem* may be given, provided the leading men promise as far as they can to contribute a share when a Municipality is constituted. But of all things must be avoided a grant which may be used to turn out clerks and attorneys; education of that kind is separately provided for.

"The only languages to be taught in *pathsalas* should be Bengali, Hindi, Assamese, and Oorya, in their respective provinces, and the aboriginal languages in some of the districts where there is a large aboriginal population using their languages, as the Kols of Chota Nagpur, the Sonthals of the Sonthal *Parganas*, the Khasias of the Khasia hills, the Khamtis, Cacharis, and others in Assam and the Lepchas of Darjeeling.

"Where Muhammadans preponderate in the population, the Lieutenant-Governor will not object to the grant to their *maktabs* of aid similar to that officer given to the *pathsalas* or common village schools, provided a useful primary education is really given. But the impression the Lieutenant Governor has derived from all he has seen of many indigenous *pathsalas* in such districts is, that the lower classes of the Muhammadans resort much more freely to the common vernacular schools than their higher classes do to the English schools; and he considers that it is better for all parties that they should continue to do so

"Newly appointed teachers of village schools, whether *gurus* or

Muhammadans, should be attached for some months to training classes at the district or sub-divisional head-quarters, either before they set up their schools or at the next rice-sowing season, or at such convenient opportunities as may offer themselves. Village school-masters when under instruction at training classes will be allowed to draw the Government grant just as if they were present with their school.

"The Lieutenant-Governor is fully aware that to people who see only the expensive Government and aided schools in Bengal towns, or to those who know the Government village schools of some other parts of India, it may seem a sanguine view to hope that any system of rural education can be successfully based upon Government monthly grants of only Rs. 5, 4, and 3 *per mensem* to each school. He is aware that in western and central India the Government wages of village schoolmasters range from Rs. 8 to Rs. 25 a month, while in northern India there are it is believed, few village school-masters who draw less than Rs. 8 a month from Government. But Mr. Campbell believes that in most districts of Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa, though unhappily too rare in so great populations, there are still scores, if not hundreds, of petty village school-masters who keep village schools of 15 to 30 boys and girls, and who maintain themselves and their families from the fees, in money or in kind, which the parents may be able to afford. If a boy's father is well-to-do, he gives the *guru* 2, 3, or 4 annas a month; if he is poor, he gives one anna or a couple of *seers* of rice a month. Boys of very poor parents or orphans are often taught by the *guru* without any fee. This is the kind of educational agency Government finds ready to its hand in Bengal villages; these are the schools which ordinary villagers are accustomed to, and for which they have a regard. One of these *gurus* would certainly find his position immensely improved by a Government or Municipal grant of Rs. 30, 40, or 50 a year. \* \* \* \* \*

"What is wanted is to teach ordinary village boys enough to enable them to take care of their own interests in their own station of life, as petty shop-keepers, small land-holders, *raiyats*, handicraftsmen, weavers, village headmen, boatmen, fishermen, and what not. It is beyond all things desirable not to impart at village schools that kind of teaching which, in a transition state of society, might induce boys to think themselves above manual labor or ordinary village work. \* \*

"The only restrictions he would insist upon are that not more than Rs. 5 *per mensem* of public money should be given to any one school; that the vernacular only is taught in any school receiving a *pathsala* grant; that every *pathsala* is open to inspection and sends in such simple quarterly statements as may be required; and that any grant is liable to suspension or withdrawal if the school is not properly kept up.



"In selecting existing *pathshalas* for grants, the Magistrate and the subdivisional officer would be guided by various considerations; they would give some grants to old established *pathshalas* which were specially large and successful; they would give some grants to *pathshalas* which were situate in large villages, but had heretofore been badly off owing to the poverty of the inhabitants; they would give some grants to newly planted *pathshalas* of which the *gurus* were especially efficient and active. \* \* \* The Magistrate and the subdivisional officer would select for the new *pathshalas* the largest villages unoccupied by any school. No *pathsala* grant would be given to any village which would not provide a house or hut of the ordinary kind used in the village for the reception of the school. When the villages were selected, the next question would be to find teachers. If possible, the Magistrate or subdivisional officer would choose men of the ordinary *gurumahasay* class; or of the *miahji* class and a new school-master should always be, if possible, a resident of the village or its neighbourhood.

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"It would be a condition of appointment of a new village school-master, and of any grant of the master of an existing school, that he should, if called upon, attend the normal class for a time, leaving a substitute in charge of the school.

"Pending the establishment of Municipalities, it will probably be best to establish a moderate number of schools here and there as examples all over the district, and to select a limited tract for a more full experiment.

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"When the system develops, when the rural Municipalities undertake schools with Government assistance, when the demands for and means of education increase, more money may be available, and we may attempt more schools. The object of the present grant is to make a beginning of mass education in the country, and the Lieutenant-Governor hopes to be assured that the money is well-spent".

At the same time, Sir G. Campbell revised the scholarship rules and arranged a system of scholarships, so as to enable clever and deserving boys to climb from the lowest to the highest stage. Scholarships were for the first time awarded to primary schools. The various stages of schools were established so that "the gifted son of a *raiyat* or labourer may become a distinguished engineer or physician, or agriculturist, or administrator of high degree, or a Judge of the Highest Court", being educated thereto at the public expense, through scholarships. At the same time, great care was to be taken that the prizes held out to remarkable boys in primary schools were

quite exceptional, and that the mass of boys were not led to look beyond their own callings. It was therefore very carefully provided that the subjects of examination in these primary schools should be confined to the simple subjects really sought by the mass of the people.

The system of primary education thus introduced was afterwards generally acknowledged to have succeeded beyond the anticipations of the most sanguine. By the end of 1873, the total grant for primary education had increased to nearly 8 *lakhs*, and 10,787 village schools, old and new, with 255,728 scholars had been brought under the Government scheme. By the 31st. March 1874 there were 12,229 primary schools and 303,437 pupils. The new *pathshalas* were reported to vary greatly in their pretensions and efficiency; but the general standard aimed at was that laid down by Government, being confined for the most part to reading and writing in the vernaculars, with native arithmetic and accounts. Where English arithmetic had crept in and gained a footing, it was said to be generally preferred. Sir G. Campbell thus wrote, at the end of 1873 :

“Village communities and individuals are invited to set up schools with Government assistance. The plan is to grant to village school-masters, who maintain tolerably efficient schools in the native fashion and submit to a certain amount of inspection and control, a subsidy or grant-in-aid for schools of an adequate salary, but which, eked out by fees and customary emoluments, may enable them to live. The grant is usually no more than from 2 to 3 or 4 Rs. per month, say on an average 5, 6, or 7 shillings per month, or a capitation allowance amounting to about as much ; and at this rate a little money goes a long way. A certain sum has been allotted to each district, which the Magistrates and local Committees distribute to deserving school-masters who set up and maintain schools on these principles.

“This scheme has succeeded beyond all expectation. Both the school-masters and the people have received it with a sort of enthusiasm. The people in districts which were supposed to be Bæotian, in respect of the absence not only of education but of all desire for education, have suddenly shown an avidity for the instruction offered to them which could not have been anticipated. Decent school-masters are forthcoming in sufficient numbers to take up all the grants available, and the full number of schools of which our means admit have been already established in almost every district or very nearly so. Both our officers and the native public fully admit and appreciate the success of the

scheme. The educational officers themselves, at first very little inclined to take a hopeful view of the plan, now admit that it has so far succeeded. The few objectors are only those who are wedded to the old system by which a few profited at the expense of the many."

A definite policy was also pursued by Sir G. Campbell in respect of Higher Education. The Government of India had in past years very earnestly drawn attention to the disproportionately large share of the Government educational funds enjoyed by the Bengal Colleges, and the Secretary of State had directed that 2 full Government Colleges should not be maintained too close to one another when there was so much difficulty in providing funds for primary education. Moreover Sir G. Campbell wished to give effect to the intentions of the Calcutta University to introduce physical science more largely into its course by having physical and natural science taught at other Colleges. Reductions were carried out in the Berhampore, Krishnagar and Sanskrit Colleges, which provoked some expressions of dissatisfaction among the upper and literate classes of Bengal. Sir G. Campbell's policy was to reduce the number of Colleges educating up to the highest point, concentrating in the remainder improved means of the highest education. The reduced Colleges were not abolished, but were still efficiently maintained to teach up to the point to which experience proved that the greatest demand existed i. e. up to the First Arts standard. The Presidency College and the Hooghly College were specially strengthened and the construction of a new Presidency College was sanctioned. Sir G. Campbell was very far from wishing to discourage 'what was called high-class education.' But he thought it would 'not be consistent with the duty which we owed to the mass of the people of this country, that we should devote a wholly disproportionate sum to the higher class of education only. Therefore, if we were to do our duty, that was to say, apportion the sums at our disposal rateably and fairly between the higher class of education and the education of the masses, then we must subtract something from the sums devoted to higher education, or by some means obtain the means of adding to our educational resources.' Certain memorials having been presented against Sir G. Campbell's educational policy, the Government of India supported it and showed that his measures were not in

antagonism to the policy of the Home Government or to the broad interests of the population of India. The Secretary of State concurred with this view and cordially approved the steps taken by Sir G. Campbell to give a more practical tone to education in Bengal. 'The advance which has been made in the encouragement of the primary instruction of the people is also a subject for congratulation.'

Sir G. Campbell felt the difficulty of providing funds for the permanent maintenance of the system of primary  
Educational Finance. education, for the cost of which he had arranged

for 2 years. He had understood the principle of local rating for education to have been sanctioned by the Secretary of State, but had thought it desirable to refrain from imposing a compulsory rate for education in the *mufassal* where the Road Cess was levied, and the Viceroy had refused his assent to provisions for imposing such an obligation on towns and for enabling rural communes voluntarily to raise funds for the purpose. Thus the Bengal Government could have no rating for education at all.

"It follows that these provinces are in exactly the same position as when the discussion first commenced, having no funds for primary education, unless they can be given from the general revenues. The Lieutenant-Governor has, out of exceptional savings, made a small provision for primary schools during the present year. But no such savings can be expected in coming years, and there has been no successful step made to meet permanently the difficulty that Bengal has no funds for establishing, aiding and maintaining primary schools for the 65 millions of its subjects."

The management of the Jails in Bengal was a subject which greatly occupied Sir George Campbell's thoughts.  
Jails.

The principles which he considered should guide the department were enumerated in various Minutes, and changes of a radical nature, resulting from the altered policy which he thought it right to adopt, were effected in jail administration. Thus, in appointing Mr. W. L. Heeley, c. s., a judicial officer of experience, to officiate as Inspector-General of Jails, a principal object which the Lieutenant-Governor had in view was that he should look into the subject from a judicial point of view, that is, ascertain whether the objects for which judicial sentences were passed, viz. the due punishment of

crime and prevention of future crime, were attained, or, if there were defects in this respect, devise a remedy. In the same Minute Sir G. Campbell expressed his opinion that manufactures and sanitary considerations had been too exclusively regarded; that the judicial side of the jail question (i. e. the penal effect of imprisonment and its concomitants) had been more or less lost sight of; that the punishment of short term prisoners was not sufficiently stinging; that, in sub-divisional lock-ups especially, there was no punishment except restraint; that skilled workmen were put on labour which was more profitable than penal; that educated prisoners, whatever their crimes, were promoted to easy places of trust; that prisons were generally made too comfortable; and that classification scarcely existed. On another occasion he noted with dissatisfaction the laxity of discipline among the paid warders, and in a third Minute he condemned the existing jails as totally unsuited to any proper system of classification, describing a Bengal jail as "a complete liberty-hall"; he disapproved of the hiring-out of prisoners to municipalities and private persons, the insufficient separation of under-trial prisoners from those under sentence, and the inadequacy of the existing guards to prevent outbreaks; and he expressed his general policy as follows—

"I think that upon the whole the best course will be to push on rapidly the central jails now in course of construction; to employ a large number of prisoners on these jails and on the canal works at Dehri; and to do what we can to make safe and capable of discipline the Alipore jail which is in fact a great central jail without any of the appliances of a central jail. The arrangement proposed would withdraw a large number of prisoners from the ordinary jails, and I would then take advantage of the reduction of numbers to make the existing jails, or as many of them as are in any way tolerable, serve our purpose for the present as well as may be, instead of attempting to build new-fashioned jails all over the country at once. With reduced numbers we may at any rate provide separate wards for under-trial prisoners, and perhaps for 1 or 2 other classes whom it is desirable to keep separate."

Defects existed also in the arrangements of the jails themselves, and, after having seen a good many of the jails in Bengal, Sir G. Campbell was more than ever convinced of the great difficulties that existed for the segregation of the several classes of prisoners, as well as of prisoners under trial, from convicted prisoners. Partitions had been so universally cleared away and the enclosures had been so

generally thrown into one, and all attempt at separation of prisoners in separate yards so completely abandoned, that, to introduce anything like the regular system prevailing in other provinces in India and other countries, the work would have had to be entered on afresh. The large commissions, moreover, allowed to jailors had led them to consider their charges as really manufacturing establishments and prisoners as people to be indulged so long as they kept the manufacture going. It also appeared that extramural labour had been allowed, whenever it was profitable, by prisoners being hired out to municipalities and even to private persons. These practices were stopped in all cases except where extramural employment of this kind had been specially sanctioned.

Where there was an attempt to separate under-trial from convicted prisoners, the common practice had been to keep the under-trial and non-labouring prisoners together. These non-labouring prisoners were for the most part men confined as notorious bad-characters in default of security, and were certainly the worst companions for under-trial or any other prisoners. It was therefore absolutely necessary that immediate arrangements should be made to keep the under-trial prisoners entirely separate. It further did not appear that in working hours the convicted prisoners were classified with any reference whatever to their offences: they were only arranged with reference to their working capacities. At night they were necessarily locked up in separate barracks, and some attempt at classification sometimes was or might be made.

After full and careful consideration of the whole matter, it was decided to push on rapidly the central jails then in course of construction; and to carry out the general policy above described.

Sir G. Campbell also placed the district jails immediately under the control of the district Magistrates who had previously been, in common with other civil officers, only in the position of official visitors. This measure was soon attended with important and useful results, one being that it placed both the jail and police departments under one head, thus putting a stop to many disputes which had hitherto somewhat frequently arisen.

The sanitary question in jails was the most difficult of all. Looking to the terrible mortality that had prevailed in Indian jails,

and in none more than in some of those in Bengal. Sir G. Campbell felt that it was inevitable that much should be sacrificed if it was necessary to do so, in order to avoid such destruction of human life. If it were a mere matter of sanitary rule, as some people would have it believed; if it could be secured that a jail built on sanitary principles would be healthy, while one not so built was unhealthy, Government might feel constrained to spend all their money on new jails and to take the consequences. The contrary was notoriously the case. He had known many jails, native buildings, and such like, contrary to all the laws of sanitation, comparatively healthy; and he had known prisoners die like rotten sheep in the finest modern buildings. By care in various ways the general result might be improved but how to ensure perfectly healthy jails was not known. Under all these circumstances, he was not prepared to sacrifice every thing to a very doubtful sanitation. The Government did what it could, but for the time, at any rate, it accepted a moderately excessive death-rate, and secured a good amount of discipline and a moderate amount of labour for all prisoners, and really severe punishment for a moderate proportion of them.

The central jails then existing were the Presidency jail, the Alipore jail and the European Penitentiary at Hazaribagh, while other central jails were in course of construction at Bhagalpur, Midnapore and Hazaribagh. Sir G. Campbell regarded the subject of jails as a very great and difficult work: he did not claim that they had been made satisfactory or soon would be, but that very great and beneficial improvements were being carried out in the buildings and in the discipline and method of their administration.

Sir G. Campbell found a system in force by which the Heads of Departments—Inspectors General and Director of Public Instruction—had in some respects exercised a large authority almost independent of Government control: whereas he was anxious that district officers should not have too many masters and that the head of the district should control the local departments. He therefore introduced changes to make the Heads of Departments the agents and inspectors on the part of Government, bound to aid, counsel, and guide local officers, each in his own department, without exercising local authority over them, and to criticise, collate,

Position of  
Magistrate-Collector:  
subordination of the police.

and compare local facts for the information of Government. His policy with regard to the position of the Magistrate-Collectors must be stated in his own words. It was his wish "to render the heads of districts, the Magistrate-Collectors, no longer the drudges of many departments and masters of none but in fact the general controlling authority over all departments in each district. On no subject had he formed an opinion more deliberately. The Orissa Famine Commission took this view and all that he had since thought and seen has confirmed Mr. Campbell in the opinion which he then shared. He might almost say that it was his belief that, all over India, the departments were ruining the empire. Everywhere the same complaint was heard—in the Panjab and the N. W. provinces, as in Madras and Bombay—that the district officers were not what they were, that their power and their influence have gone from them. There is less of such complaint in Bengal because there the days when such power and influence existed are so remote as to be almost lost to memory. But in a country where, as has been explained, we have in fact asserted our authority less completely than anywhere else in India, and where the people of the remote interior are in a more native (so to express it) condition, the concentration of authority and the personal rule so consonant to oriental habits and feelings are, in the Lieutenant-Governor's opinion, even more required than elsewhere. Departments are excellent servants, but, as he considers, very bad masters. He has therefore striven to make the Magistrate-Collector of a great Bengal district, generally comprising  $1\frac{1}{2}$  to  $2\frac{1}{2}$  millions of inhabitants, the real executive chief and administrator of the tract of country committed to him, and supreme over every one and every thing, except the proceedings of the Courts of Justice. As district Magistrate, he is also head of the department of criminal justice which is charged with the summary trial of small cases and the inquiry into greater cases previous to trial at Sessions, although he generally rather distributes and superintends this work than does a large share of it himself."

With regard to the subordination of the police to the Magistrate, he wrote in no less uncertain tone. There was still a good deal of the old feeling in the police which gave rise to a longing for independence and occasional antagonism, while many Magistrates insufficiently exercised the powers which they really possessed, not feeling very sure of their ground. Sir G. Campbell aimed at making quite clear the thorough subordination of the police to the Magistrate for all and every purpose. He wished to enable all capable



Magistrates to exercise their power to the full without hesitation or misgiving, and the police officers to feel that their position was in no degree equivocal, and that the situation must be accepted. In issuing rules regarding police procedure in criminal cases, he pointed out the relation of the police to the district Magistrate "whose hands in fact they were." They were the proper agency for him to use for all purposes connected with the peace, order, and conservancy of the district, the regulation of public assemblies, and other matters of district management, such for instance as looking after the state of the roads. In all duties in which he required it, the Magistrate was to receive from the police active and loyal assistance, while he would on the other hand be responsible that the police were not improperly employed. Further, looking at the intimate relations existing between the Magistrate and police, it was ordered that he should be consulted in regard to their appointments and promotions, and a set of rules regulating the procedure in these matters was drawn up and promulgated. Subsequently also District Superintendents of police were prohibited from corresponding direct with the Inspector-General of Police or his Deputies; all matters, except accounts and returns, were ordered to be sent through the Magistrate of the district, except when that officer during his absence had given orders to forward any particular case.

With his experience of other parts of India, Sir G. Campbell was much struck with the want—which put district officers at a very great disadvantage—of any local executive establishments corresponding to the *talukdari*, *tahsildari* or *mamlatdari* officials elsewhere.

He early recorded his opinion that it was not desirable to pay young uncovenanted officers £250 or £300 *per annum* for learning their duty by vivisection, and that it was an extraordinary anomaly that, while covenanted servants passed many examinations before entering the service, uncovenanted servants should enter without any examination at all. He set himself therefore to create an organised service, supplementary to the existing Subordinate Executive Service, to give executive establishments for subdivisions, and thereby enable the district officers to administer the country more completely. He proposed at the outset to have 100 sets of subdivisional establishments and divide them into 3 grades, 33 first

\*  
Subordinate  
executive esta-  
blishments—  
Native Civil  
Service.

class, 33 second, 34 third, composed of Sub-Deputy Collectors, Kanungos, chainmen, and messengers, at a cost of about 2 *lakhs per annum*. The Government of India at first sanctioned 20 Sub-Deputies as an experimental measure, and subsequently the whole scheme, granting towards it one *lakh* a year from Imperial revenues, being "satisfied that the establishments proposed are actually required." The Secretary of State anticipated "the best results from the increased means of efficiency now afforded to the subordinate administration of the Government of Bengal." Sir G. Campbell laid it down that the new establishments should not be employed as mere clerks in office, but as executive agents to help the district and sub-divisional officers: they were to be employed actively for executive, statistical, and (where magisterial powers were given) judicial work. The appointments to these establishments were made from among the men qualified by examination for the Native Civil Service, which Sir G. Campbell instituted. For entrance into this service he prescribed a form of examination, open to all candidates allowed to present themselves in accordance with certain rules. Besides the usual tests of educational attainments and character, he laid down that "candidates for appointments of over Rs 100 a month must show that they can ride at least 12 miles at a rapid pace; candidates for inferior posts must have a similar qualification or be able to walk 12 miles within  $3\frac{1}{2}$  hours without difficulty or prostration." This test of physical energy gave rise to some comment and mirth, owing to its novelty and to the discomfiture of some of the candidates, but the propriety of requiring it was generally admitted. Classes for teaching the prescribed subjects were opened in the principal schools and colleges, and a Civil Service College was established at Hooghly. Promotion was to be made from the lower to the higher grade of the Native Civil Service, according to merit, and Sir G. Campbell pledged himself that, whenever possible, Deputy Magistrate-Collectors would be selected from the Sub-Deputies and that men would not, without good and special reason, be taken from outside for these places by mere exercise of patronage. In spite of the attractions thus held out, he found his scheme to be unpopular with the public press. "The reason however is, he believes, not far to seek. An opening-wide of the door of employment must be unpopular with the classes who have hither-

to had a sort of monopoly of high office; and, just as in England competition and selection by merit were very unpopular with the classes who had previously provided for their sons through patronage, the present measure is unpopular with the upper 10,000 of Bengal, whom the organs alluded to chiefly represent." Examinations were held annually during Sir G. Campbell's administration and for some time afterwards, for admission into the Native Civil Service, but later other arrangements were made for supplying the vacancies in the Subordinate Executive Service.

It was in 1871-72 that surveys were undertaken with a view to establish railway communication from the north bank of the Ganges with the districts in the direction of Darjeeling. More than 1000 miles of proposed and alternative railways were surveyed, and it was reported that along any of these routes a narrow gauge railway could be constructed for about £6000 a mile. Preliminary surveys were made for a line from a point on the Ganges opposite to one of the principal stations of the Eastern Bengal line, through the rich and populous districts of North Bengal, several of which had a population exceeding 600 per square mile, and which produced enormous quantities of jute, rice, tobacco, sugar, silk and other staples. The line would, it was said, open up a country of great commercial importance sealed up for 8 months of the year, and most inaccessible to the officers of Government and other travellers at all seasons. It would run up to the foot of the Hímalayas and terminate among the tea gardens of the *Tarai* under the hill stations of Darjeeling and Kurseong. The report of the engineers was very favourable to the construction of a cheap line. The Government of India, in November 1872, accepted Sir G. Campbell's views that the Northern-Bengal Railway ought to be undertaken, and that the line advocated by the Bengal Government and the engineer (Major Lindsay, R. E.) was the best that could be chosen. They suggested that branches to Rangpur, Bogra, Dinajpur and other centres of trade would soon be found necessary when the trunk line was formed. Sir G. Campbell also contemplated an extension towards Assam. By the end of March 1873 the whole length of the Northern Bengal Railway of 204 miles was staked out, and before the end of that year, in consequence of the precarious prospects of the crops in the districts through which

the line would run, the Government of India sanctioned the immediate commencement of work, and many famine labourers were relieved by employment on the railway embankments. Extensions to Kuch Bihar and up the Tista valley were also suggested. Labour was at no time very abundant: the people were not largely attracted to the railway works because the line did not run through the most distressed tracts as they subsequently became defined; the demand for labour was most marked in Dinajpur and Bogra. Nevertheless, great progress was made before the rains of 1874.

The Garo hills formed the most western portion of the hilly country between Assam on one side and the Sylhet and Mymensingh districts on the other. They were still marked as unexplored on the maps and were inhabited by a people of unquiet and marauding character, never yet subdued by any power and prone to commit depredations from the earliest times of our rule. A considerable portion of the hills had been brought within the pale of regular Government, but communities of independent Garos continued to commit outrages on our dependent villages, so that Sir G. Campbell felt compelled with regard to the peace of the neighbouring districts to propose to terminate their partial independence. He thought the pear was ripe, and that a savage enclosure within our frontier should be terminated. An expedition was sanctioned, and was most successful. The expeditionary force of 500 armed police, supported by 3 companies of regular troops, was divided into 3 columns, 2 of which entered the hills from the Goalpara and Mymensingh districts, and the third started from Tura under the Deputy Commissioner of the Garo hills about the middle of November 1872. With little bloodshed or loss the independent country was completely occupied and subjected. The tribes seemed to be taken by surprise and submitted without any serious fight. Armed police posts were established, the ordinary petty tribute paid by the hill people was exacted and complete arrangements were made by the Deputy Commissioner, suitable to a simple people, for the administration of the territory, which gave no further trouble to the Government of Bengal.

About this time too the Daflas along the Durrang and North Lakhimpur borders of Assam came into notice by perpetrating a raid in February 1872 on Dafla colonists in British territory, killing 2 persons and carrying off 44 with their

The Garo expedition.

The Daflas.

property. The local police failed to obtain satisfaction ; so relations with the Daffas were broken off, their passes were blockaded, and measures to bring them to terms or punish them were carried out by a considerable force furnished by the Assam regiments. But the matter passed out of the hands of the Lieutenant-Governor, on the formation of the separate Assam Administration.

The subject of the sale of Waste Lands came before Sir G. Campbell, and the history of the question may be briefly recapitulated here, as it was for a long time one of much importance in Bengal. Lord Canning's Minute of 17th October 1861 laid down 3 main principles on which grants of waste lands were to be made in future. These were, *first*, that "in any case of application for such lands, they shall be granted in perpetuity as a heritable and transferable property, subject to no enhancement of land revenue assessment"; *second*, that "all prospective land revenue will be redeemable at the grantee's option by a payment in full when the grant is made, or, at the grantee's option, a sum may be paid as earnest at the rate of 10 per cent, leaving the unpaid portion of the price of the grant, which will then be under hypothecation until the price is paid in full;" and *third*, that "there shall be no condition obliging the grantee to cultivate or clear any specific portion after grant within any specific time." The minimum price for the fee simple was fixed at Rs. 2-8-0 or 5 shillings per acre, so that, by paying 10 per cent of this, or 6d per acre, a title was obtained. Moreover, many large tracts were obtained by speculation in anticipation of measurement for a merely nominal payment. A despatch from the Secretary of State subsequently required, in addition to these provisions, that grants should be surveyed before sale, and that all sales should be by auction to the highest bidders above a fixed upset price.

There were, besides these, other sets of waste lands rules, sanctioned at different times for the whole or parts of Bengal:—viz. rules for the grant of waste lands in the Sundarbans, issued in 1863; rules for the grant of waste lands in Darjeeling, dated 1859; rules for the sale of waste lands in the Assam and Dacca Divisions: the Old Assam waste land lease rules of 1854; the new Assam settlement rules, which left a wide discretion as to the terms on which waste land should be leased to *rai-yats*.

Unfortunately in granting waste lands many abuses were allowed to occur. There was a great rush upon tea-planting; speculators bought upon credit Government wastes wherever they could get them, and Government officers were so far carried away by the mania that they relaxed the rules as to surveying wastes before they were sold, and in other particulars. It followed that large areas of wastes were sold to jobbers, who transferred them at a profit, or threw them up if they could not do that; while in many cases cultivated lands, not regularly settled, were sold as "Government waste lands" over the heads of the occupiers. In other cases, lands beyond the British border; in others again, valuable forest-lands, were sold under the waste land rules. Before Sir G. Campbell came to Bengal attention had been directed to this matter, and in Chittagong especially mistakes had been recognized. There had in more than one instance been risk of grave disturbance with frontier tribes on account of ill-judged sales of waste land in the occupation of border people. To prevent complications Sir G. Campbell published in August 1871 *ad interim* rules, and orders were passed that no more land should be sold revenue-free in perpetuity without the previous sanction of the Government of India, excepting any such small plots not exceeding 10 acres in extent as might be required for buildings or gardens.

In March 1873 Sir G. Campbell proposed new rules for leasing and for selling waste land, and recommended their immediate promulgation so that the tea industry might go on. He at the same time suggested that a special enactment should be passed securing the rights of Government in waste lands, and giving legal effect to the rules which might be passed; and he pointed out that the only Waste Lands Act as yet passed by the Indian Legislature had operated to extinguish private rights, and to throw upon the public treasury the burden of compensating any right-holders who might make good their claims after sale had taken place. The Government of India passed orders on the draft rules in August 1873. They held special legislation not to be necessary; they generally approved Sir G. Campbell's rules, subject to certain alterations in detail; they directed that the Government law officers should be consulted as to the best way of securing the rights of Government, and as to the form of deeds-of-sale; and they directed that the rules should be arranged so as to keep the provisions which concerned purchasers

separate from those which were for the guidance of public officers. All these requirements were met, the rules for the sale of waste lands were re-cast and re-issued. Sir G. Campbell laid down that no sale should be allowed till the land had been surveyed and examined, that no land should be sold over the heads of natives in effective occupation and that land bearing valuable forest or supposed to contain minerals should not be sold without special reference to Government. Lease rules were not formulated but were dealt with according to the merits of each particular case. The Western Duars were excluded from the operation of the general rules for the sale of waste lands, a late Commissioner having remarked that "these Duars will hereafter be the finest property in Hindustan" as they had a magnificent soil and an abundant water supply.

In 1872-3 agrarian troubles broke out in the district of Pabna in Eastern Bengal, accompanied by considerable breaches of the peace. The disturbances originated in the Sirajganj sub-division of that district. The actual rental of the estates in the disturbed *pargana* had not been raised for some years, but the *zamindars* were in the habit of realizing heavy cesses of various sorts, which had gone on for so long that it was scarcely clear what portion of their collections was rent and what illegal cesses. Whereas under the law rents could only be enhanced by a regular process after notice duly given in the previous year, no such notices had been served in Pabna, but the *zamindars*, or many of them, attempted irregularly to effect a large enhancement both by direct increase of rent and by the consolidation of rent and cesses; and besides this enhancement they stipulated that the *raiya*t were to pay all cesses that might be imposed by Government, and that occupancy-*raiya*t should be made liable to ejectment if they quarrelled with their *zamindar*—conditions which the *raiya*t might very properly resist. The recent inquiries with respect to illegal exactions by *zamindars*, and the apprehended extension to the district of the Road Cess Act, under which the rental was registered, induced the *zamindars* to try to persuade their tenants to give them written engagements. Some *zamindars* in 1872 actually succeeded in this, and the terms of the engagements granted were very unfair to the *raiya*t. These were partially registered, but before the process was complete they repudiated the authority of the registering

agent. The difficulties were enhanced by disputes as to measurement, which all over Bengal had always afforded a fertile source of quarrel between landlord and tenant, there being no uniform standard and the local measuring-rod varying from *pargana* to *pargana* and almost from village to village. In Pabna especially there was extreme diversity of measuring standards. All the *zamindars* were not equally bad, but there were undoubtedly some among them who resorted to illegal pressure and strongly attempted illegal enhancement; in the cases where the shares were much sub-divided also special oppression was practised and the quarrels among the sharers themselves had not a little to do with the outbreaks.

At first, the *raiya*s gave way for the most part, but later one or two villages, which had not been so submissive, gained successes in the courts. One village stood out from the first; certain suits for enhanced rents were rejected on appeal after having been won in the Munsif's court; a *raiya* kidnapped had been liberated and the *zamindar* punished. These and other successes gradually turned the scale, and there was a reaction against exorbitant demands after the first surprise was over. In the spring the *raiya*s commenced to organize themselves for systematic resistance. In May, the league spread, and by the month of June it had spread over the whole of the *pargana*. The *raiya*s calmly organized themselves into *bidrohi*, (= rebels,) as they styled themselves, a word which might be interpreted into unionists,—under the influence of an intelligent leader and petty land-holder, and peaceably informed the Magistrates that they had united. The terms held out by the league were very tempting, viz: the use of a very large *bigha* of measurement and very low rent, and it was not therefore necessary to resort to much intimidation to induce fresh villages to join. In some instances, intimidation was resorted to with this object. Towards the latter end of June 1872 emissaries were sent in all directions to extend the league and large bands of villagers were formed. No doubt, persons who owed any private grudges, or bad characters for the sake of plunder, took advantage of the assemblies collecting to turn them to their own ends, and to commit the excesses that certainly occurred in several quarters, but of which very exaggerated reports were circulated. Serious outrages by *bona fide* tenants were not very numerous, and but a few houses were actually burnt and plundered.



The stories of murders and of other outrages that were current were without foundation. No one in the sub-division of Sirajganj was seriously hurt during the disturbances; no *zamindar's* house or principal office was attacked, and nothing of considerable value was stolen. Such cases of violent crime as did occur were due to the criminal class who took advantage of the excitement. At Rangpur Sir G. Campbell heard that the uncomfortable relations of the *raiya*s and *zamindars* in Pabna were likely to lead to serious disturbance; at Goalundo he met the Magistrate and fully satisfied himself of the course of action being adopted by the authorities. Upon his return to Calcutta, he issued the following Proclamation under date the 4th of July:—

“Whereas in the district of Pabna, owing to attempts of *zamindars* to enhance rents and combinations of *raiya*s to resist the same, large bodies of men have assembled at several places in a riotous and tumultuous manner, and serious breaches of the peace have occurred—*This* is very gravely to warn all concerned that, while on the one hand the Government will protect the people from all force and extortion, and the *zamindars* must assert any claims they may have by legal means only, on the other hand the Government will firmly repress all violent and illegal action on the part of the *raiya*s and will strictly bring to justice all who offend against the law, to whatever class they belong.

“The *raiya*s and others who have assembled are hereby required to disperse, and to prefer peaceably and quietly any grievances they may have. If they so come forward, they will be patiently listened to: but the officers of Government cannot listen to rioters; on the contrary, they will take severe measures against them.

“It is asserted by the people who have combined to resist the demands of the *zamindars* that they are to be the *raiya*s of Her Majesty the Queen, and of Her only. These people, and all who listen to them, are warned that the Government cannot and will not interfere with the rights of property as secured by law; that they must pay what is legally due from them to those to whom it is legally due. It is perfectly lawful to unite in a peaceable manner to resist any excessive demands of the *zamindars*, but it is not lawful to unite to use violence and intimidation.”

While the attitude of Government was thus made clear, measures were taken for the restoration of peace and order. Extra police were despatched to the district, whereupon rioting ceased almost immediately, after many arrests had been made, principally for

rioting and illegal assembly, and 147 persons convicted. But there was no abatement of the combinations of the *raiya*ts, and the movement spread through most of the Pabna district, and into Bogra : the *raiya*ts met the demand of the *zamindars* for too much by offering too little. Sir G. Campbell anxiously considered what the further duty of Government should be in the matter. He did not see his way to interfere by legislation without raising very great questions which could not be settled without long and difficult discussions. His course was to attempt to promote compromise by influence and advice. He addressed himself to the best of the *zamindars*, and desired the local officers to do so. The *zamindars* were urged to offer reasonable terms of present settlement and future security to the *raiya*ts, and the latter were strongly advised and urged to accept such terms as the Government officers thought reasonable. Considerable success attended these efforts. Meantime there was a remarkable subsidence of unhealthy excitement. The organs of the *zamindars* urged direct Government interference by means of a Commission empowered to settle differences. The Government of India also suggested this solution. Sir G. Campbell had been reluctant to appoint extra *Munsifs* to try the rent-cases, and had found that things settled themselves much more fairly by compromise than extra *Munsifs* could settle them. He saw that the whole question of the relations of landlords and tenants was being raised, and doubted whether it would be possible to avoid some further review and adjustment of the rent law, as there was great difficulty in determining what rents were really payable and the *zamindar's* claims to enhancement. As to the appointment of a special Commission, he objected to one that would merely deal summarily with the differences between landlord and tenant, but expressed his acceptance of one that would deal thoroughly with the points at issue and settle them for a long time. As a fact no special Commission was appointed : partly by compromise, partly by the natural movement of events, partly by the shadow of the impending famine of 1873-4, the Pabna difficulties to a very great extent settled themselves for the time. The disputes between landlords and tenants, in fact, remained in abeyance during the famine which postponed the adjustment of the rent question. Still things were unsettled in several districts though the public peace

was not again disturbed, and in some cases the scene of the struggle was transferred to the Civil Courts.

These Pabna rent disturbances of 1873 were really the origin of the discussion and action which eventually led to the enactment of the Bengal Tenancy Act, I of 1885.

To increase the efficiency and working powers of the Government of Bengal it seemed to Sir G. Campbell indispensably necessary to have Government offices concentrated in one building: those of the Bengal Government were at that time scattered about far apart in different quarters of Calcutta. The Bengal Secretariat had been several times moved. In 1854 the office was at 1 Council House Street; in 1856 it was at Somerset Buildings, Strand: in Sir G. Campbell's time it occupied two houses, one in Chowringhi (on the site of the present School of Art), the other in Sudder Street. Funds were provided for the proposed concentration, but there was difficulty about a site. Sir G. Campbell would have preferred the strip of waste land, between Tolly's *nala* and Lower Circular Road, and between the Alipore and Kidderpore bridges, lying outside the official limits of the Calcutta *maidan*: but the Commander-in-Chief objected and the Government of India were averse to any encroachment on the *maidan*, whether within or without the official limits. It was then proposed as the most economical arrangement to utilize Writers' Buildings, on the North of Dalhousie Square, for the purpose. It was intended to enlarge Writers' Buildings, connect them with the old Custom-house, and locate as many offices as possible in this range. But this scheme was indefinitely delayed because the East India Railway rented part of Writers' Buildings from the Bengal Government for offices, and other accommodation for them was not forthcoming.

The system of parallel promotion, as it was called, in the Executive and Judicial lines of the Civil Service dates from Sir G. Campbell's time. His object was to stop Civil Servants from being, almost of necessity, changed from the Executive to the Judicial line and *vice-versa* at every frequently recurring step of promotion. It was settled therefore that they should be invited after some years' service to choose one line or the other, in which they should ordinarily be required to remain. To make the attractions of each line fairly equal it was necessary to equalize the

salaries of the Magistrate-Collectors and of the Judges, i. e., so to adjust the salaries that it would not be necessary to promote every Magistrate-Collector to be a Judge for the sake of the increase in salary. Sir G. Campbell proposed that there should be 30 officers of each grade, 15 of each on Rs. 2,500 *per mensem* and 15 on Rs. 2,000. Eventually sanction was given to a cadre of 15 Judges on Rs. 2,500 each, 15 on Rs. 2,000 each, 15 Magistrate-Collectors on Rs. 2,250 each, 15 on Rs. 1,800 each, 6 on Rs. 1,500 each. One object of this scheme was to obviate the evils arising from too frequent changes and to secure more permanent, more efficient and more experienced officers for the charge of districts and other important posts. A greater degree of permanency of officers in their posts was attained by this system: and it was generally approved. Before resigning office Sir G. Campbell strongly urged upon the attention of the Viceroy the claim of the Bengal officers to such an addition of pay as would at least put them in that respect on an equal footing with the officers of other provinces: but the representation produced no result.

Some progress was made in Sir G. Campbell's time in the establishment of experimental farms, of which he wrote in not a very sanguine tone:

Experimental farms.

"The Lieutenant-Governor knows that there is but little reality in our farms at present, but he hopes for the future and has persevered in getting up the forms of farms, in the hope that we shall put life into them afterwards. The view we have in establishing these farms is three-fold:—(1) the introduction of scientific cultivation; (2) the teaching of improved agricultural processes for economising labour; (3) the introduction of new staple products into the country. The fact remains, however, that in practical husbandry the native agriculturists must and will beat us until we have as exact a knowledge as themselves of the soil, climate, and plants of the country. This can only be attained by careful and protracted observation of their modes of farming by educated European farmers, who, instead of interfering too much with the natives, will be content to watch, season after season, every one of their processes and the way in which they encounter the emergencies of Indian agriculture. Not until we have done all this, and have become familiar with the character and resources of native husbandry, can we hope to set up a model farm amongst them that will not bring discredit upon us by failure. The Lieutenant-Governor therefore has dropped the term "model" farms altogether. And as to the nature of our experimental farms, our first efforts should be, His Honor thinks, not to farm directly ourselves, but to

select intelligent *raiya*ts to farm after their own fashion upon our land under the supervision of our agents, encouraging them to emulate each other's efforts and giving slight assistance for the purpose of drawing out the full extent of their knowledge and aptitude as cultivators. In the course of 3 or 4 seasons a good European farmer would then have mastered the whole extent of their resources and knowledge, and would probably be prepared with well considered plans for supplementing the defective resources of the *raiya*t, improving his processes, introducing new ones, and establishing what we might perhaps call with propriety a "model" farm. The prime difficulty is that we can do nothing effectual until we get a proper man to advise us at the headquarters of the Government."

While attempts were being made to get a good head agriculturist for Calcutta, a beginning had been effected with the experimental farms at various places.

Inquiries conducted by orders of Sir G. Campbell made it clear that, in spite of the positive prohibitions of the law, <sup>illegal exactions by *zamindars*.</sup> cesses and duties in large numbers were levied by almost every land-holder. These illegal levies were divisible into two classes, (1) illegal transit and market dues taken from the general public and (2) illegal cesses levied from the agricultural *raiya*ts by the landlords in addition to the legal rents. As to the former, in the absence of legislation Sir G. Campbell was not willing to take measures not urgently necessary. He did not propose to interfere immediately with private markets on private ground, where the proprietor supplied sheds, and facilities for trade and was moderate in his demands, but he drew a distinction between public and private markets, and directed that market duties other than regular shop-rents should be prevented in public markets and bazars. He also issued orders to stop the levy of illegal river and mooring tolls. With regard to the large number of various dues and charges levied from the *raiya*ts, he ruled that district officers should interfere in the case of any extreme oppression. "In any case in which any duress or violence is used by *zamindars* or others to enforce illegal cesses, the Magistrate should interfere promptly, treating the matter as an extortion; and wherever in any particular estate the *zamindar* by any means manages to collect from his *raiya*ts inordinate cesses, exceeding those sanctioned by the usages of that part of the country, measures should be taken to inquire and

ascertain the facts, to protect and instruct the *raiyats* as to their rights, and generally to put a stop to such oppressions by every legal and proper means." Advantage was also taken of the opportunity offered by the publication of the Road Cess rules to make it generally known to the people that, excepting that one cess, of which the burden on the *raiyats* was to be strictly limited in each district, all other cesses were illegal and irrecoverable by law. Sir G. Campbell proposed to take special measures in Orissa to protect the *raiyats* and punish *zamindars* who had most frequently violated the law: but the Government of India and the Secretary of State declined to sanction them. As to the general question Sir R. Temple concurred with Sir G. Campbell in thinking that, while cases of the extortion of illegal cesses by violence should not be suffered to go unpunished, and while district officers might properly interfere in instances of clear oppression (if such instances should unhappily occur), the question might in general be left to adjust itself in the manner which would naturally result from the gradual spread of education, intelligence, and independence among the classes from whom the cesses had previously been levied. With these views the Government of India concurred.

Sir G. Campbell expressed his strong opinion that the position of the Bengal Government should be either raised or lowered: i. e. either the Government should be strengthened with reference to the vastness of its territories and responsibilities, or reduced to more limited functions: and not only should the Government itself be strengthened, but the excessive length of the official chain should be shortened. His general plan was to amalgamate the Board of Revenue with the Government, and perhaps include the executive functions of the High Court—"so great a Government cannot be efficiently carried on by one man alone." The Government of India preferred the alternative of diminishing the territories of the Bengal Government and relieving it of the political affairs of the frontier. This was effected, eventually, by making Assam and the adjacent districts of Bengal into a separate Administration, a proposal to which Sir G. Campbell did not object. He still adhered to the idea of shortening the official chain, but it was understood that he did not approve of the possibility of being outvoted by Members of Council as col-

Constitutional  
changes contem-  
plated.

leagues. The subject of constitutional changes in the Government has from that date made no advance, though it has often been alluded to in a desultory manner.

Sir G. Campbell also placed it on record that the constitution of the Calcutta Municipality required reform. In his time there was friction between the Chairman and the Justices, and some of the latter had taken a line adverse to Government, and were not responsible to any constituency, whereas Sir G. Campbell was of opinion that there should be an efficient control by a responsible Chairman and by Government. It was found that busy men could not spare the time to listen to long speeches and take part in municipal affairs, so that the latter had fallen into the hands of a few individuals; but he felt that costly improvements were required, which should be dealt with by a responsible body, and that Government should have a sufficient controlling voice. "He was more and more convinced that the present constitution of the Calcutta Municipality is not good. There is too much of a spurious independence. There has been occasion for question whether a body of well-to-do householders have not preferred to reduce the direct house taxation when taxation affecting a poorer class had perhaps greater claims to consideration. The Justices are so far independent of the Government that the Government really is not responsible for the great and weighty matters affecting the metropolis of India which are involved in great undertakings and much expenditure of money with a rapidly increasing debt. Not being in a position to interfere with dignity and effect, it is compelled very much to abstain from interference. On the other hand, the Committee of Justices and such bodies, to whom many things are now delegated, are not efficient for executive work, as was, for instance, prominently brought to light by the failure of the Calcutta Census. The position of the Chairman is exceptionally difficult and unpleasant, and it is only in the case of a singular personal influence that any officer so placed can combine efficiency with smoothness of working—the one is almost necessarily sacrificed to any attempt to obtain the other. Much had been achieved by Mr. (Sir) S. S. Hogg, but the Lieutenant-Governor much fears that some very important questions have lately drifted. His personal opinion is that the Municipality should be radically reformed. At the same time, to devise a good constitution for such a town is a work of extreme difficulty; and, perhaps, discouraged by the ill-success of his endeavours for Municipal reform, the Lieutenant-Governor has not yet attempted it."

The most important Acts of 1873 were those relating to Em-  
 bankments and Drainage, and Emigration. So  
 far back as 1868 the attention of Government had  
 been drawn to the injuries sustained in a district from inun-  
 dation, owing to certain obstructions erected in a drainage channel:  
 and the desirability of providing for the drainage of tracts which  
 might be intimately connected with embankments had come to  
 light. In due course the Embankment Act, VI (B. C.) of 1873, was  
 passed to consolidate the law and give ample powers to the Col-  
 lectors of Land Revenue and to the district engineers acting under  
 their authority to take charge of, remove, or alter existing embank-  
 ments; to improve drainage and remove obstructions to it; to  
 construct and open or shut sluices in embankments for irrigation  
 or other purposes. In ordinary cases the procedure of the Act  
 provided for full publicity being given to the proceedings of the  
 Government officers, and for due notice being given to parties whose  
 interests might be in any way affected. In cases of emergency,  
 however, where life or property was in imminent danger, the ordi-  
 nary procedure might be dispensed with, and such immediate action  
 be taken as might be found necessary. The land required for  
 works was to be ordinarily acquired under the Land Acquisition Act,  
 but strict procedure was to be dispensed with in urgent cases. An  
 entirely new feature of the Act was the provision for charging the  
 cost of works to estates in proportion to the extent to which they  
 were benefited; and the schedule contained a list of embankments  
 the property of Government and maintained and kept up at the  
 public expense. The Bill became law at a most opportune moment,  
 and Sir G. Campbell, immediately on receiving the Viceroy's assent,  
 issued a circular calling the attention of all local officers to the Act,  
 and pointing out that it could be most usefully applied with the  
 object of affording labour to the sufferers from the scarcity in the  
 distressed districts. The works connected with the Gandak embank-  
 ment were at once brought under the Act.

Certain defects having been discovered in the law regulating the  
 transport of emigrants to the districts of Assam,  
 Cachar, and Sylhet, it was found necessary to pass  
 Act VII (B. C.) of 1873, or the "Labour Districts Emigration Act"  
 to remedy the defects, and consolidate the law relating to the

Embankment  
and Drainage Act.

Labour Emi-  
gration Act.



emigration of labourers to the labour districts. One of its chief features was the countenance it gave to a system of free-recruiting, side by side with ordinary recruiting under the law. As free emigrants would have considerable advantages over emigrants enlisted under the Act, if no restriction were placed upon the number allowed to embark at one time in any one vessel or boat, the number of the former was limited by the Act to 20. This provision was also deemed necessary as a precaution against outbreaks of cholera and other similar diseases. Another important feature was the authority given to employers to arrest without warrant any labourer or emigrant enlisted under the Act who, having arrived at a labour district, deserted his employer's service. This authority, however, was confined to cases in which there was no Magistrate resident within 10 miles of the place where such labourer was arrested. On the passing of the Bill Sir G. Campbell expressed a hope that, in the course of a few years, the interests of employers and labourers might be found to be so intimately bound up together that resort to legislation would be no longer necessary to enforce their mutual obligations.

While Sir G. Campbell was at Darjeeling in 1873, the Maharaja of Sikkim, with his Prime Minister (his brother Chongzed Kabbar) and retinue paid him a visit, (to ask for an increase of his allowance from Rs. 9000 to Rs. 12000 *per annum*) and Sir G. Campbell seized the opportunity to advance the development of trade through Sikkim with Central Asia. It was settled that after the rains Sir J. Edgar, then Deputy Commissioner of Darjeeling, should visit Sikkim, and, besides local inquiries, ascertain the actual condition, extent and prospects of the trade with Tibet, the best line for a road to take and the advisability of making one &c. The Maharaja promised all assistance. Sir G. Campbell urged on the Government of India his belief that the time had come when we might fairly press upon the Chinese Government the abandonment of its policy of exclusion so far as Tibet was concerned and he felt convinced that by Sikkim, by Towang, and possibly by the Mishmi country, there were available routes of fairly easy access into Central Asia, which it would take but little time to make avenues of a prosperous trade. At any rate he thought any radical improvement in the

Trade with Tibet  
through Sikkim.

Sikhim route must considerably increase traffic and intercourse with the Tibetans. In the cold weather Sir J. Edgar made a long tour along the Sikhim-Tibet frontier and into the interior of Sikhim.

Under a Proclamation issued under 17 and 18 Vic. c. 77, s. 3, and published on the 7th of February 1874, the districts of Kamrup, Durrung, Nowgong, Sibsagar, Lakhimpur, Garo Hills, Khasia and Jaintia Hills, Naga Hills, Cachar, and Goalpara, were taken under the immediate authority and management of the Governor-General-in-Council and formed into the Chief Commissionership of Assam, of which Colonel R. H. Keatinge, v.c., c.s.i., was appointed Chief Commissioner. Subsequently on the 12th September 1874, the district of Sylhet was also annexed to Assam. These districts comprised an area of 41,798 sq : miles with a population of 4,132,019.

Other matters of some importance came before Sir G. Campbell upon which is impossible to dwell at length—such as—The Calcutta medical institutions—medical schools in the interior of Bengal and the Calcutta Medical College—road communications from the Western to the North-Eastern districts of Bengal—the expenditure of road cess money on village roads—*tahsildari* establishments for Government *khas mahals*—the appointment of a managing representative by a plurality of co-sharing landlords—Muhammadan education and the Mohsin endowment—registration of Muhammadan marriages and divorces—the question of office hours in the *mufassal*—the appointment of Honorary Magistrates, &c. &c. Under Sir G. Campbell an experiment was made to effect an increase in the revenue derived from country spirit without promoting consumption. This was done by decreasing the number of shops and putting them up to auction (subject to an upset price. The Board of Revenue, Mr. (afterwards Sir) Alonzo Money, c. b., were asserting about this time that in most places the *sadar* distillery system was a total failure, an opinion, which, in the absence of sufficient evidence of smuggling, Sir. G. Campbell declined to accept.

The Bengal-Bihar famine of 1873-74 began while Sir G. Campbell was Lieutenant-Governor and came to an end after Sir R. Temple had succeeded him. The literature of this famine is so voluminous that it is

Formation of the  
Chief Commission-  
ership of Assam.

Miscellaneous.

Bengal-Bihar  
famine of  
1873-74.

not easy to compress an account of the subject within reasonable limits. Besides all the official correspondence of the time and Sir R. Temple's final Minute of the 31st October 1874, and the Famine Commissioners' report of 1880 (Part III, Famine Histories) both Sir G. Campbell and Sir R. Temple have at subsequent periods recorded their recollections, the former in his "Memoirs of my Indian Career," Vol. II, and the latter in his "Men and events of my time in India" and "The Story of my Life." The official documents contain much information in detail, which is hardly worth reproducing after so long an interval, whereas the recollections appear to omit some of the main facts and figures. Extracts from both sources will, I think, best show not only what occurred, but the shares which the successive Lieutenant-Governors took in the policy adopted and the relief operations, in both cases under the orders of the Government of India and Her Majesty's Government. As a brief and general introduction to the whole subject I will first quote the short account of this famine given in Part I of the Report of the Famine Commission of 1878-80.

"The monsoon of 1873 was not abnormal during the 3 months, June, July and August, but in northern Bengal it ceased prematurely in September; and much of the winter rice crop, which ripens in November, was consequently lost. The Bengal Government, from inquiries instituted for the purpose, was led to believe that the inevitable effect of this loss would be to involve the inhabitants of a large part of the province in a severe famine; it accordingly set about making preparations with the utmost energy to carry out relief measures on a scale and with a thoroughness which had never been equalled before. The principles adopted by the Government were very different from those accepted on any former similar occasion. It was considered that the operations of private trade could not be relied on, and therefore that it would be necessary to accept the responsibility of providing the distressed districts with the whole quantity of food likely to be required. After elaborate estimates had been framed, it was decided, with the approval of the Government of India and the Secretary of State, to import 480,000 tons of rice; and the greater part of this stock was purchased for the Government in Burma, sent up-country by railway, and distributed to depots scattered over the famine area by the agency of Government officers. The estimates provided against every possible contingency, the failure of contractors, murrain among the cattle, the recurrence of drought in the ensuing monsoon. Relief was administered mainly in the form of employ-

ment on works and of gratuitous assistance to the infirm ; but under rules which in their details were very different from those previously followed. Tests were not to be stringently enforced in localities where the distress was excessive and widespread. In place of the self-acting tests which on previous occasions had been held to be useful and to some extent necessary, reliance was placed on personal knowledge, on the part of the relieving officer, of the applicant's condition and want. A large special establishment of inspecting officers was appointed, and the country subdivided among them, in the hope that, with the help of the resident *sumindars*, and leading *raiylats*, they might obtain such personal knowledge of the condition of every village and its inhabitants. The intention having been formed of preventing loss of life at any cost, so far as practicable, tests or restrictions were relaxed in respect of the wages, the amount of work done, and the character of the work offered ; and sufficient money or grain for their sustenance was allowed to all comers who were *primâ facie* in want. Cultivators were invited to take loans of money or rice repayable without interest. About 340,000 tons of grain were disposed of in the relief operations, a quantity sufficient to provide sustenance for not less than 3,000,000 people for 7 months. The famine area was estimated at 40,000 sq. : miles, and the population affected at 17 millions. Of these 735,000 were employed on works for 9 months, 450,000 received gratuitous relief daily for 6 months, and 3,200,000 bought grain at low rates enough to support them for 7 months, or received advances of grain or cash, large part of which was repaid to the Government. When all pressure had passed away the surplus stock of grain left on the hands of the Government amounted to more than 100,000 tons, the provision of a reserve having been designedly made when the original purchase was effected. This had to be sold at a great loss, adding not a little to the total cost of the relief measures, which reached £6,500,000 sterling, or as much as the total expenditure on all past famines in all parts of India from the beginning of the century up to that time. The result of inquiries specially made on the subject was to indicate that no mortality whatever was due to the famine, and that the bountiful relief given did not have the effect of rendering the population indisposed to return to their usual labours when it ceased."

Sir G. Campbell's narrative of the famine up to the date of his retirement and of some of its subsequent history may now be reproduced, and will form a fitting conclusion to this account of his administration, as it was the last great subject to occupy his time and thoughts in India. He wrote in his Memoirs as follows :—

"The rainy season of 1873 commenced late and rather scanty, but during July and August the rain was sufficient for agricultural operations, and the earlier and drier crops were got in and grew. But after that the rains failed more suddenly and completely than had been known in the present century, and the effect on the main rice crops over great tracts was most disastrous. Bihar lives partly by the drier crops and partly by rice—the latter chiefly in North Bihar, quite the most populous part of India. Bengal proper may be said to be almost wholly a rice country.

"One of my reforms had been to introduce a system of periodical reports from each district on the state of the country. When September passed with scarcely any rain the situation became serious, and, as October advanced without a drop of the final rainfall usually expected at that season, the reports from all sides became alarming in the highest degree. My position was one of peculiar responsibility. Not only was I responsible for the safety of an enormous population, but, as an expert who had inquired into former famines, and sat in judgment on others, that personal responsibility was much accentuated. At the same time one of the things I had learned was the extreme difficulty of making a sure forecast, especially where statistical information was so very imperfect as in Bengal. I knew, too, that the reaction after the failure on the occasion of Orissa famine had caused a tendency towards too much rather than too little alarm, and that my function must be almost as much to moderate and keep within bounds, as to take care that there was no neglect of the symptoms of approaching famine. When the reality of the failure was known, I was almost too well served by the press, which had certainly ineffectually warned the Government of the danger in Orissa, and was now most ready to support the official representations regarding the imminence of danger in Bengal. Perhaps my caution in the matter, compared to the less restrained statements in the press, induced the Government of India to entertain some anxiety, if not some distrust, and caused Her Majesty's Government at home to be almost in advance of ourselves in suggesting immediate extraordinary measures in the way of importing food from a distance. The sensitiveness, too, on the subject of famine after the Orissa failure led to the instruction that we were on no account to permit any human life to be lost, which could by any means be saved, an instruction which involved some anxiety to those who knew the difficulty of certainly forecasting what might occur. In the latter part of October there was no doubt or the reality, though there might still be question of the degree of the failure. I went to Patna, the capital of Bihar, to make inquiries, and on the 23rd October I officially reported "the gravest apprehensions of

general scarcity throughout the country, and of worse evils in large parts of it." There were still slight hopes of an unusually late fall of rain, but nothing came; and in the first half of November the prospects became very black indeed. Besides reporting to the Government of India, I telegraphed to the Secretary of State that there was an excessive failure of the rice crop in Bihar and parts of Bengal north of the Ganges, and a short crop in a wider area; also, that the prospects for the spring crops in Bihar were very bad. These spring crops are the wheat, barley, etc., sown in October and November, and reaped in the early spring. And if there was one point on which all the reports were uniform and positive it was that, owing to the failure of the latter rains, the ground was so dry that the seed could not possibly germinate.

"The supply of funds to meet famine on a large scale rested wholly with the Government of India, so that I could have done little without their sanction. But on the alarm becoming serious Lord Northbrook hurried down from Simla, and we were able to arrange matters by personal consultation between the Governments of Bengal and India. Sir Richard Temple, who was understood to be my probable successor in the Government of Bengal, paid me a visit at Belvedere, and we all, united in efforts to avert calamity.

"At this time I made a proposal of which something must be said. In addition to the provision of work and a supply of food for the labourers, I proposed that the export of rice should be prohibited. The experience of Orissa and elsewhere showed how slowly trade is diverted from its accustomed channels, and in this emergency I wished so far to anticipate private action. There was no doubt that under the existing law the Viceroy in Council was expressly empowered to take such action, and native opinion was all in favour of such a course. At first my expression was prohibition of export from "India", which would technically include Burma, really a separate country, with no land communication with India; but within a few days I confined the recommendation to export from Bengal, and it was on that basis that the question was argued. The main export of what is called Indian rice is from Burma—the only other province that largely exports is Bengal—and there the export is very variable, according to the circumstances of each year, never exceeding a small proportion of the production. About this time it became clear that in spite of alarming reports the rice survived in the lower and moister districts of the east and sea-board, from whence the surplus usually came—the excessive failure was confined to the north-western districts of the Bengal Government. I wished then to save all that was available in the south-east, and, as it were, to dam it up and drive it to the northward. Of course such a measure is a very debateable

question. I have no doubt that in any other country than a British-governed country it would have been done. Still, it was a proposal contrary to many English ideas, and I could not have been surprised if the Viceroy, on due consideration, had rejected it. I think he went farther than that ; he would not listen to or discuss such a proposal for a moment. Lord Northbrook, bred in the strictest sect of English free-traders, looked on my proposal as a sort of abominable heresy—was as much shocked as a Bishop might be with a clergyman who denied all the 39 articles. The Government at home supported the Viceroy, but in a less decided tone, the Secretary of State afterwards remarking, “To be sure, we have not heard the arguments on the other side.” However, the result of telegraphic communications was that Her Majesty’s Government approved the decision of the Government to meet the emergency by the purchase and import of food rather than by prohibition of export, and so it was settled. The Government of India undertook to obtain supplies from Burma and elsewhere, and that course was followed out on a very large scale. I have often thought over the matter, and to this day I am not convinced that the decision was right. I still incline to the belief that millions of money were sacrificed to an idea, and great efforts and labour were rendered necessary, when a very simple order prohibiting exports would have done almost all that was required by a self-acting process. The position of the Government of India seems to me to have been somewhat illogical. I can understand non-interference with trade ; but in this case the enormous Government imports amounted to an artificial interference with trade quite as great as the prohibition of exports. If the Government were willing to run the risk of supplying work only and trusting to private efforts for food, no doubt Bihar and North Bengal were by no means so isolated as Orissa. Private imports would, sooner or later, have been drawn in, and I think the prices would probably never have reached the extreme point that they did in Orissa, nor would famine (though on a larger scale) have been so acute. But the effect of the known determination of Government largely to import was to prevent an immediate extreme rise of prices, and the deflection of the trade of Lower Bengal ; consequently for some months the export of rice from Bengal went on in its accustomed channels. The strange spectacle was seen of fleets of ships taking rice out from the Hooghly and passing other ships bringing rice in ; often, no doubt, the same ship brought one cargo in and took another away. Inasmuch as the export took place in the earlier months of the year, while the Government imports were considerably delayed, the means of carriage up country were not utilised in the earlier months, and an excessive strain was thrown upon them at a later and much less favourable season, involving

an enormous expense. Even up to the time when I left, in the beginning of April, the imports barely equalled the exports, and in the whole famine year the exports of food from Calcutta were about  $\frac{2}{3}$  of the imports. The quantity imported and sent up country proved considerably in excess of the actual need; and my calculation is that, if the rice exported from the moister districts of Bengal had only been diverted to those where there was most failure, we might have pulled through with very little Government importation at all. Be that as it may, it was finally decided in November to meet the difficulty by importation, and that course was followed throughout at a cost of several millions sterling. One alleviation of our worst fears was apparent before the end of November—in spite of the confident predictions to the contrary, the wonderful retention of moisture in the soil is such that the cold weather or spring crops germinated, and, aided by a little rain very late in the cold season, there was not an extreme failure of these crops. The consequence was that the dry-crop districts of Bihar and the adjoining districts of the N. W. provinces (where there had also been an alarm) produced food enough to avoid actual famine; and what may be called mixed districts, relying partly on dry crops and partly on rice, managed to avoid the worst extremity. One crop only was good that season, viz. maize; but, unfortunately, maize is nowhere in India (except, I think in some limited parts of the Himalayas) one of the main staples. The result of the season was that the excess of failure was confined to the rice tracts intermediate between the dry-crop districts of the west and the moister districts of the east. A careful calculation made at a later date showed that the excessive failure affected a population of about 12,000,000 people, while there was great dearness and scarcity in a much wider area. Within that 12,000,000 area the failure was certainly more complete than in the famine year in Orissa, and the population was much larger. The difference was that the tracts affected in 1873-74 were more accessible, though, in fact, the means of access to the interior were very far from good, and we managed to get in the large supplies of grain by the aid of light surface railways extemporised upon the moment.

“The question of prohibiting exports put out of sight, I was fortunate enough to find that I was quite in accord with Lord Northbrook and his advisers in regard to the system of relief to be followed. Public works were at once set agoing to give employment to the able-bodied, and, as the pressure became greater, we went further and further in regard to measures of relief, and brought work nearer and nearer to the doors of the people. Our system may be described as a liberal and indulgent one. In that sense our measures were subsequently a good.



deal criticised, and I may say caricatured, and that criticism led to a much more severe system in the next great famine in India. The questions underlying the difference of opinion in this respect are much the same as those involved in controversies regarding the respective merits of out-door and in-door relief. I am, I confess, partial to the system of out-door relief prevailing in Scotland, rather than to the stricter workhouse system so much advocated in England. But, be that as it may, the Government of India and myself were agreed that, when we were not dealing with habitual paupers, but with an honest agricultural population, reduced to want by a great national calamity, it was better not to treat them as paupers, but to assist them in a way more congenial to them. We felt, too, very much (and of that I have no doubt whatever) that if we were to fulfil the injunction to save human life at any cost, there were large classes of the population whom it was absolutely necessary to approach at their homes, and who would certainly have died in very large numbers if tests and rigid rules had been applied to bar too easy applications for relief. The Government of India supplied funds liberally. I thought it rather hard that when, with much care and saving, I had accumulated a sort of Bengal nest-egg (under the local finance arrangement, I was required to sweep it away and spend it on famine for famine was not one of the things for which the Local Government had been made financially liable; but that was soon gone, and after that the Government of India found the money for the measures necessary to save the lives of the people, provided the measures adopted were approved by them. We set to work then in thorough earnest to carry out the instruction that no life should be lost which could in any way be saved.

"The smallness of the executive machinery in Bengal made it the more necessary that we should set up a large special machinery to deal with the famine. Arrangements for the conduct of public works were at once made on a large scale, and then we proceeded to establish a great civil organisation, spread like a net-work over the distressed country, to meet the needs which we anticipated. The very best of our officers were put in superior charge, and picked men under them in subdivisions of districts and local circles. I denuded all the other districts of every good man who could possibly be spared, in order to supply the distressed tracts; and I borrowed a good many officers from other administrations, especially from the N. W. provinces; also some available military officers, accustomed to deal with natives. For minor charges under the circle officers we enlisted all the most trustworthy local men we could find, enlarging upon the system which had been followed in taking the Census.

"The plan followed was first to open public works, under officers of the Public Works Department, where full work was exacted and full pay given to the able-bodied. When the need of employment outstripped that system, and large masses of the people came upon our hands who were not capable of full work, we set agoing much smaller local works nearer the homes of the people, managed by the best agency we could get. In all except the greatest works the officers in charge were entirely under the orders of the superior civil officers—for in such cases departmental rules could not be fully maintained—we could not expect to get the fullest return for our money, but we exacted some real work for which we paid low wages. A wide discretion was used according to circumstances as regards the imposition of moderate task-work. Responsible cultivators, with some permanent interest in the land, we did not seek to drive to public works—we thought it better to make them some advances to enable them to carry on their own cultivation through the next harvest, making these advances either directly to the *ryots* or through reliable land-holders and village bankers. We had a good deal of doubt and misgiving about undertaking such operations on so large a scale, but the plan proved wonderfully successful.

"When we got beyond local works and advances to responsible cultivators, and came to the charitable relief of people unable to work, we insisted on the principle that such relief should only be given after inquiry into each individual case. To effect that a very extensive machinery was required, and much organisation; but it was done. Local registers were opened, showing the cases where relief was required and the relief given, and this enabled superior officers to examine test cases taken here and there. Even the gangs employed in smaller local works were sifted out, and noted according to the villages to which they belonged. Where possible, some small work in the way of spinning and weaving was given to women, who were capable of working at home. Cooked food was given to the starving, and small out-door allowances, mostly in grain, were made to people not able-bodied, and ascertained to be in want.

"The great thing was to have all the machinery ready before the worst strain came, so that the means of meeting the demand should then be available without undue haste and panic. A general feeling of zeal in a great cause pervaded our officers, and they worked most handsomely, with an excellent will, many of them earning much distinction in the cause of humanity. We could not hope that all this should be done on a very great scale without some abuses cropping up, but all did their utmost to minimise this as much as possible, and we had no reason to believe that abuses very largely prevailed. An object which we steadily

at all times kept in view was so to make our arrangements that, even if there might be any excess or imperfection in what was done at the time, we should not suffer any general laxity to grow up which might cause a more lasting demoralisation in future.

"Besides supplying food to our labourers, and giving doles of uncooked food by way of charitable relief, shops were established at a later period for the sale of Government grain, but only where the private trade was exhausted and failed to supply the people. We had no enclosed work-houses or poorhouses, except hospitals for the sick, reduced, and weakly.

"Early in 1874 I visited the distressed districts in the places where real famine was already apparent, and on my return I wrote a detailed note setting out the methods and systems to be followed, of which the Government of India approved, and which contained the plan of action followed throughout the famine.

"For a long period after we commenced operations the question of the quantity of food to be imported, in order to secure us against failure, was much discussed between the Governments of India and Bengal. My own disposition was rather towards caution and economy, but the superior authorities were very urgent that no risk should be run—perhaps all the more after they had so positively refused to prohibit exports, and undertaken to meet the difficulty by imports. The function of indenting upon the Government of India rested with me, and I had some difficulty in coming to the full measure of demand which quite satisfied them. I felt, however, that, after all that had been said, we were bound to be on the safe side, and, going perhaps a little beyond what I felt sure would be required, I got so far as to indent for 250,000 tons of rice. Eventually the Government of India went far beyond this.

"It was not difficult to procure the supply of rice in course of time, but there was great difficulty about the transport of it into the interior of the districts, especially at the later period, when very large supplies were being sent up. By that time Sir R. Temple had gone up as famine delegate to exercise a general superintendence, and he made the arrangements for the transport. A large part of the work was done by indigo-planters under contract with the Government, and that arrangement excited some criticism. I think I have mentioned that in Bihar indigo is not managed on simple mercantile principles, but that the indigo-planters, leasing estates from the *zamindars*, acquire and exercise a sort of feudal power, to which exception may be justly taken. One form in which this power was exercised was to require the *raiya*s to place their carts and bullocks at the disposal of the planters, for the carriage of indigo and other purposes, and that power they were ready to use for the carriage of grain to the distressed districts upon terms

very advantageous to themselves. No doubt the terms of their contracts enabled them to obtain from Government rates enormously in excess of those which they paid the *raiya*s. It was questionable whether it was desirable that Government should be a party to the exercise of their feudal authority ; but the need was very great, and they certainly did the work more efficiently than perhaps it could have been done in any other way. In all, 458,000 tons of rice and other grain were sent by Government to the distressed districts, of which nearly 400,000 were imported from Burma and elsewhere, and the rest purchased locally in India. I should have mentioned that, very early in the day, we sought to encourage private trade by a great reduction of the railway rates, the Government compensating the Railway Company ; and, in fact, the Government imports by no means destroyed the private trade, especially that from the N. W. provinces. Large quantities of maize and other foods were brought in by private traders from the north-west, and there was also a considerable private trade in rice from the more productive districts of Bengal ; so that altogether the quantities of food ascertained to have been brought into the distressed and partially distressed districts, by private traders from the railway and the river, considerably exceeded the Government supplies, apart from the small streams of trade, of which no account could be had. Of the Government supplies, something over 100,000 tons remained unexpended at the end of the famine. The total net cost to Government of the relief operations, after crediting money recovered by sales, repayment of advances, &c., and apart from large permanent public works, was about £6,500,000.

" I have alluded to Sir R Temple as famine delegate. Early in 1874, when the famine operations were becoming very large, and the work of all kinds was almost more than I could undertake, Lord Northbrook proposed that Sir Richard should assist me by going to the distressed districts to superintend the operations as famine delegate, acting under the Government of Bengal, and also possessing the confidence of the Government of India ; and I quite willingly accepted the arrangement. Sir Richard and I were quite in accord ; he gave a great stimulus to the work and set things very much in order, and that put him in a position more effectively to control everything when he eventually succeeded me, and carried through the main stress of the famine the operations which I have described.

" It seemed to be supposed that Lord Northbrook and I were not so much in accord ; but that was not really so. As I have already said, he and I were quite agreed as to the methods of dealing with the famine (the export question apart), and so long as I was in India I was allowed to manage matters in a way which gave me no reason to suggest that

anything was wanting. No doubt the Government of India, which had to find the funds, were quite entitled to exercise a control over their expenditure. I only felt that there was perhaps some excess of supervision. With my special experience in regard to the question of famine, and with the assurance that I was not disposed to excess, it might have been more generous to have more completely trusted me. At a friendly conference I did to some degree complain that very complete responsibility was thrown upon me without complete discretion. It was not that anything which I required was denied, but I was placed in a kind of dilemma—if what I asked for proved to be too little, a very great responsibility for failure would be thrown me; if, on the other hand, I asked for more than proved to be necessary, the blame of extravagance and miscalculation would rest upon me. Still, that was only a personal matter; in the main there was no difference of policy, so long as I administered the Government of Bengal. It was only after I left that the provision of grain and the measures of relief were carried beyond what I should have thought expedient, and beyond what proved in fact to be absolutely necessary. Sir R. Temple, my successor, carried through the measures of famine relief—he acted in accordance with the instructions of the Government of India; and the latter Government avowed the entire responsibility for any excess in the provision made, knowing well the extreme uncertainty which must attend the best calculations regarding the outbreak of famine, and the great risk that must be run if the estimates were cut too close. I should be the last man in the world to impute any blame for any excess of provision beyond the necessity of the case. The great thing was that, for the first time in Indian history, a great failure of crops, such as had hitherto produced famine, was met in such a way as to save the lives of the people, and that there was no serious mortality. That was undoubtedly the case, and we had reason to thank God for it. The instruction that no subject of the Queen should be allowed to perish who could be saved by any means, at any cost, was almost literally fulfilled.

“It was also a subject of great satisfaction and congratulation that the event proved that the people were by no means pauperised and demoralised by the liberal relief given. When the rainy season of 1874 commenced in due course, very large numbers of the people receiving relief voluntarily went off to their own fields; before long they had almost wholly disappeared. The new crop was cultivated, and the famine came to an end. The advances made to the cultivators were eventually recovered with wonderful punctuality. Altogether, whatever critics may say, my belief is that all those concerned in these measures of relief had reason to be thankful for the result. I

say this from an impartial position, since so much of the work was done by others.

"I have mentioned that, before the alarm of famine, I had intimated my wish to be relieved in the following spring. As I think I have said, I had calculated my forces to run to a certain point, and in expectation of being then relieved had worked as hard as ever man worked. It was then very much a question whether I could bear the additional strain of the famine, and I was hardly surprised that the doctors began to warn me that there were signs of overwork.

"The occasion, however, was a critical one. I would have run any risk, and died at my post if necessary rather than give up, if the complete responsibility had rested upon me. But it was not altogether so—my requirements were complied with, but I felt that the management did not entirely rest with me. I had done my part—had given due warning, had made adequate preparations, had prepared the requisite machinery, had visited the famine tracts, and had satisfied myself both of the reality of the evil and of the sufficiency of the remedies prepared, and had elaborated a system by which those remedies were to be applied. Sir R. Temple had taken up the executive superintendence of the famine, and was to succeed me in the Government which controlled the operations. Still I was very unwilling to leave the field—it was thought necessary that a committee of doctors should sit upon me to certify whether there was real necessity for my going, and they certified that it was necessary. The Secretary of State, the Duke of Argyll, guaranteed that there could be no suggestion that by coming away I had failed to fulfil my function as it was possible to do so, and he proposed that I should join the Council of India at home, to a vacancy in which he nominated me. Under those circumstances, I no longer struggled, and in April 1874 I made over my charge to Sir R. Temple, and went home. I never myself quite felt the complete breakdown that the doctors prophesied. I worked fully to the last, and went away without any collapse, though, no doubt I was a good deal strained.

"I have already carried to the last the account of my general administration. As regards the famine, I must think that as matters turned out it does seem that, if the Viceroy had been willing to trust me more completely, the objects we all desired might have been attained with much less expense, with less labour and dislocation, and without incurring the prejudice which was to some extent caused when it turned out that the measures of relief were somewhat in excess of the need. As it happened, my estimates proved to be pretty accurate, and would just have sufficed without leaving much margin beyond. But again I say, that these things must always be uncertain; and there was probably much of

accident in the coincidence between my estimates and the reality. One very serious result, however, followed that sort of prejudice to which I have alluded, viz. another oscillation of public and official opinion, and a second reaction against too liberal relief, just as there had been a reaction in favour of very liberal relief after the Orissa famine. Serious mortality having been avoided, it was impossible to measure the degree of the evil which was averted; and the fickle opinion of some people then inclined to minimise that evil. This is an ungrateful world—and so it was that our very success caused our efforts to be depreciated. No one who saw the crowds collected so early as February and March, and the appearance among them of starved skeletons—sure indications of famine—could doubt that the crisis was real, and must have become very severe. But happily the people were relieved, so that it could be said that there was no famine. It is curious now to look at the discussions in Parliament on the subject, and to see how much in April 1874 the Duke of Argyll and Lord Salisbury were obliged to defend us from the imputation of not doing enough; and then to note how, a year or 2 later, the need was to defend ourselves against the charge of extravagantly doing too much. Several circumstances combined to cause a change of opinion besides the usual reaction. No doubt the expenditure was large, and it was admitted that the event proved that it was somewhat larger than was actually necessary. I think it was to some degree the case that towards the end, when it was found that there was much grain to spare, there might have been some laxness in the distribution of it—stories on that subject got about. And it was known that fortunes had been made by the indigo-planters who had been employed to transport the grain. At any rate there certainly was a reaction, not only in the public mind, but also eventually to a great extent in the official mind.”

On the occasion of Sir G. Campbell's resignation Lord Northbrook issued the following Resolution on the 8th April 1874:—

Retirement.

“The Governor-General in Council has considered the 14th special narrative of the drought in Bihar and parts of Bengal, and the letter from the Government of Bengal, forwarding a note reviewing the allotment of grain to each district and the arrangements for its transport, together with Minutes by Sir R. Temple, summarising the present relief arrangements in the distressed Divisions of Bihar and Rajshahi.

The narrative, with the Lieutenant-Governor's observations and instructions, has been published in the *Gazette of India*. The same publicity will now be given to these subsequent communications.

Sir G. Campbell has been obliged, on account of the state of his

health, to resign the office of Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, and it is the gratifying duty of the Government of India to acknowledge the zeal and ability with which His Honor has from the first devoted himself to the arduous task of conducting the operations for the relief of distress. The Governor-General in Council desires particularly to record his high appreciation of the manner in which Sir G. Campbell personally directed and supervised the relief organization on the occasion of his recent visit to north Bihar.

The Governor-General in Council further desires to take this opportunity of expressing his entire concurrence in Sir G. Campbell's acknowledgment of the obligation of the Government to Sir R. Temple for the great energy and administrative power which he has shown in co-operating with the Lieutenant-Governor for the purpose of completing the arrangements to meet the famine.

The Government of India have also to record their cordial recognition of the zealous and efficient services of the Commissioners of the Patna, Bhagalpur, and Rajshahi Divisions, and of the other officers mentioned by the Lieutenant-Governor and Sir R. Temple.

It is not impossible that contingencies may arise which will place still greater strain upon the resources of the State, and call for additional exertions on the part of the officers of Government. But His Excellency confidently relies upon every officer doing his duty under a strong sense of responsibility devolving upon him during the period of increasing distress which, it is to be feared, must be anticipated."

Reform was the principal feature of Sir G. Campbell's Government. The experiment of appointing a Lieutenant-

Observations.

Governor who had not graduated in Lower Bengal certainly led to great changes, and it seemed as if every department and institution had to justify its method of working. It would have been impossible for any one, in such a position and bent on such a mission as Sir G. Campbell, to avoid running counter to many cherished ideas in conservative Bengal: and it was no wonder that the pressure he applied on all officers and classes tended to render him unpopular; the excellence of his work was recognised later. It cannot be denied that he succeeded in infusing much life and vigour in the administration where a stimulus was greatly required, and that the period of his energetic rule formed an epoch in the history of the province. The expenditure of so much force, and the labours which he took upon himself, told on his health, which gave way under the strain of the famine. It would



have been a question whether he could anyhow have kept up his pace for 2 years more. The editor of his Memoirs alluded to his "diligence, his thirst for information, his grasp of great affairs, his many-sidedness, his steadfast adherence to principle, his sympathy with the oppressed and afflicted, his honesty of purpose and his untiring energy:" and he added: "But the Memoirs do not fully bring out the warmth of heart, the unselfish kindness, and thoughtfulness for others which endeared George Campbell to those who knew him best during his Indian career." To these words I can, from personal experience, fully subscribe.

A contemporary author, with some insight into his character, wrote of him:—"Sir G. Campbell arrived in Bengal with a high character for administrative ability. He had done excellent service in Oudh, the Panjab, the Central Provinces, and elsewhere; had been the indefatigable President of a Committee of Inquiry into the Orissa famine; had written a book highly spoken of on the question of Irish land, and had striven, though unsuccessfully, to find a seat in Parliament. His greatest laurels, however, had been won as President of the Famine Committee, and he was destined to be confronted by a famine as threatening as that which Sir C. Beadon failed to meet till too late. In the end, after a fierce and laborious term of office, he left India with very little popular goodwill, and very little goodwill of the English in Bengal; although in losing him the people of India lost a man more capable of serving them, if they and he could have found a common ground, than, save in a very few instances, any man they had known in all the century of English rule. His views were clear, but his temper was uncompromising. He seemed to allow nothing, either for native habits of thought, or for the weakness of his own officials, and he speedily acquired the character of an abrupt uncourteous man. His whole term of office was characterised by contention, not in the sense of wrangling, but of disputation. In the Imperial Council, where his sound views ought to have had, and indeed had, weight, his contentious tone and persistence did much to destroy the effect that his perception of facts created. He developed a system of education for the very poor, a really honest public-spirited project; but he created and promulgated it without consulting the feelings of the landlords, whose support he nevertheless

demanded. With ever so little real conciliation he could have won them to a man.

“But Bengal, at all events, will by-and-by learn to forgive the mannerism and isolated temperament (more than temper), for the value of his aims and of many of his acts. As an opponent he was an open opponent; as a friend I should say he could not be a false friend. Indefatigable in work, and loyal to good workers, his failing was to expect too much from men, who, though perhaps worthy and good men, were quite incapable of his own sustained efforts. That he could be merciful and kind some facts which I could mention, would very amply prove. That he was more than a mere executive officer every one knows who knows India. His Governorship represented a virtual revolution, succeeding that of Sir William Grey. It was a change from desk management to root-and-branch administration, resting on fixed and matured views as to political principles underlying action.

“As a statesman, Sir G. Campbell stands foremost among the Lieutenant-Governors, and it is unpleasant to add that he was the least popular. Perhaps he was too earnest, and saw too far into the future, for ordinary men. Perhaps he fell back too completely on “first principles” and disregarded existing facts. Assuredly he allowed too little for human weakness, for habits interwoven with life, and assuredly, also, he had a habit of not allowing a question once raised to go to rest again. That he went to India with a noble purpose, and to some extent gave that purpose a noble life, will not be disputed in history.”

On his retirement Sir G. Campbell became at once a Member of the Council of the Secretary of State for India, but resigned on election as M. P. for the Kirkcaldy Burghs in 1875; for which he was re-elected in 1880 and again in 1885; he presided over the Economy and Trade Department at the Social Science Congress at Glasgow in 1874; and he was the author of statistical, ethnological and linguistic works on India, also of “A Hand book of the Eastern Question” 1876, and of various publications on different countries visited by him.

He died at Cairo on the 18th February 1892.



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